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A wise man once said: “It will all work out in the end, and if it doesn’t, 
then it is not the end…” 
 
“If something is good, do it even if it means taking a little bit of risk, 
for that’s what makes a man”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The focus of this thesis is on Advance Fee Fraud (419 scams) on how it is 
executed and more importantly, on how it can be prevented. The research 
addresses the origins of AFF, the nature and extent of this crime and how the 
perpetrators are able to defraud their victims. The research described, examined 
and analysed the crimes, the perpetrators, the victims, adjudication and the 
prevention strategies of this fraud. Information was gathered through literature 
and empirical research. A qualitative research method was used to gather 
information from AFF offenders who were incarcerated in South African prisons  
in 2005.  The results of the empirical research were carefully examined, analyzed 
and integrated into the various chapters of this thesis. A theoretical framework 
was also developed in an attempt to explain this complex phenomenon. The 
findings and recommendations in terms of the crimes, the criminals, the victims, 
adjudication and prevention were also made and some suggestions for further 
research thereof were also cited.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1   ORIENTATION 
 
Crime is a dynamic social phenomenon, which, to a certain extent, is the barometer 
of the well-being of society. Social, economic and political issues are interwoven, and 
collectively they sustain dynamics, which have a constant impact on safety and 
security, especially in developing countries. In countries most affected by fraud, the 
destabilizing impact on society constitutes a real threat to their security and 
sovereignty. The loss of superpower benefactors, unstable commodity prices and 
rising domestic and foreign debt make hard currency and profits connected with 
organized crime almost irresistible, especially in marginalised African countries 
(Snyman 2001:61).  
 
The increased ability of criminal organisations to operate internationally is a potential 
danger for social and economic order in every country. The huge potential profits to 
be gained from such organised crime encourage criminals, who are already involved 
in the more  less serious crimes, to extend their activities to organised crimes such 
as fraud, corruption, bribery, forgery, misrepresentation and money laundering on a 
national and international scale. 
 
In terms of how much hard cash is involved, men armed with guns, or those equipped 
with pry bars to open doors and windows, do collectively less harm to a country’s 
economy than smooth talkers (found among both sexes) who manipulate companies’ 
books, offer unfounded securities, commit forgery, organize credit cards schemes, 
take bribes here and there, or induce the unfortunate and helpless to forego proper 
medical aid for quackery, as well as attempt other cute tricks to separate the 
unsuspecting and trusting citizens from their property. Armed robbers or those who 
 
 
2 
break and enter doors and windows, do collectively less harm to a country’s economy 
than those who are able to manipulate others by their persuasive powers, manipulate 
financial statements of companies, offer unfounded securities, commit forgery, 
organise credit card schemes, accept bribes or persuade the helpless and 
unfortunate to forego proper medical aid for quackery. The total losses experienced 
each year due to fraud operations are virtually impossible to calculate accurately. This 
type of crime, from a policing perspective, is detectable rather than preventable, even 
a large increase in the number of patrols, or a separate detective division would have 
negligible effect (Glick, Newson & Graves 1974:4). 
 
Contrary to popular belief, fraud occurs in companies, which are effectively managed. 
No-one can guarantee that fraud will not take place in the operation under his or her 
control. In fact, it would be untenable to maintain a control system that eliminated all 
risks, and even if it were possible, the resulting lack of trust and bureaucracy would 
make life intolerable. Trust and effective management are symbiotic, and fraud is the 
result when the former is abused. The best and most hard-working employees are 
often the easiest to deceive. These employees are often so focused on their primary 
work responsibilities that they do not have time to pay attention to details that appear 
unimportant, until it is too late. It is easy to be wise after the event, and fraud is always 
concealed in the detail (Comer 2003:4). 
 
Fraud is a form of deceitfulness that involves theft of money by means of criminal 
deception, the use of false representation, dishonest artifice or trick to benefit 
thieving. It involves one or more parties taking money from others, without their 
knowledge (Lampe 1992:189). Complex fraud is merely artful and it is difficult to trace 
this form of activity, which usually involves a number of companies, the activities of 
companies’ directors, large amounts of money or assets being shifted - sometimes 
offshore - and sometimes into other corporate entities, or luxury cars or homes, 
antiques, yachts etc. In essence, funds are taken out of the company or government 
structures where they ought to be and put into someone’s pocket or corporate 
 
 
3 
structure or trust or Swiss Bank account, where they ought not to be. It may also involve 
transfers of funds from investors’ accounts to the account of the perpetrator. Often the 
money chain is difficult to trace, as it moves around the world (The 419 Coalition 
2003). 
 
This type of fraudulent activity occurs very often, far more than the conventional fraud 
perpetrated against companies and governments. In recent times, one particular type 
of fraud has surfaced internationally; Advance Fee Fraud (AFF) that is also known as 
the 419 scam.  
 
“West African fraud” is the term used by Interpol to describe the 419 type of frauds. 
This is largely due to the geographical location where such scams originate, as well 
as the nationality of many of the perpetrators who engage in such fraudulent activities 
(Nedbank ISS 1999). This type of fraud has become a major business and has, 
accordingly, generated very large profits for those who are successful at it. Despite 
the corresponding losses suffered by individuals, businesses and banks, it remains 
a little understood type of fraud, within the academic arena, law enforcement 
agencies and business community in general.  
 
According to the 419 Coalition Website, the 419 scams have operated since the early 
1980’s under successive Governments of Nigeria. This crime is known as 419, 
named after section 419 of the Nigerian Criminal Code (Cap. 777 of 1990) that 
prohibits Advance Fee Fraud. 
 
The gist of Advance Fee Fraud is to trick prospective victims into parting with funds 
by persuading them that they will receive a substantial benefit, in return for providing 
some modest payment in advance (Smith, Holmes & Kaufmann 1999:1). Smith et al. 
(1999:2) maintains that the characteristics of this type of fraud usually entails that the 
services of the prospective victim is enlisted to assist in an activity of questionable 
legality, thus providing some assurance that the victim, once defrauded, would be 
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unlikely to report the matter to the police. Victims would, quite rightly, be apprehensive 
and believe that they had aided and abetted some form of criminal activity and would 
also be reluctant to make public their gullibility. The perpetrator is thus able to 
replicate the scam, sometimes engaging the same victims, whilst the police are faced 
with the difficulties of finding witnesses and securing evidence. 
 
During the past couple of decades, one particular endemic form of Advance Fee 
Fraud involved a group of expatriate Nigerians who are believed to operate from cells 
in the United States, Britain, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, South Africa and other 
African countries, with the assistance of confederates within West Africa. This fraud 
is termed ”Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud” (AFF) because it originated in Nigeria. 
However the term is not particularly accurate and the problem is now truly one of 
international dimensions, with victims and perpetrators located across the globe 
(Smith et al. 1999:2). 
 
Unlike most other transnational problems, such as AIDS and population growth, 
transnational organised crime involves malevolence (Snyman 2001:62). The threat 
that AFF poses to national and international security, although subtle and indirect, is 
not easy to measure. Criminal organisations conduct their activities in what, for them, 
is in effect a borderless world, while law enforcement is significantly constrained since 
they have to operate in what is still very much a bordered world. According to Snyman 
(2001:62) the characterisation of a transnational criminal organisation as a security 
threat acknowledges both their growing importance and progression beyond a 
simple domestic law and order issue. 
 
South Africa has no pre-1994 records of transnational crime, as the latter is not 
ideological: it is money-oriented, and has nothing to do with left or right wing politics 
(Snyman 2001:62). This is a greed-based criminal enterprise that decided to take on 
lawful institutions and civilised society. Advanced Fee Fraud is a form of organised 
crime that has developed to such an extent that it can be understood as a new form 
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of geo-politics, with its own character and logic, its own structures and support 
systems. There are no quick fixes or soft options when combating this form of 
transnational organised crime.  This crime has a negative impact on the community 
structure, especially with regard to criminality and the need for stricter border control 
measures, which affects the freedom of movement of both trade and the individual. 
This must, however, be seen against the backdrop of the existing lack of control at 
several airports in South Africa and neighbouring countries. The influx of immigrants 
into South Africa is expected to increase even further, compounding most current 
socio-economic problems, especially this type of crime. 
 
The next section focuses on the aim of this study, and methods that were employed in 
the execution of this research. 
 
1.2 THE AIMS AND METHODS OF STUDY  
 
1.2.1 Aims of study 
 
The main aims of this thesis are to do a descriptive analysis of the phenomenon of 
Advance Fee Fraud and to explain this crime. This thesis also aims to make the world 
of social sciences more aware of the problem of Advance Fee Fraud, particularly in 
South Africa. The study is an attempt to indicate the severity of the situation of 
Advance Fee Fraud that exists and to investigate whether or not the existing research 
studies regarding fraud are adequate enough to describe this crime in its complexity.  
 
It is also the view of the researcher that this study will illuminate the modus operandi 
used by the perpetrators of this crime. The study will also endeavour to determine 
whether the existing criminological theories can be used to explain this crime and 
whether existing victiminological theories can be applied to explain Advanced Fee 
Fraud victimisation. The researcher aims to indicate the problems regarding the 
adjudication of this type of fraud and possible prevention strategies.  Finally, the aim 
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is to develop a criminologically sound model to prevent these types of crimes in South 
Africa, Africa and the world at large. 
  
1.2.2 Methods of study 
 
The study methods that were used in this research were mainly literature reviews and 
empirical studies but the empirical research approach was qualitative. The empirical 
studies were performed according to the main areas of concern according to the 
findings of the literature research. The empirical research took place in 2005 and 
included structured scheduled interviews with offenders incarcerated in prisons in the 
Gauteng province of South Africa, namely: Pretoria Central prison, Pretoria Local 
Prison, Attridgeville Prison, Johannesburg Medium B Prison, Odi and Leeukop 
Prison.  
 
Some offenders who are out of prison and claimed to have ‘stopped’ or ‘retired’ (only 
two) were also interviewed. In all, five incarcerated 419-offenders were interviewed, 
one victim and an ex-girlfriend of one of the offenders.  This indicates that a total of 
only nine people could be traced to participate  in the research (see 1.5). To enhance 
the qualitative findings of the research where applicable, extensive use of word 
verbatim quotations was made by the offenders, victims and other interviewees. 
  
The interviews were transcribed, and the statements carefully examined, analysed, 
interpreted and integrated into the various chapters. A logical framework was 
developed and the results of the empirical research were presented within this 
scheme. The results were continuously evaluated according to tested scientific 
methods and techniques such as induction, deduction, logical reasoning and critical 
evaluation to produce findings and recommendations. These processes led to a 
criminological contribution in the understanding of AFF and more importantly to its 
prevention. 
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Within the general field of any research, it is always important to indicate the 
delimitation and scope of the research field. Hence, a synopsis of the delimitations 
and scope of the study of Advance Fee Fraud (AFF) follows. 
 
1.3   DELIMITATIONS AND SCOPE OF THE FIELD OF STUDY 
 
The field of study will be delimited, in the widest sense, to the field of crimes that 
involve fraud. Within this wide sense, the research will still be delimited to AFF. The 
various types of AFF will be described, explained and analysed in terms of an eclectic 
theoretical framework, in a bid to establish the causes and possible prevention 
strategies of this crime. 
 
The literature study was confined to books and articles concerning fraud and AFF. 
These consisted mainly of South African publications and those publications from 
abroad, which were readily available in South Africa and on the Internet. With regard 
to the information available in South Africa, and because of the varying concept of 
AFF and the different socio-economic, political and cultural (transnational) 
circumstances of the perpetrators and the victims, the offences are described as it 
occurs in West Africa, Nigeria and particularly in South Africa, where the empirical 
part of the research was done. 
 
The research targeted offenders who are incarcerated in South African Prisons for 
AFF. The researcher was able to interview five offenders imprisoned in the following 
prisons in Gauteng, a province in South Africa: Pretoria Central Prison, Pretoria Local 
Prison, Attridgeville Prison and Johannesburg Medium B Prison.  Two offenders out 
of prison, one ex-girlfriend of an offender and one victim of this type of fraud provided 
information for this research project. Nine people took part in the case studies for this 
research.  The information was gained through qualitative, semi-structured in-depth 
face-to-face interviews. 
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It would, however, be wise to define the main concepts that will be used in this thesis, 
as it relates to AFF. The key concepts, as they are utilised in this research, will 
therefore be defined in the next section. 
 
1.4 DEFINITIONS  
 
1.4.1 Crime 
 
Schmalleger (1996:7) defines crime as behaviour that violates the criminal laws of a 
state, the federal government or local jurisdiction that has the power to formulate such 
laws. Tappen (Schmalleger 1996:7) defines crime as “… an intentional act in violation 
of the criminal law … committed without defense or excuse, and penalised by the 
state as a felony or misdemeanour”. Sutherland (Schmalleger 1996:8) said of crime 
that it’s “…essential characteristic is that, it is behaviour which is prohibited by the 
state as an injury to the state and against the state for which the state may react by 
punishment”. In the same vein, Reid (2003:5) defines crime as “… an international act 
or omission that violates criminal statutory or case law and for which the state 
provides punishment”.  
 
1.4.2 Fraud 
 
According to Huntington and Davies (1994:3) English law does not define fraud. They 
do, however, maintain that fraud encapsulates the two key elements: ‘to defraud is to 
deprive by deceit’. This description underlines the two essential elements in any 
fraud: 
· deception or concealment; and 
· deprival or loss to the victim. 
 
Le Roux (1991:2) defines fraud as “… an unlawful and intentional misrepresentation 
that causes actual or potential harm to another person”. According to this definition, 
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four elements of fraud can be differentiated; unlawfulness, intention, 
misrepresentation and harm. 
 
Ø A misrepresentation occurs when one party makes a representation to 
another that a fact or set of facts exist that are actually fictitious. 
Ø According to South African law, intention refers to action. It must be proved that 
the action contravened legal prescription and that the perpetrator was aware 
of the fact at the time. 
Ø The law imposes two requirements for intention, namely the intention to 
mislead and the intention to defraud. 
Ø The law requires that harm must be suffered as a result of the 
misrepresentation. 
 
Snyman (1995:487) defines fraud as the “… unlawful and intentional making of a 
misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to 
another”.  He said that fraud covers a wide field, and to understand it within the South 
African law, it is necessary to refer to its origin in South African common law.  
 
The crime of fraud is derived from two different Roman laws, namely (a) stellionatus 
and (b) the crimina falsi. Stellionatus was the criminal law equivalent of the delict 
dolus. It involved an intentional misrepresentation which results in the harm of or 
prejudice to others. Crimina falsi was the collective term for a number of crimes 
relating to falsification, almost all of which were derived from the lex Cornelia de 
Falsis (Snyman 1995:487). However, Snyman stated that with regards to criminal 
falsi it was not required that somebody should necessarily have been prejudiced by 
X’s conduct. Where stellionatus is concerned, there seems to have been some form 
of prejudice in most cases but, according to Snyman, it is doubtful whether the 
prejudices have to be actual or of a proprietary nature: potential or non-proprietary 
prejudice seems to have been sufficient (Snyman 1995:487). He states that South 
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African Roman-Dutch law writers did not clearly differentiate between stellionatus 
and the criminal falsi. Hence these two crimes have become conflated to form a new 
crime, now known as fraud. According to Snyman, fraud has sometimes even been 
referred to as falsitas or “falsiteit”. Snyman is of the view that the result of this 
conflation is that fraud is committed even where there is no actual proprietary: even 
non-proprietary or prejudice may be sufficient (Snyman 1995:488). 
 
Snyman also mentioned the elements of fraud; misrepresentation (or distortion of the 
truth), prejudice, unlawfulness and intention. He stated that the very first requirement 
of fraud is that there must be a misrepresentation or, as it is sometimes expressed, 
a perversion or distortion of the truth. In this case, X must represent to Y that a fact or 
set of facts exists when in truth they do not. Usually this misrepresentation takes the 
form of spoken or written words but may also take the form of conduct and may be 
expressed or implicit (Snyman 1995:488). 
 
1.4.3 Advance Fee Fraud 
 
On 1 April 1995, new legislation took effect in Nigeria: the Advance Fee Fraud and 
Other Related Offences Decree (No. 13 of 1995). This law proscribes three forms of 
conduct: obtaining property by false pretence, doubling, washing and minting of 
currency. 
 
Advance Fee Fraud is therefore defined as an upfront payment, by a victim to a 
fraudster, to allow him to take part in a much larger financial transaction, which he 
believes will either bring him profit or will result in credit being extended to him.  In this 
case, the victim is asked to pay an advanced fee of some sort such as “transfer tax”, 
“performance bond” or “money to buy chemicals”. If the victim pays the advanced fee, 
there are often many “complications” which require even more advance payments, 
until the victim either quits, or runs out of funds.  
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Advance Fee Fraud is a crime that involves misrepresentation (as described above), 
corruption and bribery, forgery and money laundering, extortion, kidnappings and 
even murder of the victim at some stage. Further elaboration regarding these 
concepts revealed the following: 
 
Corruption and bribery 
 
Corruption consists of unlawfully and intentionally giving or offering a benefit, of 
whatever nature, which is not legally due to someone upon whom some power has 
been conferred or who has been charged with some duty, with the intention to 
influence the latter to commit or omit to do some act in future in relation to such power, 
or to reward the latter for some act or omission in the past in relation to such power 
(Snyman 1995:362). 
 
The World Bank and Transparency International define corruption as “…the misuse 
of public office for private gain” (The World Bank 1997). As such, it involves the 
improper and unlawful behaviour of public service officials, both politicians and civil 
servants, whose positions create opportunities for the diversion of money and assets, 
from the government to themselves and their accomplices.  Corruption distorts 
resource allocation and government performance. The causes behind the 
development of corruption are many and vary from country to country. Among the 
contributing factors are policies, programmes and activities that are poorly conceived 
and managed, poverty, income disparities, inadequate civil servants’ remuneration, 
and a lack of accountability and transparency (The World Bank 1997).  
 
Corruption can also be categorised in other ways. A distinction can be made between 
benefits that are paid willingly (bribery) and payments that are extracted from unwilling 
clients (extortion).This is how corruption is associated with AFF and how it will be 
viewed in this thesis. 
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Forgery 
 
Forgery is committed when a false document is made, unlawfully of course, with the 
intent to defraud the actual or potential prejudice of another (Snyman 1995:495). The 
document is used to create the impression of being something other than what it really 
is, for example: the forged document is manipulated to resemble another document 
or create the impression that it was drawn up by someone other than the actual writer 
(e.g. ID documents, companies and governments official letterheads and seals, 
signatures, passports etc.). In the case of AFF, perpetrators use professional forgers 
to falsify the signatures of the real owners of companies and governments officials.  
Letterheads of companies and governments and fictitious companies are created to 
furnish banks with false information in order to open accounts into which illegal funds 
can be transferred or deposited (Le Roux 1991: 3). 
 
Money laundering 
 
Most of the money collected by organised crime originates from illegal sources, and 
perpetrators are reluctant to report the income or its sources. Before spending or 
using these funds, they must give the money an aura of legality. This conversion is 
known as money laundering (Swanson, Chamelon & Territo 1996:526). 
 
Extortion 
 
Extortion is defined as money/property which is obtained from another person by the 
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, fear, or violence, or the acceptance of a fee 
by corrupt public officers, by virtue of their office, when they are not entitled to that fee 
(Reid 2003:284). 
 
Organised crime  
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Organised crime has been defined as the ongoing activities of those collectively 
engaged in the production, supply and financing for illegal markets of goods and 
services (Gill 2001:198). This concept emerged first in the United States in the 1920s 
but is now used internationally. The United Nations G8 countries described it as a 
range of serious crimes that are deemed especially difficult to control. Organised 
crime has been considered a problem throughout the century, and no universally 
accepted definition of the term has been established (Reid 2003:329). The 
President’s Commission on Organised Crime, defines the criminal group involved in 
organised crime as a “…continuing, structured collectivity of persons who utilise 
criminality, violence, and a willingness to corrupt in order to gain and maintain power 
and profit” (Reid 2003:329). 
 
1.4.4 Perpetrators 
 
According to South African law, a person is a perpetrator if his conduct, the 
circumstances in which it takes place (including, where relevant, a particular 
description with which he or she as a person must, according to the definition of a 
crime, comply) and the culpability with which it is carried out are such that he/she 
satisfies all the requirements for liability contained in the definition of the crime 
(Snyman 1995:245). The law states that, if two or more persons act together and they 
all comply with the above definition of a perpetrator, they are all co-perpetrators. Here 
it must be underscored that, for a person to be a perpetrator, it does not matter 
whether he/she commits the crime him/herself or makes use of an agent to effect the 
commission. 
 
1.4.5 Victims 
 
The United Nations (1992:211) define the victims of crimes as people who, 
individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, 
emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental 
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rights.  These impairments of their rights can occur through acts or omissions that are 
in violation of the criminal laws operating within a specific country, including laws 
proscribing criminal abuse of power.   
 
The above defined concepts will be utilised in this thesis, as described in the previous 
paragraphs. 
 
As with any research, the next section highlights the numerous problems experienced 
during the course of the execution of this research. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED 
 
The first problem encountered with this research project was the lack of funds 
experienced as a full-time student.  It was not possible to follow the initial research 
process. Hence it was not possible to conduct the empirical research countrywide, in 
all the major cites where AFF is a common crime in South Africa. This also hampered 
the attempt to cover all the prisons in South Africa where the perpetrators are 
incarcerated.   
 
The second problem that presented itself was that very little literature was readily 
available regarding the subject, and that many of the literature articles mainly focused 
on fraud in general.  This made it difficult for the researcher to find scientifically 
reported studies of advance fee fraud, especially in South Africa.  
 
The third problem experienced during this research was that of data collection for the 
empirical research. Despite the fact that permission was granted by the Assistant 
Commissioner Detective Service of the South African Police Service (SAPS) to the 
Head of Commercial Branch/Commander of the 419 Investigation Task Team to 
make the necessary arrangements to provide assistance with this research, the 
researcher was only interrogated and intimated by the  SAPS and the Immigration 
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officials. According to them the information requested was too sensitive to be 
provided to the researcher. Initially the police consented that the researcher be 
provided with the list of AFF offenders they have investigated and who are in prison, 
but they refused to furnish this list at a later stage. As a result the researcher had to 
request the list of all foreigners incarcerated in South African prisons for fraud and 
forgery from the Department of Correctional Services (DCS). This became time 
consuming because a list of approximately 600 prisoners was given to the 
researcher, which was used to select the AFF offenders for interviews. 
 
The lack of co-operation by the SAPS posed a major problem, because the 
researcher intended to link a particular victim with a particular perpetrator. That is, to 
interview both the victim and perpetrator to verify the information from both parties and 
thus determine the particular modus operandi of the perpetrators. This lack of 
co-operation also made it difficult to determine the number of cases that have been 
reported to the SAPS so far, the cases that had been investigated, and the number 
of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.  
 
It was also very difficult to approach the victims of AFF for interviews. It would have 
been easier if the SAPS had co-operated, as they would have introduced the victims 
to the researcher for an interview. Since this did not happen, attempts to obtain 
interviews with victims of AFF (who most of the time do not report their victimisation 
to the police) were impeded. Those victims that the researcher managed to track 
down regarded the researcher as an undercover agent working for the National 
Intelligence, Scorpions/SAPS. As a result of this, the researcher was able to interview 
just one victim.  
 
The Department of Home Affairs also refused permission to interview immigration 
officials (see appendix 1). The purpose of the interview with the immigration officials 
was to determine the status of AFF offenders in the country, and to discover more 
about their movements in and out of the country. These interviews were also meant to 
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verify the identity of these offenders. 
 
Another problem experienced during this research project was the difficulty to trace 
the offenders in prison. The researcher was given a list of 600 prisoners but only 
managed to interview three AFF offenders. This was because most of the AFF 
offenders had been deported.  Some paid a fine and others were released from 
prison. A second list was requested from DCS, and with the help of this list, the 
researcher identified 8 AFF offenders but managed to interview only two who where 
in prison in Gauteng. The six other offenders were imprisoned in the Western Cape 
and owing to lack of funds, the researcher could not travel to the Western Cape to 
interview these offenders.  
 
Finally, due to the limited number of incarcerated offenders and victims interviewed, 
the analysis and interpretation of the statement became problematic with regards to 
generalisations. However, the information gained from those that were interviewed, 
was able to shed significant light on the understanding and prevention of this complex 
form of fraud.  
 
In order to achieve the goals of this research within the given delimitation, the 
divisions of contents are discussed below. 
 
1.6 DIVISION OF CONTENTS 
 
In this research, AFF is approached in a chronological and systematic manner to 
expose the reader to the complex issues and dynamics related to this type of fraud. 
Readers are, through a strategic and sensitising orientation process of AFF 
emancipated and therefore able to follow the researcher’s reasoning (criminological 
and victimological) throughout in a qualitative analysis, hence, promoting insight and 
allowing this complex phenomenon to be addressed, analysed and integrated in a 
holistic c riminological approach. 
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1.6.1 Chapter 1 
 
Chapter 1 primarily ensconces the research orientation, background and 
methodology. This chapter unequivocally outlines the mechanisms used for the 
development of this research study. It succinctly encompasses the following: the aims 
of the research, methodology, delimitation of and scope of the research, definitions 
of the key concepts used in the research, and the problems encountered during the 
course of this research. 
 
 
 
 
1.6.2 Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 2 provides a description of the origin of AFF, the nature and extent of AFF 
and its various forms. The chapter begins with the origin of AFF with the emphasis on 
the social and political background of Nigeria after independence in 1961, where this 
fraud is said to have originated. Here, the categories of crimes in Nigeria are also 
discussed, with the focus on elite crimes. The nature and forms of AFF are analysed 
accordingly, and the characteristics of this crime examined.  The incidence of AFF 
around the globe is also discussed, as well as the causes and theoretical 
explanations. 
 
1.6.3 Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 3 presents the nature and organisation of AFF perpetrators. The 
characteristics of the perpetrators are examined and this is followed by a 
diagrammatical presentation of the e-mail cycle of AFF perpetrators and an 
explanation is made accordingly. The modus operandi used by perpetrators in the 
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execution of this fraud is also discussed. The theoretical explanations of the 
perpetrators are discussed to gain a clear understanding of these offenders. The 
sociological, rational, conflict, and the integrated theoretical perspectives were used 
in explaining these fraudsters. 
 
1.6.4 Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 of this research presents the definition of victims and victimisation in 
general. However, more attention is focussed on AFF victimisation in this thesis. The 
categories of criminal victimisation are also presented in this chapter. The types and 
nature of AFF victimisation and re-victimisation are discussed. This chapter also 
discusses the characteristics of AFF victims as the available literature research 
indicates. The ugly effects of AFF victimisation are discussed, in relation to individual 
victims, corporate body and nations. This is then followed by the theoretical 
explanation of the phenomenon (AFF victimisation) using the lifestyle and routine 
activities theories. 
 
1.6.5 Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 examines the most probable course of events, from the time the AFF is 
detected or reported to the police and the police consider criminal proceedings, to 
the arrest and detention of the suspect, followed by the charge, bail, prosecution and 
sentence. As a transnational crime, the focus of this chapter is also on the problems 
encountered in the adjudication of these offenders. This chapter also looks at some 
of the AFF cases that have been charged, and some decisive cases are quoted and 
penalties for the various offences in terms of sentences in Nigeria, South Africa and 
United Sates, are also indicated.  
 
1.6.6 Chapter 6 
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Chapter 6 discusses how AFF can be prevented. It looks at some of the prevention 
strategies that have been implemented internationally, and in some countries where 
this fraud is common. It examines what crime prevention is all about, and the 
typologies of crime prevention as well as the theories of crime prevention. More 
importantly, the chapter discusses the strategies that can be implemented to prevent 
AFF in South Africa and internationally. 
 
1.6.7 Chapter 7  
 
Chapter 7 is the final chapter of this thesis, and it presents the findings, and 
discussions pertaining to the findings of this research. The findings in terms of the 
crimes, the perpetrators, the victims, adjudication and prevention, and theoretical 
explanations of AFF are discussed, and some recommendations are made.  The 
chapter ends with suggestions for further research that would lead to a much better 
understanding and prevention of this fraud. Finally this chapter ends with the 
researcher’s concluding remarks.  
 
Due to the qualitative nature of the research, some chapters are longer than others. 
 
1.7 SUMMARY 
 
The above chapter discusses the general research orientation and background of 
AFF. It also highlights the methodology used in this research. The chapter outlines the 
mechanisms used to develop the research. It succinctly encompasses the following: 
the rationale of the research, methodology, delimitation of and scope of the research, 
definitions of the key concepts used in the research, the problems encountered during 
the course of this research and the division of contents. 
 
The next chapter will focus on the nature and extent of Advance Fee Fraud in 
Nigeria/West Africa, and South Africa. 
 20 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE CRIMES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last twenty years, organised crime elements with ties to Nigeria began 
to dominate crime emanating from West Africa. These criminal groups, also 
known as the Nigerian Crime Enterprises (NCEs), are accustomed to executing 
transnational criminal activities, including fraud scams directed to most countries 
around the globe. Advance Fee Fraud (AFF) usually known as “419” even among 
the Nigerians themselves is a crime that has become a major business in recent 
times and has generated very large profits for those who are successful with it. 
The Nigerian scam, as it is also known in literature research, is the third to fifth 
largest industry in Nigeria. The 419 Coalition is of the view that, in effect, the 
elite, which constitute the successive governments of Nigeria, are themselves 
scammers, therefore, victims have little recourse in this matter, as money stolen 
by 419 operations are almost never recovered from Nigeria. 
 
This chapter will investigate the origins of Advance  Fee Fraud, the nature of 
advance fee fraud and its various forms. The incidence of AFF, internationally 
and in South Africa in particular, will be described, and the causes and 
theoretical explanations of this fraud will also be a major focus of this chapter. 
The applicable findings of the empirical research will also be examined, 
integrated and discussed in this chapter. 
 
The next section will examine the origin of AFF, and since it is often referred to 
as “Nigerian Adva nce fee fraud”, the focus will be on Nigeria. 
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2.2 ORIGIN OF ADVANCE FEE FRAUD 
 
It has been reported that AFF originated and is well developed in Nigeria and the 
perpetrators are mostly Nigerians. The proceeding subsection thus examines the 
socio-political and economic background of Nigeria. 
 
2.2.1 The social and political background of Nigeria 
 
Nigeria is a federation which consists of 36 states and is governed by an elected 
civilian President. It is the most populous African country with a population of 
approximately 125 million people, and covers approximately 925,000 square 
kilometres. Lagos is the economic capital and was the political capital until 1991. 
In 1900, the British Government took over the direct administration from the 
Royal Niger Company Chartered and Limited and retained its existing legal 
system. In October 1960, Nigeria became an independent country and has since 
then been ruled by a series of military dictatorships, interspersed with short 
periods of democracy. In 1993, General Sani Abacha became Head of State 
after the elections were declared invalid, allegedly following massive electoral 
fraud (Smith et al.1999:2). 
  
 According to the Times (1998:13), during General Sani Abacha`s regime, billions 
of dollars were taken from the national treasury. However, after Abacha`s sudden 
death, his family returned $750 million, which was taken from the state funds, to 
the government. An indication of the extent to which Nigeria is perceived as 
being corrupt is provided by the corruption index of Transparency International in 
1988. This index for Nigeria is 1.9 on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 represents the 
highest level of perceived corruption (Transparency International 1988:2). 
 
Nigeria has vast deposits of oil, natural gas, coal and iron ore and  its main 
source of export income of petroleum products and crude oil sales account for 
more than 90 per cent of export earnings and around 75 per cent of government 
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revenue (Robinson 1999:36-8). When world oil prices declined in the mid-1980s, 
the wealth of the country suffered considerably. This, coupled with the activities 
of increasingly corrupt elite, led to a general decline of the standards of living. In 
order to raise funds, some Nigerians began to devise various fraudulent scams, 
often with the assistance of expatriate nationals in the United States and other 
developed countries. It must be kept in mind that the political and social 
upheavals which had taken place created a scenario in which unsuspecting 
individuals could be persuaded that funds located in Nigeria, needed to be 
moved to Western countries in order to prevent them from being either 
confiscated or devalued.  
 
The country has a history of social divisions, according to the regions of the 
country; the birthplace and “indigeneity”, that is, origin and membership of a 
particular state of the federation; ethnic affiliations; religious beliefs; ideological 
dogmas, and class distinctions (Marenin & Reisig 1995:502). They also said that 
much of the public and private life is consumed with the struggle to live with and 
overcome the divisive tendencies within the country. Crime and disorder are 
handled informally, because of the lack of trust in the formal social control 
institutions and the belief that informal mechanisms yield immediate and just 
solutions. Adeyemi (1990:182) summarises the impact of the informal control on 
crime reporting and crime control by stating “It is clear that the informal 
procedure of crime control is applied in most cases, except in the serious cases 
or in cases of strangers who are in no relationship with their victim or with 
someone known to the victim”.  It is also reported that crime in Nigeria occurs 
within contexts that are characterised by conflicts, political instability, extreme 
differences in economic well-being, uncertainty about the courses of future 
events, and the shifting balance of formal and informal social control 
mechanisms (Marenin et al. 1995:503). 
 
The country consists of over 250 different ethnic groups and about the same 
number of dialects. The three main tribes are the Hausa/Fulani (Moslems) in the 
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North, the Igbos (Christians) in the South-East and the Yorubas 
(Christians/Moslems) in the South-West. 
 
The Hausa/Fulani Moslems of Northern Nigeria have lagged behind 
economically, educationally, industrially, as well as with regards to their 
infrastructure. Although there is universal free education in the country, they 
rarely complete elementary school and will more often than not send their 
children to Arabic schools to study the Koran instead. Most follow the strict 
Islamic code of Sharia that espouses amputation of limbs for stealing and women 
who commit adultery are stoned to death. Women are also subjugated and do 
not have the same rights as men (Adaora Reports 2002:2). 
 
The picture in the South forms a stark contrast. The Igbo are the most educated 
group in Nigeria and are known for their aggressive entrepreneurial endeavours. 
They bore the full brunt of the 1967-1970 Nigerian Civil War when the entire 
southeast was raided and flattened to the ground by the Nigerian army. Within 8 
years after the war had ended everything was rebuilt and they continue to 
prosper. The Yorubas follow closely behind the Igbos. They are mostly 
academics and have excelled in various fields. 
 
According to the Adaora Reports (2002), the majority of the 419 scammers come 
from the South-Eastern/South-Western part of Nigeria. The reports found this 
difficult to explain, but they are of the opinion that the sheer complexity, audacity 
and ‘intelligence’ required to plan and execute this crime is way beyond the 
faculties of the illiterate Northerners. 
 
2.2.2 Categories of crime in Nigeria  
 
Crime in Nigeria can be divided into three categories; normal crimes (theft, 
assault and homicide), political-economic crimes (elite crimes and working-class 
crimes), and riotous crime (acts that are carried out during riots). For the purpose 
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of this thesis, only political-economic crimes will be discussed under different 
sub-headings. 
 
Nigeria, like most developing countries, has to import consumer and economic 
investment goods from developed countries. The dependence on importation 
opens the doors for corruption, fraud, and economic elite white-collar crimes, for 
both Nigerians and foreigners. Foreign companies often sell second-hand goods 
as products intended for the second hand market as unused items, or sell low 
quality goods which they cannot sell in their own country, they also often 
overstate the price of goods, and understate the profits in order to minimise the 
tax they have to pay for doing business in Nigeria (Marenin et al. 1995:505). 
These activities require the induced co-operation of Nigerian nationals; their 
signatures are needed on imports permits, sales contracts, consultancy 
assignments, and directorship appointments. Foreign companies are willing to 
pay fees in order to increase their profits, and have found the Nigerians eagerly 
in pursuit of personal wealth. In this regard and based on a context analysis of 
articles published in one Nigerian newspaper, it is estimated that approximately 
6.6 billion Naria was lost owing to fraud, bribes and kickbacks, direct stealing, 
extravagant expenditure, and general corruption during 1978-1982 (Marenin et 
al. 1995:505). 
 
Marenin et al. (1995) maintains that the precise extent and impact of fraud and 
corruption in Nigeria is unknown, but occasional investigations reveal it is 
massive. Their research led them to a second form of economic crime, which is 
internal and mainly involves Nigerians. According to them, government contracts 
are extremely lucrative, competition for them is fierce, and performance 
standards are seldom enforced. Paying a bribe, padding contracts, taking a 
‘mobilisation-payment’ and not doing the work, sub-standard performance, 
arranging for kickbacks, nepotism, or giving inappropriate gifts to the right person 
are ways to obtain contracts and money. A vast layer of middlemen and 
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“arrangers” extract a living from their positions between the state and private 
enterprises (Turner 1983: 76). 
 
Elite political crimes take many forms as well. A military coup is, technically, a 
crime, and people who get killed in the process are actually homicide victims. 
Many Nigerians also believe that the military’s actions, despite the justificatory 
rhetoric it promotes over the airwaves, are executed mainly for economic gains, 
by an organisation that wish to protect its share of the budget and by the 
individuals to gain access to corrupt opportunities. Other forms of political crime 
are fraud and violence during election campaigns and the use of state power for 
political ends. The contest to control the government, since it is the largest 
source of legal and corrupt income, is intense and leads to considerable fraud, 
manipulation, thuggery, and violence during election campaigns, during vote 
counting, and when the results are announced ( Marenin et al. 1995:506). 
 
Working class economic crimes, committed both by government employees and 
workers in private business, are extensive and prevalent, but they generally yield 
small gains. Working people have little power and few opportunities, and are 
more limited in what they can accomplish. It is assumed by Nigerians that every 
government official, including the police and judges engage in corrupt activities. 
For example, to get hold of a form to apply for a passport, driver’s license, or 
contract permit of any sort requires the official who has to issue the forms must 
be paid a small and illegal fee (Marenin et al. 1995:506). 
 
It is no surprise that the political and socio-economic background of Nigeria has 
led many to hold the view that AFF is/was a Nigerian issue. Today it is, however, 
an international phenomenon and perpetrators are of different nationalities from 
around the globe. However, the above assertion that AFF originated from Nigeria 
has been buttressed by the literature, based on statistical facts. An article 
published by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in 1998 titled “World: 
Middle East” revealed that Britain received approximately 50,000 419 scam 
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letters. According to the report, these letters came via the International Postal 
System. The article specifically stated “Over the last 10 years, Nigeria has been 
the principle base for such scam offers with more than 50,000 scam letters were 
read in Britain by the beginning of that year”.  According to Oyesanye (2004:2), an 
explosive increase in the volume of fraudulent e-mails originated from Nigeria is 
to be expected. Nigeria now accounts for a significant proportion of e-mail based 
Internet fraud. This also indicates that, with the increasing entry of Nigeria into 
the Internet sphere, so also does Internet fraud and AFF increase. 
 
In the same vein, the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in its 2001 
and 2002 Internet Fraud and Complaints Centre Report, issued rather alarming 
data, putting Nigeria at the forefront of certain types of Internet crime activity. 
Nigeria accounts for 15.5 per cent of the total Internet crime activity reported to 
the American FBI in 2002, and Nigerian letter fraud accounts for the highest 
median loss. Overall, it appears that there is now a significant presence of 
Nigerian-based Internet crime activity that is global in nature, and accounts for a 
significant proportion of global financial loss. 
 
AFF letters surfaced in the mid-1980’s, around the time of the collapse of world 
oil prices. Oil is Nigeria’s main foreign exchange earner. As a result of the fall in 
oil prices, some Nigerians turned to crime to survive. Fraudulent schemes such 
as AFF succeeded in Nigeria, because Nigerian criminals took advantage of the 
fact that Nigerians speak English, the international language of business, and the 
country’s vast oil wealth and natural gas reserves, ranked 13th in the world, offer 
lucrative business opportunities that attract many companies and individuals (US 
Department of State 1997:5).   
 
According to the 491 Coalition Website, most 419 letters and e-mails  originate 
from or are traceable back to Nigeria. However, some originate from other 
nations, mostly West African nations such as Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Cote D`Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and recently South 
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Africa and other European and Asian countries. In most cases, 419 e-mails from 
other countries are also Nigerian in nature because the “Home Office” of the 
419ers involves Nigeria regardless of the source of the contact material. 
Occasionally there are some local copy-cats who try to emulate the success of 
the Nigerians.  However, in the recent past South Africa has been the location of 
these so-called “West African criminals” where letters and e-mails are sent and 
received. 
 
Literature research suggests that AFF originated from Nigeria. This notion has 
been confirmed by the findings of the empirical part of this research.  This 
research found that AFF, although it originated from Nigeria, is now a worldwide 
phenomenon. According to the Perpetrator in Case 1 (where applicable, the 
exact words of the interviewee were transcribed) “…But what I can tell you is, 
that this crime is not a South African-based crime.  It did not originate from South 
Africa, and it is not based here.  So it can happen anywhere.  It can be in 
Swaziland, it can be in Congo, and it can be in Mozambique where this crime is 
going on.  So the fact that you are here in South Africa and you can see that its 
also happening here, does not mean that it is ONLY happening here.  It’s a crime 
that is all over the place.  If you go to western countries, like America or Europe, 
you have a lot of people who are doing the same crime and they are based there.  
Most of these money transfers actually are between African countries and 
European countries.  There is no money coming from Europe to Africa.  The 
money is only moving from Africa to Europe.  So you must see that the origin of 
this business is Africa”.  The perpetrator continued to say that “… and the fact 
that when you travel to European countries, of every 5 African people, one is a 
Nigerian.  This is a fact.  If you go to London today, if you see 5 African people 
together, one of them is a Nigerian.  So you must see that Nigerians travel a lot.  
And that makes them to be involved in this type of business, because by 
travelling they are exposed to a lot of things that are happening.  And they can 
also send information back that this is what is happening.  If you do this, or do 
that, you can also generate a lot of income.  That is why there is a lot of 
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Nigerians involved in this business.  That is why they say this is a Nigerian crime.  
But that does not make it a Nigerian crime.  I’m only saying because of the 
number of Nigerians that are in the population.  It is based on the population”.   
The perpetrator in Case 2 said that “…Basically from West Africa.  You know a 
lot of people are under the wrong assumption that it is only Nigerians who are 
into the 419 scam.  It’s not true.  People from DRC are into it people from Ghana 
they are into it, okay Nigerians are into it. OK, but because of the fact that we are 
more or less popularized with the 419 word, I mean the numbers 419, and its part 
of our criminal code, you know, everybody sort of attach 419 to Nigerians”. This 
statement was confirmed by Respondent 2 in a street corner interview. He said: 
“… most of 419ers are Nigerians”.  
   
The next section examines the nature and various forms of AFF. 
 
2.3 NATURE AND FORMS OF ADVANCE FEE FRAUD  
 
Advance Fee Fraud is an organised crime that is complex and it is a relatively 
new universal threat, yet it has still not been debated or properly understood by 
those outside State organizations, such as academics, analysts and the public. 
Those inside the State, also had to come to terms with a new threat, in a short 
period of time, their understanding of this type of organised crime is thus limited. 
It is precisely due to the covert activities of organised crime syndicates that the 
public, in particular, is not aware of the destructive and corroding impact that it 
has on the society. Not only does it contribute to the high crime rate, but also 
corrupts law enforcement officials and threatens the very legitimacy of the state 
and its efforts to defeat such organised criminal activities.  
 
Smith et al. (1999:1) indicated that the characteristics of this type of fraud usually 
entails enlisting the services of a prospective victim to assist in an activity of 
questionable legality, thus providing some assurance that the victim, once 
defrauded, would be unlikely to report the matter to the police. In this situation, 
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the victim would quite rightly be apprehensive that he/she had aided and abetted 
some criminal activity and would also be reluctant to make the fact of his/her 
gullibility public. Thus the perpetrator is able to carry out the scam repeatedly, 
sometimes involving the same victims, whilst the police find it difficult to locate 
witnesses and secure evidence. 
 
2.3.1 Nature of advance fee fraud 
 
This fraud essentially involves the payment of advance fees in the form of tax, 
brokerage, bribes and so on, under the pretence that such payment is needed to 
consummate a business deal, which the perpetrator knows will never materialise, 
as the objective is to defraud the other party (Snyman 2001:65). Advance fee 
frauds cases that have been discovered to date have taken a variety of forms. All 
entailed that victims were approached by letter or, recently, by electronic mail, 
without any prior contact. Victims’ addresses are obtained from telephone and e-
mail directories, business journals, magazines or newspapers. The perpetrators 
generally describe the need to move funds out of Nigeria and seek the 
assistance of the victim to provide bank account details of an account in an 
overseas country as well as so-called administration fees to facilitate the 
transactions. The victim is offered a commission, which could be up to 40 per-
cent of the capital involved. Capital sums of up to US$20 to 40 million are often 
mentioned, thus creating a potential reward for the victim of up to US$16 million. 
An advance payment that could total up to US$50,000 is usually required, which 
represents the amount stolen (Smith et al.1999:2). 
 
According to the 419 Coalition website, the scam operates as follows: The target 
victims receive an unsolicited fax, email or letter, often concerning Nigeria, South 
Africa or another African country containing either money laundering or other 
illegal proposals or you may receive a legal and legitimate business proposal 
through the normal channels.  Common variations of this scam include “over 
invoiced” or “double  invoiced” oil or other supplies and service contracts and the 
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fraudsters want to get the overage out of Nigeria, South Africa or anothe r African 
country. Other scams involve crude oil and other commodity deals; “a bequest” 
left to you in a will, money cleaning, where the fraudster has a lot of currency that 
needs to be “chemically cleaned” before it can be used and he needs money to 
buy chemicals, “spoof banks” where there is supposedly money already 
deposited in your name, “paying” for a purchase with a cheque larger than the 
amount required and asking for change to be advanced, and fake lottery 419. 
These letters carry the names of former African presidents’ ministers and their 
deputies, bank managers, CEO’s of companies, military leaders and other big 
names.  
 
Inside an official looking document or your e-mail box is an unsolicited 
“confidential business proposal” from someone purporting  to be a Nigerian or 
South African top government official, wife or son of a late African president, 
bank managers etc. The offer usually states the following:  “Having consulted 
with my colleagues, and based on information gathered from the Nigerian or 
(South African) Chamber of Commerce, I am pleased to propose a confidential 
dental business transaction to our mutual benefit. I and my colleagues have in 
our possession instruments to transfer the sum of $35, 500.000 into a foreign 
company’s account in our favour. This amount emanated as result from an over 
invoiced contract executed, commissioned, and paid for about two years ago by 
a foreign contractor. We are therefore seeking your assistance in transferring this 
money into your account as it can only be remitted to a foreign account. The total 
sum will be shared as follows:                      
Ø 30% for the account owner (you) 
Ø  60% for us 
Ø 10% to settle any accidental expenses. 
We shall commerce the transfer of funds immediately as soon as you send the 
following documents/information through fax:  
Ø Four copies of your company letter head and invoice papers signed and 
stamped 
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Ø  Your bankers name, address and fax numbers 
Ø  The account number and name of the would-be beneficiary. 
 
 Please bear in mind that this is absolutely a private and personal deal, non-
official, and should be treated with all measures of secrecy and confidentiality” 
(U.S. Department of State 1997). 
 
After a victim responds positively to an AFF letter by sending the required 
documentation the victim is hooked. The primary reason for the documentation is 
not to rob the victim’s bank account, but to perpetuate the illusion that the deal is 
legitimate and moving forward. The blank signed letterheads are altered and 
used by the perpetrators as props in other frauds, letters of reference to obtain 
visas, or sold to other criminals (US Department of State 1997:10). Within the 
same week or the next, the perpetrators establish a level of trust with the victim. 
This is accomplished by sending the victim more “official” documentation 
verifying the bona fides of the deal and the people involved. 
 
The most crucial point of the fraud can take a number of directions. A victim will 
be advised that the deal is near completion, but that an emergency has arisen 
and money is needed to pay for an unforeseen government fee or tax before the 
money can be released. If the fee is paid, the criminal will fabricate another 
“problem” that requires immediate payment by the victim. Each “problem” is 
supported by “official” documentation. The perpetrators can run this ruse for 
months or even years, depending on the gullibility of the victim or his or her 
desperation to recoup losses. One Western diplomat described it as “… kind of 
like gambling. You get in so deep you keep putti ng money in to get something 
out of it”. 
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Travel to Nigeria 
 
At some stage of the fraud, the perpetrator will attempt to persuade the victim to 
travel to Nigeria, South Africa or a neighbouring country to finalise the contract, 
transfer the money or conclude other transactions. If the victim appears reluctant 
to go to Nigeria, the perpetrators will suggest a neutral country where an AFF 
team, unknown to the victim, is already established. If the victim meets the 
perpetrators in a neighbouring country, the victim may find that he or she must 
still travel to Lagos in Nigeria. Entry without a visa, gives the criminals leverage 
over the victim and leads to other forms of extortion (US Department of State 
1997:12). 
 
Usually in Nigeria, victims will be housed in one of the hotels close to the airport. 
At this stage, the victim is totally immersed in the scam, and the criminals have 
total control over the victim’s every move. The victim is then taken to meetings 
with criminals posing as Nigerian Government officials, or possibly corrupt 
government officials, to finalise the deal. The meeting usually takes place in 
government offices or annexes that are rented by the criminals or in an office that 
is set up to resemble a government office. These offices are often located near 
government buildings to add authenticity to the fraud. 
 
Travel to a neutral country 
 
If victims are reluctant to travel to Nigeria, the perpetrators will suggest a neutral 
country and the victim will be requested to provide them with his or her flight 
itinerary and the name of the hotel he or she will be staying in. This is the first 
step to take control of the victim’s movement during the scam. 
 
Operating under the guise that the business contacts are in Nigeria, the criminal 
will convince the victim to send roundtrip airline tickets from Nigeria to the neutral 
country for face-to-face meetings with business contacts. The victim is also 
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requested to reserve hotel rooms in his or her name for the contacts. The hotel 
rooms are never in the same ho tel as the victim’s.  Nine out of ten victims comply 
with these requests (US State Department 1997). The criminals then cash the 
airline tickets, and use the hotel rooms, which are reserved under the name of a 
legitimate businessperson, or his or her company, in other scams or sell to other 
AFF perpetrators (US State Department 1997:12). 
 
Studies have indicated that the meetings with the victims are set up in areas of 
the city that are unfamiliar to the victim. This is to keep the victim off-balance and 
allow the perpetrators time to conduct counter surveillance; the criminals will 
schedule and cancel a number of meetings with the victim. Reports also state 
that once the victim is under the auspices of the criminals, and if at some point 
he decides not to pursue the deal, or if at some stage he stops paying, the 
criminals will not walk away from the victim. They will attempt to re -consummate 
the fraud, using various ruses. In this case, some of the perpetrators might pose 
as Nigerian Government or South African officials (depending where the scam 
takes place) and attempt to get the victim’s money back or try to convince the 
victim that they are the legitimate government officials and the other men he or 
she (the victim) dealt with were fraudsters. Therefore re -victimisation will be 
perpetrated either by the original criminals, or sold to another AFF team to 
operate (US State Department 1997:13). 
 
The findings of the empirical research indicate that the nature of AFF is much the 
same as indicated in the literature research. In this instance, the perpetrator in 
Case 1 said “… What happened was that somebody here would contact 
somebody abroad and tell them that I have some money. It is possible that the 
money belongs to my father and I’m about to transfer this money from here to 
another account abroad and I want you to assist me with an account.  If you can 
provide me with an account and I am able to transfer the money to that account I 
will travel down there and we will share the money. But you have to travel to 
South Africa to finalise the transfer”. In the same vain, Respondent 2 said “…If 
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you reply positively to that letter that they send to you via e-mail, meaning that 
you start going into the business, and immediately they convince you that the 
money is really in the security company, where ever you are, wherever they are, 
they will invite you to come down and discuss with them. So when you come 
down they will probably tell you its $5 million dollars”. 
 
An analysis of these findings implies that most of the time, victims are invited to 
the country where the money is kept to finalise the transfer arrangement. This is 
usually where the fraud starts or where the actual monetary loss of the victim 
begins. 
 
2.3.2 Forms of advance fee fraud 
 
It must be noted that AFF confidence scams are only limited by the perpetrator’s 
imagination. However, their proposals share a common thread. The proposals 
are often unsolicited, emphasise the urgency and confidentiality of the deal, and 
require the victim to pay various government and legal fees and taxes before 
receiving what turns out to be non-existent money. New variations of these 
scams are being developed all the time but the most common forms of these 
fraudulent business proposals fall into these main categories:  
 
Ø Transfer of funds from over-invoiced contracts 
Ø Contract fraud (C.O.D of goods and services) 
Ø Conversion of  hard currency (black-money, money cleaning or  “wash- 
wash”) 
Ø Sale of crude oil at below market prices 
Ø Purchase of real estate 
Ø Disbursement of money from wills (benefactor of a will) 
Ø Held for ransom / Kidnappings and murder. 
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In the empirical part of this research most of the interviewees mentioned money 
transfers, contract fraud and the conversion of black currency (money cleaning or 
wash-wash). It was found that there are many forms of AFF. This was confirmed 
in a statement made by the perpetrator in Case 3 in which he said “… my brother 
you see 419… 419 means there are one hundred and nineteen systems to 
commit this fraud”.   Another important form of 419 that was discovered in this 
research is what the fraudsters called “Spiritism” and “Fimash”. These forms will 
be discussed below.    
 
Within this same premise, Respondent 3 concurs with the many systems of AFF. 
In his statement, he said “…  There are so many ways, because each and 
every…as time goes on they are changing.  They know that people have been 
realising that things like this are going on.  Things like these are going on.  They 
are changing their methods.  Someone…there is another system.  Someone can 
tell you that they are coming from overseas. He has brought money, he wants to 
invest, but in order for him to invest this money he needs a South African partner, 
so that they’ll open an account now in his name, and they put the money inside.  
That’s how they approach you.  So when you hear this that somebody is coming 
from outside with millions, he wants to invest, they will need another South 
African partner so that they can use his name, so now you are happy because 
you know that you are going to become rich.  But now as time goes on now, you 
see now that the direction is going to change.  Instead of them coming to invest 
actually, they will start telling you that you are the one who has to use money.  
They will start proposing business to you, how you can make money, and at the 
end now you are stupid to fall now as a victim, you are stupid to lose some 
amount of money.  There are many ways, because one can never say that he is 
too clever to be duped, it is false.  Even those people who is doing this business, 
they can still be duped by another person who is doing the business”. 
 
The scammers essentially need the victims’ distant involvement in some illegal, 
but mostly white collar, criminal proposal. They will want to get money out of 
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Nigeria, South Africa, or any other West African country by using you as a 
conduit who will (supposedly) benefit greatly from your assistance and 
cooperation. While many such scams imply the victim’s participation in an illegal 
act, there are various forms of so-called “legal” 419-scemes such as the Will 
Scam, the Real Estate Scam, the Scholarship Scam for which there is no basis 
for the victim to be considered a potential criminal and have their claims 
dismissed or even be charged under the 419 Act in Nigeria. 
 
Each of these forms of AFF will be discussed in detail below. 
 
v Transfer of money from over-invoiced contracts 
  
According to the US State Department, about 90 percent of AFF are over-
invoiced contract scams. The State Department reports that these scams involve 
an offer to transfer large sums of money into an overseas bank account owned 
by a foreign company. The money is usually alleged to have come from over-
invoiced contracts from a Nigerian company or one of the Nigerian Government 
ministries (that is, Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation). The authors of such letters claim to be government or bank officials 
who are willing to pay the victim a generous commission of up to 40 per cent for 
assisting with the transfer of the funds. 
 
It must be pointed out that there is an almost sweetness (swaddled in lavishly 
stilted prose excavated from an 18 th century protocol handbook) in the letter’s 
introduction: “It is with a heart full of hope…” reads one. “Compliments to season. 
Grace and peace and love from this part of the Atlantic to you” is how another 
one was started. “Good day to you, I would here crave your distinguished 
indulgence”. And still another opens with “It is with my profound dignity that I 
write to you”. 
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§ Structure of such letters 
 
The letters are structured in the following fashion: 
 
Emphasizing confidentiality and trust 
 
We are writing based on information about you and your firm we gathered from a 
foreign office of Nigerian Chamber of Commence. We write with absolute 
confidence in the legality of our firm and that of you and your firm. Basically, the 
business we are about to introduce is based on trust and real confidence which 
we believe can exist between us. 
 
Introducing the scam 
 
For your introduction, we are a small but very influential firm of quality surveyors, 
construction cost consultants and projects managers who have been involved in 
the planning and execution of a number of projects for the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which were executed by  foreign contractors. 
Most of these contracts were deliberately over-measured and over-invoiced at 
their planning stages. These projects have been commissioned and the 
contractors paid their rightful dues leaving the over-invoiced sums owed them by 
the corporation. 
 
The military government of Nigeria is part of an effort to win international support 
has directed that we examine these contracts and recommend all outstanding 
debts due to all foreign contractors for payment. As consulting quantity surveyors 
on these projects, we and our colleagues at the corporation were able to  discover 
these over-invoicing and over-management. At the end of this exercise, we are 
left with huge sums of money at the moment in a suspense account of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) resulting from the initial over-invoice cost.  
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What they want from you 
 
We are therefore introducing to you one of these contracts where the sum of 
US$35 million was over-invoiced and over-measured. We now seek the 
assistance of a trusted foreign company in order to process, claim and remit 
these funds into a nominated account as debt owed to your company. In order to 
accomplish this therefore we shall require from you the following: 
i. A letter of trust and confidence to attest that we can trust and rely on you 
ii. Three copies of your company or any other company letterhead and pro-
forma invoice duly stamped and signed below with which you want us to 
process the claim. 
iii. Particulars of bank account where you wish the funds to be transferred 
into 
You are expected to send these to me via fax number…  
 
How the funds will be distributed 
 
During our deliberations, we resolve that my firm and colleagues shall take 60 
percent of the funds while 30 per cent shall be given to you for your assistance 
and the remaining 10 per cent shall be used to off-set all expenses that may be 
incurred by both parties during the course of executing the business. You are 
therefore advised to keep records of all your expenses in the course of executing 
the business. 
 
Emphasizing confidentiality again 
 
If this business interests you, please reply only by fax message so that we 
provide more details. While trying to reach us either by fax or phone, please dial 
direct. Do not go through the international operator in view of the confidential 
nature of the business. 
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Please trust with utmost confidence and urgency as we hope to hear from you 
soon. 
 
The warning and the persistence of the perpetrators are illustrated by means of 
some lengthy verbatim quotations which were obtained during the empirical data 
capturing. 
 
The empirical findings of money transfer indicated how this form of AFF is 
committed. In this regard, the Perpetrator in Case 1 said:   
 
Contacting the victim 
 
 “…He just tells them this is the amount of money I have here.  I cannot take out 
this money without somebody to assist me from abroad.  Because I cannot go 
there to open another account.  That is what he tells them. And then he ask them 
can you provide me with an account. And they say yes. And at the end of the day 
he is going to tell them well this money is in a social account over here. Which 
merely is a government account.  So before the money can be transferred we 
have to show them that we have a job for them or whatever. We have to sign a 
contract or whatever for them. It could be anything [the contract].  So he’s going 
to prepare the documents and send it to that man and say send these documents 
to them and they will release the money to you. And by the time he tells them 
that it is possible that people are gonna ask him how come you need this 
money? Are you not registered here in South Africa? You have to register in 
South Africa.  So the man says I’ll come and register in South Africa.  And for you 
to register in South Africa, you have to pay some amount, maybe registration or 
whatever. So that is how it is going to go.  So at the end of the day they say if 
you register here we are going to award you a contract. Based on that contract 
we are going to pay some amount of money into your account in advance”. 
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Duration of the fraud 
 
The perpetrator said “….It depends on the victim.  If the story is convincing to 
them, money can start exchanging hands from two weeks.  But if the story is not 
convincing to them, they need to provide more evidence, because the man is 
going to say what the proof that this story is genuine is or that the money is there 
and based on that he starts giving them more information”. “… But as soon as 
the man on the other side is committed, its going to drag on for longer periods. 
Because as soon as you are committed, by sending in $1000 or $2000 for a 
start, you’re going to know that this man is already involved.  The victim wants to 
see the end of the business. Therefore the story is now going to be prolonged.  
By the time you send in maybe a $1000 to register a business here, the registrar 
is going to prepare a registration paper and send to him and say your business 
was registered successfully. This is the receipt of your payment. Then the next 
stage now is the seclusion of your contract. Which is now going to demand 
money from him. Which now says ‘you are now registered, we are now going to 
tender for this business’, so that this money can be paid to him. Now the man 
who is the original initiator of the business is now going to ask for him.  So for 
him now, the man has taken over the business”. 
 
Convincing victims  
 
In this case perpetrator 1 said they would tell the victim that “… .You will not 
believe when I tell you that most victims will believe the story easily. Because 
they will tell you, hey, this story is true, because I have a friend who works in so-
so bank, he tells me how much money came from Africa into that bank last week. 
A lot of African leaders; Presidents, Heads of State, government officials have a 
lot of stolen money in overseas bank. When they steal government money, 
where do they send that money to?  It doesn’t justify it, but it makes the victims 
believe it easily.  Like for example, these Swiss Banks in Switzerland, the amount 
of African money in Swiss accounts. Even a lot of them, when they die here, the 
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money get lost.  When they die here, because the money is stolen, they are not 
going to reveal that so money is there, not even to their families, and the money 
will be lost forever.  Because these fraudsters can convince people the money 
are from corrupt officials. But because I am not going to be able to take this 
money directly, I need somebody there to help me. So that they will not know that 
I am the one stealing the money from here”. 
 
The perpetrator also said “... So whomever he is dealing with is perceived as 
dealing with government officials or the people involved directly.  So him, he’s 
going to advise him:  this is what I’m going there to do to negotiate on your 
behalf.  If they ask you to do it, do it. Whatever they ask you to do you do it. So a 
third party has come into the business now. It could be the original initiator of the 
business himself or his partner. The point is what that man needs to know is 
hearing different voices and having different contact numbers/addresses, still in 
South Africa or somewhere in the world and this depends on the story line. If you 
tell him this money is in Congo or Zambia, the telephone lines have to change to 
that country. The important thing is that those who are involved on this side, they 
communicate among themselves and they plan the storyline. So whatever that 
man is responding, they know the next step to take to take more money from 
him. So if the man pays money for the first time then it drags on to the next 
stage. So it depends on how that man is committing himself”.   The perpetrator in 
Case 4 said “… And then before that procession, they send you some papers, all 
the copies and papers they’ll send to you.  Good papers, they are not…they are 
fraudulent papers, they are fake papers, but it looks good.  They can even invite 
you here.  They can invite you here, they can take you to the bank, they can take 
you wherever, they can rent a house in a big suburbs.  They make as if he’s the 
director of a big company or he’s the manager of a bank, who will approve the 
transaction, and the lawyer who’ll be involved, you tip off the lawyer, and when 
you come here, they take you to all this places so you’ll be convinced.  When you 
see all these things, and then you come to their house, their private house, and 
then from there, when you’re coming into the country, they’ll send somebody to 
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the airport to pick you, maybe with a limousine, everything luxury, like they are 
official government people.  That’s what they do, and when you see all these 
people officially, all these luxury things they do, and that’s when you’ll be 
convinced.  You see the lawyer’s paper, you see the bank manager, you can 
even go to the bank, and you see the bank.  And then they make you to sign the 
paper.  And then you say, ok, before this money can be transferred, I’ll pay such 
and such amount.  And they transfer that amount to another country, and then, 
you’ll end up to lose your money”.   
 
Commitment  
 
The perpetrator said “...The more money he commits, the more money he wants 
to commit. So if he pays you $1000 now, he doesn’t want to lose that money, so 
he says if in the next stage I have to pay $2000, I’ll pay it and then get all my 
money back. So after he paid them, they’ll send him to the man who is supposed 
to release his money.  Then that man is asking maybe for this or that. So the only 
way to get that man to release that money is to give him something. And he is 
asking maybe for $5000 out of that money. And you know that money is big 
money, so you know $5000 is nothing, so you give him that money.  And it’s also 
possible that the man can release the money somewhere else”.   
 
Complications 
 
The Perpetrator said “… Like they can say the money cannot come to your bank 
directly, maybe it can go the Reserve Bank of another country. And they’ll tell you 
the money is there, but its not really, and they’ll give you the contact number of 
some person. He’s going to tell you the money is there, but how can they be sure 
that you are the right person?  Come down directly and let us see you, so he is 
going to come. They’ll go and meet people there and sometimes they can meet 
money there.  But the money of course is not going to be real money. It could be 
paper money. They can take brown paper and wrap it like money and put it in a 
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bag, and then put real money on top. The man is going to come, they’ll open the 
box, say this is your money.  He’ll see it and say ok. They will have another story. 
Like you didn’t pay your tax. While they are pretending to release the money to 
him, they’ll take the documents from him and say oh the money is yours but you 
didn’t pay tax, you didn’t pay this or that. And they’ll be closing the box again and 
tell him, well for such an amount of money you know you have to pay tax.  For 
you to evade tax is a big offence.  Because the people discussing with him are 
going to be talking like real government officials”.  
 
It was also found in this research that there are various patterns of money 
transfer. This was the statement of the perpetrator in Case 4 in which he spoke 
of a “Master Password”. According to this perpetrator, this master password is 
used to enter the system of any bank, government department, Internet and e-
mail facilities. The perpetrator said “… as soon as we transfer money from an 
account, we introduced virus into the account to make it difficult for authorities to 
trace the account in which the money was transferred into”. He said that “…I 
came with this high-tech master password from Italy, and I have used it 
successfully in South Africa”. 
 
The second type will now be discussed. 
 
v Contract fraud  
 
This form of AFF is sometimes referred to as trade default and targets primarily 
small companies with little export experience. According to the US Department of 
Commerce, twenty-five percent of reported fraudulent business solicitations from 
Nigeria involve large orders for products from U.S. companies. 
 
With this type of AFF, the target receives an order from a Nigerian company and 
a bank draft for items to be shipped via airfreight. The Nigerian company will 
attempt to solicit a sample of the product and/or introductory price under the 
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guise of planning to introduce the product to Nigeria. The Nigerian company will 
try to convince the targeted company that registration, import, and other fees are 
required to bring the product into Nigeria. They will do this by sending the 
targeted company documentation from real or fictitious law firms. 
 
The Nigerian company usually places a number of small orders (less than 
$10,000) with the targeted company, paying with legitimate bank drafts. This is to 
develop a business relationship with the targeted company and convince them 
that they have established an export opportunity and a new distribution system in 
Nigeria. At an advanced stage of the business relationship, the targeted 
company will receive an urgent letter with a bank draft indicating that the Nigerian 
company has just been awarded a lucrative contract by the government. They 
will request the targeted company to immediately send large shipments of their 
products. When the shipment is sent, the targeted company only learns too late 
that the bank draft is fraudulent. At that time, the goods are not recoverable, and 
only then does the supplier discover that the Nigerian company does not exist at 
all (US Department of State 1997:16). 
 
Conversion of black currency (wash – wash/money cleaning) is another type 
 
v Conversion of black money 
 
 The victim is shown a suitcase, which is allegedly full of U.S Dollars or Rands in 
100-denomination bills that was temporarily defaced with a black waxy substance 
to mask their origin. The perpetrators tell the victim that there is $40 million or 
Rand in the suitcase. However, in order to remove this substance, and restore 
the notes, the victim must purchase a special but very expensive chemical 
solution to remove  the black waxy material. The cost of the special chemical 
ranges from $50,000 to $200,000 and afterwards the victim will receive 40 per 
cent of the $40 million as his or her commission.  
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Research (The 419 Coalition 2003) indicates that the exotic and expensive mix of 
secret chemicals for cleaning money, which could be referred to as the SSD 
solution, is Vectrol Paste, Lactima Base 98 per cent, microtecine and Tebi-
Matonic. In reality the secret chemical is actually ordinary cleaning fluid which 
reacts with the black mixture of vaseline and iodine.  
 
In front of the victim, the perpetrators will wash/clean one of the bills with a 
special solution restoring the black money to its original form; either U.S dollars 
or S.A Rands. In an effort to assuage any doubts the victim may have, he will be 
asked to pick another bill at random to be cleaned. Before the perpetrator cleans 
the bill, the victim is momentarily distracted by one of the criminal’s accomplices. 
During that split second, the criminal, using a slight movement of his hand, will 
extract a real bill from his sleeve, and clean it in front of the victim. The treated 
notes are given to the victim to take to the bank for verification. 
 
In some instances, as a sign of good faith, the victim will be asked to keep the 
suitcase for a short time, until the victim has raised the money to buy the 
chemical solution to clean the money. Ammonia is placed inside the suitcase in 
the event that the victim opens the suitcase to give the impression that the 
money is disintegrating. However, the remainder of the material in the case is 
actually blank, blackened paper, often made by simply photocopying money 
notes without closing the lid of the photocopier and cutting the sheets down to 
banknote size. 
 
In some instances, the perpetrators tell the victim that the procedure was 
introduced in South Africa during the apartheid regime in order to avoid the 
international boycott on weapon deals by transporting big amounts of cash in this 
manner. Some victims are told that the defaced currency were abandoned by 
U.S forces in Somalia and blackened as a security measure as part of the 
shipping process (The 419 Coalition 2003). 
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During the empirical part of this research, it was found that this particular form of 
AFF was more common in South Africa. The perpetrator in Case 3 said that he 
was arrested, charged and sentenced for this form of AFF. The perpetrator said 
“… I told her that I came into the country with a briefcase, that the briefcase is in 
the embassy, I want to collect money from… I want you to help me with R3200 
so that I can collect my money from so-so person, and I will bring the money here 
to you so that we can start business together”.  
 
To execute this type of AFF, letters are also used. 
 
§ Structure of such letters 
 
Indicating where he got your particulars and why he needs you 
 
Your contacts come to me through a friend who does business between your 
country and Lagos. But I was careful not to reveal to him why I needed a 
competent foreign link in the person of your respected self. 
 
Introducing himself 
 
In short I am a trained Chemist specializing in currency chemistry and top official 
in the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Limited, in Lagos. During the last 
political dispensation in Nigeria, I was hired and involved in the chemical re -
conversion of otherwise genuine US Dollar Bills brought into Nigeria under 
hidden circumstances by a powerful Arab national who was out to give financial 
support to a Moslem former presidential aspirant. And of course, this was with 
the tacit connivance of the then military government. 
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Introducing the scam 
 
Now in the heat that followed the political crisis and the subsequent cancellation 
of the elections, the former Moslem presidential aspirant was clamped in jail and 
has since remained in detention, with the result that some package containing a 
little less than US$40 million,  awaiting re-conversion, were abandoned in my 
care and custody. 
 
As a result of the discreet nature of the re-conversion exercise, which in fact is 
known only to me, I now have my exclusive control about (US$40 million) dollars 
bills in cash, presently in the form of bonded re-contractable negative 267, 03 
mint stage, deliberately defaced to elude detection and facilitate their importation 
into Nigeria. The bills now require only chemical re-conversion to grade A1 135 
neon proof mint stage and subsequent movement outside Nigeria for choice 
investments preferably in your country. 
 
After successfully reconverting the dollar bills by chemical process, and in the 
event that you accept to work with me, you shall entitled to 40 percent of this 
funds and the another 5 percent be set aside for expenses, while the remainder 
of 55 percent shall be for me and 2 subordinates. 
 
Indicating what is required of the client 
 
What in essence, the whole exercise entail, is that you shall be required to make 
a brief visit to Nigeria to see things for yourself and be convinced beyond doubts, 
that the re-converted bills would really meet any scientific or commercial test in 
terms of its genuineness, either in Nigeria, Europe or in the USA. 
 
Your visit will also avail us the opportunity of knowing each other and collectively 
plan workable strategies for smooth conclusion of this exercise. A letter of 
invitation to enable you obtain a visa to Nigeria will be fax to you in due course. 
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Securing secrecy  
 
Finally, it is important to keep the facts of this exercise to yourself, the way I have 
done all these months. You must agree with me, that we can not blow up a 
chance of a life time because we can not be discreet over a matter that would 
definitely work to our mutual satisfaction. 
 
I await your urgent response, while I remain with best regards for your kind 
attention. 
 
The empirical research found that this form of AFF is very complicated because it 
may start with money transfers and end up as money cleaning. Hence, the victim 
will be asked to give money to buy chemicals to clean or wash the money.  
 
Introducing the business 
 
In this regard respondent 2 said: “…they are telling you that they are  having a lot 
of money and its kept in a security company, and they need your help to come 
and help them to get that money”. Respondent 3 said “…you can tell him you 
brought a consignment from abroad, and this consignment consists of black 
dollars, or it consists of dollars that have been stamped, and this consignment 
now have been given by the UN as a foreign aid to a country, for example a war-
torn country like Liberia or DRC.  Since this money was given now, it happened 
that a government official embezzled this money and you were working on with 
that government official, maybe as a driver.  So it happens now that you were 
aware of this, and you stole some of this consignment now and then left the 
country.  So you flew now into another country which is South Africa”. 
Respondent 3 went further to say that “…you tell this victim (mugu) that it is at 
the airport and you need money now to clear the assignment.  So what will 
happen now is the mugu is going to give you an advance say maybe R10 000”. 
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In this instance, respondent 2 said: “…If you reply positively to that letter that 
they send to you via e-mail, meaning that you start going into the business, and 
immediately they convince you that the money is really in the security company, 
wherever you are, wherever they are, they will invite you to come down and 
discuss with them. So when you come down they will probably tell you its $5 
million dollars, and if you’re a businessman, and you’re a rich person, when you 
hear about 5 million you will be much exited. It’s a lot of money.  So the first thing 
they will ask you to do is to go and collect the box where the money is kept in the 
security company.  Already in the security company, there are people there who 
are already aware”. 
 
Organised - Network   
 
Respondent 2 said “… So when you go there to that security person, with the 
person who invited you into the country, and you get to the security company, the 
manager is going to tell you. Yes, you have kept a box in the security company, 
but for me to give you that box, you have to give me the money, according to the 
period that I have kept it for you, so he will maybe say you have to give me 50 
000, because I have kept the box for you”.   
 
Respondent 3 said “….  So they will look now for another person and he will 
dress as a pilot, and you will meet this person at the airport.  You’ll pay that 
person.  It can even be a hundred thousand.  So you’ll pay this person the 
amount, and he’s going to release the consignment.  This person is going to act 
as a custom official. So you pay him the R100 000 at the airport”. According to 
Respondent 3 it’s a fake custom official.  He is still one of the 419 guys.  They will 
dress as the custom official, or the pilot.  Mostly it is the custom official not the 
pilot.  So now the custom official is going to hand over the consignment, so you 
the mugu now, is going to pay the custom official.  And the custom official is not 
the real custom official.  He’s still a member of the team”.   
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Convince victims 
 
Respondent 2 said “…So the person that invited you, because you are already in 
South Africa, or wherever, so because he invited you, it means that you are 
already interested in the business, he will just tell you that he doesn’t have 
money to take that box out of the security company.  And he will tell you that 
there is R500 million in the box, and he will show the documents proving that 
inside that box is R500 million.  Now what you must do, because you are excited, 
if you remove that money, we are going to share. If he was having money, he 
was just going there and removing it without anybody’s knowledge.  Because he 
doesn’t have money, he’s looking for a sponsor from somebody.  So the 
manager of the security company he said he wants R50 000 to remove the box 
from inside the security company.  For that period of time that the box has spent 
inside his company.  So you, because you are interested in the business, you 
have to discuss with the manager, and you have to come out with a solution.  
Coming out with a solution is you have to guess… you have to say no I can’t pay 
you R50 000, I can give you 30 000.  Please please please.  Now finally he is 
going to accept.  Now you remove the amount of maybe, maybe R30 000, you 
agree on R30 000, so you remove the R30 000 and give it to the manager of the 
security company.  The manager of the security company will give you the box 
full of money, and when he gives you the box of the money, you will take the box 
maybe to the hotel where you are staying”.  Respondent 3 said “…So they will 
take this consignment now to you, it will always come with a bit of a chemical, 
inside the consignment.  And inside the consignment now there is a hangout.  
And inside this hangout there is the signature of George Bush, the President of 
America, and the signature of the UN also, the US secretary of state.  And 
there’s also now the signature of the UN secretary of state.  There are going to 
be three signatures, yeah the secretary general.  And then there are going to be 
the American Logo, and the logo also of the UN, on the hangout.  So this 
hangout is now going to give you the directions of how they can clean the money.  
So they are going to use this small chemical now to clean the black dollar on 
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top”.   To further convince the victim that the business is genuine Respondent 3 
said ‘…Actually when the mugu meets the custom official at the airport, and he 
pays the money, they deliver the consignment to him, the consignment is being 
kept by the mugu, so the mugu now takes the consignment to his house, and 
inside the consignment there is a small amount of the chemical.  And they 
(perpetrators) will accompany the mugu to his house.  So the mugu will prefer his 
house to a hotel, and the mugu now will prefer to keep it because he already 
invested some money there. Now they come now and they open it, there’ll be 
cutting and powder. It will be dusted with powder as a means of preservation.  
And there’ll also be cotton so that air does not get into the money.    So they’ll 
take the powder now and they’ll take a few of those black dollars on top, and 
they’ll put this chemical, so they’ll put this chemical on top of that black dollar.  
The chemical now is going to clean that black colour.  So they are going to tell 
you now, you see this is it.  You see now how this money is coming all right?  So 
when they clear it, it becomes a normal dollar and they then take OMO or any 
other detergent and they wash it and they iron it.  So you’ll be convinced now that 
the whole box is filled with that dollar”.   
 
Respondent 3 also said that to further convince victims to buy the chemical, they 
would tell the victim that “…. So they will tell the mugu now if you want to clean it, 
in order to clean the whole box, you need now to buy one full litre of that 
chemical, and the chemical is coming from overseas,  it is not made here in 
South Africa.  So if you have brothers now overseas, Geneva, Switzerland, so 
they’ll tell you now you should phone those people overseas dealing with the 
chemicals, they will give you a number of someone who is also their member, 
you phone that person about the chemical, he’s going to give you now the price 
of that chemical in dollars, and when you convert it, its still going to amount to 
R250 000 this side. And you are going to be very convinced.  And you are going 
to ask him how you are going to get the chemical because he’s in Switzerland, 
you are in South Africa, and you need the chemical for business.  So then what 
happens is that he’s going to tell you he’s going to arrange with a pilot on the 
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plane, he’s going to give the pilot the chemical and when the pilot reaches the 
Johannesburg international airport he’s going to phone you.  And when the pilot 
phones you, you should come with exactly that amount of money.  The pilot does 
not know you, he has no dealing with you, it’s just him giving you the chemical 
and then you give him the money.  This pilot is a fake pilot he’s still a member of 
the team, so someone will just dress as a fake pilot.  And then goes to the 
airport. Now, your consignment has been given to me, so you should come and 
collect it because I’ll be leaving soon.  I’ll be leaving instead.  So you’ll be rolling 
instead.  You’ll be happy that things are alright.  You are going to buy the 
chemical and then you are going to clean the money and then you’ll be rich.  So 
when you go now there, you give him the money and he gives you the chemical.  
And when he gives you now the chemical you take it and you go now home”.   
 
Complication 1 
 
“…And when you get there, the person who invited you, the 419 man will say 
there is 500 million Rand, but the key of this box, I am not having the key of this 
box.  You have already paid 30 000 Rand to the manager of the security 
company, now he will maybe tell you I have another company where I take keys 
always for safekeeping.  We have to go and collect the keys.  Now you go with 
him and collect the keys.  When you arrive there to collect the keys of the box, 
the person is already there, waiting for you, because he knows you are in the 
country.  He says that to give you the keys, you have pay maybe for the time that 
he has kept the keys.  And you have to say how much?  He’s going to say R20 
000.  Now you have to guess:  no, R20. 000 is too much.  Or if you are really 
exited, you are going to remove the 20 000, and they give you the key.  Now they 
give you the key, and you go back to the hotel”.   
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Complication 2 
 
“…Now you open the box, there is money in the safe, but that money is not 
clean.   Its not clean as money… usually it has a colour.  But I know the money 
inside the box is not the real money.  It should be fake, let’s say its fake money, 
or it is real money, but with the chemicals, says colours, different colours 
compared to the real money.  So now when you go to the…when you open it you 
see there is money, but the money is not real, yes it doesn’t look original.  That 
money doesn’t look original.  But now the person, the 419 man is going to say to 
you, this money is dirty, because it has stayed there for a long time”. 
 
Complication 3 
 
“… So now we must put this money into maybe chemicals or products so the 
money can be ready to use.  That is already the 3rd stage.   You have already 
spent money to take the box from the security company; you have already spent 
money to take the keys, so the next stage they will say to you that that money is 
not well cleaned.  You have to pay for the chemicals or there’s a special water to 
clean the money.  Now you as a man, invited here by the 419 man, because you 
are excited, you have already started spending money.  You haven’t even spend 
half the money that are in the box, somewhere in the box they will show you,  I 
don’t know how you call it,  they will show you how to make that money a real 
money.  So for you to know how to make this money to be ready to be used 
anywhere in the world.  Of course it’s inside the box, now they will remove it and 
they will say to you this is the name of the product. That can make that money to 
be well used and ready to be used anywhere in the world. The guy who invited 
you he behaves as poor, as a person who doesn’t have any parents, he’s relying 
on that money to survive”.  
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Chemicals 
  
“…So because you are here now, by all means you have to help him. So you 
must now by all means, you have to buy that chemical to make sure that the 
money must be ready to use.  So now you are going to go out looking for 
chemicals.  419 is a game.  It’s a game.  Those people, I never heard that they 
killed people.  It’s a game. So now that you are looking for chemicals, they’ve got 
a friend, it can be an old black man or an old white man,  he’s very rich.  It’s that 
person that they are going to prepare, to make sure that they are going to sell 
you the chemical.  Because he is the only person who’s got the good chemicals”. 
 
Sales of chemical 
 
The respondent said “…No he doesn’t ask the victim to go and buy.  He says to 
the victim lets go and call this number this is the chemistry, because the victim 
doesn’t know this country, lets say he’s in Kenya, he doesn’t know Kenya, he 
doesn’t know how things work there.  Now he cannot go and give the victim an 
address to go look for chemicals, because the victim is invited.  He’s the one who 
invited the businessman to the country.  The person who is there, the old man, 
the very rich man, who is the owner of the chemical, he’s in the chain, (Network) 
because 419 is a game.  It’s a team.    So now, in the team, there is someone 
who is just there ready to sell you chemicals.  Because all those people where 
you always pay the money they are trustful people.  Because when you pay the 
money, they take the money and they share it.  So now when you go to buy the 
chemicals, they arrange someone already within the network to wait for you.  If 
the person has an office, he calls the person:  ‘…good morning sir, I’m looking for 
this type of chemical’.  The person can say he doesn’t have the chemical.  And 
you’ll say if you don’t have the chemical, can you direct me somewhere where I 
can get that chemical.  That person will give him the name of another person.  
Maybe it may be the same person or it might be another person from within the 
network.  Now he calls the person.  All this in front of the person invited, in front 
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of the victim.  Now they make a plan, and they arrange where to meet to discuss 
the price.  Now the victim, he’ll say to the victim, no that man is speaking English, 
so you can discuss with him about the price.  The victim will take the phone and 
say:  ‘good morning sir, my name is this and this, I would like to buy the chemical 
because I have a problem and this problem is just something that will help me’.   
He doesn’t say he needs the chemical to go and wash the money.  So now the 
person is going to say, yes I have that chemical, just half a litre is R400 000. So 
now, you have R5 million in front of you, you want the money, so what are you 
going to do?  They say they want R 400 000.  But you, you want the 5 million to 
be clean.  But even then you haven’t spent half of that 5 million.  Because you 
are excited, you’ll say I’ll come and buy the chemical; I’ll give you R300 000.  He 
says no, I want the 400 000.  He can even refuse.  Because you have started 
spending, you must continue to spend.  Now you make an appointment with him, 
you go there, you remove the 400 000, and you give him, and he gives you a 
bottle full of chemical”.   
 
Complications 4 
 
“…So now he’s going to take you back in the hotel.  He’ll say to you that this 
chemical, the person who sell to you said that this is not the chemical that you 
are supposed to work with it in the sun.  Or this chemical is not supposed to be in 
the area where it is ra ining.  Maybe outside it’s already raining.  But he’s going to 
tell you to take the chemical, and you go and put it somewhere where it’s not 
raining or where there is no sun.  But where are you going to see where there is 
no rain or no sun.  So now you are going to take the chemical with him, and you 
drive until your hotel.  And maybe while driving, there was a sun, or maybe while 
driving it was raining.  They already told you the chemical doesn’t need sun or 
rain or what what”.   In this regard also, Respondent 3 said “… Now this chemical 
now, at times they make it in such a way that it is an explosive.  When he gives 
you he will not tell you that it needs a certain temperature.  You cannot keep the 
chemical in the fridge actually, and he will tell you now that you can keep the 
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chemical in the fridge, while you are not actually supposed to keep it.  So what 
happens now is that you put it in the fridge, and overnight it explodes, and 
everything is going to come out.  And you are going to be confused now and you 
will need another chemical.  And in certain cases they are going to sell you the 
chemical, and when they come to your house, what happens that since they 
know its working as an explosive, they are going to shake it and the whole thing 
is going to come out.  And when the whole thing explodes now, nobody is to be 
blamed because it happened when they were working.  So they tell you now that 
you need now to buy another chemical from overseas.  And if you don’t have the 
money to buy the chemical you are going to be stuck.  You’ll still now have the 
business that you cannot continue.  You’ll still now be looking for me now to look 
for money”.             
 
Complication 5 
 
“…So now when you get to the hotel, maybe now it’s the process to wash or 
clean the money.  Maybe after an hour, he’ll say that he’s received a call, a very 
urgent call, I’ll be with you within the next two hours.  And he leaves you there in 
the hotel.  And maybe while you are there in the hotel there is a sun.  and maybe 
after 30 minutes he’s gonna call you and say, hey my brother, as you see things, 
its raining, and maybe in the conduct of this chemical you don’t need to use it or 
walk with it when its raining.  But you have already walked with it in the sun and 
now its raining.  Which means the chemical is not good for you anymore, 
because when you receive the chemical,  they say keep it under 20 degrees.  But 
you have already walked with that chemical in a cool area and in a hot area, 
meaning that the powerfulness of this chemical is no longer the same. So what 
he is going to do is he’s going to come back to you and tell you that this 
chemical…its raining and there is sun, we have to wait before the weather is nice 
before we can use it.  They have already collected 400 000 from you.  But on the  
box they say 5 million.  And then that box, they give you the key of that box to 
keep.  Because that box, you have to wash what is inside that box, you have to 
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make it ready to use.  So now that the chemical has already passed through so 
many processes, that they were not supposed to pass these processes, meaning 
that the chemical is invalid, so now he’ll say to you that because it is raining, this 
and this, in the code of conduct of this chemical, they say you cannot use it in 
this area, meaning that the chemical is not useful anymore, meaning that what?  
You have to buy a new chemical”.  
 
Buy more chemical 
 
 “…And to buy another chemical is money.  And because you buy half a litre, you 
must buy another half litre for R400 000.  That is how you’ll keep pumping the 
money because you want the 5 million to be useful.  So you’ll keep pumping the 
money to buy that chemical.  So you must make sure that you walk with on this 
money only when it’s not raining and when its not hot.  So anytime you are 
planning to go and buy chemical, you go and buy in good weather, and maybe 
on your way back, it’s raining.  Meaning that the chemical is damaged.  Another 
R400 000.  Meaning that the chemical is damaged, you cannot go back to the 
person and say the chemical is not good anymore and he gives you another one.  
Meaning that each time that you go there to buy another chemical, they will 
always tell you how the chemical should be kept. And if you are walking and the 
chemical is not in that weather where they told you it should be, it means that the 
chemical is not useful.   And to precede you must buy another chemical. So you’ll 
be busy buying another chemical.  Maybe until when your money will be 
finished”.   Respondent 3 said “… If you can arrange more money to buy the 
chemical, they will still arrange for somebody to bring the chemical to you, and 
then, this business never goes to completion, it will always end halfway.  If you 
still bring money, they can always arrange a way in which it can explode again, in 
such a way that you will never realise that this thing was fake.  You’ll think that it 
did not go through because of a lack of chemicals.  You’ll still believe that that 
consignment consists of black dollars”. 
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Bank loan 
 
“…they can ask you if you can go and do loan from the bank, or loan from any 
office.  Maybe chemist said he’s going to give us discount now, than to pay 400 
000 you can pay R250.000, its better if you can go and get loan so that you 
mustn’t lose all this money.  If you have people who can give you loan, you can 
still go there and take loan.  And then you must go and buy chemicals again.  
Just make sure that every time you go and buy chemicals…because there is a 
condition that they give you when they give you the chemicals”.   
 
In this research, other method  of black currency was found which is known as 
“Fimash” or the “Box method”  
 
v Fimash or Box method 
 
Findings in this research indicate that this method of AFF is more common in 
South Africa. According to respondent 3 this method of fraud is committed as 
follows: 
 
Approaching victim 
 
Respondent 3 said “…What happens is somebody approaches you, he tells you 
he has a negative to produce money.  That he’s short of chemicals.  He can tell 
you that he has connections with the Reserve Bank, e.g. with Titus Mboweni.  
That people are supplying them with negatives.  That the problem now is the 
chemicals.  That the chemicals are very, very expensive.  So what happens now 
is that they are always going to bring a bit of the chemicals to show you what 
they want to do.  Now they are going to take the normal Rand, they are going to 
mix some other chemicals, they will dip this note into the chemical, and they will 
transform this note into a white piece of paper.  So when it transforms now into a 
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white piece of paper, they will tell you that that note now is the negative from the 
Reserve Bank”. 
 
Convince victims 
   
In this case, respondent 3 said “…You’ll be convinced, you wouldn’t see that as a 
white piece of paper.  So they are going to tell you now that they need chemicals 
to clean this money.  In addition to that they need extra notes to give colour to 
that paper.  So if you are coming into the business, they’ll need you to bring few 
notes to this paper, and you have to buy the chemicals.  So they’ll take the 
normal note, they put the negative.  So now they are going to spray that chemical 
on top. So when they smash it now, the white piece of paper on top is going to 
become black.  All the two of them they are going to become black.  The original 
notes and the white piece of paper, even though its money although they are 
claiming it’s a white piece of paper. Everything is going to become black.  After it 
becomes black they are going to leave it for some hours.  If it is in large 
quantities they are going to leave it for 24 hours.  And the one is going to 
ferment”.  The respondent said they tell the victim that “It’s going to go into 
fermentation, so the color is transferred from the original load to the other one”.  
So before this they have copied the number of the original notes that you have 
brought them, they have copied the number to make sure that the number does 
not coincide with the original one.  To proof to you that its not a duplicate, that its 
just the colour.  So what happens is that, yeah they copy the number in front of 
the victim.  If they are working with one million Rand they are going to copy all 
the number for the victim to see that they are not duplicating the money.  That 
this money is already in the system, they did not clean it.  And then they are 
going to wash it again and you can see that now it has come out to be a normal 
note.  So if you bought R200, you brought two notes of 100/100 each, they’ll 
make it to become four.  Since they know the number of your notes, they have 
copied the number of your notes, so in the end they will know the ones that they 
have made.  So they’ll give you the two, they will keep yours, and you should use 
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theirs.  You should go to the bank or you should go for shopping to see that the 
money is real.  If you go to the bank, they’ll accept it.  If you go to any shop they 
will still take the money.  So after they have taken this money now you are 
convinced”.  
 
The Respondent said “…Yeah after you have given him the money to go and 
deposit the money in the bank, after he has deposited the money in the bank and 
he realises the money is now ok, that’s now when the real business begins.  So 
he’ll come now and realise that everything is ok. So it’s now that if you are 
starting you are starting with a good amount of money”. 
 
Amount of money involved  
 
 Respondent 3 said “… it also depends on how much the victim, in certain cases, 
we use R200 to make R600.  So R100 was making R300.  So after we gave the 
money to this person, he went and he used it and it was all right.  So he was not 
very sure.  He was telling us that this thing he has heard from people that at the 
end there were going to be magic.  So he’s going to bring only 10 000.  If we can 
make it to R30, 000 he’s going to bring R350 000”. The Respondent said: “… 
when the victim was bringing R10 000, actually we made R30 000”.   
 
Manipulation 
 
The Respondent said “…We took R20 000, transformed it into white paper and 
we do the normal process again.  So we put 2 negatives and one 100 Rand note.  
And then we still put the iodine solution in front of the victim.  And now it was the 
victim who was doing it himself.  So after we did this, they waited for 24 hours.  
After they took the money from the iodine solution and they washed it the money 
came out R30 000”.   
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Chemical  
 
The Respondent said at this stage, they will tell the victim that “… now you have 
to buy the chemical, the chemical that you have to use to clean the money.  And 
we are also selling it in litres.  And you have to bring now the notes that will 
transfer the colour.  So they are going to use you twice.  First of all we are going 
to need money for the chemicals. They are going to tell you maybe that a litre 
costs R20 000.  So you buy now the chemicals and you keep it”.  
 
Defrauding victim 
 
The Respondent said “… Meanwhile we have cut pieces of paper in equal sizes, 
we are going to documentaries and they cut it to the size of money, and they can 
put it in so many boxes, and they can go and put it in your house.  And they can 
tell you that pieces of paper are worth about R5 million. White paper.  They are 
worth about R5 million.  So to wash them now it needs 1 litre of chemical, which 
is R200 000.  So first of all they bring you these negatives.  You know that you 
now you have the negative.  So you’ll go now up to the extent of buying the 
chemical for R200 000”.  
 
Respondent 3 said “…  They will connect it to another person who is selling the 
bottle of chemical, but that person is still one of them.  So they will now sell you 
that chemical.  So at the end now they will tell you must still bring them money 
that will transfer the colour.  They can tell you to bring R300 000.  This R300 000 
they can use now to transfer colour to all this money.  So if you bring now this 
R300 000 now, what happens is, if they know that you are going to work R5 
million, they will also cut pieces of papers worth R5 million, and they will use 
aluminium foil, they can put them in packets of R100 000, R100 000.  So when 
he’s (fraudster) coming now, he comes with a bag, he’s going to come with that 
bag full of pieces of paper that have been darkened.  Since they are very clever, 
he’ll come with you now, you’re working together, he puts the negative, he puts 
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the normal money, he puts the negative, he puts the normal money, and then 
you wrap it now with the aluminium foil, the same aluminium foil.  So if maybe he 
had 20 packets of aluminium foil of R100 000 in his bag, he was also going to 
make sure that he had 20 packets of aluminium foil from the one you are 
wrapping.  So after doing this now, you people are going to inject it.  He’s going 
to give you a certain chemical that you have to inject.  When you inject it now, its 
going to transfer the colour.  So after you inject it now, he’s going to tell you that 
you people should have a walk, you should go out with him now maybe for a 
drink”.   
 
The Respondent also said “…Most people they are doing this in a hotel.  If you 
are going out to the restaurant, maybe there’s another friend, maybe before you 
do the business now, he took the key of that hotel, he goes and duplicates it, and 
he gives it to that friend, the friend is in the nearby room.  So when you go now to 
the restaurant, the friend now is going to come and open the door, and since that 
friend now is having the same packet, he’s having pieces of paper that has been 
cut and darkened and folded in aluminium foil, ten of them, he’s going now to 
swap, he’s going to collect…he use the negatives from the colleague, so he’s 
going to swap, he use those ones from the bag and he carries those other ones 
out.  And then maybe after 2-3 hours, he’s going to bring you now back in.  And 
when he brings you now in, he’s going to give you now an excuse, that there is 
one guy that is supposed to take this final chemical that is supposed to clean this 
money.  That he needs to go and see that guy, that you, you should be waiting 
there. That you should wait in the hotel, he will bring the chemicals and you 
should finish the business.  Like this, he’s leaving already.  The money has left 
long time already.  The other friend who swapped it has left with the money”.   
 
Complications 
 
Respondent 3 said “… he also is going to use this excuse to leave.  So after 
maybe one hour, he is going to phone you that hey, he has been arrested maybe 
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by the police.  And when he took that chemical when he was coming there was a 
raid, and the police caught him with this chemical.  So he has been arrested.  At 
times he will arrange with the policeman.  The policeman will go and keep him in 
the cell.   So he’ll say that he has been arrested, that he is in so and so police 
station, and that you should come for his rescue”.   
 
According to respondent 3 “…Since you (victim) know that you were doing an 
illegal thing, instead you are running away.  You are scared that he can also 
involve you in the same thing.  That is something that has been arranged 
between him and the policeman, so in the end you can’t blame him.   So they are 
gone now with the money.  But you still believe that you are with the money, 
which are pieces of paper that has been changed into black colours.  So you’ll 
still believe that its money, but they are many pieces of papers.  So he’ll tell you 
now that you have to postpone the business.  So he’ll push it now to a further 
date.  So you’ll carry these things now you’ll take them home while waiting for 
him to be released.  And while waiting for him to be released, he’s going to tell 
you now the chemical he bought was seized by the police”.   
 
Buy more chemical 
 
The Respondent said “… So he means that now you have to buy another 
chemical. If you don’t have more money you’ll be confused.  You’ll still have the 
business and you’ll be confused.  So at times you’ll be fed up with the man.  
You’ll still go around to people now, asking them how you can get chemicals who 
is cheaper than the one he charged you.   Maybe he charged you R300 000.  
You go and ask another person do you know about this thing.  They will never 
refuse you, most of the people, anyone who has an idea, they will tell you I can 
sell it to you for R100 000.  So you will still go to the extent of buying it again.  
Actually they’ll bring the chemical, they’ll sell it to you again, but since you know 
how to produce it yourself, when they are coming now to test the chemicals,  they 
will tell you to take some samples from the one you have at home”. 
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Testing of chemical 
 
Respondent 3 said “… So you’ll take it to the hotel, so those guys they’ll have 
theirs also.  It’s the normal notes, but they have made it to be black.  These guys 
they are very fast, he’ll put it inside your pocket or maybe he’ll put it in a suit.  So 
when he gets inside now, he’ll put it in his pocket, or they can put it in a suit.  So 
when you get inside the hotel room, he will tell you that you must give yours and 
so you give yours and you are in the hotel he goes into the toilet as if he’s 
urinating and he takes yours and he swaps it with his own which is normal money 
that he put some chemical to make it black.  And then you come now and they 
use this chemical.  He will inject it now with that note which will become clear.  
He’s going to say now, you see if you buy this chemical you yourself can clean 
the money at home, you don’t even need to call a technician, they call 
themselves technicians, now you yourself can do this, there’s no need to involve 
someone if you involve someone like him, if you bring in someone to clean it you 
have to pay his chemical, first, and then secondly after cleaning it you have to 
share because he must give his own workmanship.  And most of these people 
are greedy, because he will not also want to give his own share.  So you’ll prefer 
to buy his own chemical and allow him to go.  So most of the time now you buy 
the chemical, since he has proven to you that it is working, so you want to clean 
it yourself”.   
 
Respondent 3 further said “…So when you go at home now, you put it on the 
negative you got, when you try to wash it instead of it coming out normal notes, 
its going to curl because its normal notes.  So him, he brought the negatives you 
gave to him, he has prepared his notes at home, and transformed them to black, 
so you were cleaning his own notes that he brought from home.  It was normal 
money but he has manipulated it to be black.  And you are convinced now that 
this chemical is the right chemical, and meanwhile he has been playing with you.  
And you are going now to lost more money, until now you are tired, and you are 
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going to leave the business and at a certain stage now, when you come across 
them now, you are going to tell them no, you are tired of all these things.  You 
cannot buy chemical any further.  That you always want somebody who will bring 
his chemical, clean this money and then you share.  Than for you to buy this 
chemical again is impossibility.  At this point now the mugu begins to become 
wise.  That there’s something going on.  He prefers you to bring the chemical, 
then you wash the money and you share”.   
 
The findings of this research reveal that when the victims has been defrauded 
about twice and has now become wiser and suspicious, the perpetrators would 
use another form of AFF known as “Spiritism”. This form, according to the 
perpetrator, is to completely finish and drain the victims of whatever he/she still 
might have. 
 
v Spiritism 
 
In this form of AFF, Respondent 3 said “…Because they say, there is a saying 
that wherever there is money there is a demon. Spiritism will always come in 
when the victim has been duped up to the extent that he himself he is fed up with 
the business.  That’s now when they bring in spiritism.  Spiritism now is to 
end…ya, now you are tired, now you can’t go further, if they bring spiritism you’ll 
be involved”.  
 
Respondent 3 said “… So most 419ers use spiritism when they see victims are 
becoming clever, that’s when they use spiritism.  And at times they can tell you 
that, uh, spiritism works in so many ways.  They can come at the end of the 
business”.  
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Approaching victim 
 
Respondent 3 explained this as follows: “… they can tell you that they can use 
their ancestors, or someone, one of those guys in a way, who have been dealing 
with you, can go and send someone who is dealing with spirits, most of the time 
these people are herbalists, they’ll know something about herbs and all the like, 
so they will give your number to him, that phone this person, we’ve been dealing 
with him and now he’s wise”. He said the perpetrators will contact one of their 
members and would tell him “…That phone this mugu since you know much 
about spirits, that his ancestors revealed his name through a dream and his 
number, that he’s got a packet in his house, and that they are here to help you”. 
 
The Respondent said the herbalist will tell the victim that “…it’s the spirit who 
gave your name and your number to me, that you are having something in your 
house, that you don’t want to use it, that you are a wealthy millionaire, that he is 
here to help you”.  The victims will be in doubt about who gave his number to 
them; he’ll be confused.  So the victim books an appointment.  The Respondent 
said “The victim will go and see the herbalist now, and he’ll tell you what you’ve 
got in your house.  Actually this thing he’s been told from behind by the first 
perpetrators, so what will happen now is that he’ll clean this money for you for 
free”.  The Respondent said that the herbalist would tell the victim that “…but 
what he needs to buy is, there is a certain perfume, that you are going to buy for 
R150.  With this perfume everything is going to be clean.  With just R150 they 
can clean R5 million for you”.   
 
Executing the fraud  
 
In this instance, the Respondent said that “… So what will happen now is you 
(the victim) arrange a day that he (the herbalist) is going to do it for the victim to 
see”.   
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According to the Respondent “… So you buy the perfume, you go to a hotel or 
any place that is comfortable for both of you, you put the money in a box, it can 
be any box, and those people they have their statues, they have their statues, 
idols, so he will open this perfume, and it is believed that this perfume attracts, it 
has a nice smell, it attracts the spirit, so the spirits now, are cleaning the money, 
the spirit hypnotises the victim actually, instead of you seeing papers there, you 
are seeing millions.  Instead you’ll be seeing money that the spirits are playing 
with your eyes”.   
 
He continued: “… So the perpetrator pray, and the victim see those pieces of 
paper now changing into his/her local currency, changing into money.  So the 
victim will be pleased that no, God has answered his prayers.  You’ve been 
struggling for a long time and now finally your prayers have been answered”.  
 
Complications 
 
Respondent 3 said “…. But there is always a clause.  After it has been 
transformed, a letter will appear in front of you.  It’s a spiritual letter, what 
happens is that the perpetrator will write a certain letter before going into 
business with you.  He’ll write a certain letter, he knows your name, that if my 
name is Mr Moses, it says ‘ Mr Moses, you are welcome into the spirit world, now 
that your money has been cleaned, we just need R200,000 or R300,000 from 
you, we just need R300 000, that’s the only thing we are going to charge you.  
When you give R300 000, you can collect your R5 million”.   
 
He further said: “…That’s now where they are going to crook you.  So the letter is 
going to appear now, you are happy that the money is clean, and you know that 
you can take part of that money and give it to him, so the letter is going to appear 
now that no, before you can take this money, you have to give R300 000 first, 
you give to the spiritual healer, and then you go and collect your money.  So at 
times if you know that R300 000 and 5 million, R300 000 is nothing, if you have 
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the money,  you are going to bring it, since you’ve seen box of money, so you are 
going to bring the money, or they are going to tell you, or unless you bring the 
money, and then you can come and collect your money, at times they can give 
you a few notes of that money, and then you can come, later on they pray again, 
and the money change into normal pieces of papers.  So when you go and sleep 
at home, you’ll be dreaming of how you are a millionaire”.  
 
 He also said: “…So the victim will be struggling now to borrow money.  So now 
is when he bring the R300 000, you give to the perpetrator, and they put the 
R300 000 on the floor, and they open the consignment, and they pray, and the 
R300 000 is now going to disappear, it’ll burn, with fire, and it will become ash.  
And after they pray now, the money in the box is going to transform, the paper is 
going to transform now into money.  And they’ll tell the victim that ‘that’s your 
million, you should take your money and go home’”.   
 
Complication 
 
Respondent 3 said “… And they will give the victim a certain condition, ‘that when 
you reach home you shouldn’t tell anyone, and when you reach home you should 
open that box only after two days’.  So when you collect it, you’ll go, at home 
you’ll be very happy, you cannot keep that, you are richer by 5 million, if you are 
having a wife, you are having a kid, you are having children, they must know that 
something is going wrong.  So the way your mood is going to be now, you’ll be 
smiling, and they’ll know that something is wrong. So most of the time now you’ll 
be forced to open the box, before the two days, so when you open this box now 
before this two days, it changes into normal pieces of paper.  But it has changed 
already to normal pieces of paper from when you collected it.  When you 
collected it and they closed it, it has changed already to normal pieces of paper.  
So the devil actually camouflaged your eyes.  So now you start to think, this thing 
actually started to change because I didn’t follow the law, they said two days, but 
actually I opened it after 1 day”.  
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The Respondent explained further: “…So when you phone them now, they have 
to start afresh again, you have to bring money again.  So at times if you don’t 
have the money you just end like that and now you’ll be scared.  And even if you 
know the person, you cannot approach him, because you believe because he’s a 
spiritual healer, he can kill you overnight.  You know the person who did that, but 
you can’t do anything because he tells you he can finish you in a second.  He 
can pray for the spirit, and the spirit can take you while you are sleeping.  The 
money has been taken by the spirit people, he’s not gaining anything.  But that 
money now, belongs to him.  So that’s how that one works, spiritism ”.   
 
Other types of AFF/419 scams include: 
 
v Sale of crude oil at below market value price 
 
In these cases, the victim is offered special crude oil allocations at lower than 
market value. As in other AFF business  proposals, the victim is required to pay 
special registration and licensing fees to acquire crude oil at below market price, 
only to find that the “sellers” have disappeared once the fees have been paid (US 
Embassy Lagos). 
 
v Disbursement of money from wills 
 
In this form of AFF, charities, religious groups, universities, and non-profit 
organisations receive letters or faxes from a mysterious benefactor interested in 
the group’s course and wishing to make a sizable contribution. Before the 
contribution can be released, however, the recipient must first pay an inheritance 
tax or various government fees and taxes (U.S Department of State 1997:23). 
 
In one of these letters, the name of the deputy minister of mines and energy in 
South Africa was used. The letter said she was a member of President Mbeki’s 
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cabinet and a beneficiary to millions of dollars inherited shortly after her husband 
had died while she was on an official trip to Trinidad and Tobago in 2002. The 
letter states “…After his death, I discovered that he had some funds in a dollar 
account… This fund emanated as a result of an over-invoiced contract which he 
executed with the South African government,” the letter said.  
 
It continues:  “Though I assisted him in getting this contract, I never knew that it 
was over-invoiced by him”. The letter says secrecy is essential as the 
government may investigate. If they discover this money in her bank account, 
they will confiscate it and seize her assets here in South Africa and it will 
definitely affect her political career in the government. The letter stated that 
because of her position in government, “Shabangu” should not be contacted and 
for security reasons her son would handle all negotiations (Naidu 2004).  
 
It should be noted that the type of AFF used by these criminals depends on 
where they and their prospective victims are located. The structure of the letters 
also depends on the prevailing world situation. For example, some letters are 
reported to have been from Iraq because of the war in that country, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Zimbabwe (plight of white farmers) and South 
Africa.   
 
v Held for ransom 
 
More and more often reports appear of individuals who are being held for ransom 
after they had been lured to Nigeria/ West Africa or South Africa with the promise 
of these exceptional business transactions. For example, in July 2001 the 
Sunday Times reported on the exploits of a former deputy mayor who travelled 
from Northampton to South Africa and was subsequently kidnapped by the 
fraudsters (Sunday Times 2001). 
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After he had flown to South Africa to meet his new “business partners” he was 
met at the airport by a man and a woman who escorted him in a car to a rented 
house in order to meet a Mr. Ford. There he was confronted by two men, armed 
with a pistol, and informed that they were holding him prisoner. 
 
Only after he had managed to alert his wife of his predicament in Polish, his 
home language, during a call he was allowed, was he able to garner police 
assistance and two detectives flew to Johannesburg to assist the South African 
Police. Three telephone traces led the police to a house in the East Rand of 
Johannesburg where the victim had been held captive in a locked room for nearly 
48 hours where they threatened to cut off his ear or kneecaps. 
 
Previously police also had to rescue a 42 year old Romanian businessman, who 
was kidnapped in 1999 and held captive in Soweto after he ad flown from 
Bucharest, in response to one of these letters. A ransom of $500,000 was 
demanded for his life. At the time, police arrested seven suspected gang 
members, five South Africans and two Nigerians who were being investigated for 
the kidnapping, and maybe even killing of a 65-year-old Norwegian millionaire, in 
September 1999.  
 
A similar scam involved a Japanese businessman who managed to escape his 
captors without serious injury, ran into a hotel’s restaurant in Durban where he 
found refuge and summoned the police. Earlier he had been forced to call his 
son in Japan with the message, “I have been confined. They will not release me 
until the money is paid. Please send $50,000”. 
 
In one of the nine cases, a Canadian, who was a resident of Mauritius, was found 
next to the motorway south of Johannesburg in June 1999. He was bound and 
shot twice through the head. He  flew to South Africa in response to a 419 letter 
which was later found at his home. After a few days his family received a 
demand for $200,000 but the deal went wrong and he was murdered. Four 
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others had survived after a ransom had been paid, and the police freed a fifth 
victim. 
 
While direct violence leads to several deaths each year as a result of this type of 
AFF, there are also several victims, often unreported, who eventually take their 
own lives, after they had been reeled in, to the point of financial or reputational 
ruin. 
 
In a related case it is open to speculation whether the finance director of a 
company in Saskatoon knew he had been duped by the Nigerian prior to taking 
his own life in July 2001. What he did know was that his unauthorised transfer of 
$105,562 from the company pension fund account had been discovered and he 
was about to be confronted (Sunday Times 2001). 
 
The next subsection that follows discusses the characteristics of AFF in terms of 
structure and organisation.  
 
2.3.3 Characteristics of AFF 
 
Capability 
 
This type of crime is not possible without some degree of criminal collaboration 
and infrastructure. Criminal capability is therefore not so much a matter of the 
skills and knowledge of an individual, although some individuals ha ve some 
particular skills and knowledge that are vital to a particular criminal enterprise, 
but more a matter of the convergence of criminal contacts and associates. They 
either join forces to commit a specific moneymaking crime, or provide essential 
logistical support, buy or dispose of illegal goods or launder the proceeds. This 
need for collaboration lies behind the formation of organised crime groups.  It is 
this capability of the AFF-schemes that enhances their power to defraud others. 
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Organised crime groups or criminal networks 
 
The term ‘organised crime groups’ is often used to refer to the activities of very 
serious and organised criminals, and in some instances it best describes the way 
those concerned have organised and see themselves. However, the term can 
also be misleading. While there are certainly some organised crime that 
resemble the Italian mafia, with permanent members and each with a distinct 
role, a hierarchy in which there are clear chains of command and communication, 
there are other groups that are, in practice, loose networks. The members of 
these groups coalesce around one or more prominent criminals to undertake 
particular criminal ventures of varying complexity, structure and length. In the 
latter instance, the criminals may not think of themselves as members of any 
group, and individuals may be involved with a number of sub -groups within the 
network, and therefore may be involved in a number of separate criminal 
ventures at any one time. AFF is a classic example of the latter. 
 
No clear consensus exists, however, regarding the degree of organisation in AFF 
networks. The New Jersey Commission of Investigation, as well as Enonchong 
(Jones 1993:66), state that controlling cells operate in various parts of the 
country, implying a high degree of structure. Enonchong (1988) suggests that a 
few Nigerian Mafia bosses tightly control Nigerian criminal activities on a global 
scale. A Sergeant of the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office interviewed a 
Nigerian informant, who gave him the following response when asked about the 
degree of organisation in his cell: “…there’s no formal organisation or informal 
organisation. See the way they are put these days, when somebody discovers a 
source of making quick money, he spreads it, you know like to  his friends, 
partners and all that” (United States Senate, 1987:213). 
 
It is clear that this capability of AFF-schemes, to utilise organised crime groups or 
criminal networks, makes them more dangerous and more likely to succeed. 
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In the empirical part of this research, the statements of the perpetrators and the 
respondent revealed that organised crime groups and criminal contacts are 
essential tools in the execution of AFF.  In his statement the perpetrator in Case 
4 said “… No, they work from there.  Its just they send them jobs, they call them 
from here and say no there’s jobs.  And that jobs will send them to people where 
there is money, you can’t do this job alone.  You do it with a network.  From 
South Africa, Nigeria, from Nigeria to UK to Chile, all those things they got a 
network”.  The perpetrator also said that “…It’s a network also. You cannot do it 
alone.  They’ve got that document maybe from the American Embassy to show 
that this paper is not allowed to be used by any person, it can only be used by 
government”.  Supporting this stance, Respondent 2 said “…But to be clear is that 
people who are doing it is a team and it’s a game.  Very well organised, very well 
organised.  And you as a victim you can’t even know that this thing is a game or 
it’s a team.  They are well organised.  But you as a victim you can never realise 
that they are well organised.  You’ll only realise they are well organised when you 
speak to another person, who was already victim.  He’ll say to you no, those 
people, blah blah blah.  Its only when you can realise they are well organised.  
And maybe stop pumping your money in”.   
 
Criminal contacts  
 
Where AFF is concerned, collaboration is crucial, as with any other serious and 
organised criminal activity. The desire or need to work with others encourages 
criminals to form groups and networks. However, these criminals routinely 
collaborate with people outside their immediate circle, not least with criminals 
that they buy from or sell to, and those that provide them with services, such as 
money laundering and transport. The ability to network and forge new 
relationships is thus an important factor in the success of many criminal rings, 
often opening up new money-making opportunities. Prison provides the ideal 
environment for criminals to network and make trusted contacts. In a number of 
cases, jailed members of serious and organised crime groups have come across 
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other prisoners who provided them with access to new networks or markets.  It is 
this capacity to utilise criminal rings that further enhances the success rates of 
AFF-schemes. 
 
Managing the risk from criminal contacts  
 
Research conducted by the National Criminal Intelligence Service in the UK 
(NCIS 2001-2004), indicates that criminal contacts pose a risks to organised 
crime such as AFF. This risk exists  because some of their contacts may turn out 
to be unreliable or indiscreet, or become a rival, or will be an informant, or even 
an undercover agent. In this regard, they try to manage these risks by working 
mainly with people they know well and trust. Shared experiences, gained for 
example through family connections, school, prison or previous criminal 
collaboration, are clearly important to establish trust. Common nationality or 
ethnicity is also important, particularly where there is a relatively small community 
involved and everybody knows everybody, or somebody can easily be checked 
out.  
 
Increasing social or geographic mobility has, however, been eroding the 
relevance of nationality and ethnicity in terms of the people involved in specific 
markets, and around the interaction between groups of different nationalities and 
ethnicities. 
 
Operate on strict ‘need-to-know’ basis 
 
These criminal rings operate on a ‘need-to-know’ basis, so that associates only 
know part of the picture. They also try to steer clear of activity that may link them 
directly to their crimes, and thus use subordinates or intermediaries for hands-on 
jobs such as handling illicit materials and dealing directly with new criminal 
contacts. The latter may first be checked out through other criminals or corrupt 
law enforcement contacts. However, until they have gained sufficient trust, new 
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contacts are more likely to be kept at arms length. The process of building trust 
might involve performing a number of minor roles or high-risk tasks, successfully 
of course.   
 
2.4 THE INCIDENCE OF ADVANCE FEE FRAUD 
 
To assist in understanding AFF, literature studies of the statistical facts need to 
be articulated. It should be noted that several references used in this section of 
the thesis focus more on sources of international origin, as the researcher does 
not consider AFF data of Nigerian sources as accurate. 
 
A report by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BCC) stated that Internet 
scams offer millions, and that Britain has received approximately 50,000 scam 
letters up to date (BCC 1998). These letters came via the international postal 
system. The article specifically stated, “Over the last 10 years, Nigeria has been 
the principal base for such scam offers with more than 50,000 scam letters were 
read in Britain by the beginning of that year. However, with the use of e-mail it is 
difficult to know the origin of these letters because perpetrators claimed to be 
located out of their location stated in the letter”. 
 
It is reported that in 2002, more than £8 million worth of losses were registered at 
the NCIS in U.K alone, with further losses reported directed to the U.K police 
forces. According to the NCIS, AFF has been a lucrative method of stealing 
money from gullible punters for more than 30 years, but the Internet boom has 
made it much more effective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
 
2.5 CAUSES OF ADVANCE FEE FRAUD 
 
Motivation for AFF 
 
Explanations based on financial strain feature in almost every type of fraud. 
According to Duffield and Grabosky (2001:2) this arises from imprudence, 
misfortune or a combination of the two. It should be noted, however, that financial 
strain is a very subjective concept. Even those with above average affluence 
(who are involved in AFF) may feel economically deprived in comparison to what 
they perceived to be the relevant standard. At times, “keeping up with the Jones’ 
” may require other than lawful conduct (Duffield et al. 2001:2). This stems from 
the desire to posses what one cannot afford, even when true financial deprivation 
may not exist. 
 
Inherent in the above, an element of ego is present, when a comparison with 
others, who are better off, is made, and a desire to match that standard in terms 
of lifestyle, comfort and material possessions. Other sources of financial stress 
may result from lifestyle choices, the most prominent of which is compulsive 
ostentation and even more ostentation is prevalent among AFF offenders. 
Duffield et al. (2001:3) stated that ego/power is a motivation that applies to all 
fraudsters. This can relate to power over people as well as over situations. In 
terms of the former, the sensation of power over another individual seems to be a 
strong motivating force for some fraud offenders to the point that it becomes an 
end in itself. As one con fraudsters put it “… for myself, I love to make people do 
what I want them to do, I love command. I love to rule people. That’s why I am a 
con artist…” (Blum 1972:46). 
 
The financial reward of AFF was found to be another motivating factor for this 
crime. In most cases it was found that the ease with which they make money 
through this fraud encourages individuals to take part in this crime. In his 
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statement, the perpetrator in Case 2 said: “…Because the financial rewards are 
enormous.  I mean how can, you’ve never worked in your life, maybe you’ve 
been selling sweets in the streets or maybe you’ve been working in a tuck-shop, 
and just because a letter you’ve sent, somebody pays you a million dollars? I 
mean obviously for a rationally thinking person, everybody would be interested in 
something like that would give you a financial reward for that kind of money”. 
 
With regard to the manipulation of people and making fools of their victims, some 
perpetrators seem to take a contemptuous delight in the act itself rather than 
simply the outcome. As Stotland (1997:186-7) points out sometimes individuals’ 
motivation for crime may have originally been relative deprivation, greed, threat 
to continued goal attainment and so forth. However, as they found themselves 
successful at this crime, they began to gain some secondary delight in the 
knowledge that they are showing their superiority to others. Similar to the sense 
of superiority over others is the gratification obtained from mastery of a situation. 
This is particularly prevalent in more complex, long -term and computer fraud 
where specialist skills are required. It also reflects the professional pride of the 
perpetrators.  
 
The following quotation (Blum 1972:44) illustrates the thrill of the chase, “Half of 
being a con-man is the challenge. When I score, I get more kick out of that than 
anything; to score is the biggest kick of my whole life”. Stotland (1977:88) calls 
this motivation “ego challenge” and it relates to the sense of mastery and 
excitement in meeting and overcoming challenges. As he pointed out, some 
fraud perpetrators work very hard at their trade, so they are not in it for an “easy 
buck”. 
 
It is acknowledged that the basic motivation for fraud is greed, a fairly robust and 
enduring human characteristic. Crime is also said to follow opportunity, and 
opportunities for fraud flow from economic growth. This implies that, the more 
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commerce grows, the more opportunities exist to commit fraud, and AFF is no 
exception.  
 
In this regard, Opolot (1986: 196-199) is of the opinion that a political-economic 
paradigm explains the increase in organised crime in Africa. This is due to the 
major structural changes that occurred in many African countries during 
colonisation, which resulted in political realignments and social differentiations. 
This therefore created conditions favourable for organised crime groups such as 
AFF perpetrators to exploit. A number of other conditions, including the 
introduction of a money economy, the existence of political instability, the 
expanding international trade, price differences and price fluctuations in 
commodities like crude oil, coffee, urbanisation, and the high incidence of 
unemployment create favourable circumstances for this type of crime, especially 
in Nigeria/West Africa and Africa in gene ral. 
 
This subsection below will focus on the motivation of AFF in Nigeria and in South 
Africa and why this crime has become an international phenomenon with 
perpetrators and victims scattered all over the world. 
 
2.5.1 Nigeria 
 
According to the Adaora Reports (2002) and as stated above, the North has 
ruled Nigeria for 36 out of the 42 years of independence, be it military or 
democratic. As a result of this, thousands of retired soldiers and their civilian 
accomplices are sitting on billions of dollars, sto len from public coffers. It has 
therefore been suggested that the exclusivity of the South in AFF business can 
be explained as their way of getting back at the northerners. Hence, the majority 
of the scammers could not do without the funds generated from it. However, 
there is a strong need in them to get even richer, and as the national cake 
remains as elusive as ever, the money has to come from somewhere else. Anger 
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(because despite all their intelligence and sophistication the northerners remain 
the ‘kingmakers’) is the motivation. 
   
Some government officials suggest that Nigerian criminal activity is motivated 
simply by greed. However, if this were the case, one could also blithely assume 
that Nigerians are inherently greedier than other nationalities. Some answer this 
question by saying that Nigerians are an impoverished people, turning to crime 
as a means of escaping economic hardship. It should be noted that Nigeria is a 
poor country, but most other developing countries are poor too. Yet many of 
these nationalities are not disproportionately represented in this type of activity. It 
is also acknowledged that Nigerians involved in criminal networks are not 
impoverished; many have graduate degrees, and thus possible alternative 
explanations to the “poverty hypothesis” are offered (Jones 1993:60). 
 
A contradiction: Oil wealth, yet poor 
 
Nigeria is endowed with natural resources so vast that it would have been a very 
beautiful country, if only good governance had managed her natural riches. 
Nigeria has oil reserves of over 22 billion barrels and there are numerous oil 
fields that are still untapped. In 2000, the country was the 5th largest supplier of 
crude oil to the U.S.A. The fact is that Nigeria is oil rich, but at the same time, it is 
one of the world’s poorest countries (Adaora Reports 2002). This could partly 
explain why the scammers use crude oil business to lure victims to Nigeria 
before defrauding them. 
 
Corrupt leaders: past and present 
 
The Adaora Report (2002) is of the opinion that the answer of AFF can be found 
in the activities of the country’s past and present leaders. The report states that 
corruption is socially embedded and there is no political accountability. 
Corruption and power abuse is one of the worst examples of Kleptocratic rule, 
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and Kleptocracy and corruption are synonymous for Nigerian governments since 
independence. The report further states that, successive governments have used 
its resources to purchase support, while increasingly repressing its opponents. 
In the same vein, Ebbe (1990:285) suggests that corruption in Nigeria emanates 
from the top. He states political assignations, acceptance of bribes, and other 
capitalistic crimes of the powerful provide the underprivileged elements in society 
with a technique for the neutralization of guilt. This explains why a reputed 
Nigerian “mafiaso” is quoted to have said “…we are simply recovering by non-
violent means the money extorted from Africa for generations. All means of 
getting rich are good so long as you are not caught. This is the  law of capitalism. 
I am a capitalist, so is America” (Enonchong 1988:30). 
 
Research indicates that poverty is not the reason why people indulge in AFF 
because a large percentage of the fraudsters are wealthy in their own right (not 
owing to AFF). They employ people to scam for them while they use their 
legitimate business as a front. Lower down the ladder are the newly qualified 
professionals who are caught up in the ‘get<->rich<->quick syndrome’ pervading 
southern Nigeria in recent times. This group would rather wait for the maturity of 
one scam than to work their way up the employment ladder (Adaora Reports 
2002). It has also been said that these fraudsters do this because the input is 
miniscule and the returns astronomical. If the scammer sends out 2000 letters or 
e-mails, and he or she receives a response of 1 per-cent or lower, he or she has 
hit the ‘Jackpot’. 
 
2.5.2 South Africa 
 
Several aspects of the social structure, culture, and economic system of South 
Africa are conducive to AFF. Competition in the business world, unemployment, 
modernisation and corruption in the criminal justice system are factors that 
contribute to the increase of AFF in South Africa. Consequently, the results of 
this sometimes goes beyond “puffing one’s wares” to fraud, a crime  
 82 
characterised by the intent to deceive (Conklin 2001:169). This situation became 
explosive after 1994, when South Africa opened its borders to the international 
world, which led to the influx of both legal and illegal aliens into the country. 
 
Business opportunities 
 
The transition to democracy in South Africa did not only end the country’s 
isolation from the rest of the world, but also opened the country to an influx of 
international business people who do business of all sorts. This transnational 
movement brought the perpetrators of AFF, who pose as businessmen, into the 
country. Since South Africa is a growing economy that has just emerged with a 
lot of potential, investors from around the globe, especially Asia and Europe, are 
eager to set up businesses in South Africa. As a result of this, perpetrators of 
AFF have been using South Africa as their location to coin and defraud both 
national and international would –be investors.  
 
In support of the above assertion the perpetrator in Case 4 said: “… I came from 
Italy, I left there, I didn’t have anything.  No I just bring small money, I thought I 
was coming to visit, I just brought small money to guard myself, when I came to 
this place, I saw there was money.  I just do small, small job.  We took money.  
We took money from Europe, transfer it to South African bank account, I brought 
it, I bought my house, and then I clear the other money”. The perpetrator in Case 
4 also said “…. The problem is most of the people they think South Africa…South 
Africa they need more investment.  That foreigner, they are very interested to 
invest here.  No the problem is everybody wants to survive and to make money 
easily in South Africa”.   
 
In a similar statement, Respondent 3 said: “…It’s not that they are choosing 
South Africa.  419 is everywhere in the world.  419 is everywhere in the world, 
most people they choose South Africa because South Africa is better than any 
other African country.  If the business is not moving, there are other things that 
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they could be doing in the meantime while waiting for the business. But I still 
believe South Africa is on top because they still believe there are more people 
here in South Africa who have money than in other parts of Africa, their economy 
is…there is much economic activity here.  So if you collect $20 000 here in South 
Africa, it’s not much for that person as compared to collecting $20 000 from 
maybe Congo DRC, or Ivory Coast or any other country.  Here, this person here 
doesn’t feel it much”. 
 
High rate of unemployment 
 
Crime rates are directly and often significantly associated with unemployment 
rates, but the relationship between the two rates is complex and difficult to 
unravel (Conklin 2001:184). In the case of South Africa, with an unemployment 
rate of about 40 percent, coupled with the influx of immigrants from other 
countries, the already complicated problem is complicated even more. The 
immigrants, both legal and illegal, are unable to find jobs, and then they become 
involved in criminal activities. However, it must be underscored that some 
offenders mix employment and crime by “moonlighting” as criminals. That is, they 
use their job or business as a front, or they use legitimate income as a stake for 
crime (Conklin 2001:84). It is argued that for moonlighters, more employment 
might increase criminal activity, but for those who use a job as a front or use their 
income as a stake, unemployment might reduce crime. However, research 
indicates that some perpetrators alternate between employment and crime, and 
in those cases more employment might increase crime, (Conklin 2001:184). 
Meanwhile, other offenders are committed to crime as a source of income. They 
would not work, even if jobs are available, and so a higher unemployment rate 
would not affect their criminal activity.  
 
In the research it was found that the high rate of unemployment amongst 
immigrants contributes to their involvement in AFF. Respondent 1 made this 
comment in her statement: “…Ja he told … He started this fraud in South Africa.  
 84 
Because he told me everybody in Nigeria is creative and there is no business.  
So here in South Africa, most of us are lazy and they are coming here to do 
business.  In Nigeria, he said to me he was studying…he used to complain that if 
ever you are from Nigeria, and you come this side, its very like difficult to get a 
job and everything.  You know if you are a foreigner, and it’s worse if you are 
from Nigeria.  You know he used to say that it’s very difficult to be employed. 
That‘s one of the reasons why he did that”.   
 
Modernisation and technological advances (Internet) 
 
In England, the Home Office considers a possible change in the way crimes are 
recorded, in order to mandate the collection of information regarding any 
significant use of the Internet where the commission of crime is concerned (Carr 
2004:24). The US Department of Justice is also said to have engaged in a similar 
study as well as several other governments. The obvious inference is that it is 
impossible for anyone to describe the impact or role of the Internet on the 
commission of crime with the kind of certainty one would prefer. However, there 
exist a growing body of circumstantial but objective evidence that point in the 
same direction (Carr 2004:24). AFF is a classical example, and is as old as the 
hills, but the Internet has given it a whole new lease of life. 
 
The fact that South Africa is regarded as a modern society, with the most recent 
technological development compared to other developing countries serves as an 
attraction for AFF offenders. The good infrastructure, communication networks 
and free economy pave the way for these criminals to function and elude quick 
detection from law enforcement agents. The availability of fixed telephone lines 
and cellular phone, as well as Internet service providers, facilitates the 
establishment of Internet cafes  used by these offenders to carry out their criminal 
activities. 
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In the next section of this thesis, the focus will be on an explanation of AFF, and 
those theories that can best explain this crime will be used. 
 
2.6 THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF ADVANCE FEE FRAUD  
 
Hirschi and Gottfredson (Joubert 1998:61) have argued that fraud can be 
explained in the same way as conventional crime. They are of the opinion that 
these individuals tend to strive for short-term gratification without taking the 
possible long-term consequences of their actions into account, in this case crime. 
Such people are characterised by impulsiveness, aggression and indifference to 
the opinion of others. This tendency to seek the short -term gratification of desires 
does not necessarily lead to crime. Crime requires the opportunity, as well as the 
possibility of evading immediate punishment. According to Albanese (1995:103), 
this explanation of crime is based on the assumption that human behaviour is 
motivated by self-interest, that is; pleasure is sought in order to avoid pain. 
 
In an attempt to test Hirschi and Gottfredson’s theory, Benson and Moore 
(Albanese 1989:104) compared more than two white-collar offenders with the 
same number of conventional offenders. They found that white-collar offenders 
are different from conventional offenders. They reported that a typical white-collar 
offender does not display the same deviancy problems such as alcohol or drug 
use, poor performance or social maladjustment. 
 
Meanwhile research carried out by Doerner and Lab (2005: 121-124) states that 
the theories of crime fall mainly into three categories. In this regard, their focus is 
on the intra-individual approach, socio-cultural and the social learning approach. 
With reference to Shaw and McKay’s social disorgani sation theory, Lemert’s 
labelling theory, Sutherland’s differential association and learning theory, and the 
opportunity theory, the researcher came to the conclusion that, within 
criminology, it is not possible to fi nd a single theory that incorporates all the 
necessary requirements to explain the manifestation of this phenomenon. Hence, 
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the above named theories will not be viewed individually, but eclectically in order 
to serve as a possible explanation of AFF. 
 
First, the cognitive theory will be applied to explain AFF. 
 
2.6.1 Cognitive theory 
 
Intelligence and cognition 
 
It is acknowledged that intelligence falls under the biological perspective because 
it has a genetic basis. It is discussed separately in this section, because the main 
emphasis is on cognition. Research has shown that intelligence should be 
approached as a collection of aptitudes or abilities, such as verbal 
comprehension, word skills, number skills, spatial comprehension, memory, 
perception and reasoning. The product of intelligence may be measured by 
means of various tests, and the final score is called an intelligence quotient (IQ) 
(Van der Hoven 2001:27). Meanwhile cognition is a concept that is closely 
related to intelligence. Cognition refers to our intellectual knowledge or 
comprehension of the world. It also includes the ability to combine things and 
relate them to one another (Kohlberg 1969:349). With regards to criminology, it is 
important to study the intellectual processes of offenders in order to explain why 
they commit particular offences. It must also be noted clearly that the degree of 
intelligence does not play a decisive role in determining whether a person will 
commit offences or refrain from it. It does, however, determine the type of 
offence that the offender will be capable of committing (Van der Hoven 2001:28). 
Hence a person of low intelligence will not be capable of committing computer 
fraud.  
 
This explains why literature research indicates that AFF perpetrators are 
intelligent, since this type of crime requires special skills and knowledge. The fact 
that AFF is a complicated form of fraud and that it can be perpetrated by 
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individuals with high intellectual capacity who are able to adapt to the changing 
methods of this fraud supports the validity of this theory. The writing of good and 
convincing letters, and the use of business, legal and banking language also lend 
some credence for the application of this theory to the explanation of this fraud.  
 
Supporting this assertion is the fact that the degree of intelligence influences a 
person’s social position in society and this in turn offers the opportunity to commit 
fraud. An intelligent person may have access to computer systems, a database 
of companies and governments, bookkeeping skills as well as the international 
business language needed to commit fraud (Conklin 2001:337). 
 
Cognitive theorists assume that offenders are rational actors (Tunnel 1992:5), but 
people do not always make rational decisions. The way in which people make 
decisions is very important in understanding criminal behaviour. Similar to the 
biological and the psychodynamic perspectives, the cognitive perspective relates 
to the internal processes of a person. Rather than emphasising urges, needs and 
motives, the emphasis falls on how people interpret and use information to 
resolve problems and, specifically, commit crimes. Thus the cognitive 
perspective places greater emphasis on an individual’s current thinking and 
problem solving strategies than that individual’s history. The individual is 
regarded as an information processor and they gather, store, modify, interpret 
and comprehend internal and general information as well as environmental 
stimuli (Sarason & Sarason 1993:81). Through their influence on cognitive 
processes, schemes enable people to rapidly identify stimuli, group them into 
manageable units, and supplement missing information to develop a strategy in 
order to obtain further information and thus resolve a problem or realize an 
objective (Sarason & Sarason 1993:81).  
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2.6.2 Social ecology or disorganisation theory 
 
Ecology studies the relationship between the organism and its environment. 
Social ecology focuses on a person’s relationship with the social environment. 
Therefore with regards to criminology, ecology includes the study of the spatial 
distribution of delinquency and crime (Brown, Esbensen & Geis 2001:307). 
 
Shaw and McKay (Joubert 2001:109) links the incidence of crime to the 
ecological properties of the environment. In this case, three variables are central, 
namely: poverty, mobility of residents and racial heterogeneity. According to 
them, these independent variables generate social disorganisation, which in turn, 
contributes to crime. These theories attempt to explain why crime rates are high 
in areas characterised by urban decay. In such environments there is a high 
turnover of residents, large scale unemployment and the key social control 
agents in society can no longer function properly. Shaw and McKay maintain that 
crime is associated with the physical structure and social organisation of the city. 
They claim that differential value systems exist in different communities. They 
also argued that this exposure to a multitude of different values meant that 
people in these areas would come into contact with individuals involved in 
criminal activities (Brown et al. 2001:311). 
 
This theory can best be applied to explain AFF in Nigeria – West Africa where 
the socio-political and economic systems have fallen apart due to massive 
corruption, embezzlement, theft of public funds and massive unemployment 
which led to disorganisation of all fabric of life in this region. The rule of law and 
social order breaks down and, as a result, everybody wants to get rich through 
any means possible. The social disorganisation theory can be applied to explain 
AFF in South Africa in recent times. This crime is mainly perpetrated by 
immigrants who come to South Africa for a better life. On their arrival, they are 
faced with many social problems such as housing, unemployment and racial 
heterogeneity. Shaw and McKay argue that these immigrants would be exposed 
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to a multitude of different values and would come into contact with individuals 
who are already involved in this fraud. 
 
2.6.3 Labelling theory 
 
This theory focuses no the process that leads to crime and the supporters of this 
theory are concerned with the effect of the labels that are used to label a person. 
The concept of a label treats the label as an independent variable, a causal 
agent that creates criminal behaviour (William & McShane 1994:136). According 
to William and McShane, labelling may take place in two ways: 
Ø The label may catch the attention of the labelling audience, causing the 
audience to watch and continue to label the individual accordingly, and 
Ø The label may be internalised by the individual and lead to an acceptance 
of a criminal self-concept. 
Either of these processes may amplify the criminal and create a career in crime 
(Wilkins 1965). 
 
This process causes crime, because the label creates a reaction and individuals 
who have been labelled become more visible in the sense that people are more 
aware of them. This awareness often results that they are watched more closely. 
Especially important are those at the law enforcement agencies who closely 
watch individuals, once they have come to the attention of their agency (William 
& McShane 1994:137). In this regard, those who are labelled become the cliental 
of the criminal justice system, and, like any other good business, the system 
keeps close tabs on its customers. According to William and McShane 
(1994:138), it is difficult for those, once labelled, to escape the attention of this 
audience, and subsequent behaviour is likely to be identified and relabelled. 
 
The point to note here is that people who are identified as ‘criminals’ have fewer 
chances to make good in the conventional world. This means that conventional 
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avenues to succeed are often cut off, and illegal means may become the only 
way left to them. 
 
As an example, one reason why immigrants, Nigerians and West Africans, are 
involved in AFF is because they have very few legitimate opportunities available 
to them to get a job and make money. Hence, after they had been caught for 
committing a couple of crimes such as drug dealing, and after their release, the 
individual’s opportunities for legitimate work certainly decreased. Employers, who 
would not hire the individual before are even less likely to do so now. There may 
therefore be little for the individual to turn to, except AFF. This explanation 
indicates that continued criminal behaviour is therefore not a matter of choice, 
but takes place because the person’s choices have been limited by society. 
 
2.6.4 Differential association theory 
 
According to this theory, Sutherland maintained that criminal behaviour is learned 
through social interactions, and to describe this learning process, he developed 
the concept of differential association. He suggested nine fundamental principles 
that explain the processes whereby a person becomes involved in crime . His 
propositions are as follows (Brown et al. 2001:325-329): 
Ø Criminal behaviour is learned 
Ø Criminal behaviour is learned through the interaction with other people in a 
process of communication 
Ø The principal part of the learning of criminal behaviour occurs within 
intimate personal groups 
Ø  When criminal behaviour is learned, the learning includes; 
i. Techniques of committing the crime, which are sometimes very 
complicated, sometime very simple 
ii. The specific direction of motives, drives, rationalisation, and 
attitudes. 
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Ø The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of 
the legal codes as favourable or unfavourable 
Ø A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions 
favourable to the violation of the law, over definitions unfavourable to 
violation of the law 
Ø Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and 
intensity 
Ø The process of learning criminal behaviour by association with criminal 
and anti criminal patterns involves all the mechanisms that are involved in 
any other learning 
Ø While criminal behaviour is an expression of general needs and values, it 
is not explained by those general needs and values, since non-criminal 
behaviour is an expression of the same needs and values. 
 
According to Brown et al. (2001: 331) the principle that criminal behaviour is 
learned provides the foundation for differential association. This expressly rules 
out heredity, human nature, and innovation as the causes of aberrant behaviour. 
This means that people are taught how to  behave, or misbehave in a social 
context. 
 
The second and third principles of differential association specify that criminal 
behaviour is learned primarily in interaction with significant others such as family 
and friends. 
 
The fourth principle, learning the techniques of committing crimes are said to be 
much less important than acquiring a mindset that is conducive to criminal 
behaviour. While a particular mindset is essential, familiarity with technique 
relates to the type of crime perpetrated and to succeed in committing the  offence 
without detection. Some crimes, such as AFF, entail the acquisition of complex 
techniques. Research concerned with AFF illustrates that considerable skills are 
needed and must be mastered to be able to pursue these criminal paths. 
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Learning the motives and drives, which result in a relatively constant desire or 
persistent urge to do illegal things is, on the other hand, a requisite of criminal 
behaviour. Similarly, learning rationalisations and attitudes that define criminal 
behaviour as acceptable, supports criminal behaviour. For example, in the case 
of AFF the perpetrators are taught specific attitudes and rationalizations, such as 
“payback time” or “we are simply taking back what they took from us during 
colonialism”, in other words “reparations”. 
 
In line with this theory, Sutherland claimed that differential association can 
account for offences committed by decent people with high social status during 
the course of their careers. His investigation revealed that lawlessness is 
common in the business, political and professional world. Research that 
focussed on AFF reinforces Sutherland argument that crime cannot be attributed 
to poverty, because most of these offenders are not subjected to poverty. 
Research also reveals that most of these offenders start their careers in good 
neighbourhoods and come from stable homes. When they enter the business 
world, however, they come into regular contact with illegal practices (Joubert 
2001:136). The principle of differential association can therefore explain advance 
fee fraud. 
 
2.6.5 Social learning theory 
 
In order to appreciate and use learning theory as an explanation of AFF, a basic 
understanding of operant-based learning theory is necessary. Operant theory is 
concerned with the effect that an individual’s behaviour has on the environment 
and, subsequently, the consequences of that effect on the individual (William & 
McShane 1994:204). In the same vein, Skinner (1971:16) indicated that, 
behaviour is shaped and maintained by its conseque nces. Therefore, behaviour 
is a product of present and past events in the life of the individual.           
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Akers (Brown et al. 2001:331) expanded Sutherland’s differential association 
theory by adding components of operant (voluntary response) and respondent 
(involuntary response) conditioning. While applying Sutherland’s sixth 
proposition, Akers formalised the extent to which learning is the result of 
exposure to both conforming and criminal behaviour and definitions. Akers 
therefore assumes that criminal behaviour does not differ as behaviour from 
normative conduct and both forms of behaviour can be explained by his learning 
theory. Accordingly, Akers identifies four key elements that help to shape 
behaviour (Brown et al. 2001:322): 
Ø Differential association 
Ø Definitions of behaviour 
Ø Differential reinforcement and  
Ø Imitation. 
 
Social learning theory states that people learn both deviant behaviour and the 
definitions that go along with it. The learning can be direct, as through 
conditioning, or indirect, like through imitation and modelling. The learned 
deviance can then be strengthened by reinforcement or weakened by 
punishment. Its continued maintenance depends not only on its own 
reinforcement, but also on the quality of the reinforcement available to alternative 
behaviour. If the definitions of deviant behaviour are reinforced, and if alternative 
behaviours are not reinforced as strongly, an individual is likely to engage in 
deviant behaviour. In the subsequent development and empirical testing of the 
theory, Akers focused on the principle processes of differential association, 
definitions, differential reinforcement, and imitation (William & McShane 
1994:209). 
 
This theory can be applied to explain AFF in the sense that the knowledge of this 
fraud is gained through social interaction and learning. AFF is said to be very 
lucrative for the perpetrators, and with this success and the resulting flamboyant 
lifestyle of the perpetrators those who admire them are attracted towards this 
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lifestyle and therefore imitate them and their criminal activities. This theory 
actually explains AFF when it is committed by Nigerians/West Africans, out of 
their country and region.  The association between immigrants who are 
fraudsters and law-abiding immigrants in South Africa lead to the association of 
two different value systems. The successful values are therefore reinforced by 
the law-abiding immigrants, through imitation and learning. In South Africa for 
example, most Nigerians/West Africans congregate daily at street corners and 
Internet cafes to discuss their fraudulent activities and use the Internet. In this 
way, more and more Nigerians/West Africans get involved in AFF.  
 
Compared with the other theories, social learning focuses more directly on 
behaviour and presents an obvious treatment or remedy for the crime. On the 
same stance, because learning theory is so focused on the individual, it is not 
difficult to classify it as a micro-theory. Although the theoretical principles are 
general enough to apply to all behaviour, it is a direct attempt to explain how 
individuals become engaged in criminal behaviour.  
 
According to William and McShane (1994:209), this theory can be referred to as 
a processual theory. This is because it explains the process by which criminal 
behaviour takes place and tells us why that behaviour occurs. 
 
2.6.6 Differential opportunity theory 
 
Cloward and Ohlin use the term differential opportunity, and according to this 
theory criminals are seen as the victims of unequal opportunity structures and the 
obstacles to legal opportunities that lower-class citizens need to overcome in 
order to achieve success (Fattah 1993:247). According to the theory of Cloward 
and Ohlin, criminal behaviour is seen as a deliberate choice, which depends on 
the relative availability of legal alternatives for potential offenders (Van der Hoven 
2001:56). The theory maintains that the motives of criminals are essentially the 
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same as those of law-abiding citizens (Fattah 1993:247).    
       
The unavailability of opportunities and the obstruction of legal channels for 
success for lower-class citizens create feelings of injustice, frustration, 
helplessness and direct victimisation. At the same time such individuals develop 
a perception of relative deprivation and reject society’s empty claim of equal 
opportunities for all (Van der Hoven 2001:57). The result is criminal activities, not 
only as substitute for legal activities, but also as a last resort. It must also be 
noted that professional criminals seek to create the opportunity to commit 
offences, whereas occasional offenders will use the opportunity when it presents 
itself (Fattah 1993:247).      
 
It has also been argued that the opportunity theory may also be presented in 
terms of available means for committing an offence. This is also a situational 
theory because it shifts the emphasis from the characteristics of the offender to 
the characteristics of the situation. This theory provides a firm base for 
developing a stimulus-response model for criminal behaviour and an interaction 
model that combines the behaviour of both parties (offenders and  victims) into 
one integrated scheme (Fattah 1993:249). 
 
One must bear in mind that a criminal event occurs when a situation fortuitously 
brings together factors that facilitate it (Barlow 1996:493). From the above 
discussion, it is clear that AFF is a crime that occurs because the opportunities 
for committing it are readily available in South Africa. Advocates of a situational 
approach look at crimes that have occurred and ask what events came together 
to make them happen. According to Cohen and Felson (Barlow 1996:493-494), 
predatory criminal events contain the following minimal elements: 
Ø Motivated offenders  
Ø Suitable targets and 
Ø The absence of capable guardians. 
 96 
These elements offer the opportunity for crime to take place and AFF is no 
exception.  
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the researcher discussed the origin of AFF, with emphasis on the 
social and political background of Nigeria after independence in 1961, where this 
fraud is said to ha ve originated. In this case, the categories of crimes in Nigeria 
were discussed with a focus on elite crimes. The nature and forms of AFF were 
analysed accordingly, and the characteristics of this crime examined.  The 
incidences of AFF around the globe was also discussed, and the causes and 
explanations. 
 
The findings in this chapter indicate that AFF usually begins with one form and 
ends as another form of AFF. A new form of AFF, which is referred to as 
“Spiritism” and “Fimash”, was not available in the literature, and was encountered 
in the empirical part of this research. It was also found that this fraud may begin 
with money transfers and when the victim visits the resident country of the 
perpetrator, they would change to anther form which is black currency or wash, 
wash/ fimash and end it up with spiritism. Interestingly, the whole process of 
black currency or wash-wash fraud was discovered. This research illuminates 
how the perpetrators introduce this fraud ‘businesses’ to the victims, how they 
contact victims, how they convince victims to pay them and finally how victims 
are defrauded. In this regard, the various ways of complications used by 
perpetrators was also illustrated. The findings also support that the high rate of 
unemployment and business opportunities, for investments, when compared to 
other African countries, was associated to this form of fraud in South Africa. The 
findings also support that AFF is very organised, specialised and well networked 
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Based on the socio-political origins and the nature (letters and travelling), the 
findings of this chapter regarding the crimes, can be presented in a table as 
follows: 
 
Table 2.1The crimes 
Types  Characteristics Structuring 
process 
Causes Explanations 
Transfer funds Infrastructure Introduce the 
business 
Motivated by 
greed 
Cognitive 
Contract fraud Organized Emphasise 
trust 
Oil wealth Yet 
poor in Nigeria 
– West Africa 
Social 
ecology 
Currency 
conversion 
Criminal contacts Explain the 
scam 
Corrupt 
leaders 
Social 
learning 
Crude oil sales  Manage risk What they 
want from you 
Business 
opportunities  
Labeling 
Real estate  How funds will 
be distributed 
High 
unemployment 
Differential 
association 
Disbursement  Emphasise 
trust again 
Internet access Differential 
opportunity 
Ransom, 
Kidnapping, 
Murder 
 Contact the 
victim 
  
Fimash  Convince 
victim that 
business is 
real  
  
Spiritism  Victim commit 
making 
advance 
payment 
  
  Manipulate the 
victim with 
‘complications’ 
  
  Spiritism   
 
 
Table 2.1 can be explained as follows: 
 
The types of crimes include the transferring of funds, contract fraud, currency 
conversion, cheaper crude oil sales, real estate fraud, disbursements, and even 
ransom, kidnapping and murder. 
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The characteristics of these crimes include that they are organised around 
criminal contacts to manage the risk of being caught.  All of these are supported 
by some kind of infrastructure. 
 
To execute the crimes, the following procedural aspects are employed: The 
perpetrator first introduces the business and at the same time emphases trust 
and secrecy.  Then the scam, as well as what is expected of the victim, is 
explained.  Next is explained how the funds will be distributed, and trust is 
emphasised again.  Then the victim is contacted (usually via e-mail).  Once the 
victim reacts, he is convinced, with the assistance of some other documentation, 
to commit him.  Next a meeting is set up and the manipulation by complications 
is activated to get as much money as possible money from the victim. 
 
This chapter also revealed the causes and explanations of these crimes.  The 
causes are greed; corrupt national leadership; business opportunities; high 
unemployment and access to the Internet.  These crimes, it was found, can be 
explained by means of the cognitive, social ecology and social learning theories, 
labelling, differential association and differential opportunity theories. 
 
In a nutshell, the types of AFF determine the nature and origin of this fraud. The 
origin, in the same vein, influences the characteristics, which in turn determine 
the causes. Why these causes actually cause AFF is in turn explained by the 
theoretical basis of these types of fraud. One can explain this type of fraud, 
because it is structured very clearly. Thus it is clear that the types are the basic 
building blocks for understanding this phenomenon. 
 
In conclusion, considerable publicity has been given to the problem of AFF, and 
this offence continues to take place, fuelled by vulnerable and gullible victims and 
increasingly unscrupulous and violent organised criminals. It all began as a 
relatively simple adaptation of a traditional advance fee ploy, but now it has 
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developed to an extensive and intensive organised criminal ring with links to 
other major crimes internationally. The nature of this form of organised crime is 
such that displacement invariably occurs where law enforcement proceedings 
are taking place, with offenders moving away to nearby countries. Also, the use 
of electronic messages to disseminate AFF letters represents a particular 
problem, as this enables offenders to disguise their identity and canvass large 
numbers of victims. Unfortunately this crime has become an international 
phenomenon, and it would need careful study and analysis in order to fully 
understand it.  
 
The next chapter will focus on the perpetrators of AFF their modus operandi and 
their characteristics. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
THE PERPETRATORS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The most common crime, theft in its widest sense, is motivated by human greed, 
which is acknowledged as a natural human trait. Fraud in general and Advance 
Fee Fraud in particular is said to be a crime where the primary motivation is 
greed. The AFF fraudsters prey upon human vanity, fantasy, loneliness, 
insecurity, and fear. According to Bohlen and Kerr (Friedrichs 2004:178) it is 
usually, during hard economic times, when people are desperate for money or 
savings that get-rich-quick schemes tend to flourish. 
 
It should be noted that, when they decide to what category of fraud they commit 
themselves, and how, where, when and with whom to go about it, that Advance 
Fee Fraudsters are guided by considerations of profits, risk, opportunity and 
capability. The perpetrators aspire to do so without getting caught, and therefore 
they manage their risk. The decisions they make involve a balancing act of 
anticipated profit and risk, but also rely on identifying an opportunity and 
possessing the capability to exploit it. Studies state that different perpetrators 
approach these considerations in different ways, influenced by a variety of 
factors, including environment, culture, experience and individual temperament. 
  
These criminals are highly fluid with regards to their personalities and their 
methods of operation. Although there is a degree of structure evident in these 
organisations, the hierarchical composition and relationships within these 
organisations are not comparable to the more traditional criminal organisations. 
In terms of structure, these enterprises seem to range from independent 
entrepreneurs to highly organised syndicates. They are able to change and 
adapt, as needed, both with respect to the criminal activities they pursue, and in 
the members they employ. This flexibility allows them to remain in operation and 
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insulate themselves from law enforcement. The speed with which some of these 
offenders react to law enforcement efforts and adapt to new techniques 
demonstrates the effectiveness of their inter-group intelligence sharing and the 
co-ordination between the various syndicates. 
 
In this chapter the perpetrators of AFF in terms of their nature and organisation, 
their characteristics, and their modus operandi will be discussed. The findings of 
the empirical part of this research will also be discussed and integrated into the 
relevant sections of this chapter. The theoretical explanations of these career 
offenders will also be examined in order to fully understand them. 
 
3.2 THE NATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF AFF PERPETRATORS 
 
In the discussion that follows, the nature and organisation of AFF perpetrators 
will be examined as it is documented in the literature. First, the nature of these 
offenders will be discussed.  
 
3.2.1 The nature of AFF perpetrators  
 
The perpetrators of Advance Fee Fraud are said to belong to an underground 
network of influence that is characterised by evil, violence and dare-devilry. The 
machine of their trade is oiled by an over-arching determination to get wealthy by 
any means possible. The morality of their operation is akin to the code of ethics 
among thieves, assassins and the mafia. Detailed descriptions of their operations 
point to a sadism that is beyond human comprehension. These men and women 
have chosen to live dangerously, a step beyond the law. They dare the law. They 
manipulate the system. The tragedy is that they are good students of human 
psychology: they play on their quarry’s greed. They exploit the insecurity of law 
enforcement officers (Abati 2003:4). According to Abati, AFF is a very 
sophisticated game with connections in the police, the judiciary and every other 
level of society. The 419 kingpins patronise hotels; they have their own taxi 
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drivers. Curiously they provide emp loyment for both the innocent and the guilty, 
and they regard this type of fraud as a profession. Subjected to close 
interrogation, the 419 operators may even mouth an uncanny ideology namely: 
that he commits fraud as a Robin Hood. He steals from the rich what they have 
stolen from society; he is also engaged in a form of reparation. Many of their 
victims are unsuspecting foreigners; by robbing them he insists that he is 
correcting the injustices of colonialism (Abati 2003:5). 
 
Research (The 419 Coalition 2003) reports that they are prepared to kill to get 
their loot, and are constantly surrounded by the threat of violence. The more 
successful ones are the role models of the underworld; they have apprentices 
who, while waiting for their own big break, functi on as part-time robbers or 
assassins. When the ‘boy’ also hits it big, he is required to respect his masters in 
the trade, and he soon acquires his own apprentices who help him to build a cult 
of influence around him. Studies report that the ingenuity of the fraudsters is 
magical, and according to Abati (2003:5), it is sustained by sorcery and cynicism.  
 
Highly skilled and creative in fraud 
 
According to literature research, the perpetrators of Advance Fee Fraud ranges 
from highly skilled to average individuals in terms of their intellect, wealth and 
status in society. Research also reveals that the driving force behind this crime is 
greed, and these fraudsters are said to have a talent for sniffing out the same 
vice in others, who, in their desire to get rich quickly, are too eager to put their 
trust and money in the hands of unscrupulous schemes. These scammers justify 
(neutralised) their actions by assuming that victims deserve their fate (Scammers 
& Cons 2004: I). 
 
Supporting the above statement, as per the complex nature of AFF, the 
perpetrator in Case 4 said “…You know fraud, you must understand fraud has 
too much technicalities.  You need thorough knowledge, and you need to be in 
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that field to know what is fraud.  If you don’t know fraud, they can come to you 
today there, and you’ll accept.  Even me I do fraud, somebody can come to me 
today and defraud me myself.  It’s just the technicalities you must know, and the 
procedure, this, you must know these things”.   
 
These brand of fraudsters have charisma, which sometimes masks the fact that 
they are malignant narcissistic and like to feed on the insecurities and stupidities 
of the naïve and weak. They know that people who are down on their luck are 
easier to manipulate, and they have no feelings of guilt or remorse as they use all 
manners of trickery and deceit available to them. These criminals love to flaunt 
the spoils of their massive multi-million dollar deceptions. After spending as much 
as physically possible on luxury cars, fully equipped mansions and casino 
junkets, they try to hide the excess in offshore accounts. 
 
Learned the techniques of AFF 
 
Research (Jones 1993:63) determined that the perpetrators of AFF do not just 
come out of the blue; they actually study the techniques of this crime. A study by 
United States Senator Roth’s sub-committee reported that the most common 
element of this crime is that individuals learn how to commit this fraud from one 
another, sometimes for a fee. The report states that, once this information is 
learned, one can live off the fruits of this fraudulent activity for years (Jones 
1993:63). In a Secret Service raid conducted in Atlanta U.S.A, agents recovered 
what they named a “Nigerian Handbook”. The document is a well-crafted 
instruction guide explaining how to commit various types of fraud. The Secret 
Service did not know if a Nigerian wrote the document, but the point is that it was 
distributed to Nigerians entering the U.S.A (Jones 1993:63). 
 
The fact that this fraud is learned was also confirmed by the empirical part date 
presented in this research. This was made in a statement by the perpetrator in 
Case 1 in which he said “… Yes it can be learned.  If I had stayed in Mr. Ribado’s 
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house for a longer time, maybe I would have been a master in the business.  If I 
had stayed there for maybe 6 months to one year, I would have been a master in 
the business from beginning to end. But because I stayed there for a couple of 
days, I don’t have the details of how to start the business and end it. So that is 
the process of learning the business.  So I can say that I was in the process of 
learning the business, although my mind was not there”.  
 
The perpetrator also said “…What I know is, when you are in the business, and it 
benefits you and it helps you, and you have a friend or a brother that you want to 
help, you are going to say ok, you come, come and stay with me. And you stay 
with them, and they can be sending you on errands, go and buy airtime for me, 
go and post this letter for me or go and send this money from the bank. This is 
the kind of errands they can send you on.  And in that process, they are teaching 
you, this is how I make my money.  If you are also able to do it on your own.  And 
you ask them what must I do?  And they tell you go and look for an address 
book, and like playing Lotto or whatever, you lie to them. If they reply its fine, 
you’re serious.  And if they don’t apply then you are not lucky. And then it is 
possible that you don’t even know how to write, and they’ll tell you, this is a copy 
of what I wrote.  Write a similar story to Mr. James.  Then they are already 
teaching you”.  
 
The perpetrator in Case 4 said: “…No, I’m from Congo, DRC, yes.  In this fraud, I 
was dealing with big, big shot guys.  These big marshals, I was working as … I 
was a refugee in Italy.  And I was working at a big merchant house in Italy, and 
while I was working there, I was…from there I left.  So they taught me how to do 
fraud.  They taught me.  No it was like school obviously.  If you read about that 
experience that they do, they wi ll explain to you.  Yeah, I used to do…we do, we 
do jobs”.   
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Impersonation   
 
It should also be noted that the lack of face-to-face contact that typifies these 
crimes allows the perpetrators to impersonate government and corporate officials 
to increase credibility, and in some cases, to coerce reluctant victims. The 
anonymity of telephones and e-mails permits amateur perpetrators to 
impersonate middle age authority figures with distinguished names in order to 
gain credibility with their victims. These perpetrators can identify themselves as 
the “general manager” or “president” of a company, son or wife of a former 
African head of state, thus leading further credence to their claims that “Yes, this 
time your ship has finally come!” According to one of them “… I make them 
understand the importance of my position, being the promotional director. And 
right off the bat they are excited because when it is the owner, they think of you 
as the higher authority”. Impersonating government officials may also serve as 
the basis for subtle or even brazen coercion. For example: perpetrators 
sometimes pose as tax or customs officials and “remind” the victims that they are 
under legal obligation to pay taxes on the funds the perpetrators has promised 
them (the victims).   
 
The research shows that impersonation by the AFF perpetrators is a common 
factor evident in all the letters that they send to prospective victims. It is 
acknowledged that they do not use their real names in this regard because they 
want to create the impression that their letters are from “General Managers”, 
‘Presidents”  “Chiefs”, “Mayors”, Sons/ Wives of former presidents, and Directors 
of companies, as seen in the annexed AFF letters in this thesis.  
 
Ostentatious lifestyle of perpetrators   
 
Research (Adaora Reports 2002:2) indicates that the life and mind of 419 
perpetrators are all about ostentation, ostentation and more ostentation. It is 
reported that, one of the perpetrators had so many cars that his palatial mansion 
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resembled a car dealership. His wife would co-ordinate what she was wearing 
with the colour of the car she drives. If she drove a different car every day it 
would take her over six months to drive all the cars (Adaora Reports 2002:2-3). 
 
The empirical research indicated that ostentation and more ostentation was part 
and parcel of the mind and lifestyle of an AFF perpetrator. This statement was 
made by the perpetrator in Case 2 when he said: “…  I mean you drive flashy 
cars; you can be able to buy maybe an A4 or BMW 3-series CASH.  There are 
people who have these kinds of cars. They buy CLKs or SLKs Mercedes Benzes 
cash”. The perpetrator in Case 3 said “…But you know as a friend, I just needed 
money for a weekend in Nigeria, just for a weekend.  So I can fly to Nigeria for 
the weekend, come back to SA”. In a related statement, the perpetrator in Case 5 
said “…Yeah, yes, yes, yes, I had money, but I can only say most of my money I 
squashed it.  Yeah I had money, but most of my money I squashed it because I 
was travelling, I was like travelling all over the world and sleeping in five-star 
hotels, you know, like going out with the best woman, like driving the best cars.   
Yes, I had money.  I taste money and I had money”. 
 
World travellers 
 
The research conducted for this thesis indicated that AFF perpetrators are well 
known travellers, both nationally and internationally. It was found that these 
fraudsters travel to complete a job/business, to enjoy their loot, to evade law 
enforcements agents and to stay away from their victims in cases of local 
victimisation. At times, it is said that they travel to invest their stolen money, 
especially in their native country. 
 
In this regard, the perpetrator in Case 2 said: “…You see me personally; I’ve 
never been in Nigeria for a long time.  I’ve been in and out of Nigeria for 11-12 
years.  I left Nigeria when I was a very tender age.  I go to the country and spend 
maybe 2 months, a month, and 3 weeks with my parents.  I have studied in 
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Tunisia for a long time.  So from there I came to South Africa”. The perpetrator in 
Case 4 said “…And then I used to travel.  I did travel. I travel to Australia on 2000 
1 July and when I come back, I was planning to leave for America, and then the 
same Wednesday my friend called me and I get arrested”. The same perpetrator 
said “… I’ve been in Italy for 10 years, and I own property in France”. 
 
In an exclusive interview with one of the “reformed” perpetrators, Delio (The 419 
Coalition 2003) reports that the perpetrator, who is a Nigerian student in the U.S, 
asked to be identified only as “Taiwo”, detailed the workings of the business, 
which he said his family had been involved in for 15 years.  Delio reported that 
Taiwo did nothing more than write letters intended to lure victims into the scam, 
that Taiwo said the con game is profitable enough to “nicely support” several 
dozen of his family members. 
 
“We have the letter writers and the people who create the official documentation, 
the people who talk to our clients on the phone, the people who arrange travel 
and meetings and tours of government offices in Africa, Canada, Japan, and the 
United States…no, it’s not a small business,” Taiwo said. “But I want to make 
clear that very few Nigerians are barawo  (criminals). Nigerians, too, are the 
victims of these crimes,” Taiwo said. “This is not just something that Nigerians 
do; the business is organized and run throughout the world by people of all 
races”. 
 
Taiwo said he began composing letters for his family’s 419 operations eight 
years ago when he was 11, after he had discovered he enjoyed “playing with 
words”. The letters are intended to resembles soap operas, Taiwo said, but with 
language that evokes someone whom is “educated, upper-class, out of touch 
with the common people”. “I was told to write like a classic novelist would,” “very 
old world, very thick sentences”. He said his family first became involved in the 
scam around 1986 when Nigeria’s oil industry collapsed. “For many of my 
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relatives, there is much shame in the business,” Taiwo said. “Others have come 
up with ways to justify it. They say it is not our fault foreigners are so greedy” 
  
During a telephone interview, Taiwo’s uncle told Delio that “You would be 
shocked at how many wad (rich people) want something more for nothing”.  
“Greed carries their heads and turns them foolish”.  
 
“Many of the people who contact the family are laughing unbelievers. But once 
they realise there is a real person on the other end of the e-mail, they sometimes 
get interested, Taiwo said. “Then the game starts”. Small sums of money for 
bribes, processing fees and the like are then extracted over time from the “client”. 
But the optimum goal is to lure the prospects to Nigeria before their “eyes go 
come down sad” (they realize they’ve been conned), Taiwo’s uncle said.  
 
Once in Nigeria, clients will be treated to what Taiwo’s family calls “dirty money 
mago-mago” (deal). The prospects will be shown a suitcase stuffed full of 
blackened pieces of paper and told that it is money, which has been disguised so 
it can be smuggled into or out of the country. “So the person thinks right away 
they are playing with him,” Taiwo said. “He gets all tense”. Then they ask him to 
select any bills at random from the suitcase. “And they take and rub the black off 
- yes; it is real money covered with Vaseline and something else… I think they 
use iodine, too. So he relaxes, and then asks for many thousands to pay for all 
the money to be cleaned”. 
 
“We make sure the wad came into the country illegally (without proper 
documentation), so they have to pay big to leave with no trouble”. “There have 
been some more arrests recently. Six people were taken away in April” Taiwo 
said. “But I think there’s no stopping the game”. 
 
 
 
 109 
3.2.2 The organisation of AFF perpetrators 
 
The perpetrators of AFF are said to have a particular pattern of organisation to 
facilitate their activities. The manner in which these perpetrators organise 
themselves is discussed below: 
 
Cross-sector criminal activity - the concept of crime sectors 
 
While it is in understanding the scale and nature of the various activities and 
considering the best response, the division of AFF into different sectors is as 
much a reflection of the law and organisational responsibilities for its 
enforcement as it is a criminal behaviour. As part of their risk assessment, 
419ers may take account of the fact that different crimes are tackled in different 
ways and by different organisations, are afforded greater or lesser priority, and 
attract more or less severe penalties. They are, however, unlikely to think in 
terms of discrete crime sectors (NCIS 2003). 
 
The scale of cross-sector criminal activity 
 
Studies (The 419 Coalition 2003) indicates that significant numbers of 419ers 
especially those that are larger and have been active for longer, are involved in 
two or more money making criminal activities. This excludes money laundering, 
which is common to nearly all groups of any consequence or durability, but 
includes drug trafficking which involves more than one type of drug. In this 
regard, the NCIS reports that the most frequent cross sector activities in the U.K. 
involve drugs plus other activities. However, combinations that do not include 
drugs are also seen, for example organi sed vehicle theft, kidnappings and 
extortion. Law enforcement emphasis is, however, on drugs, especially in South 
Africa and crimes that do not involve drugs, such as AFF, are less likely to be 
spotted and are almost certainly occurring more frequently than reported. 
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The spurs of cross-sector criminal activity 
 
In their search for profitable ventures, many AFF perpetrators diversify their 
activities by combining AFF with drugs importation and distribution, acceptance 
of counterfeit currency, prostitution and use illegal immigrants as drug couriers 
(NCIS 2003). The perpetrators therefore have an interest in facilitating 
immigration crime and do so mainly by supporting deceptive methods of entry in 
and out of a country. Trusted contacts are, however, central to the spread of 
cross-sector criminal activity since they extend a group’s range of skills and 
reach. In some instances, there is synergy between two distinct criminal 
activities. Some perpetrators’ criminal capabilities are specific to a particular type 
of crime, but many, either separately or in combination, provide criminals with the 
means to carry out a range of crimes, thereby creating cross-sector criminal 
activity (NCIS 2003) For example; someone who owns vehicles and yards, and 
has access to warehouses, may be prepared to rent them out to be used to 
smuggle goods, drugs, people or any other commodity. This may encourage 
others to diversify into whatever commodities they can source and profit from. 
Similarly, someone who provides financial services opens the door to a range of 
crimes, such as AFF and money laundering. Research also suggests that the 
AFF perpetrators’ risk management approach also leads them to diversify their 
criminal activities. They may be prompted to move from one crime area to 
another because they perceive the risk to have increased in an area, perhaps as 
a result of specific law enforcement actions such as arrests and seizures. 
 
Players of the game 
 
The perpetrators of AFF are well organized in their dealings with their victims. In 
this case, there is a “qualifier”, also known as a “dialer”, who identifies victims on 
the lead lists who have either lost substantial amounts of money or have the 
potential to, by making exploratory contacts. A “fronter” makes the initial sale, but 
then passes the lead on to a reloader who will then attempt to repeat the 
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process. A “closer” is a high-pressure perpetrator who completes the fraud. A “no 
saler” is someone who solicits people who have said “no” to prior solicitation. A 
“takeover” man will step in if a fraud attempt bogs down and needs new 
enthusiasm and a different line to convince the victim (The  419 Coalition 2003).    
 
Organised and well-networked /Government officials as accomplices 
 
This research found that AFF perpetrators are well organised and they operate 
as a network, both nationally and internationally. Nationally, it was found that 
they networked and operate with government officials, law enforcement agents 
and businessmen.  This was evident in the statement of the perpetrator in Case 1 
when he said: “…Bank officials or government officials are involved. It could be a 
bank official or security companies.   But what you must know is that there are 
some people working in the bank that they are going to get information from”.  
Similarly, the perpetrator in Case 4 said ‘…Yeah, there I can’t mention their 
names. Yes these people, big people, big, big people.   Big business people, in 
the government, big officials, big people.  Well known in this country.  Yes they 
were involved in this fraud.  The fraud was for 9 million Rand, nine million Rand 
that fraud”.  He also said “…Yes, they use government officials, they use 
government officials.  They use big people to convince the victim.  Yeah, they 
use all these people.  They can use these people, they can use these people 
officials who work in the office”. 
 
He elaborated: “… There are people, lets say he meets you in the U.K. You might 
have some friends who live there.  And it is those people who give information for 
the business company there; they send them to meet people here.  Now they 
work from there.  Its just they send them jobs; they call them from here and say 
no there’s jobs.  And that job will send them to people where there is money; you 
can’t do this job alone.  You do it with a network.  From South Africa, Nigeria, 
from Nigeria to U.K. to Chile, all those things they got a network”.  The  
perpetrator in Case 5 said “…Because the thing is, those officials inside, those 
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who are working in government institutions, those who work in banks, they also 
do fraud.  They work with outsiders”.   
 
Bankers assist perpetrators 
 
This research also discovered the role bankers play in the facilitation of the 
commission of AFF. The research found bank officials assist these fraudsters by 
giving them information on how international banking transaction are carried out. 
This of course makes it easier for the perpetrators to convince victims of their 
legitimacy.  The findings of this research also indicated that banks do not raise 
any questions in cases where large sums of money are transferred into the 
accounts of fraudsters. Supporting this stance is the statement of the perpetrator 
in Case 1 in which he said: “…Yes, I’ve told you that government officials are 
involved, bank officials are involved, because a layman in the streets doesn’t 
know how money is transferred from one bank to another.  Yes they can corrupt 
them.  Like they can go and ask the bank official how does money leave from 
one bank to another?  What are the instruments involved?  Because if you have 
to tell somebody to transfer money from one country to another, you have to 
know the legitimate procedures to transfer money from that country.  This means 
that you need information from the bank.  This means that you have to source 
that information”.  
 
The perpetrator said: “… You may pay for it, but it depends on how you get it.  
So, you can also get legitimate instruments like wire transfer documents, 
communications, different charges like commission or whatever the bank 
charges.  This is the information that you’ll need”.   
 
According to this perpetrator, this information is meant to convince victims. He 
said “… When discussing with somebody, you must tell them the information 
which is operative.  Even when you’re discussing with somebody who is, he’s 
going to know that what this person is saying is true. Because you have to tell 
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them something that is happening.  You can’t just go there and say you have to 
transfer money to me, and then the person ask you how you are going to transfer 
it, and if you don’t know how to transfer it, then you’re not going to have anything 
to say. So if the man says how I am going to transfer it, you begin to educate him 
like this is the procedure, and whatever you are saying is what is really 
happening.  Which means for you to be able to have such information, you must 
source it”.   
 
This perpetrator also made mention of the fact that, banks do not query 
perpetrators when they receive huge sums of money into their accounts. He said 
in his statement that: “…If the bank is raising questions, they wouldn’t be getting 
money, because at the end of the day the money is getting to the 419ers.  You 
understand?  If the bank is raising questions, at the end of the day they can stop 
the perpetrator from taking that money. What is happening is the perpetrators are 
getting the money. If they ARE raising questions it is just trivial 
questions…because at the end of the day they ARE getting the money. 
Perpetrators are getting the money. And in most cases they can send the money 
maybe through wire transfer.  So what kind of questions are you going to ask? 
So when they send money maybe through monogram all you need is to take your 
I.D and fetch the money. So the only thing they can ask you is who send you the 
money.  They ask you who send you the money. You tell them this is the man 
who send the money.  They can ask for his address and you can tell him this is 
the address. So my point is the one who goes there to get the money already has 
all the information about the person who paid the money.  So if you pay that 
money to the bank, it is possible that they will ask questions but the questions 
are not sufficient to stop them from taking the money.  For whatever question the 
bank is going to ask they are going to have an answer for it”. 
 
The perpetrator in Case 4 said: “… like they can take you to the bank, so the bank 
manager must be aware that they are taking this victim into the bank to show him 
here in South Africa”.   He also said: “…No, the bank doesn’t ask questions.  
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Usually, before we do these things, we usually tell somebody in the bank.  For 
protection.  And then you just contact him and negotiate.  Someone who never 
raise any question when the money is coming.  Any money which comes, like 
let’s say if its dollars or pounds, if that enters the bank.  Yeah some knows that it 
is fraud.  Yeah you share the commission, whatever they want.  Yeah I did the 
same thing in France.  I make a lot of money in France”. 
 
The perpetrators in Case 5 also said: “…money transfers is when you…you get a 
connection in the bank, Yes, we work with…we worked with bank officials”.  He 
also said that: “...  We used to work with, with…inside, it was an inside job.  
Yeah, it was an inside job.  So there I cannot say much.  People do open 
accounts and it’s just something like that.  Even the database of all what we’ve 
got; the names, the account number, and then their job is done”.   Respondent 1 
said: “…Then they’ve got connections with managers from this… bank.  Then 
they’ve got those extra bank accounts, so they give them those details so that 
they cannot trace them, you know?  They don’t give them their real details, so 
that’s how they get their money and because they are having connections with 
the bank managers, its easy for them to get money, to withdraw the money, 
because they don’t ask them a lot of questions”. 
 
Perpetrators commission / Outsource AFF 
 
This research revealed that perpetrators of AFF commission or outsource their 
business. In this case it was found that the amateur perpetrator would hand over 
or transfer a victim that he has hooked to an experienced perpetrator. They 
would share their loot 50-50 when the fraud matures.  
 
The perpetrator in Case 1 supported the above with the following statement: “…It 
is possible that somebody cannot speak proper English but he can write.  Or it’s 
possible someone is not competent and he’s having this business and want to 
seek advice from somebody else.  So this person says:  okay, you want me to 
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give you the advice, when the thing happens I must also have something.  
Because you have a lot of new people that don’t know how the business works 
but they have hooked victims and they don’t have the procedures to take so they 
have to ask somebody who is already involved in the business to take over”. 
 
Respondent 3 also confirmed this and said: “….  But there are some people who 
are still beginning; those are the ones who struggle.  For those who have been 
inside the business for years, they don’t even need to approach what we call a 
mugu.  For those who are starting, they are the people who go and contact this 
mugu, they go and search for them, and they propose business to them.  And 
when now they believe the victim are inside the trap, they come now and hand 
them to those big ones who have been inside the business for a long time.  They 
have their bosses.  They have their boys.  So when they take the money now, 
they take their own share.  They learn how to do the job.  With time now, you can 
do it yourself.  You can speak to the mugu, and then sample him, and then you 
collect the money at the same time.  But there are some people they are just 
good only in speaking.  Maybe they are scared to go further than that.  He’ll 
speak and come and hand it, and when they take the money, even if it’s a small 
share, he’s going to be satisfied”.   
 
Use of Internet cafes 
 
It is known that Internet is one of the instruments that AFF perpetrators use to 
contact victims. They use these facilities to send e-mails in which they propose 
business investments, or transfers of funds from Africa or any troubled area 
around the world to Europe and America. This research found that these 
fraudsters spend most of their time at Internet cafes, sending e-mails to victims. 
The findings indicated that AFF use Internet cafes as their offices and they have 
special rooms and computers that they use. It is reported that at times these 
fraudsters use their mobile laptops that they take to Internet cafes in order to 
store their information and contacts. 
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In this case, the Respondent 1 said: “…And the other thing is when they sit the 
whole day there, in the internet cafes, that’s where they normally go ... they use 
internet cafes as an office, they pay owners in advance like an account, and they 
give them this special room whereby nobody enters there, its only them, they go 
there and they do their thing”. This Respondent also said “….  More than ten in a 
room … some of them they work together or they wait in turns. Like maybe you 
use the computer for two hours and then some other person uses it. Ja, they 
spend most of their times in Internet cafes.  Ja, they pay them in advance”.   
 
3.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF AFF PERPERTATORS 
 
Research published by the Australian Institute of Criminology regarding the 
characteristics of serious fraud offenders in Australia and New Zealand in 1998 
and 1999 indicated that the offenders are usually males, in their mid-40s with no 
prior criminal record, with a relatively stable employment record with the victim 
organisation. They are usually directors or accounting professionals, motivated 
by greed or gambling, with a secondary education or some professional 
qualification and they act alone whe n they commission the offence (Crimes Facts 
Info 2003:1). However, the characteristics of AFF perpetrators are a little bit 
different. 
 
3.3.1 Age 
 
The 419 Coalition maintains that AFF perpetrators range from the age of 20 and 
above. It must be noted that the actual age of the perpetrators is very difficult to 
determine. This is because they do not give their real age when they write the 
letters to their victims. At one point, they may reduce or increase their age, 
depending on a particular situation. For example; in one case, a perpetrator 
stated in a letter to his victim that he was 29 years old and that he had been in 
this business for 18 years. This implied that, he had started this crime when he 
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was 11 years old. Therefore, the actual age of perpetrators  varies and is not 
usually correct when stated by the perpetrators.  
 
Findings in this research indicated that the average age of AFF perpetrators is 35 
years. Of those perpetrators who participated in this research study, 28 per cent 
was 35 years of age, 28.57 per cent was 38 years, and 14.28 per cent was 34 
years, 32 years and 30 years.  
 
3.3.2 Gender 
 
Literature research addressing 419 perpetrators indicate that both male and 
females are culprits. Often more males than females are associated with this 
crime. Females are said to act as accomplices and sometimes, when letters are 
written males pose as females. There is no doubt, however, that the perpetrators 
of this crime are mostly males. 
 
These research findings suggest that the perpetrators of AFF are males. This is 
owing to the fact that all the incarcerated perpetrators who took part in this 
research were males. 
 
3.3.3 Occupation 
 
According to the United States Secret Service (1997:5) AFF perpetrators include 
university-educated professionals who are best in the world of non-violent 
spectacular crime. These offenders also include politicians, parliamentarians, 
accountants, business people, chemists, medical practitioners, the unemployed, 
pastors and many other professions. Consequently, perpetrators can be anybody 
from any profession. 
 
The empirical findings of the research indicated that 71.45 per cent of the 
perpetrators were businessmen. This would probably suggest that it is easier for 
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perpetrators to present themselves (to victims) as businessmen than any other 
type of profession. 
 
3.3.4 Nationality 
 
The literature regarding AFF indicates that the perpetrators are of Nigerian 
nationality. This fraud is also referred to as Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud, 
signifying that the perpetrators are of Nigerian origin. The number of Nigerians 
involved in this crime is, however, difficult to assess. Shapiro, Staff Counsel for 
the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, states that 
these estimations are speculative and without factual base (United States Senate 
1987). One law enforcement officer told the Wall Street Journal in 1985 that 
about 1500 Nigerians were involved. Other sources told the Journal that the 
number is much higher (Penn 1985). A report issued by the U.S Customs 
Service stated that as of 1984, there were 30,000 to 50,000 Nigerians in the 
United States and that 75 per cent to 90 per cent (22,500 to 45,000) of these 
people were involved in fraud. From these reports, it seems as if an accurate 
estimate could not be made in 1984, let alone in the 1990s and to date (Jones 
1993:61).  
 
However, Alemike and Oladapo (Jones 1993:61) stated that some of the 
arrestees associated with Nigeria are not Nigerians, but possess Nigerian 
passports. According to them, some are from other West Africa nations like 
Ghana or Benin. 
 
Another reason for the difficulty to ascertain the nationality of these perpetrators 
is that there has been no concerted centralised effort to obtain accurate 
numbers. Nigerians, understandably, raise claims of discrimination if law 
enforcement agents simply target them because of their nationality. According to 
Adeyemi, Martin and Stanton (Jones 1993:62) complaints against law 
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enforcement agents are common, and objections are raised towards newspaper 
articles that portray Nigerian nationals as fraudsters.  
 
Perpetrators who were arrested for AFF were discovered to be South African 
nationals, Liberians, Cameroonians, British, Europeans, Americans, Pakistanis, 
Congolese (DRC), Togolese, Ivorians, Sierra-Leonians, Ghanaians, and 
Zimbabweans. However there is still some contention in this regard, for it is 
suggested that some of these perpetrators are Nigerians or have Nigerian origins 
and are in possession of foreign passports.  The 419 Coalition maintains that the 
perpetrators of AFF in other countries are Nigerian because the “Home Office” of 
the 419’ers involve Nigeria, regardless the source of the contact material. 
According to the Coalition, however, there are occasionally some local copy<-
>cats who try to emulate the success of the Nigerians. 
 
This research indicated that 42.85 per cent  of the perpetrators were Nigerians, 
14.28 per cent from the Democratic Republic of Congo and 14.28 per cent from 
Zimbabwe, Pakistan and Malawi. 
 
 In his statements the perpetrator in Case 2 said: “….  People from DRC are into 
it, people from Ghana they are into it, okay Nigerians are into it. Ok, but because 
of the fact that we are more or less popularised the 419 word, I mean the 
numbers 419, and its part of our criminal, you know, everybody sort of attach 419 
to Nigerians.  I mean Angolans are doing it, South Africans are doing it now, 
really.  It’s like everybody is doing it now.  Even people who are living in London 
are doing it now”. The perpetrator in Case 4 said: “… other countries are doing it 
also.  Not only Nigerians, other countries are doing it also”.  He also said that 
“…Like around the world, the fraudster, they are Italian, they are Nigerian, they 
are Congolese, they are Zairian, and Uganda, Ugandans guys also, and 
Cameroon, né, Cameroonians are also there”. 
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In the same vein, Respondent 3 said: “…Yeah, South Africans nowadays they 
have been going into this business.  Actually the fraud now have showed them 
there are easier means they can make money.  Rather than them carrying the 
gun and shooting people, or robbing the security guard, or burglary, they can use 
their knowledge to trick people, then money comes out.  So I know a good 
number of South Africans who are inside this business.  What happens is, they 
go as far as, they go and bring other South Africans, they propose that they saw 
someone with this and this type of business, that it is nice, now they connect it to 
those people, so when they collect the money now they take their own share ”. 
 
3.3.5 Race 
 
Initial research stated that perpetrators of AFF were African. The explanation of 
this is due to the fact that this type of fraud originated from Africa and is regarded 
as a fraud perpetrated by Africans, especially black Africans. Over time and 
recently the offence has become an international phenomenon with offenders of 
all races. In this regard, Caucasians and Asians are now also being identified as 
perpetrators of AFF. In the empirical part of this research, all the perpetrators 
who took part were African. 
 
However, it was found that not only Africans are involved in this fraud. In his 
statement, the perpetrator in Case 1 said: “…No. White people are involved.  
White people are even more involved in the business than Africans. Here in 
South Africa, white people are involved”. The perpetrator said that it is easier for 
a Caucasian man to convince somebody than an African man.   According to 
him: “... if a white man is coming from America to South Africa for this business, 
and the person who meets him here is a white man, it would be easier for him to 
bring more money. The whites can work on their own; they can work with the 
blacks they can work together if they want”.  
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The same statement was made by the perpetrator in Case 4 in which he said: “… 
Even white people they used to do it.  No not…even South Africa, but white 
persons, they do it, they do it.  No how can they give it to African people to do it”.    
 
3.3.6 Educational qualification 
 
There is no doubt that a fraud of this nature would warrant a certain amount of 
skill to execute. The nature, structure and organisation of this fraud need special 
skills to pursue it. This explains why these perpetrators are mostly university 
graduates with knowledge of international banking, legal and financial parlance 
(jargons). They speak impeccable English and are up to date with current world 
issues and crisis situations around the world. Their higher educational 
qualifications enable them to be well spoken and professional in their dialogue 
and behaviour towards their victims, and they are renowned world travellers. 
 
Studies (419 Coalition 2003) state that with their higher qualification, they are 
experienced in the ‘confidence game’.  Perpetrators are careful not to victimise 
people in the country in which they conduct their criminal activity. They do this in 
order to isolate themselves from both victims and the police in order to avoid 
detection. Perpetrators often use aliases, fraudulent corporate identities and a 
variety of false documentation to convince victims of the legitimacy of their 
criminal enterprise. 
 
The findings of this research indicated that the perpetrators of AFF are educated 
individuals. This is because all the perpetrators who took part in the empirical 
research had earned at least a university diploma. Moreover, in his statement the 
perpetrator in Case 1 said: “…No no no. Not at all.  This is a white-collar crime.  It 
is strictly a white collar crime.  Because for you to prepare a convincing letter, 
you have to be a learned person.  You don’t expect somebody who’s carrying 
ammunition to go and rob these people… all people who are involved they are 
learned people.  People who must have had some education.  Because you must 
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be able to write letters that are convincing to people. And armed robbers are not 
mostly learned people”. 
 
3.3.7 Criminal records 
 
Research reported that these perpetrators were not deterred by stringent security 
laws or by prison sentences with hardened felons. It therefore transpired that 
419’ers have extensive criminal histories, including convictions fo r assault and 
narcotics offences and they must have been arrested and investigated as 
suspects in frauds or narcotic offences (The Nigerian 419 Coalition 2003). 
 
3.3.8 Patience 
 
This research found that AFF perpetrators are very patient. It was revealed that 
the perpetrators could wait for long periods of time for their deals to mature. 
Patience is one of the characteristics of these fraudsters. This character trait was 
supported in a statement made by the perpetrator in Case 1 when he said: “… 
You don’t expect somebody who’s carrying ammunition to go and rob these 
people.  You want somebody who is patient.  What I know is even here in jail the 
armed robbers, when they ask you what are you in for and you say you 
committed fraud, they say I don’t want to waste my time committing fraud.  
Because you write a letter and you wait for two weeks or whatever.  They say if I 
want some money, I take my gun and go to the bank, and I know I’ll get the 
money the same day.  But for you to write a letter, you start waiting for 1 month, 
2 months before you get money from that person. And the money you get from 
that person might be small money. They tell you they don’t have such patience”. 
The same statement was made by Respondent 2: “…You know 419 guys they 
are very patient.  They can send many letters to people for one year or maybe 2 
years and they never get a reply.  But one day there’s going to be someone who 
is interested”. 
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The next section depicts a sketch of the processes that indicate how AFF emails 
are initiated and finally executed.   
 
3.4 THE 419 PERPETRATORS EMAIL CYCLE  
 
The steps used by AFF perpetrators in the execution of their crimes can be 
categorized as follows: 
Ø Letter drafting 
Ø Email harvesting 
Ø Initial victim response 
Ø Communication exchange and false documentation presentation 
Ø Transfers of funds by victim 
Ø Money laundering. 
 
These steps, known as the ‘419 email life cycle’ is presented in diagram 3.1 
below (Oyesanya 2004). This diagram shows the steps involved in the 
commission of 419 fraud. It shows the start of the cycle when 419 e-mail fraud is 
first created, the steps involved in harvesting e-mail addresses on the Internet, 
the methods for the mass transmission of these e-mails  to unsolicited victims on 
the Internet. 
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Diagram 3.1 419 Life Cycle 
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3.4.1 Letter drafting 
 
According to Oyesanya (2004:3) AFF perpetrators commence their fraud by 
drafting letters. In most cases, the 419 letters are either saved to a floppy disk or 
to the hard drive of a laptop. The transient nature of a 419 perpetrator, moving 
from one cyber café to another, requires that he keeps his wares at hand. Hence, 
the 419 letters are thus written and carried around on a portable medium. 
 
3.4.2 E-mail harvesting 
 
During the e-mail harvesting stage of the 419 operators capture e-mail 
addresses. According to Oyesanya (2004:5), this can be done manually or by the 
use of automated e-mail harvesting software. He also maintains that it is possible 
for perpetrators to buy bulk e-mail addresses from Internet based email address 
resellers on the Internet. 
 
Manual e-mail harvest 
 
In his study, Oyesanya (2004:5) found that 419 operators also manually harvest 
e-mail addresses on the Internet by visiting guest books. He states that a website 
guest book is a website feature used by website operators to allow comments 
from their visitors. Internet visitors would sign an online guest book and usually 
leave a comment and an e-mail address. These e-mail addresses are the prime 
harvest target of the 419’ers. These perpetrators are so smart that they warn 
other would-be 419 e-mail harvesters; they usually leave a territorial marked 
comment once the e-mail address at an online guest-book has been harvested. 
Comments such as, “guyman”, or “mugu” are used to mark a guest book that has 
been harvested. 
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Automated harvest 
 
These e-mail addresses are harvested through specialised email harvesting 
software. These harvesting tools are website crawlers that are able to parse e-
mail addresses embedded within HTML code on the website.  
 
3.4.3 Initial mass solicitation 
  
According to Oyesanya (2004:6) during this phase of the 419 fraud, the 419 
operators take the drafted 419 letter, and transmit it via e-mail to the harvested e-
mail addresses on the Internet. This process can be done manually or 
automatically. The manual transmission is the most popular approach and a free 
web-based e-mail client is used.  In this case, the 419 operators manually send 
out the 419 letter, using a mail client and manual intervention by selecting a letter 
and the corresponding victim’s e-mail address. The process of selecting the 
destination e-mail address is usually “cut and paste”.  
 
Automated transmission, on the other hand, can be done, using the automated 
mailing functions that are integrated into some of the more advanced e-mail 
harvesting software. Selecting and transmitting the 419 letters, using an 
automated form which is software-driven. No manual intervention is required to 
harvest and transmit the 419 letters. This phase is the spamming stage, and it is 
at this point, that the 419 operators begin to send unsolicited emails on the 
Internet.  Most 419 perpetrators use cyber café facilities for the transmission of 
their bulk email operations.  
 
3.4.4 Initial victim response 
 
No 419 operation will be successful, without the collaboration of a victim.  Once 
the 419 operator has transmitted his e-mail messages on the Internet, e-mail 
users at the receiving end will have to make a decision.  Overall, most people will 
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discard the e-mail, but a collaborating victim will respond with a favourable or 
non-favourable feedback.  Non-favourable feedback involves the communication 
exchange between victims that chooses to play along with the 419 operator, 
knowing full well the defrauding intentions of the 419 operator.  Words such as, 
“baiting” have been used to describe this type of response.   A favourable 
response on the other hand, describes the response of a victim that perceives 
this e-mail as an opportunity for financial gain, and does not suspect any 
fraudulent activities (Oyesanya 2004:8). 
 
3.4.5 Communication exchange and false document presentation 
 
Oyesanya (2004:8) states that once a 419 operator has acquired an 
unsuspecting victim, he must now maintain the dialogue though more e-mail 
exchanges and may even provide documents to validate the fraud.  Most of the 
documents are either forged Nigerian institutional forms or actual documents 
obtained by the corrupt compromise of authentic Nigerian government 
institutions. These documents may include receipts of payments, banking 
account records, or invoices, all of which are non-authentic.  The unsuspecting 
victim may also be required to forward personal information, such as personal 
bank accounts, passport copies, etc.  These documents are either transmitted via 
e-mail, or through international mail carriers.   
 
3.4.6 Transfer of fund by victim 
  
As the exchange of communication proceeds, the 419 perpetrator gains the 
confidence of the unsuspecting victim. Over time, the 419 perpetrator will create 
an advanced fee request.  At this stage, the victim is asked to make a payment of 
some sort in order to fulfil or partially fulfil the fraud.  Oyesanya (2004:10) is of 
the opinion that, at this stage, the victim again, has the opportunity to withdraw 
from the relationship.  
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In most cases where unsuspecting victims are involved, the victims proceed and 
produce the money. There are various variations of the Advanced Fee Request.  
In some cases, the victim will be issued fake Nigerian Bank drafts for deposits 
into his bank account, and asked to remit money against the deposit.  
Remittance of money by the victim is usually done by depositing funds into 
Nigerian Bank accounts, or via international money transfer agencies.  
 
Generally, once the victim has been defrauded, there is either a termination of 
activity amongst the parties, as the victim now becomes aware of his financial 
loss, or, in some rare cases, the victim may be again defrauded by an extended 
recovery plot.  The recovery plot is an extension of the 419 scheme, where the 
victim is asked to invest more money to regain the money he has lost.   
 
3.4.7 Money laundering  
 
The money-laundering phase is the phase during which the 419 perpetrators, 
after a victim has been defrauded, schemes to turn ‘dirty’  money, into ‘clean’ 
money.  This phase involves moving the ill-gotten 419 funds into various financial 
schemes in Nigeria or around the world, and sometimes these funds are 
reinvested into legitimate businesses in Nigeria and around the world (Oyesanya 
2004:12). 
 
3.5 MODUS OPERANDI OF PERPETRATORS 
 
In the process of committing AFF, the perpetrators have some special methods 
of operation that are unique and distinct from other types of fraudsters. The study 
of the available literature reveals the following modus operandi often used by 
these fraudsters: 
 
The modus operandi and certain idiosyncrasies of 419 perpetrators that 
illuminate the peculiar habits of these offenders, and which are of high 
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importance because of their individualised nature, have been carefully identified 
and described. The more unusual and absurd their actions are, the greater the 
possibility that the perpetrators will be identified (Prinsloo 1996:38). 
 
3.5.1 Criminal specialist 
 
As an elite crime, the use of criminal specialists becomes crucial for these 
perpetrators. Research by NCIS (2003) in the U.K indicates that these offenders 
need and employ someone with special skills or know-how, and the range of 
these ‘specialists’ is very wide. These specialists include chemists, accountants, 
and people with access to particular services, such as firearms or false identity 
documents or passports or those who are willing to carry out specific tasks such 
as murder or debt collection. It should be noted, however, that some specialists 
are low-level, expendable individuals who are used on a once-off basis or 
sporadically, but many are said to be professional criminals who provide their 
services on a continuing basis. 
 
The findings of this research indicated that the AFF perpetrators make use of 
other criminal specialists in order to execute the fraud. In support of this assertion 
the perpetration in Case 2 said: “… But you also need connections.  Or maybe 
you want to do fraud from, you want to do fraud in First National Bank, you have 
to look for bank statements, for blank bank statements, for First National.  So you 
have to go around to other friends and connections in the field.  We know each 
other; we used to know each other”.  The perpetrator said that “…even if you are 
not on speaking terms, but you know he’s in the field.  So you have to go to him 
or to her and say:  Listen, help me with a blank bank statement, because I want 
to make a bank statement for First National Bank because I want to take 
something from them.  That one, it was not my speciality.  If I want a bank 
statement I have to jump around to look for it. Yeah, you just go to him, get that 
thing, do the transactions if he wants money then I pay him.  Or maybe he says, 
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listen, if your job is all right, it’s through, then please come back to me.  Please 
come back to me, and then you can pay me after you’ve done the job”.   
 
The perpetrator also said that “…Yeah I knew they were doing like listen…lets 
say you want to go open a gold card at a bank, or an American Express. And 
maybe they can organise you like, a school certificate, like a Masters degree 
from UNISA.  The names that you want they can make them.  They give you that 
certificate.  And then you can go to any institution, banking institution, and you 
want to open a credit card, you know it comes with a budget, it comes with a 
budget, and it comes money, with money inside.  Yeah, I knew something about 
that.  I also knew that if you want a car, if you want a car, there are also guys 
from a country, you can also go to them, you choose what you want, and they go 
and get it for you from the garage”. 
 
3.5.2 Supporting other criminal activities 
 
Research (NCIS 2003) states that perpetrators of AFF engage to a greater or 
lesser degree in criminal activities aimed at facilitating their main money-making  
activities or protecting themselves, their assets and their activities. This support 
take many forms, but given their broad aims, it is unsurprising that these 
supporting activities often revolve around money laundering or the use if 
coercion, corruption or deception. An example, in this case, is that the 
perpetrators engage in corruption (for inside information) possession and use of 
firearms (to threaten and intimidate) and forgery (of identity documents to open 
false bank accounts in order to launder money). 
 
3.5.3 Violence and intimidation 
 
The 419 Coalition (2003) notes that violence and intimidation is one of the 
methods of operation employed by the 419ers in the execution of their crimes. 
Coercion is regarded as the most widely identified supporting criminal activity. 
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This is meted against their victims and fellow perpetrators, and takes many 
forms, from unspoken intimidation, where they operate on a reputation for 
violence and ruthlessness, to the ready use of extreme violence or murder.  
  
Intelligence suggests that violence and intimidation are used primarily to maintain 
the discipline and compliance of victims, group members and criminal 
associates, and to enforce criminal business deals as well as to recover debt. It 
is also used to avoid double-crossing or if someone is suspected of informing the 
police. Violence sometimes erupts because of disputes between members, 
although only a small minority becomes involved in turf wars. According to NCIS 
(2003:14), intelligence about the use of threats and actual violence are crucial to 
silence victims, potential witnesses, or to force victims to act against their will. It 
is also reported that, in some cases, violence and intimidation is the result of 
machismo or a predisposition on the part of the particular perpetrators, and is 
reactive and spur of the moment rather than planned and considered. This 
violence may also be calculated, for example when security personnel are 
sighted or noticed, victims are pressed to keep silent or to retract statements. 
 
This research found that violence and intimidation is one of the modus operandi 
elements used by perpetrators to manage and maintain their fraud. This was 
confirmed by the statement made by the perpetrator in Case 1: “... I know of 
419ers fight over money, fraudsters can kill each other. Violence is minimum.  
Even if it involves sharing of money.  The only time violence can creep in is when 
you feel you are oppressed by somebody.  You feel he’s not giving you your 
share of the business or whatever, and you’ll now feel maybe this man is doing 
this because he is stronger than me or bigger than me.  That is when it resorts to 
violence”.  
 
This perpetrator also said “…I know they can fight physically, Sharing of money 
usually brings a lot of fights.  Somebody can say I’m the initiator of this business 
and I involved you in this business, and it’s possible that while you were doing 
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the business you didn’t know the business is going to pay so much money.  So 
you didn’t put enough interest in it.  So how are we going to share this money 
when it comes?  That is where the problem comes.  Because you didn’t know 
eventually that the business is going to bring $50 000.  You say how can I give 
you $40 000 because you are the owner of the business.  Let me give you $20 
000.  That’s where the fighting starts.  But if from the beginning you make a plan 
that this is the business – whatever comes out of it, 10 per cent is mine, 10 per 
cent is yours, etc – there will be no fighting”.  
 
The perpetrator in Case 4 also said “…Everybody there they are afraid to speak, 
and be exposed.  The problem is the law…this crime is like a massive 
organisation.  You swear, (take an oath) when I handle these things, if they arrest 
me, let me go alone.  If you point to this one, they kill you.  Because if you point 
to this one and this one is involved, but when you’re out of prison, you don’t know 
who’s going to be after you”.   
 
Respondent 1 also supported the fact that violence is part of the modus operandi 
of AFF perpetrators. She said: “….  It is very dangerous.  Those people they are 
very aggressive.  And when they start fighting among themselves you are not 
safe, because they are very aggressive and secretive.  They fight because of the 
money”. This Respondent indicated that these perpetrators resort to violence and 
intimidation in a situation when a dispute that involves money arises: “…Maybe 
he’s supposed to give them their money…he’s like having accounts you know, 
and people deposit the money in his account.  Maybe, your friend or somebody 
deposited your money is my account and I need to give you the money.  Ja, from 
the fraud.  So I’m supposed to give you that money.  If ever I give you half of the 
money, or something, that’s when they’ll start fighting.  You understand. Ja it is.  
Most of the time they fight because of girls and money.  Those are like, two 
things they fight about most of the time.  Ja, money.  Those people they are like 
money-conscious.  They love money”.   
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3.5.4 Corruption 
 
It is acknowledged in literature that addresses organised crime that the 
perpetrators use corruption to secure the help from people with access to 
information, influence or any other type of access they want or need. 
Perpetrators of AFF are reported to view corruption as preferable to coercion 
since threats may not work. The National Criminal Intelligence Service in UK 
(2003:20) reported instances where corrupt UK law enforcement officers colluded 
with criminals, some of which received extensive publicity. 
 
Research (NCIS 2003:26) indicated that corrupting officials by AFF perpetrators 
is advantageous to them, since they can discover information about the status 
and direction of operations against them. This includes the identity of surveillance 
vehicles, informants or witnesses. Using corrupt practices, these perpetrators 
can also discover general information concerning law enforcement capabilities, 
procedures, operational priorities and resource deployments, which is very 
valuable, though of less immediate value to a career criminal or his associates. 
According to the NCIS (2003:27), these criminals maintain corrupt relationships 
not just with those involved in ‘front-line’ law enforcement, such as the police, 
customs officials and immigration officials, but also with others throughout the 
criminal justice system, including the Crown Prosecution Service, prison officials, 
and representatives of the legal profession. However, the NCIS (2003) also 
reports that corruption is not restricted to the criminal justice system, and has 
involved central and local government employees, accountants and others in the 
financial field, plus a range of other professionals. 
 
Intelligence shows that while these offenders actively target those employed in 
the criminal justice system, this approach appears to be opportunistic, based on 
the accessibility and perceived vulnerability. ‘Cold’ approaches are unlikely, as 
they might backfire. On this note, research (NCIS 2003:30) reveals that the 
opportunity for these criminals to approach a corrupt official safely may arise 
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socially, through friends, family connections or in pubs or sports clubs or it may 
occur in a professional setting. 
 
3.5.5 Identity fraud and other misrepresentations 
 
Identity fraud is another most important modus operandi that underpins AFF 
perpetrators. These fraudsters reportedly produce, supply or use false personal 
identities documents. Misrepresentation occurs, for example, when documents 
provide false information regarding a company’s identity, a perpetrator’s identity, 
business accounts and transactions . 
 
Research (NICS 2003:25) states that the primary purpose of a false identity is to 
enable these criminals to conceal themselves, their activities, and their assets in 
order to minimise the risk of detection, particularly when ‘things are on the move’. 
Perpetrators’ movements normally require proof of identity in documentary form, 
which will be recorded and copied. It should be noted that false identities are 
obvious means of disguising the audit trail and frustrating law enforcement 
enquiries. Intelligence reports (NCIS 2003:32) show that false identity documents 
are used to acquire vehicles, open bank accounts, apply for loans or credit cards, 
make money transfers, rent safety boxes, set up mailing addresses, subscribe to 
telephone or internet services, buy property, register companies, sign shipping 
documents, obtain other identity documents, book hotel rooms or plane tickets, 
and any other travel arrangements abroad to conduct their business (often they 
use one passport for one leg of a journey and a second for another).  
 
This research revealed identity fraud and misrepresentation as one of the 
aspects of the modi operandi used by perpetrators of AFF. The findings of the 
empirical research emphasises misrepresentation, as confirmed by Respondent 
1’s comments: “… He’s having like four I.Ds. His own personal IDs.   He’s having 
a South African I .D, a Nigerian, and Malawi, and I forgot the other one.  But what 
I know is that they are four.  People from Home Affairs they helped him to do it.  
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Yeah, that’s what he told me.  I even saw the I.Ds. Yeah, the South African ID, 
and Malawi, and Nigeria, of course, because he is coming from Nigeria.  And the 
other thing, they are using girls too.  In the bank, when they go to bank. Because 
it’s like he’s having a lot of savings accounts and cheque accounts.  In his name 
and fake names, you understand me.  So you need to gonna have somebody 
who’s gonna go there and withdraw the money.  Because they are gonna be 
suspicious every time you go there you withdraw money so they are using girls 
and they pay them so they get their money easily”. 
 
3.5.6 Intelligence gathering  
 
Organised criminals like the 419 perpetrators gather intelligence about the 
activities of their rivals and the vulnerabilities of their potential victims in order to 
protect their criminal ring and identify opportunities. They value, in particular, 
information concerning law enforcement operations, intentions, techniques and 
capabilities. It is reported that corruption is an important means to acquire this 
intelligence, but perpetrators can also gain insight into how law enforcement 
operates by attending court hearings, following the media reports of 
investigations, and debriefing associates who have been arrested. Some 
perpetrators reportedly have employed surveillance and counter-surveillance 
techniques in order to protect themselves and gather intelligence regarding law 
enforcement activities. In this case, counter-surveillance ranges from basic 
evasion techniques to more sophisticated methods, involving observation or the 
deployment of surveillance technology. Some of these perpetrators have 
approached third parties with specific knowledge of law enforcement techniques, 
technology and procedures for assistance, for example; retired police officers 
who have entered the security advice or private detection fields (NCIS 2003:36). 
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3.5.7 The use of legitimate or quasi-legitimate businesses 
 
AFF perpetrators, as well as other organised crime perpetrators, cannot operate 
exclusively within a criminal underworld. The NCIS (2003:32) finds that many, 
probably the majority, make use of legitimate or quasi-businesses to further their 
criminal activities. Their research also states that in some cases these 
perpetrators own businesses and they collude with or coerce businessmen and 
employees. These businesses are most obviously used to launder the proceeds 
of their crimes, but they are also used to facilitate illicit trades and in some 
instances to fulfil a desire for social acceptability and status. In such instances, 
front companies are essential for this type of fraud and these companies provide 
cover for purchases of regulated items such as precursor chemicals. 
 
As with most organised crimes, operating legitimate businesses was found to be 
one of the modus operandi used by AFF perpetrators to disguise their ill-gotten 
gains. This research found that AFF perpetrators in South Africa are owners of 
Internet cafés, groceries shops, importer and exporters businesses, liquor 
businesses, night clubs and some are hawkers. It should be noted that these 
legitimate businesses act as fronts to justify what perpetrators do for a living and 
also serve as means to launder money. 
 
In the statement made by the perpetrator in Case 1 he said: “…apart from doing 
that they have legitimate businesses. Like people they have money and they say 
I want to invest in the legitimate business.  There are a lot of 419ers when they 
are making a little money, they set up businesses, because the wise ones are the 
ones who are going to start a business”.  
 
In his statement, the perpetrator in Case 2 said: “…I’ve been in South Africa for 
two years. I was already here two years before I got arrested. I basically buy 
things. Like I have things sent in from Nigeria like clothes, jewelries.  
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Occasionally, I have this store, I buy retail vouchers at their real market cost 
prices, and I have shops I supply them to”. 
 
The perpetrators also said “….  Quite a number of them do have businesses, 
because for you to maintain going to the Internet, sending fax machines, they 
need money to fund those things.  So obviously whatever job or activity they can 
find to maintain that, they’ll do it.  Even doing legitimate jobs, like he having a 
shop, like finding a legitimate business, he’ll do it.  He has to do something to 
fund it. So he’ll do anything.  It’s a legitimate business.  Most of them have 
legitimate businesses.  It’s just something they do on the side.  Because you 
can’t live on it.  You can’t. You don’t say I’m a fraudster and I’m gonna send 
letters and live on it.  You cant, because you have a family, you’ve got wife’s, 
kids, you’ve got to pay the school fees, pay the rent, so basically, you have to 
have something very legitimate, you have to do it”. 
 
The perpetrator in Case 4 said “…I had a office in Johannesburg, and the office 
where I was working, I had other…my workers, and then they get some vouchers 
from government departments, and then we fill them, and after filling them, we 
send them to the bank, to draw the money. I was doing imports and exports of 
clothes”.  
 
3.5.8 Communications  
 
It is generally accepted that any modern enterprise relies on effective 
communication in order to succeed. In the case of AFF perpetrators, 
communication needs to be either wholly secretive or sufficiently difficult to 
penetrate prevent that law enforcement agencies gain foreknowledge regarding 
their plans or enable them to piece together evidence that a crime has been/is 
being committed.  
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However, criminal businesses often involve complex logistics, with people and 
goods moving around the world, with deals and transfers negotiated with other 
criminals or associates, and with timings and locations to be managed against a 
background of unreliable partners and active oppositions from law enforcement. 
In practice, this means the extensive use of telecommunication. 
 
Research by NCIS (2003:37) indicates that when organized criminals choose 
telecommunications products and services, they are guided by the need for 
security, anonymity and convenience. The research also stated that these 
perpetrators often strike a balance between security on the one hand and 
convenience and ease of use on the other. Mobile phones, in particular ‘prepaid’ 
or ‘pay-as-you go’ phones, remain particularly popular, since there exist no legal 
requirements to register these type of mobile phone and thus no need to disclose 
personal details. Moreover, these mobile phones are not expensive when bought 
in bulk and also make it possible for them to change their phones regularly. They 
are also reported to use public telephones quite often. 
 
These perpetrators make increasingly use of the speed, accessibility and relative 
anonymity offered by Internet communication. They use e-mails, chat-rooms, 
instant messaging and ‘peer2peer’ networks, and are also beginning to relay 
messages via the Internet that were traditionally delivered in person or via the 
telephone. These perpetrators use Internet cafés or encrypt their messages as a 
further layer of protection (NCIS 2003: 37). 
 
They also use illegal telecommunication operators whose primary business is to 
“dump” international calls in order to defraud members of the public. It is reported 
that in Lagos, Nigeria, these fraudsters rent offices located in skyscrapers and 
specialise in tracking of incoming international telephone calls via Very Small 
Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite -based gateways. Their facilities have the 
capacity to track both voice and data via signals, which are decoded so that they 
are able to defraud bona fide beneficiaries of these messages. The perpetrators, 
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whose mode of operation appears the same, install very sophisticated 
telecommunication equipment. These include: 
Ø A Main Distribution Frame (MDF) on which they install acquired telephone 
lines from either the Nigerian Telecommunication Limited (NITEL) or any 
Private Telephone Operator (PTO) as the case may be.  
Ø A satellite dish of a minimum size of 3.8 meters and linked to an antenna 
hoisted on a mast. 
Ø  A satellite modem for receiving and tracking signals at speeds of two 
megabytes per second (mbps). 
Ø Personal computers 
Ø Backup batteries of at least 12 volts 
Ø Backup generators 
Ø Uninterrupted power supply (UPS) 
Ø Telephone handsets, among others. 
 
It is reported that these fraudsters usually acquire a certain number of telephone 
lines from the public switched telephone network which they use to monitor every 
day’s network traffic, especially calls from abroad. What shocked officials of 
NITEL was that these fraudsters collaborated with certain unnamed foreign 
operators who monitor calls coming into the country on their behalf, and these 
collaborators then dump these calls on the network of the Nigerian illegal 
operator, for a fee (Aragba-Akpore 2002:67-74). 
 
3.4.9 Masters of manipulation 
 
It has been suggested in literature (NCIS 2003:38) that the perpetrators of AFF 
are experts at manipulating certain human traits such as goodness, gullibility, 
greed or fear, which will influence people to voluntarily part with their money. 
Perpetrators have stated that in order to succeed they need a victim who 
displays greed, gullibility and the ability to be controlled (Crimes-of-Persuasion 
site 2003). Investigations focussed on these fraudsters showed that they use a 
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wide variety of influencing techniques, ranging from friendly conversations to 
outright demands or even threats, to persuade victims to part with their money. 
According to the 419 Coalition (2003), many calls made by perpetrators include 
the following elements intended to mislead victims and secure their compliance: 
 
Ø Excitement 
Perpetrators reportedly introduce statements that will excite their victims, and 
therefore interfere with victims’ ability to think clearly and calmly.  For 
example; one of the statements reads: 
 “Thelma, I can’t tell you what you’re getting, but I surely hope you live long 
enough to enjoy it all”. “If you recall, you were involved in a promotional 
campaign and you were promised you’d receive some very large corporate 
award, do you remember that? Great! Then you’d better sit down for this”. 
“They told you the man in charge of the place would be calling you. Well, 
that’s me! Take a deep breath now and try not to be nervous”. 
 
Ø Urgency 
AFF perpetrators routinely include an element of urgency in their pitches, 
stressing that the prize, investment, or other item being offered will not be 
available unless the victims send the required funds quickly. This puts a lot of 
pressure on the victims to react before reconsidering the proposal. A key 
element to the AFF perpetrator’s act is convincing his victim to pay quickly, so 
that they receive the funds before the victim has second thoughts or seek 
advice. For example; they would tell you that “you have to pay or transfer the 
funds today or I’m afraid we might lose the business” 
 
Ø Anonymity 
AFF offenders often use false names, and victims can only identify them by 
their voices, if at all, which creates a serious obstacle for criminal 
investigators and subsequent prosecutions. They usually receive payments at 
commercially rented “drop boxes” which make it difficult to trace the money. 
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They will try to avoid any witnesses to the fraudulent act and contact the 
victims when they are alone. They may even promise victims an all expenses 
paid trip to their company’s “corporate headquarters” when, in fact, the 
headquarters is an upstairs office in a strip mall and the company’s “Suite 
2400” mailing address is a rented box at a commercial mail receiving agency 
at a different strip mall. 
 
This research revealed that AFF is all about the manipulation and deceit of 
victims. Perpetrators reportedly have special manipulation skills to cajole and 
entice their victims to get involved into their business proposals. The fact that 
most of the proposals emphasised urgency, anonymity and at times excitement 
from the perpetrators, are geared towards preparing the victims for even more 
manipulation when the business commences. In this regard the perpetrator in 
Case 4 said: “…  You cannot understand that.  You cannot understand.  Even if I 
explain to you, you cannot understand.  Yeah, it’s only the fraudsters; you won’t 
understand.  They steal your own money, and you won’t understand.  You are 
looking and you can’t see.  They’ll take the original and give you the fake and say 
no take it. Yeah, me and you only, I’ll take your money and you can’t see”. 
 
3.5.10 Fake Internet website 
Literature studies reveal that AFF perpetrators create and use fake websites to 
lure victims into their webs. According to NCIS (2003:48), these West African 
criminals used a fake version of a British bank’s online service to milk victims for 
cash. The fake site was used to squeeze more money out of people whom they 
had already hooked. It is reported that the scam behind the fake web domain 
was the familiar one that offers people a share of huge sums of money that has 
to be moved out of various African countries. These criminals also used this 
method to set up a fake website that supposedly gave victims access to accounts 
held at the South African Reserves Bank. Typically, victims are given a login user 
name and password and are encouraged to visit the site so that they can see 
that the cash they will get is a share of what has already been deposited into an 
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account (at the supposed South African Reserve Bank) in their name. This is 
used to convince victims that the money is already in their names and before 
they can get their hands on the cash, they must hand over more of their own 
money to assist with the transfer process (The 419 Coalition site 2003). 
 
It has been widely acknowledged in the findings of this research that, the use of 
fake Internet websites and fake documents are amongst the instruments used by 
these perpetrators lure victims into their traps. The statement made by 
Respondent 1 supported these findings: “…They’ve got fake website of banks, 
governments departments, schools, companies that they send victims to check 
their information. These sites are similar to the original sites. They have fake 
documents and papers, those things they do them and sign them and they like 
fax everything and stuff, and that’s how they do their thing”.  Respondent 2 also 
said: “….  And those people are very clever, because they can act in South Africa 
as South Africans with fake passports or fake ID’s and you don’t even know 
where they get these things.  And tomorrow he’s going to be in the United States 
and he’s going to act as an American citizen with the fake ID’s, passports, so 
that’s how they try to change victims’ minds about these things”. 
 
3.5.11 Use of law enforcement agents 
 
This research study found that AFF perpetrators make use of law enforcement 
agents in the execution of their crimes. In this regard, police officers were found 
to have been used by perpetrators to “discharge”/scare victims. In some 
instances, police officers act as accomplices and are said to even give jobs to 
perpetrators. Hence police involvement in this type of fraud would suggest why 
these fraudsters are successful and at times able to avoid detection and evade 
the justice system. 
 
The statements made by the perpetrator in Case 3 supported the above findings: 
“… police are working for it. The police that arrested me asked for a bribe of 
 143 
R3000 for him to give me bail. I told him I cannot trust you because you are 
working with those fraudsters”. He said: “…as a foreigner is a victim see police 
you are very scare, and if I know that the victim will be stubborn to pay we 
involve the police to discharge and at times arrest the victim, the victim will start 
calling to come and bail him. All this are arrangement with the police. They are 
part of the game”. 
 
In a similar statement, the perpetrator in Case 4 said: “…No, usually that 
happens among themselves.  Maybe my customer’s coming.  You are away.  I 
know that today I’ll be making a sitting; they use to call it a sitting.  I know that 
today I’ll be making a sitting.  And then you are away.  And then when you are 
taking money from the mugu, and then you can call police contacts, the police 
arrest the mugu, and then arrest me also, and then the money that is going to 
remain, you share between you and the police.  Yes some police know.  Even 
this one, Scorpion, there are some Scorpion, they know, this big Scorpion 
leaders, they are involved in some big fraud.  Even locally, there are some big 
men they are involved.  Yes they share amongst them”. 
 
In the same vein, Respondent 2 said: “...So they can act as a police official, 
maybe they dress as a policeman, and they can behave as a policeman.  So in 
this way that they act as a police, maybe those who are acting police are really 
police.  But I know that it’s a game, and it’s a team.  And in the team there are 
many people involved, and many people have their own role”.   This statement 
was also made the Respondent 3. He said: “…At times he will arrange with the 
police man.  The policeman will go and keep him in the cell.   So he’ll say that he 
has been arrested, that he is in so and so police station, and that you should 
come for his rescue.  Since you know that you were doing an illegal thing, 
instead you are running away.  You are scared that he can also involve you in 
the same thing.  That is something that has been arranged between him and the 
policeman, so in the end you (victim) can’t blame him.   
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This Respondent also said: “… What happens is the day they go to collect the 
money, this people they usually arrange with the police, he arrange with the 
police that he is going to do this and this, this and this, this and this.  The police 
know the business and he has a commission inside.  The police have a 
commission.  So what happens is, after they had taken the money from that 
victim, then, after they have swapped the money, and he’ll tell that person now 
that he’s going to collect the chemical, he goes out now, after one hour he’s 
going to claim that the police arrested him.  Actually you can see him now, 
actually you can see he had the bottle, he was arrested with that bottle, the 
police will arrest him actually with that bottle, its true, and they will take him to the 
police station, you will see they take him to the police station with that bottle, but 
there is something behind.  There is something that has been arranged”. The 
Respondent went further to say that “… there are certain situations where the 
police storm the hotel, but it is still an arrangement, these fraudsters arrange it 
with the police.  And when the victim has brought the money and then put on the 
floor, they can just go and send a ‘please call me’ to the police, the police will just 
be hanging around.  They know the room-number.  So the police will just come 
into the hotel and then arrest all of them.  And when the police arrest all of them, 
the police are going to carry the money.  So they’ll come with different police van.  
So the victim is going to be carried in the different van, the 419er is going to be 
carried in a different van and inside that van now that is there money.  And then 
they are going to tell you now that they are taking all of you to the police station.  
So you (the victim) now, will be begging, that they should allow you to go, so that 
the money you don’t mind whether you lost or not. So they will be threatening 
you that they will take you and they will take you round and round and you’ll be 
begging, you’ll beg them that you will never do this again.  And at the end they 
can abandon you somewhere, they can just throw you and you can go.  And they 
will go with that other guy now and they will share the money.  The guy will never 
reach the police station, and they will share the money and the police will also 
have their own share”.   
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3.6 THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF PERPETRATORS  
 
The most basic theories of criminality argue that crimina ls differ in some 
fundamental way from non-criminals. These theories then attempt to identify the 
nature of the differences (Friedrichs 2004:193). On the sociological level, 
criminality, the propensity to commit crimes, is shown to vary among different 
segments of the population or among different organisations. Therefore, the 
focus in this section will be to explore psychological and sociogenic explanations 
of criminality. 
 
Psychological explanations  
 
At first glance, a psychological explanation for fraud and AFF would appear 
simple – greed and dishonesty. Such an explanation is, however, overtly 
simplistic (Duffied & Grabosky 2001:2).  
 
Criminality has also been explained as a psychological phenomenon. In this 
approach the focus is on personality, mental processes, the enduring effects of 
early childhood traumas, and the like (Friedrichs 2004:194). The most famous 
psychological explanations of human conduct were advocated by Freud. 
 
From a Freudian approach, crime, including fraud, can be viewed as a reflection 
of the eternal conflict between the desires of the individual and the needs of 
civilization. In one of his discussions concerning crime, Freud suggested that 
individuals might commit crimes in order to bring punishment upon themselves 
for a pre-existing guilt (Friedrichs 2004:194). He further noted that at least some 
fraud offenders have engaged in such self -destructive acts of illegality, lending 
this notion some credibility. Friedrichs also reported that in the Freudian 
approach, fraud could be linked with defects in the superego (the conscience), 
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the ego (the balancing voice of reason or the idealized self), or the id (aggressive 
and libidinous innate drives). 
 
Many limitations of the Freudian model regarding the self have been identified, 
but the core notion of tensions and conflicts amongst different aspects of the self 
intuitively makes some sense and can hypothetically be associated, in a limited 
sort of way, with the fraud criminality. Whatever the case, it must be emphasised 
that not all psychological theories follow the Freudian lead by emphasising the 
importance of early childhood experiences in shaping adult attitudes and 
behaviour.  Whether fraud can be linked to childhood experience has not yet 
been subjected to systematic study (Friedrichs 2004:195). To the extent that 
one’s moral sensibility is shaped by childhood socialisation, there may be some 
connections. 
 
However, Duffield et al. (2001) indicated that not all dishonest people commit 
fraud. They maintained that behavioural scientists ha ve been unable to identify 
psychological characteristics that serve as valid and reliable markers of the 
propensity of individuals to commit fraud. 
 
Another general psychological aspect of fraud is the process of rationalisation, 
which reduces the offender’s inhibitions. Such attempts at prospective excuses 
have been termed “techniques of neutralisation” by Sykes and Matze (Duffield et 
al. 2001:3). There had been a tendency in the literature to confuse motivation 
with neutralisation, but they differ in important ways. Duffield et al. (2001:3) 
pointed out that motivation is the drive behind the act of fraud, while 
neutralisation paves the way by nullifying internal moral objections. They 
maintained that most offenders seek to justify and rationalise their activity 
regardless the type of fraud they commit. In doing so, they will use “vocabulary of 
adjustment” (Cressey 1953, 1986; Krambia-Kapards 2001) that manufacture 
rationale and extenuating circumstances and remove the perception of criminality 
from the act (at least from the point of view of the perpetrators). According to 
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Benson (1985:583) techniques of neutralisation will vary depending on the type 
of fraud. Those types of fraud that require victims, willingly and knowingly, to 
enter into the process (AFF) are amongst the easiest for offenders to rationalise. 
In such case it becomes easy to believe that the victim “had it coming”. 
 
 In support of this a study of conmen conducted by Blum (1972:46) found that 
many attributed their successes to the inherent greed of their victims. He also 
pointed out that many conmen seemed to have a misanthropic view of human 
nature and assumed that others were as scheming and dishonest as they were. 
The idea that victims ‘get what they deserve’ is reflected in another conman’s 
statement: “… the victim has the same responsibility as the victimiser. If the 
victim never wanted anything from you, he’d never go so far to get in the 
condition to be conned”. In other words, you can’t cheat an honest man. 
Responsibility for fraud, in this case, is placed squarely on (or at least shared 
with) the victim. 
 
Sociogenic explanations 
 
According to Friedrichs (2004:197) some theoretical and empirical work that 
adopts the sociogenic framework also addresses the matter of criminality, 
especially in terms of alleged differences in criminal propensities amongst 
members of different social classes or groups. Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990:104) suggested that varying levels of self -control are fundamental factors 
in people’s decisions to commit crimes and that low social control (the inability to 
defer gratification) is more pronounced among lower-class individuals. People 
who commit fraud also have low self-control, but according to Gottfredson and 
Hirschi’s interpretation, those in the fraud classes typically have more attractive 
options than law breaking available to them, and thus the rate of such crimes is 
relatively low. 
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It has been argued that fraud can be unique, highly specialised, and thus not well 
explained by a broad claim of criminal disposition. It has also been commented 
that the conventional view: that criminality is more pronounced among lower-
class individuals than middle- and upper-class individuals is not dictated by 
theory or supported by empirical observations. Others have suggested that 
middle-class criminality, for the most part, is relatively trivial in nature (Goode 
2001; Tittle, Villemez, & Smith 1978; Tittle 1983). Still, other criminologists, 
including Hagan (1989) and Thio (1988) have developed the structural or power 
theories of crime, which claim that criminality is more pronounced among the 
powerful and the privileged than among the powerless and underprivileged. 
 
In this interpretation, the advantaged have stronger deviant motivations, enjoy 
greater deviant opportunities, and are subject to weaker social controls. The 
claim regarding stronger deviant motivations is based on the contention that the 
powerful are potently conditioned to aspire to material success; accordingly they 
experience relative deprivation much more strongly than the underprivileged or 
powerless.   
 
Many explanations of fraud focus more on the crime rather than on the 
criminality. However, most of these explanations are sociological, and they 
emphasise differences in circumstances or opportunities rathe r than differences 
among individuals. 
 
In a bid to explain the criminal behaviour of fraudsters, and especially AFF 
perpetrators, the sociological explanation is more relevant because fraud is a 
socially patterned phenomenon, and is not just a manifestation of individual 
psycho-pathology or other defects of personality, character or physiology. In 
order to understand AFF perpetrators, the sociological theories will be applied. In 
this regard, sociological theories, such as anomie and strain theory as well as 
differential association theory will be used to explain why some individuals 
commit fraud and Advance Fee Fraud. The rational choice perspective, the 
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conflict theory, and the integrated theoretical model will also be applied to explain 
AFF. 
 
3.6.1 Sociological theories 
 
Anomie and strain theory 
 
This theory is at the heart of the sociological bid to account for crime.  According 
to Brown et al. (2001:285) the thrust of theoretical agenda is that stress, 
frustration, or strain, generally a part of failed aspirations, increase the prospects 
of norm violation. As stated by Agnew (Reid 2003:126), “…strain theory has 
typically focused on relationships in which others prevent the individual from 
achieving positively valued goals”. Therefore this theory maintains that norms are 
violated to alleviate the strain that accompanies failure. As Brown et al. 
(2001:285) puts it: “…blockage of legitimate goal attainment is said to encourage 
deviant solutions”. Most strain theorists reason that the structure of the society 
creates the greatest pressure within the lower-class echelons, and consequently 
these theorists focus on explaining lower-class crime. Strain also tends to be 
associated with distorted aspirations, the attainment of unrealistic desires and 
class materialism. These distortions set the stage for individual failures and the 
desires for deviant solutions. 
 
Agnew (Reid 2003:126) also maintains that strain theory should be expanded 
beyond the traditional emphasis on an individual’s failure to achieve goals and 
include all types of negative relations between the individual and others. 
According to Reid, Agnew believes that there is more to strain than a person’s 
failure to achieve desired goals. As a consequence, Agnew developed three 
types of strain that may produce deviances: 
 
Ø First is the individual’s failure to achieve his or her goals, which he divides 
into three subtypes. These goals include immediate as well as future 
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goals, and he went beyond Merton’s anomie theory to include the inability 
to achieve these goals because of one’s own inadequacies. Agnew also 
noted that the gap between one’s expectation and achievements might 
result not only in disappointment but also in resentment or even anger. 
The third subtype includes the person’s impression that there is a 
difference between the actual outcome and what the outcome should be, 
that is a fair and just outcome. 
Ø Reid (2003:130) reported that Agnew’s second type of strain occurs when 
an individual loses a source of stability, such as a loved one, through 
death or the dissolution of the personal relationship, such as the end of a 
romantic involvement. The person suffers strain through loss of stimuli that 
had a positive valuation. 
 
Ø Agnew’s third strain type occurs when an individual is confronted with 
negative stimuli such as; difficulties in school, crime victimisation, or even 
abuse by his or her family member/s. The young person cannot escape 
their school or family without acting in a deviant way, and that appears to 
be the solution to the troubled youth. 
 
The above theory can therefore be utilised to explain AFF perpetrators in general 
and in South Africa in particular. The individual’s inability to achieve his desired 
goals leads to strain, frustration and increases the chances of law violation. This 
explanation is especially related to immigrants in South Africa. It is suggested, 
therefore, that AFF perpetrators in South Africa are mostly immigrants from West 
Africa who enter the country in search of greener pastures. It can therefore be 
concluded that these West African immigrants become involved in this type of 
fraud because their immediate goals, such as finding a job, cannot be met 
because of their own inadequacies such as not being in possession of the correct 
working permits and other restrictions imposed by the State.  This theory is used 
to explain not only AFF perpetrators in South Africa, but also in the country from 
which the perpetrators originate. 
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 Differential association theory 
 
In criminology, social process theories attempt to describe and explain the ways 
in which individuals become criminals. They deal with the link between an 
individual’s interaction with others and that person’s motivations, perceptions, 
self-conception, attitude, behaviour and identity (Barlow 1996:468). Although 
many interac tionist theories seem to place greater emphasis on the behaviour of 
others than on the behaviour of ‘self’, the goal is the same; to explain the 
emergence and consequences of behaviour. Whatever the case, the underlying 
assumption is that criminal behaviour can be explained within this framework like 
any other behaviour. According to Barlow (1996:468), a common theme in many 
social process theories is that criminal behaviour is learned through interaction 
with others, hence Sutherland’s theory of differential association. 
 
Sutherland (Friedrichs 2004:205) promoted a theory of differential association, 
which views criminal behaviour as learned through contact with others who have 
a law violating orientation. This theory applies to both conventional and fraud 
crimes. In some respects, fraud may be better understood by reference to 
differential association than is true of conventional crime, because of the broader 
range of learning options generally available to fraud offenders and the complex 
nature of the offences themselves. 
 
This theory is useful in explaining white-collar crime and fraud because of the 
learning of cultural goals, such as material success, and the pursuit of those 
goals through illegal means (Conklin 2001:278). Conklin is of the opinion that, 
because there is no enforceable code of business ethics to limit the pursuit of 
material success by legal means, definitions unfavourable to the violation of the 
laws are not readily learned in the world of business. This means that those who 
are mostly assimilated into a business organisation seem to be the most likely to 
violate the law. Those new to the world of business are less apt to do so because 
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they are more influenced by the unfavourable definitions associated with the 
violation of the laws, which they have brought with them from the outside world. 
 
In an attempt to use this theory to explain AFF perpetrators, the fourth principle 
stated by Sutherland is of importance. This principle emphasizes the importance 
of learning the technique of committing fraud and learning the mindset (motives, 
drives, rationalisation, attitudes) conducive to criminal behaviour. While a 
particular mindset is essential, familiarity with technique relates to the type of 
crime perpetrated and the ability to successfully commit the crime without 
detection. AFF entails the learning of complex techniques. Studies of white-collar 
offenders (Sutherland 1947), confidence men (Maurer 1974), and professional 
thieves (Sutherland 1937) illustrate the considerable skills that must be mastered 
to pursue these criminal paths (Brown et al.2001: 234). Research regarding AFF 
perpetrators indicates that learning the motives and drives, which results in a 
relatively constant desire or persistent urge to do illegal things is, on the one 
hand, a requisite for AFF would-be offenders.    
 
In an application of this theory to explain AFF perpetrators, it is suggested that 
the high concentration of immigrants in big cities around the world, and especially 
Johannesburg in South Africa, supports the premise of this theory. The strength 
of this theory in explaining AFF perpetrators is supported by literature research, 
which states that amateur perpetrators learn to commit this fraud, and sometimes 
for a fee. It has also been noted in the literature (U.S State Department 1997) 
that, on arrival in the United States, young perpetrators are given a manual that 
contains the techniques and instructions on how to commit AFF.      
 
Modification of differential association, such as Glaser’s (1956), emphases 
differential identification (with a criminal role model) and Akers’s (1985) 
emphases reinforcement (conditioning to engage in criminal behaviour when it is 
experienced as rewarding) and these concepts can also be applied to white-
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collar and fraud offenders (Friedrichs 2004:205). In this regard, this theory can be 
applied to explain AFF perpetrators operating in South Africa. 
 
It must be borne in mind that the overriding limitation of this theoretical approach 
is that it does not adequately account for the structural origins of the illegal 
patterns of behaviour and appears to confuse the process of involvement in 
criminal behaviour with the causes of such behaviour (Geis & Goff 1987: 98; 
Goode 2001:109). The theory also does not address the problem that some 
white-collar fraud crimes are individualistic in nature and that the collective forms 
of white-collar fraud crimes are committed by individuals who mainly hold 
attitudes that are favourable to obeying laws, Coleman and Goode (Friedrichs 
2004:205). In the case of AFF perpetrators, the critique of this theory also applies 
to AFF perpetrators, because some perpetrators act alone when they commit this 
fraud. It is, however, equally true that individuals who are able to obey the law 
commit AFF. 
 
Within this same premise, Tittle and colleagues (1986:145) focused on 
deficiencies in the causal framework set out by Sutherland. According to them, 
differential association presumes that definitions acquired through the 
association with others lead to deviant behavioural patterns. In other words, 
some associations were thought to cause criminal behaviour and others to cause 
non-criminal behaviour. Brown et al. (2001:330) supported this stance by saying 
that, some people may engage in criminal conduct for whatever reasons, and 
then seek out particular associations to match their criminal values and activities. 
In the case of AFF, some individuals become involve in this type of fraud 
because of their associations with other 419’ers and they commit this fraud for 
various reasons, fo r example; lack of legitimate job opportunities.  
 
Another possibility is that the relationship between associations and behaviour 
may be reciprocal, that is, both may influence one another simultaneously. The 
causal nexus is also complicated by the possibility of intervening variables. Tittle 
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et al. (1986:146) found that excess associations with criminal definitions led to 
criminal behaviour only through intermediary factors such as criminal motivations 
(Brown et al. 2001:330). These motivations, in the case of AFF, are the rewards 
of this type of fraud; the ostentatious lifestyles of perpetrators.   
 
3.6.2 The rational choice perspective 
 
The rational choice perspective emphasises offenders’ strategic thinking, or the 
ways that they process information and  evaluate opportunities and alternatives. 
According to Conklin (2001:289), this perspective stresses calculated decision-
making, and argues that offenders choose how to act after determining the likely 
reward of a particular kind of behaviour. He also stated that this perspective 
looks in detail at specific crimes, because different offences meet different needs. 
There is also considerable variation between offences in the situational context of 
decision-making and the information that must be considered. 
 
The rational choice perspective focuses on the processes by which individuals 
initially decide to violate the law, choose to continue their life of crime, and 
eventually opt out of the criminal lifestyle. It should be pointed out, though, that 
not all people calculate rewards and risks in the same way. Some of the many 
factors that affect the choices people make are age, marital status, group ties, 
social class background, opportunities for legitimate careers, attitudes toward 
work, willingness to use violence, preferred life style, identity, and values (Shover 
1996:89).  As with all other crimes, this perspective will assist to provide an 
explanation for individuals’ decisions to commit AFF and why they would decide 
to cease their fraudulent activities.  
 
With this perspective in mind, it should be noted that offenders do not normally 
calculate the risk that is associated with theft, nor do they thoughtfully consider 
legitimate alternatives to crime. Instead, their decisions to commit crime are 
affected by lower-class and working -class values such as autonomy, toughness, 
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and excitement; as well as their lack of opportunities for legitimate careers; their 
low aspirations; and their desire to gain the respect of others. This is mostly 
applicable to property offenders whose decisions to steal are made in the context 
of a lifestyle characterized by a “life as party” attitude, in other words they seek 
the “enjoyment of good times” with minimal concerns for obligations and 
commitments that are external to their immediate social setting (Shover 
1996:93). This explanation shed some light in the understanding of AFF 
perpetrators. This is because their decisions to commit this fraud is partly due to 
the lack of opportunities for legitimate careers in South Africa, and in 
Nigeria/West Africa as well as values like toughness, excitement and their low 
aspiration to succeed in their country of origin. 
 
These offenders believe they are unlikely to be arrested and think that if they are 
imprisoned it will be for a short time. They approach their first prison term with 
some fear, but soon learn that they can survive incarceration, and even gain the 
respect of their peers for the crimes they have committed. In this regard, Conklin 
(2001:290) states that amateur offenders typically see imprisonment as a 
temporary setback, vowing to be more careful the next time they commit crime. 
Conversations with other inmates change the way offenders calculate rewards 
and risks, and they are encouraged to make money a more important goal and 
are taught which penalties they can expect for various offences (Shover 
1996:104). When AFF perpetrators are arrested, charged and granted bail, 
especially in South Africa, they continue with the fraud.  
 
Reward-risk and self-control 
 
This theory emphasises that situational influences on criminal behaviour might 
appear incompatible with theories that stress individual traits (for example low 
self-control) that are established during childhood. Research by Nagin and 
Paternoster (1993:67) found support for both kinds of theories and concluded 
that there was no incompatibility between the theories. Also, Conklin (2001:291) 
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maintains that criminal behaviour is strongly associated with low self-control. In 
their research, Nagin and Paternoster (1993:83) took prior behaviour into 
account, the situational aspects of the crime, and the perceived rewards and risk 
for committing the crime. They also found support for the reward-risk theory: the 
intention to break the laws was substantially influenced by the accessibility and 
vulnerability of the target, perceptions of the sanctions apt to result from breaking 
the law, and the pleasure derived from committing the crime. All these aspects 
are applicable to AFF perpetrators when they decide to commit this type of fraud. 
Perpetrators therefore consider the reward and risk associated with AFF and 
apparently the rewards of AFF activities outweighs the risks involved.    
 
An interpretation of this theory implies that the anticipated rewards for committing 
a crime would be more important than the perceived costs of committing a crime 
when one predicts the intention to break the law. Rewards are thus more 
immediate and risks are more uncertain and remote. As with AFF, rewards are 
immediate because they deal with cash. Nagin and Paternoster (1993:98) also 
indicated their support for both the reward-risk theory of criminal behaviour and 
the predispositional theories such as low self-control, and argued that both these 
theories are needed to fully understand the sources of offending behaviour. They 
suggested that people with low self-control focus on the pursuit of immediate 
pleasure and lack the commitment to the conventional line of actions, such as 
education, a career and lasting social relationships that provide long-term 
rewards and consequently have little to lose when they break the law (Conklin 
2001:291). 
 
However, before the rewards and risks of fraud and AFF are discussed, the 
researcher will consider the rewards and risks of crime in general.  
 
 
 
 
 157 
Rewards 
  
Many offenders find that the rewards of crime justify their violation of the law 
(Conklin 2001:91). Conklin also states that some of the offenders believe that the 
income they derive from crime is more certain and more substantial than the 
income they could earn from the legitimate jobs available to them. It has also 
been argued that, even if all offenders were paid the amount they realise from 
their criminal activities, many of them would continue to violate the law because 
of the non-economic rewards of crime. Supporting this notion is a study by Wood 
and Peter (1997:335), which found that the behaviour of habitual offenders is 
reinforced by the intrinsic rewards they derive from their crimes, specifically 
“…(1) the neurophysiological high such acts produce and (2) the symbolic 
meaning of the behaviour as it relates to self-concept and identity formation”. 
Offenders “reported that when performing crime, particularly violate crime they 
were pumped up, experienced a substantial high, and felt they could do anything 
they wanted. They also felt intensely alive and had a sense of accomplishment” 
(Wood et al. 1997:360). This explains why, when AFF perpetrators have 
defrauded a large sum of money, they say “...they have hit big or they have hit a 
jackpot” and boast about their greatness. 
 
Where AFF is concerned, one would suggest that one non-economic reward of 
criminal behaviour is the challenge of violating the law and getting away with it, 
this is important in many computer related crimes and fraud. The application of 
this theory to AFF perpetrators justifies why they referred to their victims as 
mugus. They believe they are more intelligent, cleverer and smarter than their 
victims. 
   
Risks 
 
The primary risk associated with crime is the threat of arrest, conviction, and 
punishment. Offenders often plan their crimes to minimise this risk, but most 
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people who continue to be involved in crime for any significant amount of time 
are eventually arrested (Conklin 2001:293). 
 
Therefore, if offenders have an 80 percent chance of escaping arrest for a given 
offence, the chances of escaping any arrest if two such crimes are committed is 
reduced to 64 percent, the chances of not being arrested at all if three offences 
are committed is 51 percent, and the chances of no arrest if the offenders commit 
twenty crimes is only 1 percent (Conk lin 2001:192). This means that the chances 
of not being arrested for a single crime are quite high, but the chance of never 
being arrested over the course of a criminal career is quite small. As a result, 
most criminal careers are eventually interrupted by an arrest. This explanation is 
applicable to AFF perpetrators who commit the fraud once off. 
 
Research has indicated that continued criminal activity might make some 
offenders experts, thereby minimising their chances of being arrested, but with 
continued successes many offenders become over-confident and careless 
(Conklin 2001:294). Chance plays an important role in determining whether an 
offender will be arrested for a given crime, an offender’s luck will eventually run 
out if he or she continues to break the law. 
  
 For criminals who commit fraud and AFF perpetrators, the risks are relatively 
small because few of them are convicted of a crime, and the courts usually treat 
those who are arrested, leniently. Perhaps the major risk they face is the loss of 
reputation (Conklin 2001:295). The instrumental nature of fraud lends itself to a 
careful calculation of the cost and benefits of violating the law. 
 
Conklin’s (2001:297) critique of the reward-risk model is that it fails to indicate 
exactly how potential offenders weight the various benefits and cost of criminal 
and non-criminal behaviour. He argues it is difficult for an offender to calculate 
the probability of an arrest, or balance a small chance of a prison sentence  
against the high probability of making a small financial gain. He concludes that 
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this theory seems to explain some offenders better, such as fraud offenders than 
other type of offences, like child molesters. 
 
3.6.3 The conflict theory 
 
The conflict theory has principally been concerned with the process of 
criminalisation. The theory rejects the consensus theory notion of the social world 
as an organic or integrated system (Friedrichs 2004:209). In its so-called “non-
partisan” form, the conflict theory is concerned with determining how the values 
and interests of different groups conflict because the more powerful groups in 
society are disproportionately able to influence the character and content of the 
law (Vold, Bernard & Snipes 2002:286). In this view, the behaviour of the 
powerless is most likely to be defined as criminal. 
 
The structure of contemporary capitalist society can be linked to the conflict 
theory, and can therefore be used to explain AFF perpetrators because the most 
basic form of fraud focuses on the nature of the society itself. This is because 
one principle version of the conflict theory is the Marxist or neo-Marxist theory. 
 
Marxist theory 
 
According to Quinney and Greenburg (Friedrichs 2004:210), Marx and Engels 
did not regard crime, in any form, to be a necessary or inevitable feature of 
human society. Rather, crime is essentially a product of a class society, and of 
capitalism in particular; to the extent that humans manifest such patterns of 
behaviour. Capitalism promotes these tendencies in human beings.  The 
capitalist system dehumanises people, transforms many objects and dimensions 
of the human environment into commodities, and promotes “false needs” that 
generate a significant amount of property crime. 
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In Marxist view, the worst crime is committed in the name of capitalism: the 
systematic exploitation of the working class. Engels contents that the ownership 
class is, in fact, guilty of murder because this class is fully aware that workers in 
factories and mines will die violent, premature deaths due to unsafe conditions. 
The private ownership of capital results in many socially injurious acts that, in 
today’s terms, can be labelled crimes of capital (Michalowski 1985:314).  
 
According to Bonge, Gordon, Lynch, Michalowski and Groves                                    
(Friedrichs 2004:210) it must be pointed out that, beyond crimes that are intrinsic 
to capitalism, Marx, Engels and their intellectual heirs have suggested that crime 
by the rich and poor alike is a rational, inevitable response to an economic 
system that fosters greed, egoistic or individualistic tendencies, competitiveness, 
and the debasement of humans. In this regard, Reiman and Headlee (1981:24-
27) noted that whenever the capitalist system undergoes an economic crisis, 
pressures to commit crimes increase, which supports the literature regarding 
AFF perpetrators, especially those from Nigeria/West Africa where economic 
pressures are rampant.  
 
It has also been suggested that the alienating and inauthentic dimensions of 
contemporary capitalism promote complex patterns of collaborative crime 
between elite organisations and governmental power holders (Simon 2002:98).  
Pearce and Tombs (2002:187) state that, as capitalism becomes increasingly 
globalised, it becomes even less subject to state regulation in its relentless drive 
to expand markets and maximize profits. This opens the door for international 
fraudsters and AFF perpetrators to spread worldwide. 
 
American society has been described as criminal or criminogenic on the basis of 
its modern, urbanised, bureaucratic character, which promotes impersonality and 
instrumentalism; its competitiveness; and its frontier cultural values, which 
promotes toughness and resistance to authority, according to Schur 1969 and 
Barron 1981 (Friedrichs 2004:211). It should be noted that Nigerian and West 
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African societies are suffused with contradictions and conflicts pertaining to its 
religious, ethnic, gender-related heritage, and their political systems celebrates 
democracy in an environment of gross misdistributions of real power. AFF 
perpetrators should thus be understood in terms of these structural attributes. 
 
3.6.4 Integrated theories 
 
In an attempt to explain white-collar crimes and fraud, criminologists have 
attempted to develop integrated theories of these crimes that incorporate insights 
from different theoretical traditions and account for fraud at different levels.  
 
Coleman (1987:406) developed an integrated theory that centers on the co-
existence of appropriate motivation and opportunity. According to him, a culture 
generates motives for lawbreaking when it emphasises possessive individualism, 
competition, and materialism, justifies rationalisation, and removes unified 
restraining influences.  This means that a built-in structure of opportunity renders 
white-collar crime and fraud both less vulnerable to legal controls and sanctions 
(due to the disproportionate power of the elite in the formulation and 
administration of the law) and open to a variety of attractive possibilities for 
disregarding or violating the laws that do exist (Friedrichs 2004:214). 
 
Various factors, including the structuring of opportunity, the nature of financial 
reimbursement, and the occupational subculture, can render some occupations 
more conducive to illegality than others. Accordingly, fraud is most pervasive in 
societies that encourage a culture of competition, in organisations that are 
financially pressured, and in occupations with special opportunities and 
subcultural values that promote illegality. 
 
Within this same perspective, Braithwaite (1989:333) based his integrative theory 
on two traditions: structural Marxist theory, which links both fraud and 
conventional crime with the promotion of egoism in capitalist societies, and 
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differential association which argues that both fraud and conventional crimes are 
learned, relative to differential opportunity. Accordingly, nations with high levels 
of inequality of wealth and power will have high rates of both fraud and 
conventional crime because they produce a broad range of illegitimate 
opportunities that are more rewarding than legal opportunities (Friedrichs 
2004:214). White-collar crime and specifically fraud are both responses to 
relatively more attractive illegitimate opportunities and a sub-cultural value 
system that rationalizes that it is appropriate to take advantage of those 
illegitimate opportunities. For Braithwaite, the theoretical challenge is to construct 
a “tipping point” explanation that predicts when a stake in non-compliance 
outbalances a stake in conformity with the law. His critical tipping factor is 
differential shaming. From this analysis, one would conclude that involvement in 
fraud and AFF could be understood as a function of relative vulnerability to 
shaming. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter presented the nature and organisation of AFF perpetrators. The 
characteristics of the perpetrators’ behaviour were examined and this was 
followed by a diagrammatical presentation of the e-mail cycle of AFF perpetrators 
and explanations were provided. The modus operandi used by perpetrators and 
by these offenders in the execution of the crime was also discussed. The 
theoretical explanations of the perpetrators were also discussed in order for one 
to have a clear understanding of these offenders. In this case, the sociological, 
rational, conflict, and the integrated theoretical perspectives were employed. 
In this chapter findings were made in terms of the nature and organisation of 
these perpetrators, their characteristics, and the modus operandi they often use 
when they commission this type of fraud.  
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The table below shows the findings of this chapter: 
 
Table 3.2 The perpetrators 
Nature of 
the 
perpetrators
Characteristics 
of the 
perpetrators 
Organization 
patterns 
Modus 
operandi 
E-mail MO 
cycle 
Explanations
Highly skilled 
and creative 
Age 20-35 yrs Diversify Intelligence 
gathering 
Letter drafting Moral 
insensibility 
Learn 
techniques 
Mostly male Cross-sector 
criminals 
Activate criminal 
specialists 
Store letters Neutralization 
techniques 
Specialise in 
a function 
Any occupation Well-networked Support other 
crimes 
Outsource 
communications
Lacks social 
control 
Impersonate 
people 
Primarily 
Nigerian/West 
African nationals 
Internet Café’s Use lawful agents Harvest email 
addresses 
Anomic strain 
Ostentatious 
lifestyle 
Race: African Outsource AFF 
communications
Corruption Mass email 
solicitation 
Differential 
learning 
World 
travellers  
Graduates Bankers as 
assistants 
Misrepresentation 
and fraud 
Victim 
response: Yes 
Motivation and 
opportunity 
 Extensive crime 
records 
Game players 
(dialler, fronter, 
closer, 
takeover) 
Fake Internet 
Websites  
Initiate 
communication 
Rational 
choices 
 Patience  Manipulation Provide fake 
documentation 
Relative 
vulnerable 
shaming 
   Violence and 
intimidation 
Transfer funds Integrated 
theory 
 
 
Table 3.2 can be explained as follows: 
 
The nature of the perpetrators determines their biographical characteristics, 
which in turn influences the way in which they organise themselves to commit the 
AFF.  The modus operandi and specifically the e-mail modus operandi, flows 
from these organisational patterns.  When all of these; the nature, biographical 
characteristics, organisational patterns, modus operandi and e-mail modus 
operandi: are integrated, one can understand the criminal (criminologically 
speaking) best. 
 
 164 
Fraud, and particularly AFF, is clearly a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon. No 
single theory or explanation can comprehensively explain the perpetrators’ 
behaviour. One must be clear about what exactly is being explained: criminality, 
crime, or criminalisation. The overarching view of this section is the complexity 
and diversity of fraud and AFF precludes any single comprehensive theory or 
explanatory scheme. It becomes evident that it is difficult to overcome the 
methodological barriers to demonstrate conclusively the validity of the competing 
theories of fraud and AFF.  
 
However, given the large numbers of possible variables one cannot expect to 
easily explain AFF perpetrators’ behaviour with propositions that possesses the 
reliability of a scientific law. Therefore one can only invoke the core motivation of 
‘greed’ to largely explain AFF.  The essential notion of this section is that such a 
simplistic, one-dimensional explanation does not clarify, either the endless 
complex mixture of factors that may be involved in the character of such 
offenders or the different ways of even thinking about what one want to explain, 
and motivation is only one element (Freidrichs 2004:216). 
 
From the above discussion, analysis and findings, it becomes clear that AFF 
offenders come from different backgrounds. This makes it very difficult to study 
and understand them.  Since face-to-face contact with their victims is rare victims 
are even less likely to discover that they are being defrauded. Hence, one would 
conclude that AFF perpetrators are smooth criminals, who can function for years 
without detection by the victims or law enforcement agents.  
 
The next chapter will examine the victims of AFF and it will also attempt to 
explain AFF victimisation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE VICTIMS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Fifteen years ago, it would have been difficult to find anyone involved in either 
criminological research or any agency connected with criminal justice, who gave 
the problems of crime victims more than a passing thought. The primary interest 
then was focused on the motivation of the offender, as part of a search, either for 
general explanations of criminal behaviour, or for ways to prevent crime, 
particularly through rehabilitation or training. The victim was simply a source of 
information about the offending behaviour, or a witness when the case was heard 
in court. Today, however, interest in the aetiology of offending has waned 
dramatically, the focus of crime prevention strategies has shifted from offender 
rehabilitation to community action, and literature regarding crime victims is fast 
expanding.  
 
It must be pointed out that this interest in victims is not only found inside these 
narrow professional circles. The professionals’ responses have themselves been 
stimulated and accelerated, both by a general climate of opinion, sympathetic 
towards crime victims, and by the activities of increasingly well organised and 
influential groups, set up specifically to assist or campaign on behalf of victims. In 
the recent past, newspapers, magazines and the broadcasting media have 
frequently featured stories or commented on issues related to victimisation. Not 
surprisingly, politicians have noticed which way the wind blows and governments 
of some countries have thus legislated improvements that address procedures 
which compensate the victims of crime (Maguire & Pointing 1988:1). 
 
Whatever the case, it must be underscored that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Report (URC), and the Justice Department’s 
National Crime Victimisation Surveys (NCVS), usually provide annual tabulations 
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of property and violent crimes, based on crimes reported to the police and 
household surveys. They do not, however, provide information regarding people 
who have been victims of fraud. These types of white-collar/economic crimes 
target individuals and employ deception in order to obtain illegal financial gain. 
This involves the misrepresentation of facts and the deliberate intent to deceive, 
with a promise of goods, services, or other financial benefits that, in fact, do not 
exist or that were never intended to be provided (Titus, Heinzelmann & Boyle 
1999:179). Lured by the simplistic and often error-laden correspondence, 
balanced against the potential procuring of millions, norma l astute businessmen 
who come from very money-oriented societies vainly believe that they have the 
business acumen to deal profitably with what they see as a Third World country, 
never imaging the complexities and professionalism of the operation they are up 
against. 
 
The criminal justice professionals and researchers have often highlighted the 
need for systematic information concerning the nature and extent of various 
economic crimes, including personal fraud, to influence both the action of 
potential victims and the policies and practices of the criminal justice system 
(Titus et al. 1999:180). Moreover, researchers and policy makers have not yet 
adequately addressed the needs of the victims of these crimes. The focus of 
legislation and victim assistance has been on the victims of interpersonal 
violence and street property crimes, not on the victims of economic crimes, 
including personal fraud. At the moment, research concerned with the nature of 
personal fraud is limited, and statistical data regarding these crimes and their 
victims is scarce.  
 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to describe, analyse and comment on victims 
in terms of the nature or types, and incidences of AFF victimisation, victims’ 
characteristics, and the effects of AFF victimisation, especially on individuals, 
corporations and nations, and the theoretical explanation of this type of 
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victimisation. In this chapter, the findings of the empirical research of AFF vi ctims 
will also be integrated into the literature research. 
 
First, the categories of victims and the concept victimisation will be examined as 
it relates to AFF.  
 
4.2 CATEGORIES OF VICTIMS 
 
Literature research indicates that not every crime has a direct, tangible, and 
easily identifiable victim. Acts that are prohibited and made punishable by penal 
law may thus be classified, according to the type of victims involved. In this case, 
Fattah (1991:90-96) classified the following categories of victims: 
 
4.2.1 Crimes against specific victims 
 
According to Fattah (1991:92) most conventional crimes are committed against 
specific, individual victims, referred to in law as the wronged, injured, or harmed 
party. This party can either be a natural person, juridical persons (a corporate 
body), or an animal. A natural person, in this case, is a human being, whether 
alive or dead. Certain offences, such as homicide, assault causing bodily harm 
and rape can only be perpetrated against a natural, live person. Dead people 
may also be the victim of some offences, such as in the case of desecrating dead 
bodies or tombs. 
 
It should be noted that the modern penal law recognises the existence of juridical 
persons, that is, a number of natural persons grouped together in some form of 
association who have rights and obligations distinct from those of the individual 
members. The law acknowledges that juridical persons can be victims of crimes 
committed against patrimony, homer and so forth. In general, juridical persons 
may be public corporations, private corporations or international organisations 
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(Fattah 1991:92). These are common victims of frauds in general, and AFF in 
particular. 
 
4.2.2 Crimes against non-specific victims 
 
Research indicates that all criminal offences, whether against specific individuals 
or not, are supposed to be harmful to one or several social, political, legal, or 
religious institutions. However, there is a whole category of offences that, by their 
very nature, are not directed against a specific person, natural or juridical (Fattah 
19991:93). In such cases, the victim is merely an abstraction, for it is not a 
definable, identifiable individual who is wrong or who suffers the injurious or 
harmful effects of the offences. Public peace is the abstract victim of offences 
such as the acts of propagating false news or rumours likely to cause fear among 
people, or acts of inciting people to disobey the law. Public authority is 
collectively victimised in cases of rebellion, the escape of prisoners and 
defilement of monuments. The constitution is the abstract victim in cases where 
the administrative and judicial statutes are violated or in cases of conspiracy by 
government officials (Fattah 1991:93). 
 
4.2.3 Crimes against a potential victim 
 
In this case, the offence is not perpetrated against a specific individual. Nobody 
is actually harmed, though the dangerous nature of the act implies a threat of 
potential harm to an, as yet, undetermined victim. Such is the case with all illegal 
possession of offensive weapons, dangerous driving or driving while one’s 
faculties are impaired. In all these cases, the offences are determined by the 
perpetration of the act, even if no actual harm has resulted from it (Fattah 
1991:93). 
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4.2.4 Crimes without victims  
 
It must be underscored that in some offences, there is no victim, only two 
offenders who jointly perpetrate the prohibited act.  A classical example is the 
case of incest between two consenting adults. In some jurisdictions, the law 
prohibits homosexual acts and other sexual deviation among adults. The two 
parties involved may be charged and convicted. If, in any of these incidents, one 
of the two individuals involved is a consenting or willing minor, the criminal law 
establishes a legal presumption in his or her favour, thus assigning him or her the 
designation of a victim (Fattah 1991:93).  It mus t, however, be noted that this 
legal presumption of victimisation is established by the law in favour of minors, 
regardless of the facts of the case and the actual roles of the two parties in the 
commission of the offence. 
 
Rubin (1971) defines victimless crimes as “… behaviour not injurious to others 
but made criminal by statutes based on moral standards which disapprove of 
certain forms of behaviour while ignoring others that are comparable”. Packer 
(1968:67) views victimless crimes as “… offences that do  not result in anyone’s 
feeling that he has been injured so as to impel him to bring the offence to the 
attention of the authorities”, and Schur (1965) who use the term “crimes without 
victim” defines the concept as referring to “… the willing exchange, among 
adults, of strongly demanded but legally proscribed goods or services” (Fattah 
1991:94). 
 
 In some offences the victim may be a united person. This is the situation Von 
Hentig (Fattah 1991:93) refers to as the “doer-sufferer”: an individual who 
combines the roles of the victim and the offender. The wounded party in duels 
and suicide attempts and individuals who mutilate themselves or get another to 
mutilate them to escape compulsory military service are all “doer-sufferers” liable 
to different sanctions in most jurisdictions. An act deemed harmful, dangerous, or 
threatening need not have a real victim or specific victim to qualify as a criminal 
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offence. There are, however, certain offences that cannot be easily classified in 
any of the previous categories. In such cases, there may be no discernible harm, 
and if the act involved any harm at all it is primarily harm to the participating 
individual’s themselves. 
 
Based on the above-mentioned types of victims, the next section will deal with 
victimisation as it relates to AFF. 
 
4.3 VICTIMISATION  
 
Victimisation is a process 
 
According to the South African Law Commission (1997:3), victimisation is a 
process whereby a victim, either innocently, through negligence or intentionally, 
is exposed to the negligent and/or intentional unlawful conduct of a criminal, 
which is prohibited by law. It is not limited to conduct which the victim regards as 
criminal, but it includes the feelings, responses and the community’s attitude 
towards the victim. From a humanistic perspective, victimisation is the process 
whereby a person (s) suffers harm through the violation of national criminal laws 
or of internationally recognised norms relating to human rights (NCPS Victim 
Empowerment Program June 1997). 
 
AFF victimisation 
 
The choice of AFF criminal victimisation and the decision not to deal with other 
types of victimisation is not meant to suggest that AFF criminal victimisation is 
more serious, more harmful, or more injurious than other types. Nor should it be 
interpreted as suggesting that the material cost of, and the human sufferings 
resulting from, AFF criminal victimisation are more substantial, more traumatic, or 
longer lasting than those caused by other forms of victimisation. However, for 
theoretical as well as practical considerations, it is necessary to circumscribe the 
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chapter and to reduce the enormously vast field of general victimisation to a 
single manageable area (AFF victimisation).  
 
4.3.1 Types and nature of AFF victimisation 
 
Types 
 
With regards to AFF, there are direct and indirect victims. The direct victim, in 
this case, would be someone who suffered financial loss, physical or 
psychological suffering and even death as a result of this type of fraud. The 
indirect victim includes, where appropriate, the family members of the direct 
victim, as well as investors and shareholders of companies. The most common 
types of victimisation in AFF are, however, the direct victims. 
 
Nature 
 
According to research, during the first phase of this type of fraud, the victim 
receives a letter, allegedly from officials of a large institution. These letters 
request an urgent and confidential business relationship between the 
perpetrators of the fraud and the intended victim, in order to transfer funds out of 
one country to another, usually to the financial institutions in the victim’s country 
of residence. The intended victim is falsely offered payment for his assistance, 
usually in the region of 10 to 30 per cent of the total contract amount (The 419 
Coalition 2003). 
 
The victim is asked to forward personal financial information, including banking 
information as well as copies of their corporate letterheads and invoices, so that 
the payment can be made through a contract claim in the victim’s name. The 
victim is also asked to wire a payment of approximately $US 10.000, supposedly 
for legal fees and administrative costs in order to secure the business 
arrangement. According to the 419 Coalition, once the victim discloses the 
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required personal financial information and corporate documents and wires the 
required payment, the “hook is in” and phase two of the scam begins. 
 
In phase two, the victim receives a telephone call from confederates in the 
criminal organisation, posing as top executives of the corporation or bank. At this 
stage the victim is falsely informed that the full total of the contract funds have 
been cleared and are now in an alleged clearinghouse or merchant bank in the 
victim’s country. 
 
Typically, the fraud continues when the victim is informed that, before the money 
can be claimed, there are further outstanding fees that the victim must pay. The 
419 Coalition reports that these fees are alleged charges for such items as taxes, 
duties or environmental levies and can range from approximately $US 50.000 to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Once these fees are paid, the victim is 
approached to pay even more fees. The scam continues until the victim is broke 
and the fraudulent business deal is never consummated. 
 
Move funds to Europe 
 
In one of the victim’s statements (involving marked currency), he explained how 
he fell prey to these fraudsters (The 419 Coalition 2003).  In his statement, the 
victim said: “… after I replied, he responded back in a very convincing way, so I 
thought I could believe that he was to give me 30 percent of 40 million dollars if I 
help bring the funds to Europe and help him invest his portion”. The victim 
continued to say that: “… after speaking with him I came to believe it was real. 
Finally he asked me to go to Amsterdam to have the funds released into my 
name for transfer to my account in Italy”.  
 
According to this victim, the fraudster said he was going to pick him up at the 
airport in Amsterdam. The victim said: “…there was no one waiting for me. I 
called him and he said he was busy and that I should take a taxi to a hotel. Three 
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hours later I opened the door to find a tall and very well-dressed African man with 
another African individual, with the title of Doctor, that I later discovered was the 
supposed chemist”. 
 
The victim said: “Douglas hugged me with a ‘Hello my friend!’ greetings filled with 
warmth and sincerity. Again, everything seemed real to me. He explained that, 
for the release of the funds, the security company wanted $38,000 USD and 
although he was only able to collect $35.000 he said he  had made an agreement 
with the company whereby they would bring one of the two trunk boxes, which 
contained $20 million dollars, and we would pay them the remaining $3000 
directly from the funds. That seemed to be a perfect idea to me”. 
 
The victim said:  “He gave the $35000 to this doctor and told him to go to the 
security company for the release of the consignment. While Douglas and I stayed 
in the hotel room, waiting for the doctor to come back, we talk about families, 
religion, and other nice things. He was so pleasant and good-natured anyone 
would think he was a decent man” the victim said. 
 
The victim said:  “Two hours later the chemist came back with another African 
person carrying a normal travel case. He sat down and asked who the 
beneficiary was. I said it was me, so he asked me to show him my passport 
which I did. Then he took out some documents from a folder and asked me to 
sign them. He then asked me for the balance owing, and Douglas said there was 
a person who was going to bring the money in a few minutes”. The victim said 
the courier then became upset, saying that this was not the agreement, and that 
his boss would be upset with him if he did not come back with the $38000 USD. 
 
According to the victim, Douglas implored the courier to wait for just ten minutes 
in the hallway and after some other terse words the man agreed and left the 
room. The victim said “…I was getting nervous because I realised that things 
were not going as smoothly and as risk free as Douglas stated in the beginning”.  
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Douglas and the chemist then opened the trunk, and inside was a locked metallic 
galvanized case. The chemist asked for the combination to which Douglas 
replied “431”. The doctor opened the case and inside there was a strange 
container packed in foam which he took out, revealing the money below, 
hundreds of stacked US dollars, which filled the entire case. 
 
The victim said: “…then our focus went to the strange container”. The victim 
explained that “… there was a bottle inside and when they examined it they 
remarked, with dismay, that the solution inside had almost entirely solidified; 
leaving only a very small portion liquid. I asked what it was and the doctor 
explained that it was a chemical compound called Lactima Base 98 percent, 
used for cleaning the money”. “…I thought here is another thing that Douglas did 
not tell me; so I asked him to explain further”. He said that for security reasons all 
bills had been marked with a stamp which invalidate them and that the liquid is 
used to remove the stamp. He planned to wash $3000 to pay the balance to the 
security company man, but there was only enough to wash $200. This was 
confirmed by them actually cleaning two bills in front of me. Everything seemed 
so real!  
 
The victim said: “…Douglas calling someone on his phone, shouting that the 
liquid had hardened in the bottle. Then he said to me he was stymied and he did 
not know what to do. I was scared, but my mind was still working on how to 
resolve the thing. I suggested we call in the courier and tell him the person who 
should have brought the balance could not make it, then ask him to return the 
case until we had the money to retrieve the cases”. 
 
The victim reported that the courier returned and again was upset, but finally 
decided to do what I proposed. After saying that he wanted to be sure the man 
actually went back with the consignment to the security company, Douglas went 
with him. “…But not before, as perfect IDIOT, I said that I could raise at lease 
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$1500USD using my credit card. So off I went to the centre of Amsterdam 
accompanied by the doctor to get the cash advances at various ATMs”. 
 
“Successful, we went back to the hotel and met Douglas, who said he had 
acquired the remaining money needed, took mine, and went off to the security 
company while I stayed at the hotel with the chemist who brainstormed that we 
had to somehow liquefy the solution to do the cleaning. He then called someone 
on the phone, asking about the possibility of melting it. After some minutes of 
talking he put down the telephone and said that Prime Chemical Company may 
be able to melt the solution, but they could not say just how much they would 
charge us for doing so. I had to fly back to Italy the next day so I told Douglas, 
when he returned, that he would have finished the operation alone. But wait, he 
said, first we had to determine how much the melting would be. I replied that as 
we, or certainly I, did not have any more money they should simply make an 
agreement with the Prime Chemical Company to have the solution melted and 
then pay them out of the cleaned money”. 
 
The victim said: “…the next day Douglas brought me all the linked documents 
below and said the doctor was still waiting for a price for the melting. He later 
brought me at the airport and said goodbye like a true friend with a big hug”. 
 
In his statement, the victim said “… I should have flown out at 6pm, but at 9pm I 
was still waiting for my delayed plane so I called him to see what was going on. 
He said that the Prime Chemical Company successfully melted a very small part 
of the solution as a test, and was asking for $46000USD for the total melting. 
Knowing I was short of funds, he started asking me if I could talk with my father 
for ‘assistance’”. 
“I guess, I was finally clueing into the possibility that it was a scam so his 
enthusiasm started to wane. After a couple of days he saw that I was not very 
convinced and said that he had been able to raise $20000 and so I “only” had to 
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find the remaining $26000”. At this stage, the victim realised that he had been 
defrauded. 
 
Dead foreign contractor transferred money 
 
In another victim’s statement, (The 419 Coalition 2003) the victims identified 
themselves as Shahla Ghasemi and Dr. Ali-Reza Ghasemi of Florida USA. In 
their statement, they stated how they got involved in AFF in 2000. In their 
statement, they said: “… we got a phone call from Nigeria by a man named Dr. 
Ali Abubabker though, I don’t believe that is his real name”. 
 
The victims said the man introduced himself as the Director of Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC) and used the number 234-1-774-1703.  According 
to the victim, the man said he has a confidential message for my husband, but if 
we were to expose this message he could lose his job and his life. “… He told us 
that he would receive a very big commission from this”. 
 
The victims said that: “… the story that he told us was that one foreign contractor 
from our country (USA) who died transferred $27,400.000 to Dr. Ali-Reza 
Ghasemi (my husband). We were very shocked as that is my husband’s name. 
After that, he faxed all the documents and attached all the needed documents. 
We looked over everything and they seemed real, all bore the government’s 
official seals and stamps. Then he faxed us a copy of our bank information, 
which we filled out and faxed back to him”. 
 
The victims reported that thereafter: “… we received a letter from the bank which 
stated that we needed to hire a power of attorney. His name is FA Williams and 
his telephone is 234-1-774-0939. We contacted Mr. Williams and he asked us to 
send him $7, 250, 00 for the court registration fee through Western Union. We 
sent the money with a fee, which came out to be $7.565.00 After they had 
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received the payment, Mr. Williams said that everything was ready but, calling 
from the bank asked us for a copy of SEPA”. 
 
The victims reported that they had no idea what SEPA was, so they called Dr. 
Abubaker who said he didn’t have the form and thought that maybe the original 
contractor hadn’t paid for it. They then asked us for $27.400 but with a fee we 
paid $30.000 through Western Union. The victim said “Two days after, Mr. 
Williams had called and congratulated us. He said that our money had been 
transferred and he faxed me a copy of the transaction, which stated that our 
money had left the bank and was on its way into our account”. 
 
The victims said: “…in that same week, Dr. Abubaker had faxed me his 
confirmation ticket saying that he was on his way to America, and that we should 
send him money to buy his ticket. The following day Mr. Williams called and said 
that our money had been stopped because of a shorting tax that needed to be 
paid which hadn’t been paid. He faxed me an invoice for $63.250 bill for the tax. 
We transferred this money through our bank to Prism Company at Nigeria. Two 
days later he called and said everything was fine. He said that we should be 
hearing from our bank representative very soon. Two days later we received a 
call from Carlos White from Atlanta, Georgia in America. He introduced himself 
as a NCB Bank Representative with the phone of 404-944-1842. He said that our 
money was ready and that we needed to fly to Atlanta to transfer the amount into 
our account”. 
 
The victims asked why they had to go to Atlanta and Carlos replied that because 
it was such a big amount he had to transfer the money in front of us. Carlos told 
the victims to come along with their driver’s licence, a copy of the contract, and 
$11.500 in cash. That same evening, the victims and their daughter flew to 
Atlanta and got a hotel room. 
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The victims said that the next day they called Mr. Carlos White to make an 
appointment with him at their bank. According to the victims, Carlos told them 
that he was sending a bank representative to their hotel room. They said Carlos 
sent two men by the names of Mustafa Sharief and Agu Jbreh. The victims said 
that the two men received all the documents and $11.500 in cash and they told 
the victims to wait for two hours at which time their money would be transferred 
into their account. The victims waited for a few hours and kept calling the bank 
and the bank said no transaction had occurred. At this stage, the victims decided 
to head back to Florida. 
 
The victim said “…while we were in link checking our bags and receiving our 
tickets, we were contacted by Mr. White by our cell phone. We told him that we 
were leaving and ready to go back to Florida. He got very mad and said that we 
couldn’t go back because the transaction hadn’t been closed yet and that he still 
needed to talk to us. We went back to our hotel and we had to reserve another 
room. 
 
The victims said they called Mr. White and he said he would be sending two 
people. The victim said these two men came and told them that the government 
of Nigeria had approved their payment to be physical cash.  The victims said “… 
we asked them what that meant and they said that it was real cash. Then they 
asked us to go to their car and see the cash and get the cash or to wait and 
transfer the money into our bank account”. According to the victims, the 
fraudsters told them that the money couldn’t go into their account until it had 
been cleaned.  “We asked them to what they meant and they went to the car and 
came back with five pieces of black paper. Then they went into the bathroom sink 
and with some chemicals cleaned the black paper and it turned out to be $100 
bills. We told them that it was fine. They could clean the money and deposit it 
into our account”. 
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The victim said: “Mr. Sharrif called Carlos White and he said we had to pay for 
the chemicals, we asked how much they need and he said it was $185.000. We 
asked if he could take the $185.000 from the money but he said that he could not 
touch the original money. Then we decided to go back to Florida”. 
 
From that night, they decided to contact the Nigerian government and their 
attorney Mr. Williams. They called Dr. Abubaker and Mr. Williams, and they acted 
normal. In the victims view, these two men did not know what Mr. White had told 
them. The victims said Mr. Williams told them that he had to go and speak to the 
president of Nigeria in Abuja (capital) and get his advice. The victims said “… two 
days later, he called me and said that we had no choice but to pay the money for 
the chemicals, but he said that we should send him a copy of the receipt so that 
after the government received their money from America and Japan they would 
reimburse my money that we paid for the chemicals”. The victim said “…Mr. 
White was calling me and asking me for the money for the chemicals. Finally we 
wired $150.000 to them. Two days later, Mr. White called from Atlanta and asked 
for a Rolex watch for the president of Nigeria so that he could impress the 
president and get a better job in Nigeria. In addition, he wanted $350.000”. The 
victim was told that the $350.000 was for the purpose of opening an account for 
me for a Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) transit account. 
 
At this point, the victim spoke to their consultant and he told them that they had 
been scammed, and showed them various different stories and examples of 
Internet scams that had happened to different victims. The victims reported that 
they had lost almost $400.000 to this scam. They said they had borrowed the 
money from different places, and now they have lost their credit. 
 
This is just one of the many ways that AFF use to defraud victims and illustrate 
the process of victimisation. 
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These research findings found that individuals easily fall victim to money transfer 
and black currency (money cleaning wash-wash). This is because it is easy for 
victims to be convinced and contacted by the perpetrators. All the perpetrators 
who took part in this research said their victims were defrauded, either for money 
transfers or money cleaning. One victim, who took part in this research, said she 
was approached for money cleaning. The research also found that money 
cleaning was the most common type of AFF in South Africa.   
 
As per money transfer, this research found that the victims were foreigners who 
were lured to South Africa by these perpetrators. In this regard the perpetrator in 
Case 1 said: “…But what I know is most of the victims I was aware of are not 
locals.  They are from the US or the UK”. 
 
This research also recorded that AFF victims can be just anybody. In this regard, 
the perpetrator in Case 1 said: “…I don’t think there is a category of persons.  
They target everybody.  Sometimes the people that they target don’t have money 
of their own, but when they hear the story, they will go and get money from 
somewhere to get involved in the business. So it’s not as if they are targeting rich 
people or business people”. 
 
Similarly, the perpetrator in Case 2 said: “….  I mean a 419 person would knock 
anybody for money.  That’s just basically…its fraud. Even me as a Nigerian I can 
get knocked by another Nigerian or somebody from the DRC. You see the whole 
essence of 419 is greed”.  This perpetrator also said “…All sorts of person, 
anybody.  Even you and me, we are potential victims.  Just like that, anybody, 
you or me. Victims could be anybody; it could be you it could be me”. 
 
In the same vein, Respondent 2 said: “…No they don’t have a special target. 
That’s how they get their targets.  You can be a pastor when he sends the letter 
to you, you can be a minister, you can be a businessman, and you can be a poor 
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person”.  Respondent 3 also said “…They don’t naturally have a profession.  
Anyone who has got, who they believe has got money, can be targeted”. 
 
 
The findings of this research also indicated that most victims of money transfer 
scams later became victims of black currency. This is because the perpetrators 
usually change their approach from one type of problem to another. In certain 
cases, the initial proposal was to transfer money from Africa to Europe or 
America and when the victim has paid the first and second instalments of the 
transfer fee, the perpetrator will change the story and ask the victim to come to 
their base country. From there he will be introduced to black dollars and then 
they will start to talk about money to buy chemicals to clean the money.  
 
4.3.2 Re-victimisation  
 
Reports received by Interpol indicate that AFF offenders are becoming so brazen 
and confident that they are contacting earlier victims of the fraud. They pose as 
Nigerian government officials who investigate the fraud in a so-called attempt to 
retrieve the victims’ money, and request the payment of an up-front fee. There 
have also been reports of a spoof email being distributed, which claims a probe 
investigation has been set up by the Nigerian government to crack down on the 
fraudsters. It reads: “Operation Zero has been commissioned to investigate, treat 
and conclude in an accelerated hearing on genuinely reported cases of Advance 
Fee Fraud (419) under the criminal code name”. In reality, no such probe has 
been set up. Instead, it is thought to be rival gangs of conmen who will charge 
victims to “investigate” their case. Victims will be fleeced a second time (NCIS 
2004: 39). 
 
Supporting the above statement, Smith et al. (1999:3) said that some victims, 
who have been defrauded, receive correspondence months later, ostensibly from 
Nigerian authorities advising them that their funds have been recovered. Again, 
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they are requested to send funds to enable the so-called recovered funds to be 
released, thus resulting in further losses. 
 
According to Sullivan (2003:4) the perpetrators themselves refers to this as 
“reloading” where the con artist appears to be revisiting old potential victims. It is 
reported here that when someone loses money to AFF, the victim will often hear 
from another con claiming they can recover the lost funds. It is called ‘reloading’, 
a term used in the timeshare sales industry where the resort’s marketing people 
review their lists of ‘ups’ who did not buy timeshare and develop a marketing ploy 
or strategy to get them back at the resort for another go at them. In this case, 
people who have heard fro m a 419er are most likely to hear from a 419er again. 
They will either again hear from the same group with the same tale, or from the 
same group using a different approach. An individual in the group could also 
‘branch out’ for himself, tell them that the original group just didn’t have the juice 
to get the job done, but he does (The 419 Coalition 2003). In a related case, 
fraudsters will inform the victims that they are police officers who heard about the 
scam and that they are able to arrest the offenders/or recover the money lost by 
the victim. The fraudsters will mention that the police department have no 
resources to make the arrest or recover the money, and then request the victim 
to pay an amount, ranging from between $US2000 to 10,000 in order to 
apprehend the fraudsters (419 Legal 2004). 
 
This research found that multiple or repetitive victimisation usually takes place. 
Most victims of this fraud lost money more than once to the same perpetrators or 
to different perpetrators within the same network.  It was found that the moment a 
victim gets involved in the ‘business’ he/she will be victimised repeatedly.  
 
Supporting this stance was the statement made by the perpetrator in Case 4 
when he said: “… about ten times…by different persons.  Me, I take money and I 
finish, and I call you, go and take money from him also.  Hey, you can tell him 
that this person this and this, you want some money, this and this and this, I’ve 
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got some money, which is dirty, I want to clean it.  Here I can clean it.  No, the 
others they will come around to where you are, and they’ll start talking business.  
For you to give attention to hear, and from there, they’ll attract your attention, and 
then they’ll take money from you”. 
 
Similarly, Respondent 2 said: “…if they said to you the target is 5 million rand, 
and you have already spend R100 000, or R300 000, you haven’t even reached 
a quarter of that money, meaning that you’ll always try to spend, so that the 
money must be well and ready to use, for you also to get your part, and for him 
also to get his part.   So that’s why from the day you start investing money in, you 
will continue, until the day you’ll be satisfied or the day you get tired”. 
 
Re-victimisation can also be explained as follows: 
 
Pease and Laycock (1999:3) suggested two reasons that help to explain the 
occurrence of repeat victimization. They said that the first pertains to risk 
assessment by offenders. They cited an example of burglary in an area of poor 
housing which is likely to be regarded as a low-risk opportunity by any passing 
burglar. The second is that victimisation itself makes a repeat more likely.  
However, common sense argues for an offender to victimise a person more than 
once.  A burglar walking down a street for the first time sees houses he 
presumes are suitable targets and those he presumes are unsuitable. He 
successfully burgles one home. The next time he walks down the same street he 
sees not only houses he presumes suitable but also one he knows is suitable. 
Why not burgle the latter - again? He knows his way in and out of the home and 
knows the value of what he had to leave behind the first time (Pease et 
al.1999:4).  Apart from common sense, street corner interviews support the 
above position that past victimisations of a person plays an importa nt role in 
generating Advance Fee Fraud against him or her by the same or other 
offenders. 
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In the case of AFF re-victimisation, this research found that the hope of 
completing the ‘business’ deal successfully hooks victims and sets them up to be 
re-victimised. The findings also suggest that when a victim has made an advance 
payment, and despite the usual complication that arises, he/she will still continue 
to pay fees. So when a victim starts paying he/she pays until he/she becomes 
dry or very broke. It should be noted that all the complications that arise are 
meant to make the victim pay more and more money. With this in mind, the 
perpetrator in Case 2 said: “… you see hope is the issue, most people have hope 
that one day the business will pay them. So they continue to give more to make 
sure that the money is clean or the transfer goes through into their account. So 
hope makes victims to continue to lose money in so far as they have it, they may 
even go and borrow, make bank loans or even steal money from their company 
just to invest into the business”. 
 
The above-mentioned scamming techniques tell something about the 
characteristics of these victims.  These will now be highlighted. 
 
4.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF AFF VICTIMS 
 
According to criminological research, victims’ studies have emerged as a 
separate component. With regard to AFF victims, the main area of interest in this 
section includes their personal characteristics.  Studies (Collier 2002:4) indicate 
the vast majority of victims who are targeted are individuals and small 
businesses. Most of the individuals who fall victims to AFF broadly fall into one of 
these two categories. Either they or their business is seeking credit and they 
have difficulty in obtaining it elsewhere, or they are persuaded that they have the 
opportunity to join a business deal which is going to make them a great deal of 
profit. It is often difficult to persuade these victims that they have been defrauded, 
even after they have lost their money. It must be pointed out that individuals and 
business people find it hard to believe that their judgment has allowed them to be 
fooled into losing money that they will not recover. According to Collier (2002:4) 
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this pride, along with the embarrassment when they do realise that they have 
been duped is one of the major contributory factors in allowing these fraudsters 
to successfully get away with their crimes, as victims are often reluctant to make 
a report to the authorities. 
 
Research (The 419 Coalition 2003) indicated the following characteristics of AFF 
victims:  
 
4.5.1 Age 
 
According to literature research the definitional restriction limits the age  range of 
AFF victims between the ages of 25 to70 years old. 
 
The findings of this research indicated that AFF victims vary, but in most cases 
the perpetrators target those who they believe have money. In this regard, the 
perpetrator in Case 1 said: “…Multiple – there are no restrictions.  If you are a 
small girl, for example, and tell them that you are interested in the business, the 
first thing that they will tell you is:  ‘Look, I’m not ready to deal with you, you are 
too young. My intention is to deal with your father’.  Because when they make 
contact with them and hear their voice, they ask you how old you are, and you 
tell them you are 20 or 21 yea rs, and they say no, I don’t think you can handle 
this because we are talking about a big business here. So they are now trying to 
see the response of that person.  If that person says:  No I can handle this 
business, my father is not here but I can handle this business; they’ll say no, let 
me speak to your father.  And that is where the issue of greed comes in.  
Because that person doesn’t want the father to know how he can make some 
quick money.  He’ll say:  don’t worry; even without my father I can do it.  This is 
how young boys and girls get involved.  And by getting involved it is even 
possible that he doesn’t have money of his own, he is going to take his father’s 
money or his mother’s money, or somewhere, somehow.  He can sell his father’s 
property to get involved”. 
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4.5.2 Gender 
 
In terms of gender, studies indicate that AFF victims belong to both sexes. 
However, it is acknowledged that males are more often defrauded than females. 
In some cases, husbands and wives have both been reported as victims of this 
form of fraud. 
 
This research indicated that, many of the victims were found to be males and all 
declined to take part in this research study, although a female victims was also 
found. However, the only female victim that was found in this research took part 
in the research study, sceptically.  
 
4.5.3 Marital status 
 
Research states that most victims of AFF are married, although there are some 
cases that involved singles. This research also found that most victims of AFF, 
both males and females, are married. This is probably because of the age group 
that the perpetrators target. 
 
4.5.4 Occupation 
 
Literature research states that victims of AFF include busy professionals from all 
walks of life, a cattle rancher, an insurance agent, a hotel chain owner, a brewery 
consultant, an importer-exporter, farmer, police officer, bankers, top government 
officials, lawyers and clergymen are reported to have been victimised by this 
form of fraud. 
 
Although victims of AFF may come from all walks of life, this research found that 
AFF perpetrators target mostly business people. The reason for targeting mainly 
business people is probably because they always have cash available. This was 
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according to the statement of the perpetrator in Case 1 who said: “….  
Sometimes the people that they target don’t have money of their own, but when 
they hear the story, they will go and get money from somewhere to get involved 
in the business. So it’s not as if they are targeting rich people or business 
people”.  The perpetrator in Case 4 said: “…The mugus?  Most of these mugus 
they are big business people.  They own companies…they are big, big, big rich 
business guys.  Civil servants…?  No, they don’t have money”.  
 
Similarly, respondent 3 said: “…Anyone who has got, who they believe has got 
money, they can be targeted.  But they prefer business people, those who are 
involved in business.  Because somebody who is involved in business has some 
money in his account.  Even if you are a civil servant you are struggling at the 
end of the month to have salary to pay the rent and all those things, you are not 
suitable for this business. They prefer to target those who are maybe sole 
proprietors, or they own a company, or they have a business in general.  So they 
know that this people they got money on their own.  So they prefer this type of 
people to go into the business”. 
 
It should also be noted that the findings indicate that the occupation of the victims 
of money transfer are mostly involved in businesses. However, the victims of 
black currency were found to belong to all professions. 
 
 4.5.5 Race 
 
It is estimated that most of the victims if AFF worldwide are Caucasians. 
However, this form of fraud has also victimised Asians and Africans. 
 
The finding in this empirical research indicated that both Africans and 
Caucasians are victims of AFF. Race would come into play depending on where 
the victim is based. Most victims of money transfer were found to have been 
foreigners from Europe and America. This means that they will automatically be 
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Caucasian. However, the victims of black currency in South Africa are both 
African and Caucasian, whereas the victims in other African countries are 
Africans only. 
 
4.5.6 Nationality 
 
In terms of nationality, people from all nationalities have been victimised by AFF. 
The 419 Coalition, however, maintains that most of the victims of this fraud are 
non-Africans. 
 
In this research it was found that victims of black currency were mainly local 
South Africans, however, the victims of money transfers were foreigners. 
Accordingly, the perpetrator in Case 2 said: “…Basically Europeans and 
Americans, people from the Middle East … Asia and all those things. Not South 
Africans… its victims from outside the country.  It’s people from overseas, not 
here.  It’s very rare for you to hear that a South African has lost $500 000 or 
R500 000 from a fraudster”. 
 
The perpetrator in Case 4 said: “… The most of our victims are foreigners, they 
are not South Africans, and they are foreigners”. 
 
4.5.7 Greedy  
 
According to studies, if you’re greedy and gullible, you become a victim. Victims 
of AFF are greedy, gullible, and their love for money is unmistakable. These 
victims are those who want something for nothing. According to reports, this 
fraud is all about the psychology of greed. A website for victims of AFF maintains 
that some victims want to believe so badly that they are going to profit in the end 
that they ignore explicit personal warnings sent to them by fraud-baiters (The 419 
Coalition 2003). 
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In this research, greed was found to be the imbedded characteristic of all victims 
of AFF. Most people fall victim to AFF because of greed and love for money, 
those who love money and want something for nothing are more likely to become 
victims. This characteristic of victims was found in the statements of all those 
who took part in this research. 
 
The perpetrator in Case 1 said: “… Its greed. It’s the same greed.  Both sides 
they are greedy. Both parties are greedy.  And you on the other side that is giving 
the money, you are not giving the money simply for the sake of giving; you are 
giving the money because you feel that you can get something out of it”. The 
perpetrator in Case 2 said “…You see the whole essence of 419 is greed.  The 
part of the victim more or less…But you must realise if somebody writes you a 
letter or sends you a letter that he’s got $18.5 million dollars stashed up, that he 
doesn’t have access to it.  Basically that you must get this money out from the 
security company, or maybe the bank, or maybe he’s in Angola or South Africa 
and all those things.  I mean, common sense says that you should wait before 
you start investing on these things. But the greed on that person’s part doesn’t 
allow him to do that.  Because also on his part he’s imagining that $18. 5 million 
is also going to do a lot on its bits. I mean at the end of the day the perpetrator 
says he’s going to give you 20 percent if you help him to get it out.  I mean it’s 
not your money, who would entrust 18. 5 million dollars or 20 million dollars to 
somebody he doesn’t know? You don’t know this person from Adam.  So if there 
is no greed on your own part, you wouldn’t even consider it as an option”. The 
perpetrator in Case 4 said: “…Well the problem is greed.  They want to get more 
money for free.  I say okay, help me to transfer $100 million dollars to Australia.  
But before that, you have to give me maybe $20 million dollars, and I will give 
you $40 million dollars.  Then that greediness, they’ll fall in that trap”.   
 
Respondent 2 said “… Yeah, and to be honest, people who are falling into this 
business are people who like money.  Yeah, there are certain people in this world 
who don’t want to work; they just want to get money easily.  It’s always business 
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people who are getting into this business”. Respondent 3 made a simila r 
statement. 
 
4.5.8 Crimonogenic 
 
It has been reported that victims of AFF are susceptible to commit crime because 
in the process of being defrauded, they accept to do something of questionable 
legality. They are often informed of the confidentiality and illegality of the 
business. According to the US State Department report (1997), when victims 
finally realize the business offer is fraudulent, they are reluctant to turn to law 
enforcement agencies because they essentially agreed to do something illegal. 
After all, many of the scams are based on moving money while evading custom 
duties. 
 
According to Lannucci, the Assistant Special Agent in charge of the Secret 
Service’s New York office “… once a person engages in this form of activity with 
a suspect, they are sort of co-conspirator in a crime that doesn’t occur”. 
 
This aspect of the characteristics of AFF victims was confirmed by this research 
study. It was found that, the fact that the victim accepts to take part in a deal of 
questionable legality eventually linked them to any criminal charges that might 
arise. Hence, they are victimized repeatedly and hardly report this fraud to the 
police. 
 
Supporting the above was the statement made by Victim 1 in which she said: 
“…No, I didn’t report the crime to the police, because at the end of the day, it 
would be like me, I’m involved.  So I don’t want to involve myself. Remember, I 
have to protect myself.  I am working.  Sometimes when you report this thing to 
the police you are also linked.  So I can’t let it go that way.  It’s not easy, that’s 
what I’m telling you, because you are afraid that you’ll be linked.  That’s why 
people don’t come forth, to be honest.  Because they are afraid they’ll be linked 
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to that thing, even if you are victims.  You don’t see yourself as victims 
sometimes, you are involved, so they’ll say you are linked.  So that’s why you 
don’t say anything.  It’s not easy like I said”.   
 
In this regard, Respondent 3 also said “…Oh, I think they don’t report to the 
police because they themselves they are aware that they are criminals 
themselves.  By them trying to make money is already a crime.  I think they are 
going against the Reserve Bank, because it is only the Reserve Bank that can 
produce money.  So if they are trying to do this business from the house, or 
hidden, they are trying to enrich themselves, they know that they are doing 
something wrong.  So that’s why at times, they really find it difficult to expose it 
out.  Some people they don’t even tell their wives or their kids what they are 
undergoing, they can lose millions of rands but they sit silent. Because they are 
scared if they inform their wives, people now of the surrounding they are going to 
be aware of what is going on”. He further said “…That’s why most people when 
they are duped, they don’t tell the police, but some, some people tell the police, 
and when they tell the police action is being taken.  There are very few people 
who have reported to the police, and then instead now of the police going to the 
victim, the police are now involving them in the problem”.  
 
However, in some cases victims are reported to have reported the matter to the 
police and the perpetrators were arrested, charged and convicted. This research 
study found that the perpetrators in Case 2 and Case 5 were arrested when the 
victims reported the matter to the police. The perpetrator in Case 2 said “… So I 
arrived in there I met her by her car so the next thing that happened she said I 
must get into the car, so I get into the car, so the police, different guys they come 
to me, they ask me where is my passport, so I show them my passport, so they 
ask me what am I doing, shut up, find up, and I was arrested”.   
 
 
4.5.9 Mind set of victims  
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This research project found that the minds of the victims are filled with 
excitement, happiness and projects to accomplish when they are introduced to 
this “business”. They become more excited when they fly to the base country of 
the perpetrators or when the have been given the washed sample of the black 
dollar to use it and bank some. 
 
However, when the victims finally reali ses that all the promises and documents 
were fake and he/she was defrauded, they react violently against the 
perpetrators This research found that perpetrators have been shot, killed and 
kidnapped by victims. In a situation where perpetrators are kidnapped, the 
associates of the kidnapped perpetrator usually refund the amount that the victim 
has lost. Respondent 3 said: “…At times they shoot these guys, I’ve seen a 
situation when someone was shot;  at times, if maybe you are driving and he’s 
crossing the road, he knows this is the person who duped you he is behind, you 
can use the car and hit him”. Victim1 said “…It was like attracting me to get more 
money.  You know sometimes when you’ve got your own problems, and guys 
come up, because they were having rolls of moneys.  And they showed me that 
ah man. They said we can double it or whatever.  And I thought they were 
definitely…to do it and I thought I be rich and pay off my debts. They did find out 
that I’m looking for money”. 
 
The next section will discuss the effects of this type of fraud on victims. 
 
4.6 EFFECTS OF AFF VICTIMISATION 
 
Fraud is a complex or complicated offence that affects all facets of a society. It is 
a crime that has a negative impact on individuals, corporations and governments.  
Fraud currently costs the community in excess of $3.5 billion and at least the 
Commonwealth states lost over $150 million. It cost big business megabucks, 
though the dollar value is hard to ascertain.  White collar crime costs South 
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African businesses around R40 billion a year with 71 percent of companies falling 
victim to fraud as opposed to 31 per cent  globally (Cairns 2004:48). In South 
Africa business leaders operate in a state of naiveté when it comes to the risk 
they face with regards to fraud. One reason is that those companies that have 
been stung are reluctant to go public with details and warnings because of the 
sheer embarrassment. The belief that market confidence will be affected 
negatively if a company admitted to - and divulged details of - how they have 
been hoodwinked is what keeps most cases behind boardroom doors. 
 
However, the effects of AFF on individual victims, businesses and governments 
cannot be underestimated, considering the amount of money that has been lost 
by victims, and the reputation or image of governments that have been tarnished 
in the international business arena. Businessmen and organisations are targeted, 
therefore the losses per incident can range from tens, to hundreds, of thousands 
of dollars and is currently estimated at over $1million per day in the US alone 
(419 coalition website).  
 
Therefore, this section of the thesis focuses on how the victims of AFF are 
affected, and special attention will be focussed on individuals (direct and indirect) 
who have suffered money losses, property losses, and lives; as well as losses 
suffered by business organisations and the governments. 
 
4.6.1 Individuals  
    
Apart from the millions of dollars lost by individuals due to this type of fraud, 
victims are said to have been threatened with violence unless they co-operate 
from the start. Smith et al. (1999:3) reported that victims have been held hostage 
until a ransom is paid. They also reports that, since 1991 seventeen people have 
been killed in Nigeria who attempted to recover their funds, and the US State 
Department has documented over 100 cases in which American citizens have 
been rescued from Nigeria. According to Canberra Times (1995) one US investor 
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who went to Nigeria to recover his money was found dead on the steps of a 
hotel, after he had been set on fire. In a related incident, a victim collapsed and 
died in London while trying to recover $4million lost to AFF. According to 
sources, the victim died of a heart attack. He was a director of the Ashburton 
stock firm that collapsed, owing millions to farmers. The victim, in his late 40’s 
were in London for months, where he tried to recover $4 million he had siphoned 
from company funds for the scam (Van Beynen 2002:15). 
 
In Durban, South Africa, a Greek national was brutally murdered just before 
Christmas in 2004. He was lured into the country under the pretence that he 
could earn hundreds of thousands of Rands. He was then kidnapped and 
summarily killed when his family refused to pay the ransom (419 Legal 2004). 
 
AFF is said to have escalated to the extent that victims involve themselves in 
fraudulent activities in order to obtain further funds to ship to fraudsters. Smith et 
al. (1999:4) reported a case where a Sydney victim of AFF fraud allegedly 
defrauded Australian investors of $700.000 in order to transfer money to Nigeria 
in the hope of recovering funds that he had already lost. He used the same kind 
of AFF methods that had previously been used to defraud him. 
 
4.6.2 Corporations and businesses 
 
In recent years, a number of surveys have been carried out to determine the 
extent to which organisations have been victimised through fraud, that is crimes 
which entails an element of deception in which the offender seeks to derive some 
financial benefit (Smith 1999:1). 
 
 However, in as much as AFF affects individual victims, there are cases where 
large corporations or banks were affected and these institutions are at times the 
intended victims of the fraudsters. Collier (2002:5) states that AFF perpetrators 
are often involved in many other types of fraud and financial crimes. According to 
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Collier one day they may be involved in approach a bank with prime bank 
guarantee fraud and the next day they are involved in a tested telex scam 
involving the same institution. They may also be simply laundering the proceeds 
of their frauds through the bank concerned. 
 
How AFF affects banks 
 
In his research, Collier (2002:5) states that banks are affected by AFF in a 
number of different ways. He maintains that, at the lowest scale, considerable 
executive time can be wasted. These fraudsters, according to him, are keen to 
obtain signed letterheads which they can then alter and use to convince potential 
victims that a bank is actively participating in a deal. 
 
Research (The 419 Coalition 2003) points out that in order to obtain the 
maximum number of signed correspondence, perpetrators will frequency send 
numerous letters and faxes to the bank which relate to deposits and remittance 
which they claim will be made or received at some time in the future.  It is a fact 
that junior, or even medium level executives, spend a great deal of time 
answering this correspondence and making other arrangements, in the mistaken 
belief that he or she is promoting a very profitable deal for his bank, meanwhile 
he is doing the contrary. 
 
It is reported that sometimes these fraudsters approach the banks through a 
middleman, perhaps a trusted customer whom they have managed to convince 
and who is willing to invest in their scheme. This trusted customer may wish the 
bank to loan money to the scheme, hold documents against receipts, issue 
guarantees or any number of other actions which all add up to the same thing – 
involvement by the bank and possible financial exposure. Collier (2002:5) reports 
that attempts to advise this trusted customer that he is being defrauded is an 
uphill task. He may not wish to believe that he is a victim of fraud and may well 
go directly to the fraudster and repeat what he has been told. In many 
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jurisdictions this may lead the fraudster to threaten with legal proceedings for 
defamation.  
 
It must be noted here that knowing that a scheme is fraudulent and proving it are 
two different things. It is not unheard of, under these circumstances, for banks to 
make ex-gratia payments to fraudsters simply to extricate themselves from 
possible legal action (Collier 2002:5) hence, great care and sensitivity needs to 
be exercised when dealing with these cases. The threat of legal action can be a 
potent one, particularly in Western countries. This can lead to publicity and 
possible damage to the bank’s reputation, even when the bank concerned is 
absolutely blameless.  
 
In this regard, Collier (2002:6) cited a case in Asia where two large banks 
inadvertently became involved and issued some perfectly genuine low value 
guarantees to a particular company. Unknown to the banks, the individuals 
behind this company were involved in a major fraud that was designed to dupe a 
large number of investors. Crucial to the victims’ decision to invest in the 
fraudulent scheme was their belief that it was guaranteed by these two banks, 
something that was deceitfully claimed in the fraudsters’ investment literature. 
These investors lost $US 100 million whilst the fraudsters fled, and left the banks 
to proclaim their innocence and to defend themselves against claims of 
compensation and demands for the repatriation of funds that were transferred 
overseas.  
 
In another case a European bank was used to defraud a group of investors from 
the United States for over $US 300 million. They had lost money and claimed 
that the bank, which has a spotless reputation, was party to the fraud that cost 
them their money. Understandably the victims’ claims largely rest on bank 
letterheads that had been provided by the fraudsters. In some cases most 
fraudsters will attempt to involve or defraud a bank directly, and they often target 
 197 
a small branch or a junior or susceptible manager that they believe they may be 
able to deceive. 
 
It is reported that the worst incidence of a 419 case was a bank in Brazil that filed 
for bankruptcy when a corrupt bank official invested USD$250 million in a 
scheme which was suppose to extend the airport in Abuja, Nigeria (SAPA-AFP 
2005). 
 
4.6.3 Nations 
 
It is a fact that AFF fraudsters do not only affects i ndividuals and businesses, but 
they also have a huge impact on countries in which they operate. Countries are 
affected because AFF leads to corruption and bribery, forgery, money laundering 
and loss of business confidence in countries and regions where such offenders 
are located (The 419 Coalition 2003). 
 
Corruption and bribery 
 
One of the effects that AFF has on nations is that it leads to the corruption and 
bribery of law enforcement and government officials. As stated in chapter three, 
these offenders use corruption as their modus operandi. It is acknowledged in 
the literature that the perpetrators use corruption to secure the help of people 
with access to information, influence or any other access that they want or need. 
Perpetrators of AFF are reported to view corruption as preferable to coercion, 
since threats may not work. The National Criminal Intelligence Service in UK 
(2003:40) has reported instances where corrupt U.K. law enforcement officers 
colluded with criminals, and some of these cases received extensive publicity. 
 
Research (The 419 Coalition 2003) indicates that the advantage of corrupt 
officials is that AFF perpetrators can discover information about the status and 
direction of operations against them. This includes the identity of surveillance 
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vehicles, informants or witnesses. Using corrupt practices, these perpetrators 
can also discover general information concerning law enforcement capabilities, 
procedures, operational priorities and resource deployments, which is important 
information, though of less immediate value to a career criminal or his 
associates. According to the NCIS, these criminals maintain corrupt 
relationships, not just with those involved in ‘front-line’ law enforcement, such as 
the police, customs officials, immigration officials, but with others throughout the 
criminal justice system, including the Crown Prosecution Service, prison officials, 
and individuals in the legal profession. However, the NCIS also reported that the 
use of corruption is not restricted to the criminal justice system, and has involved 
central and local government employees, accountants and others in the financial 
field, plus a range of other professionals. In West Africa and Nigeria in particular, 
there are reports of police officials who have been arrested for assisting and 
colluding with these fraudsters (The 419 Coalition 2003). 
 
It is widely recognised that corruption is ultimately destructive to society at large. 
Research suggests that corruption affects government revenue collection, or its 
expenditure, or its enforcement of regulations. These categories may be 
extended to include the ways in which corruption destroys different aspects of 
culture. According to Osborne (1997:26) corruption undermines governments, it 
subverts company cultures, destabilises society as a whole, threatens global 
security and threatens everybody everywhere.  
 
Forgery 
 
Forgery committed by AFF perpetrators has one of the most devastating effects 
on nations. These fraudsters forge Government and company’s documents such 
as letterheads, stamps and seals in order to execute their crimes. There are 
reports of fake websites of the South African Reserve Bank, South African Police 
Service, and websites of banks and companies around the world created by 
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offenders to convince their victims and potential victims that they are dealing with 
the right people (419 Legal 2004). 
 
Money laundering  
 
AFF is an offence that involves the movement of the proceeds of this fraud from 
one country to another, in order to avoid detection by the authorities. Money 
laundering has serious consequences if allowed to take place because the 
integrity of financial markets depends heavily on both the reality and perception 
that high legal, professional and ethical standards apply (Sithole 2003:2). If 
proceeds of crime are laundered through a financial institution, or employees of 
the institution are corrupt or turn a blind eye to the criminal origins of funds, the 
reputation of the institution will be seriously damaged. This could affect the 
willingness of law-abiding customers and other institutions to deal with them, and 
could also affect the market and loss of revenue by the state. 
 
Loss of business confidence 
 
As a result of AFF, most countries in West Africa and Nigeria in particular have 
lost their business reputation in the international business community. It has 
been stated that doing business in these countries are risky and international 
businessmen are advised to seek counsel before engaging in any business 
transaction in these countries. Due to the losses suffered by US citizens, the 
American governments and 38 other governments have warned their citizens 
about doing business with Nigeria. In this regard, the U.S. Department of State, 
Bureau of Consular Affairs, produces Consular Information Sheets  on all 
countries providing warnings, country descriptions, entry requirements, as well as 
information on air travel safety, currency regulations, and commercial fraud in 
West Africa and Nigeria (US Department of State 1997). 
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This research found that the consequences of AFF mainly affected individual 
victims. It was found that these victims usually lost millions of dollars as a result 
of this fraud. In this research, the perpetrator in Case 1 said: “… No I don’t know 
the amount of money. But according to the Scorpions and the complainants they 
said something within the reach of $100 000”. The perpetrator in Case 2 said: “… 
I know people paying as much as a million dollars, getting a million dollars from 
the 419 scams.  I’ve seen lots of people making as much as $500 000, or 200 
000 pounds”. Relating to the financial loss suffered by AFF victims, Victim 1 said: 
“…I lost R10.000, other people they lost more”. 
 
The next section that follows will focus on the theoretical explanation of AFF 
victimisation. 
 
4.7 THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF AFF VICTI MISATION  
 
The task of applied victimology, grounded in science, is to articulate theory into 
policy and to translate the policy into action. Hence victimology strives, like other 
social science disciplines, towards the formulation of theory (Fattah 1991:21). 
Fattah pointed out that to develop a global or macro theory of general 
victimisation is not only a futile endeavour, but also a hopeless task. According to 
him Criminology is a case in point, and there is a good lesson to be learned from 
historical development. He maintains that, despite continuous, strenuous efforts 
extending over more than a century, Criminology has not yet succeeded at the 
development of a grand or a macro theory of criminality. This can be attributed to 
the enormous heterogeneity of criminal behaviours and the elusiveness of the 
cause of crime.  
 
 Fattah (1991:22) also said that victimology is a much younger discipline than 
Criminology, and attempts to speak of a victimological theory are premature. 
According to Fattah there is not yet sufficient knowledge and understanding of 
the phenomenon of victimisation that would enable the development of a causal 
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or an explanatory theory.  It may then be said that one cannot understand or 
explain a phenomenon, such as criminal victimisation, unless it is defined, 
observed, measured, described, classified, analysed and interpreted. One cannot 
develop rational policies and undertake effective action aimed at controlling and 
preventing the phenomenon unless, and until one gained some understanding of 
that phenomenon and have developed some propositions, models, or theories 
aimed at explaining it. However, such knowledge and understanding are 
essential for achieving the primary goals of this thesis - to understand, exp lain 
and prevent AFF victimisation. In a bid to achieve the said goals, the lifestyles 
and routine activities theories will be applied.  
 
4.7.1 Lifestyles and routine activities theories 
 
Some theorists believe that the concepts of the rational offender do not 
adequately explain the causes of crime. They argued that illegal behaviour 
cannot be linked only to the rational actions of the offender, but it also depends 
on the behaviour of potential victims and those whose duty it is to protect people, 
such as the police (Van der Hoven 2001:50). In this regard, Siegel and Senna 
(1991:86) said that crimes do not only occur because an offender has decided to 
break the law, but also because the victim is in the wrong place at the wrong time 
and because there was no law enforcement agent in the area. 
 
The lifestyle theory is grounded in the empirical findings derived from analyses of 
victimisation data and other sources of information about crime (Fattah 
1986:136). Fattah (1986) argued that victimisation is not distributed randomly 
across space and time – there are high-risk locations and high–risk time periods. 
Similarly, some characteristics are disproportionately represented among 
criminal offenders relative to the general population; there are high-risk persons. 
It must be stated that lifestyle patterns influence the amount of exposure that 
people have to places and time with varying risks of victimisation as well as the 
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prevalence of associations that people have with others who may be more or 
less likely to commit crimes. 
 
At the same time, the lifestyle theory was developed to explain personal 
victimisation. Cohen and Felson (1979:593) formulated a similar theory that they 
referred to as the routine activity approach. They defined routine activities as “… 
any recurrent and prevalent activities which provide basic population and 
individual needs, whatever their biological or cultural origins. Thus routine 
activities would include formalised work, as well as the provision of standard 
food, shelter, sexual outlet, leisure, social interaction, learning and childrearing”. 
In order for these offences to occur, three minimal elements; motivated 
offenders, suitable targets, and absence of capable guardians must converge in 
space and time. 
 
Lifestyle theory 
 
In an attempt to  explain personal victimisation, Hindelang, Gottfredson and 
Garofalo developed the lifestyle theory. They wanted to know why certain groups 
of people are more vulnerable to victimisation than others. In this case, they 
found that the lifestyles or pattern of activity of people gave rise to differences in 
the incidence of victimisation which are characterised by the daily functions in 
respect of both work and leisure activities. 
 
Hindelang et al. (1978:241) define the concept of lifestyle as routine daily 
activities, both vocational and leisure activities. They maintained that lifestyles 
are influenced by three basic elements (Williams & McShane 1994:224): 
 
Ø Firstly there are social roles of people in society, and in line with the 
expectations of others, people behave in certain ways and develop 
lifestyles that are to a greater or lesser extent conducive to victimisation. 
According to them, this is the reason why young people are victimised 
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more often, because they fulfil social roles that demand more regular 
activities outside the typical places that are visited. In the case of AFF 
victimisation, this explains why the middle class and the affluent are often 
victimised. They want to get more (money) so as to maintain their social 
role in society.  
Ø Secondly, lifestyles are influenced by people’s position in the social 
structure. In general it may be said that the higher a person’s position, the 
lower the risk of victimisation. This may be attributed mainly to the type of 
activities in which a person participates and the typical places that are 
visited. This element explains AFF victimisation, for it acknowledges in the 
literature that most of the victims are people with influence in society with 
access to a computer and Internet facilities. 
Ø Thirdly is the rational component in which decisions are made about 
desirable behaviour. Based on social roles and structural position, a 
person’s decisions may confine his or her routine behaviour to relatively 
safe activities, or otherwise the risk attached to activities has to be 
accepted.  Hence young people tend to increase their likelihood of 
victimization by electing to participate in activities with high levels of risk in 
terms of time and place, such as nightclubs. This again would explain AFF 
victimisation in the sense that victim choose to reply to AFF letters and 
finally found themselves caught, hook, line and sinker. 
 
However, Van der Hoven (2001:53) stated that role expectations and structural 
limitations depend on the individual person’s combination of demographic 
features, such as age, gender, race, income, marital status, education and 
occupation. She noted that role expectations vary according to a person’s age, 
and the role expectations for married and unmarried individuals vary.  Strijdom 
and Schurink (1992:42) also indicate that economic factors limit the choices 
available to a person in respect of residential area, type of leisure activities and 
access to educational opportunities. 
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In the same vein, a multivariate analysis of robbery by Fattah (1986:141) 
indicated that the type of direct-contact victimisation on which the development of 
lifestyle model was based, found that age, race, income, household size (a 
dichotomy of living alone versus not living alone), and major activity (a dichotomy 
of employed, unemployed, and home centred) were all related to the likelihood of 
victimisation. Accordingly, Africans, the young, and people with low incomes who 
are more likely to interact with potential fraud and AFF offenders had higher risks 
than Caucasians in South Afri ca, older persons, and those with higher incomes, 
persons who live alone and who, by definition, spend less time in the company of 
household members had a higher risk than person not living alone, and the risk 
of AFF would be high for the unemployed, about average for the employed. 
 
Findings from the British Crime Survey by Hough (Fattah 1986:144) provided 
additional support for the lifestyle-type theory. The British data show that violent 
victimisation is positively associated with the frequency of going out in the 
evening and regular drinking habits, particularly among people between 16 and 
30 of age. 
 
Hindelang et al. (Van der Hoven 2001:53) list some requirements that must be 
met before there can be any possibility of personal victimisation. They are; 
 
Ø There must be an offender and a victim who meet at a particular time and 
place. 
Ø There must be a dispute of some sort and one has to demand something 
from the other, so that the offender regards the victims as a suitable object 
of victimisation. 
Ø The offender must be willing and able to use violence or the threat of 
violence in order to achieve the desired result. 
Ø The circumstances must be such that the offender considers it rewarding 
to use threats or violence to achieve the desired result.  
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According to Van der Hoven (2001:54) different lifestyles imply that there are 
different possibilities for individuals to be at specific places at specific times 
and under certain circumstances and to interact with specific people. Hence 
lifestyle influences the likelihood of victimisation. 
 
 However, from the offender’s perspective, not all individuals are equally 
desirable targets for victimisation. If the motive of the offender is to steal, the 
apparent wealth of the victim plays a significant role. Also, an important factor 
that determines the desirability of the victim is whether the offender believes 
that the individual is unlikely to report the crime to the police (Hindelang et al. 
1978:265). Vulnerability in respect of personal victimisation increases in 
relation to  the offender’s perception of the potential victim as an individual 
who will be unable to defend himself or herself successfully, examples are 
lone individuals, the elderly, someone under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
(Van der Hoven 2001:55). In the case of AFF, a vulnerable person will be an 
individual who would not report the matter to the police. 
 
4.7.2 Other theoretical developments 
 
There have been other theoretical approaches regarding the macro and micro 
level which have been developed to explain criminal victimisation. Some of these 
approaches and especially those that adequately explain AFF victimisation will 
be examined below. 
 
Macro level explanation 
 
Macro level approaches to criminal victimisation focuses on the wider social 
context in which individuals operate (Barlow 1996:430).  
 
According to the social-cultural perspective, victimisation is the reflection of the 
economic and power structure of a society, which result in marginalisation, and 
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powerless individuals become victims of crime (Davis 2005:48). Davis indicated 
that within this context, the social pressures placed on the disenfranchised, which 
result in social disorganisation and the decay in relations to communities causing 
a propensity to become a victim of crime, explain victimisation. Despite the 
critique of this explanation on some categories of criminal victimisation, it has a 
bearing on AFF victimisation because poverty, especially on the previously 
disadvantaged South Africans has been sighted as one reason why people 
become victims to this fraud.  
 
Micro level explanation 
 
Barlow (1996:431) maintained that micro level approaches to criminal 
victimisation focus on the activities of individuals and the way in which people 
interact with each other. Applying the socio-interactionist perspective, Schneider 
(Davis 2005:49) indicated that this perspective focused on the misrepresentation 
of the victim’s behaviour by the offender.   
 
Although the situation-oriented model is often controversial and often 
misinterpreted as victim co-responsibility, as victim blaming, Davis (2005:49) 
suggests that it is not based on determining guilt or responsibility. According to 
Davis it merely states that victimisation is often the result of misguided 
perpetrator-victim interaction, where the perpetrator action is provoked by the 
victim’s behaviour. In the case of AFF victimisation, this perspective is applicable 
when the individuals respond to e-mails related to business proposal and goes 
ahead and furnish their bank and personal details to the perpetrator.  
 
The interactionistic approaches focus on the inter-changeable role of the victim 
and the perpetrator and acknowledge that many incidents of victimisation are the 
result of dynamic and explosive interaction between individuals (Davis 2005:49). 
This approach also explains AFF victimisation because the perpetrator and the 
victim interact intimately during the course of the victimisation. In support of this 
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assertion Fattah (2000:39) said that the stereotyped view of the innocent victim 
and guilty perpetrator should be replaced by the view of two human beings 
caught in a web of complicated social relationships and human “financial” (in 
case of AFF victimisation) emotions. 
 
Victim precipitation theory 
 
This theory maintains that individuals might initiate confrontation/interaction that 
may lead to their victimisation. This theory attempts to explain what actions 
performed by the victim, triggered victimisation (Doerner & Lab 2002:271). 
Research concerned with AFF supports the position of this theory. The victim 
takes the bait the perpetrator presents on the Internet by means of an AFF-letter.  
It is suggested that this explains AFF victimisation when victims go around 
looking for people with a special chemical to clean darkened or defaced 
dollar/rand notes. During the course of searching for the right chemical, they are 
repeatedly victimised by the same perpetrators or other perpetrators of AFF.     
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the research presented the definition of victims and victimisation 
in genera l. However, more attention was placed on AFF victimisation as AFF is 
the focus of this thesis. The categories of criminal victimisation were also 
presented in this chapter. The types and nature of AFF victimisation and re -
victimisation were discussed. This chapter also discussed the characteristics of 
AFF victims as the available literature research indicates. The effects of AFF 
victimisation were discussed, in relation to individual victims, corporate bodies 
and nations. This was then followed by the theoretical explanation of the 
phenomenon (AFF victimisation) using the lifestyle and routine activities theories. 
 
An analysis of AFF victimisations suggest that the victims see themselves as 
very lucky to have been recommended by the Chamber of Commerce of a 
 208 
foreign country or by someone else. They also take this as an opportunity to get 
rich within a short space of time.  
 
Hence, one is tempted to conclude that victims of AFF are those who favours 
riches but depreciate hard work, they are those who want crops without 
ploughing the ground, they want rain without thunder and lightening, and they 
want the ocean without the awful roar of its water. 
 
The findings of this chapter indicate that victims and perpetrators of AFF belong 
to an equivalent group, and the explanations portray victims who engage in 
certain high-risk lifestyles. Victims and perpetrators share the same interests, 
participate in the same activities and are drawn from homogenous or overlapping 
lifestyle groups. Offenders even select their victims from their own circle of 
adversaries, acquaintances and even former friends. Adherence to and 
participation in the norms of certain deviant subcultures sharply raise the 
chances of becoming a casualty. Victims might even be seen as fair game or 
easy prey because of their own involvement in criminal behaviours discourage 
them from turning to the authorities for help. The following are the findings of this 
chapter presented in the table below: 
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Table 4.1 Victimization 
Types Nature Characteristics Effects Explanations 
Direct False offers Individuals Embarrassment Lifestyle 
Indirect Real payments Small businesses  Financial loss Routine activities 
 Telephonic 
confirm 
Age: 25-70 yrs Ransoms, violence 
and murder 
Economic and 
power structure of 
society 
 More fees Gender: Both 
(more males) 
Become fraudsters 
themselves 
Misrepresentation 
of victims actions 
 Re-
victimisation 
Marital status: 
married 
Wasting executive 
time 
Interchanged roles 
of victim and 
perpetrator 
  Nationality: Non-
Africans 
Extrication 
payments  
Victim-triggered 
behaviour 
  Greedy and 
gullible 
Deception, bribery 
and corruption 
 
  Co-conspirators Money laundering  
  The 
Criminogenic/ 
victimogenic 
person 
Loss of business 
confidence 
 
   Forgery  
   Damaged 
reputations 
 
 
 
These findings can be explained as follows:  The nature of the victims is 
determined by the types of victims.  The nature of the victims determines their 
characteristics, and who they are (characteristics) lead in turn to the way they are 
effected by AFF.  When everything is put together; their nature, biographical 
characteristics, and the way in which they are affected, the explanations become 
intelligible. The victim is seen as a criminogenic/victiminogenic person. The fact 
that the victims initially accept to participate in a “business” of questionable 
legality makes him/her criminogenic. The fact that victims are repeatedly 
victimized also makes them victimogenic. 
 
The next chapter of the thesis will look at the adjudication of AFF perpetrators 
and their victims.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ADJUDICATION 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Advance Fee Fraud, as with other forms of transnational organised crime, is 
difficult to detect, investigate and prosecute. Most fraudulent acts are almost 
never reported to the police because of the integrity of the firm, the reputation of 
the institution, the honour of the family, embarrassment of the victim, personal 
obligations, or some other weighty factor on the social scale may be a more 
important consideration and duty. Hence perpetrators of this fraud had used 
various strategies to thwart official investigations, and coupled with that, the 
victims are often reluctant to co-operate with the police, because they believe 
that they will be implicated in a criminal conspiracy and could be prosecuted, 
either in their own country or in Nigeria and or South Africa. Victims are also 
reluctant to co-operate  with police through fear of the reprisals of the organised 
criminals involved. Difficult legal jurisdictional questions also arise in determining 
where the offence has been committed and in which country a prosecution 
should take place (Smith et al.1999: 4). 
 
Fraudulent practices over the years have become sophisticated and varied with 
the social and technical developments in commerce and industry that the term 
“benco”, which was all-inclusive in its original usage, now normally applies to 
what is euphemistically called the “short con” or the “street con”; descriptive of 
the fast moving, short duration, high mobility operation with a commensurately 
smaller take but with a higher frequency rate. 
 
However, from a criminological perspective, the adjudication of fraud, AFF and 
related offences in particular, include the reporting of such cases to the police or 
a special unit thereof, arrests, investigations, prosecutions and the punishment of 
offenders and their victims by the criminal justice process.   
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The ringleaders and true beneficiaries of AFF, although identifiable through 
investigations, are masked from the operational structure they are part of, the 
‘shadows’ behind what is immediately visible. According to the 419 Coalition 
website (2004), most of AFF perpetrators brought to justice, are at the ‘front end’ 
of the operation, and are invariably ‘fall guys’. These individuals will have some 
assets but often nothing like the sums involved in the victim’s loss. The real 
individuals who the law enforcement agencies want to identify and prosecute, 
stand well back from any obvious involvement, but will be responsible for funding 
the operation, as well as the subsequent laundering of the money (The 419 
Coalition). These are usually the well connected and politically influential guys 
(big fish), some of which are in governments, especially in West Africa.  
 
This chapter will examine the most probable course of events, from the time the 
AFF is detected or reported to the police, and the police consider criminal 
proceedings, to the arrest and detention of the suspect, followed by the charge, 
bail, prosecution and sentence. As a transnational crime, the focus of this 
chapter will also be on the problems involved in the adjudication of these 
offenders. This chapter will also look at some of the AFF cases that have been 
charged, and some decisions will be quoted and penalties for the various 
offences in terms of sentences in Nigeria, South Africa and United States. The 
findings of the empirical research will also be examined, analysed and integrated 
into this chapter. 
 
In the next section attention will be given to the legal processes regarding the 
arrests, investigations and prosecutions of AFF perpetrators in Nigeria, South 
Africa as well as the situation in the United States. 
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5.2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 
 
The criminal justice processes in most Western democratic jurisdictions are the 
same and are divided into three time frames: before trial, during trial and after 
trial. In most cases, a complaint by the victim or detection by law enforcement 
agents trigger arrests, and the criminal process against the accused is set in 
motion. In others, the procedure is initiated through the filing of a complaint that 
leads to the issuance of a warrant to arrest the suspect, search and seize 
documents that may assist in the investigation and prosecution, especially in 
fraud cases (Del Carmen 1991: 25). 
 
In relation to conventional fraud (and, in essence, of all crimes committed for 
gain), the social control system involves a succession of stages through which 
people must pass before they become defined as convicted offenders. Given that 
the conduct is punishable by the criminal law, a problematic issue in fraud, the 
first set of stages relate to crime commission, and take the form of barriers to 
entry: moral, social, technological and, particularly in the case of the more 
elaborate frauds, intellectual/imaginative (Levi 1987:109). According to Levi 
(1987:110) those potential offenders who cross the initial barriers of technique 
and morality and who consider participating in fraud are influenced in the 
decision to go ahead or not by their subjective perception of the risk from the 
criminal justice system and the salience to them of the expected consequences 
of involvement in crime for them personally and for the people to whom they may 
be attached. 
 
The criminal process in any fraud case and especially AFF is very complex. The 
labelling of an act as a crime and a person as a fraudster or criminal is the 
product of whether the official agencies with the formal competence to impose 
the labels actually do so. This is a universal principle that applies to all crimes. 
However, Levi (1987:110) stated that before an act becomes a recorded fraud, 
the following processes have to be undergone: 
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Ø The legal framework within which the social problem will be managed has 
to be negotiated, which entails defining the nature of the problem in such a 
way that rules can be formulated, either very broadly or very narrowly. 
Ø The act has to be prohibited, either by the judiciary alone (in common law) 
or (in the case of statute law) by both the established law-making bodies. 
Ø The victim of fraud (or, in some relatively rare cases, a regulatory agency 
representing investors or consumers as a class) has to define his/her 
experience as an example of (1) a ‘rip-off’, and (2) an illegal act. 
Ø The victim has to decide to report the matter to the criminal authorities 
(such as the police) rather than, say, putting it down to experience or 
treating it solely as a civil debt. 
Ø The police have to concur with the victim’s interpretation that what 
happened was a crime (rather than, say, a civil matter or in police 
parlance, an ‘unsatisfactory business transaction’). 
 
He also maintains that, for someone to become a convicted fraudster there has 
to be: 
Ø a police investigation 
Ø a decision to prosecute and 
Ø a conviction. 
 
The role of the police 
 
Most serious fraud offences and AFF cases are investigated by the police and 
handled by groups of officers like the fraud squads in England (Roskill 1986:11). 
It was contended that the police working in this field are under constant pressure. 
Hence, the setting up of these fraud squads was a valuable innovation, but it has 
become plain in recent years that, particularly in relation to large-scale and 
complex frauds, investigations conducted by the police in isolation of those 
concerned with the prosecution process can be time consuming and inefficient.  
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The police role in relation to fraud is not a novel one. In England, the police are 
sometimes involved in lengthy investigations, which include the tracking of 
suspects overseas. However, the pursuit of fraud largely depends on the chance 
availability of detectives with both an interest and time for it (Levi 1987:120). The 
police have to provide a range of services for the public. These include not only 
crime investigations but also an array of activities best described under the 
umbrella of the ‘service role’. In principle, the police can adopt two different types 
of approaches to their roles. The first is primarily proactive (as in the stronger 
form of community policing), where policing resources and strategies are police-
initiated, albeit perhaps in response to general public request for action. The 
second is generally reactive, where police activity is initiated by a specific 
compliant from a victim.  
 
The rationale for proactive policing is to intervene where victims are weak and 
disorganised, or may find it difficult to know whether or not an offence has 
occurred. In the case of AFF where victims are often reluctant to report the 
offence, the state must intervene to detect offences in order to prevent harm as 
well as do justice. However, given the reactive mode of operation with regards to 
the policing of fraud and AFF by the police, it is clear that, although it is important 
to study the role of the police as gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, 
victims and professionals play a primary role as initiators of actions via their 
decisions to report fraud or not.  It is reported by Levi (1987:123) that from time 
to time the police in London complain in the media about the lack of co-operation 
they receive from business and individuals, not only regarding the investigation of 
fraud, but also in the initial reporting of it. It must be pointed out that very little is 
known about the criteria that individual victims use when calling the police to deal 
with allegations of fraud.  
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The reporting of fraud to the police 
 
It must be noted that, before any case of fraud is reported to the police, it 
normally goes through a filtering process by which an individual or group acting 
on their own or on behalf of an organisation, has to make a symbolic statement 
that ‘something should be done’ by the state rather than the civil courts (by suing 
for the debt) ‘or putting it down to experience’. There are some rare exceptions to 
this: complain or, more common, the threat to complain, may be made to the 
police as a way of putting pressure on the suspects to provide compensation. 
 
Individual victims of AFF often perform some kind of cost-benefit analysis before 
making the decision to report the crime, though, if their calculations were purely 
economic, it is possible that they would not report anything at all (particularly if 
the costs were ‘personal’ and were not ‘externalities’). Discretion in the use of 
formal justice is an important feature of all types of fraud including AFF, which 
predominantly uses informal methods of dealing with perpetrators. However, it is 
equally important to note that the use of informal discipline is influenced by the 
background of civil and criminal sanctions that could be applied (Levi 1987:125). 
It is suggested that, the decision to report fraud is commonly a reflective choice 
rather an emotional or habitual response to loss. 
 
The above explanations about the decision to report AFF victimisation were 
found in this research. These calculations regarding the decision to report this 
crime often become a problem to law enforcement officers when they have to 
investigate and apprehend suspects. 
 
In order to trace the victim’s money and bring the perpetrators to justice, the 419 
Coalition, through its investigative agency, systematically processed the money 
transfer trails, until the key beneficiaries are identified. Although the money is 
always dissipated through extensive laundering mechanisms, the true 
beneficiaries can ultimately be pinpointed. The Coalition maintains that 
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sometimes this process is quite swift and in other instances it can be very 
protracted. Accordingly, when they have the identified key beneficiary, along with 
the signatures of the primary bank accounts, they would identify their assets in 
the form of bank accounts, companies and real estates. 
 
The next subsection examines the criminal justices process as it relates to AFF, 
and the efforts of various governments in the adjudication of this fraud. 
 
5.2.1 Nigeria 
 
In 1992, the Nigerian Government issued a white paper detailing its actions  and 
planned actions regarding 419. However, the Nigerian 419 Coalition (2004) note 
that according to the Nigerian government’s own figures, there were only 22 
convictions of AFF for the period 1993 to June 2001 and that only a minimal 
amount of stolen money was recovered. The 419 Coalition criticises the $4 
million of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) spent abroad for education on 419. 
The Coalition reiterates its opinion that the money would have been much better 
spent on counter-419 enforcement activities in Nigeria. Others can be educated 
regarding the topic of 419 but only Nigeria can punish the 419 criminals operating 
within its own borders.  
 
The Nigerian government launched the Nigerian Crime Initiative (NCI) in 
compliance with the Presidential Decision Direction 42 (PDD-42), which was 
aimed at combating international organised crime and which directed agencies to 
collaborate with each other to fight international organised crime more effectively 
(Buchanan & Grant 2001:42). In keeping with this mission, the NCI has helped to 
develop: 
 
Ø An interagency working group in order to share information and help make 
policies 
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Ø The Anti-Drug Network (ADNET) computer system for collecting and 
tracking data relating to Nigerian crime, and 
Ø Interagency Nigerian Organized Crime Task Forces (INOCTF), which are 
located in cities where Nigerian crime is more prevalent and investigate 
local Nigerian Crime Enterprises.   
 
The NCI Working Group 
 
The NCI working group brings together representatives of every important federal 
law enforcement agency, as well as the Department of Justice and the 
Department of State. The NCI includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Naturalisation Service 
(NIS), National Drug Intelligence Centre (NDIC), U.S Customs Service (USCS), 
U.S Secret Service, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), IRS – 
Criminal Investigation Division (IRS-CID), U.S Marshals Service (USMS), U.S 
Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), Department of Defence/ Information Systems 
Agency (DISA). Buchanan et al. (2001:42) stated that, because of the 
sophistication of multi-faceted AFF, the response to it must draw upon all the 
resources of the government working in concert. According to them, the working 
group helps to pool information among the law enforcement agencies by 
discussing the latest issues and ensuring that ADNET becomes a useful tool for 
investigators and prosecutors. 
 
The crux of the NIC working group was aimed to develop policies and plans to 
track international AFF by supporting the task forces. The working group selects 
task force cities and assures that the task force cities carry out the mission of the 
NIC. The working group also addresses policies issues, such as privacy in 
criminal cases (Buchanan et al.2001:43). 
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ADNET 
 
In a bid for proper arrests, investigations, prosecutions and convictions of AFF 
perpetrators, the Nigerian government lunched ADNET. It is a computer network 
with powerful capabilities for the storage and retrieval of data concerning AFF. 
ADNET is a secure system and can be accessed through a dedicated ADNET 
terminal in the task force cities. In conjunction with the working group, an outside 
private contractor trains and provides support to investigators working with AFF 
cases. ADNET terminals are located in Lagos, Nigeria and Accra, Ghana so that 
data can be accessed close to the sources of much of the AFF activities 
(Buchanan et al. 2001:43).  
 
It has been reported (Buchanan et al. 2001) that several federal and law 
enforcement agencies in the United States contribute and access ADNET data. 
The report maintained that the number of records in the NIC database has 
increased dramatically, making the network a potential valuable resource to law 
enforcement. Some of this data consists of information collected from prior 
criminal investigations, including aliases used by individuals involved in AFF. 
 
Inter-agency Nigerian Organised Crime Task Forces 
 
The Inter-agency Nigerian Organised Crime Task Force (INOCT) consists of 
several law e nforcement agencies in a number of United States cities where AFF 
activity has been particularly troublesome. INOCTF targets AFF and investigates 
it in a co-ordinated manner (Buchanan et al 2001:43) and Task force cities have 
access to ADNET terminals, so that data from other cities can be used in 
investigations. 
 
It must be emphasised that the co-ordinated NCI approach expects that, through 
information sharing, investigators would be able to spot connections between 
different types of Nigerian/West African criminal activities. Indeed, research 
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(NCIS 2003) has shown that AFF offenders rarely engage in one type of criminal 
activity to the exclusion of all others. 
 
The predecessor to the INOCTF was the Secret Service task force which was 
already in place to counter AFF. Under the NCI, the forces of the Secret Service 
task force were transformed into a multi -agency task force, but the Secret 
Service continues to host these task forces. This has allowed the NCI to tap into 
expertise that has been developed by the Secret Service since the 1980’s in 
areas such as access device fraud (Buchanan et al. 2001:43). 
 
Equally important to note is that in 2002 a number of financial houses issued 
statements that the Nigerian government was doing nothing to curb AFF 
perpetrators.  The attention of the Nigerian Government was therefore drawn to 
the black listing and classification of Nigeria as a non-cooperative country in the 
fight against money laundering by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) based 
in Europe. FATF claimed that Nigeria’s money laundering law was too narrow 
and focused mainly on drug trafficking (Nigeria 419 Coalition 2004). 
 
In the same vein, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the 
United States Department of Treasury in April 2002 indicted that the Nigerian 
Legal System harboured deficiencies in its anti-money laundering law. The 419 
Coalition (2004) stated that this indictment, which came in the form of an 
advisory note, to all American banks and financial institutions dealing with 
Nigeria, warned of the risk of being duped by conmen exploiting the loopholes in 
Nigeria’s anti-money laundering law. 
 
The financial advisory notice to all American banks maintains that: 
 
Ø Nigerian law fails to criminalise the laundering of illicit proceeds other than 
those derived from narcotics 
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Ø Nigerian banks are not required by law to report all suspicious 
transactions 
Ø There is no penalty under Nigerian law for failing to report suspicious 
transactions 
Ø Nigerian’s legal supervisory and regulatory systems create significant 
opportunities and tools for money laundering and increase the possibility 
that transactions involving Nigerian entities and accounts would be used 
for illegal purposes. 
 
As a reaction to the advisory note by the US State Department, the Government 
of Nigeria made some efforts towards the investigations, arrests, seizures, and 
convictions of AFF offenders (The 419 Coalition 2004). These include: 
 
Ø The establishment of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA) via NDLEA Act No.48 of 1989, to check drug trafficking and 
associated money laundering  
Ø Promulgation of the Money Laundering Act No.3 in 1993, the main 
instrument criminalising money laundering in Nigeria 
Ø Constituting the Joint Steering Committee on Money Laundering Act with 
membership drawn from relevant ministries, parastatals and agencies to 
fashion out the Guidance Note on Money Laundering 
Ø Establishment of a Special Fraud Unit within the Nigerian Police to 
Investigate and prosecute cases bordering on criminal deception (419) 
Ø Establishment of a Presidential Task Force on Trade Malpractices in 1991 
to check Advance Fee Fraud  
Ø Enactment of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act No. 
13 in 1995 
Ø Enactment of failed banks (Recovery to Debts) and Financial Malpractices 
in Banks Act No. 18 in 1994 
Ø Appointment of a Senior Assistant to the President on Drug and Financial 
crimes 
 221 
Ø Security raids on car dealers and bureau de change that are suspected to 
have links with drug or AFF money 
Ø Publication of the names of Nigerians convicted abroad for drug and other 
related crimes to arouse public awareness, concern and control as well as 
the retrial of offenders in Nigeria once they have been deported 
Ø Publication of a dictionary of business registered by the Corporate Affairs 
Commission and the names of persons and businesses implicated in 
business scams and swindles 
Ø  Establishment of an Independent Commission on Corrupt Practices in 
2000 
Ø  Establishment of a National Committee on Financial Crimes in 2001. 
 
In 2002 the international community could no longer tolerate Nigeria’s attitude 
towards financial crimes. The International Financial Task Force (IFATF), a 
Paris-based organ of the G8 group of industrialised countries issued an 
ultimatum that Nigeria should strengthen its laws on financial crime, or get 
blacklisted by the international financial community (Abati 2003:2). According to 
Abati, IFATF was concerned that Nigerian banks are so easily used for money 
laundered by AFF. In other developments, the World Bank/IMF also declared that 
the Nigerian financial system is under-developed, shallow and porous. Hence the 
National Assembly was required to make tougher laws. In this regard, the 
National Assembly passed a law creating the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC), led by Nuhu Ribadu (Abati 2003:3). 
 
Abati (2003:3) reported that within a week of his appointment, Ribadu was 
drawing the line in the sand. He said. “We are dealing with human beings and 
they naturally would want to exploit everything to their advantage. But you see, 
Nigeria’s image has been severely battered by the very few people who engage 
in these unwholesome acts. The Obasanjo administration says it can’t allow that 
to continue. Our job is not just to tackle established 419 fraudsters, but also to 
make fraud unattractive. And by God’s grace, we shall succeed. We won’t 
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concede an inch; we shall battle all the way”. Abati (2003) states that a week 
after the Ribadu statement, his commission moved against the known 419 
kingpin, arresting two of the fat cats and through these actions, the commission 
sent out a signal to the community of 419 fraudsters: a New Sheriff is in town. 
 
Some of the arrests made by the EFCC, included that of Chief Fred Chijiudu 
Ajudua who was among those arrested for defrauding two Dutch businessmen of 
$1.69 million. Briefing the media, Ribadu said that: “…The Dutch Businessmen 
Cina and Vijgen, were defrauded of the sum of $1.693.300 between July 1999 to 
September 2000 by a syndicate of international fraudsters headed by the 
notorious 419, Fred Ajudua” (Odita 2003:2).  
 
According to the State Prosecutor, the accused fraudulently conspired and duped 
the German by presenting sundry payments of $18.000.000 on contract 
FMA/PED/3040/X-92, purported to have been executed by the German and 
which is thus due for payment.  
 
The State Prosecutor read the charges as follows: 
 
Ø That the conspiracy was contrary to Section 8 (a) and 1 (3) of the 
Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act No. 13 of 1995 as 
amended by Act No. 62 of 1999. 
Ø That the accused and his partners had induced the payment of money by 
false pretences, contrary to Section 1 (1) (b) and 1 (3) of the AFF Act 
Ø That the accused had obtained money under false pretences, contrary to 
Section 1 (1) and 1 (3) of the AFF Act. 
 
 
 
 
 
 223 
The Central Bank of Nigeria’s Effort 
 
The CBN has been on the forefront of the fight against AFF and money 
laundering ever since the government of Nigeria subscribed to the global war 
against financial crimes, especially as it is known that banks all over the world 
are the most convenient vehicles used by the fraudsters to realise their inordinate 
ambition (The 419 Coalition 2004). In reaction to this advisory note by the U.S 
state Department, the Central Bank of Nigerian (CBN) also made some efforts in 
the detection of this fraud. The CBN included the following: 
 
Ø Emphasizing the policy of transparency in financial transactions through 
the CBN monetary policy circular  
Ø Establishment of a money laundering surveillance unit in the Bank 
Examination Department in 1994, preparatory to the criminalisation of 
money laundering in Nigeria in 1995 – Under the Act, financial institutions 
are expected to; 
§ Render three mandatory returns to the appropriate authorities 
using the prescribed format 
§ Adhere strictly to the principle of Know Your Customer (KYC) 
§ Co-operate with the law enforcement and regulatory authorities 
and observe the procedure for disclosure of suspicious 
transactions by promptly reporting such transaction to the CBN 
§ Maintain records of  transactions for a minimum of 10 years and 
§ Establish an effective means of retrieving information at short 
notice. 
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The Nigerian Police Effort 
 
The Nigerian government established a Special Fraud Unit (SFU) under the 
Nigerian Police, charged with the responsibility to investigate, arrest and 
prosecute Advance Fee Fraudsters. This Unit is also charged with the 
responsibility of recovering money and/or properties that were obtained 
fraudulently. The Nigerian Police, through the SFU has accomplished a lot in 
their attempts to combat the menace of Advance Fee Fraud. These successes 
include: 
 
Ø Arrest and prosecution of a large number of Advance Fee Fraudsters 
Ø Recovery of money and goods fraudulently obtained from various victims 
Ø Disruption of the operations of 419 syndicates in Nigeria by carrying out 
raids at their hideouts and confiscating their tools of trade such as 
computers, fax machines, telephones and forged documents  
Ø Blocking of bank accounts used to receive 419 funds 
Ø Seizure of cars, electronic and other items purchased with the proceeds of 
419 funds 
Ø Liasing with other law enforcement agencies of other countries, especially 
the U.S Secret Service to track down AFF perpetrators. Collaborating and 
sharing of information with other law enforcement agencies within Nigeria.    
 
The unit reported some modest achievements in the area of arrests, 
prosecutions and convictions of AFF offenders from 1993 to 2001. Below are the 
statistical data of the number of cases dealt with: 
§ Number of persons arrested          = 1,954 (100%) 
§ Number of cases charged to court =     254 (13%) 
§ Number of cases prosecuted            =    154 (7.9%) 
§ Number of convictions                    =       22 (1.1%) 
§ Number of persons acquitted            =        7 (0.35%) 
§ Number of cases pending at the legal section = 52 (2.7%) 
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The effective enforcement of law in AFF, which provides, among other things, for 
the following offences, gave rise to a decrease of the activities of the fraudsters 
in Nigeria (Snyman 2001:66): 
 
Ø Obtaining property under false pretences: a person who is 
found guilty of this offence is liable, if convicted, to 
imprisonment for a term of not less than five years, without 
the option of a fine. 
Ø Use of premises with the express purpose to commit a 
criminal offence: a person found guilty of this offence, when 
convicted, will receive a sentence of imprisonment for a term 
of not less than five years, without the option of a fine  
Ø Fraudulent invitation to entice a person to partake in a 
fraudulent scheme: a person found guilty of this offence, if 
convicted, will receive a sentence for a term of not less than 
seven years, without the option of a fine 
Ø Laundering of funds obtained through unlawful activity; 
receipt of fraudulent letters; and possession of fraudulent 
letters: this constitutes an attempt to fraud on the part of the 
sender and receiver. A person found guilty of this offence will 
receive a prison sentence for a term of at least 15 years or 
more than 25 years.  
 
However, despite all the investigations and arrests of 419 perpetrators in Nigeria, 
prosecution remains a challenge. Abati (2003:2) maintains that Ribadu’s 
commission only need to arrest the kingpins and if the fraudsters cannot beat 
Ribadu’s trap, can all the same be said of the larger Nigerian police system? Or 
the courts? In this regard, Abati (2003:2) states that the fraudsters are assisted 
by the banks, and what is worse: the laws that address money laundering and 
financial malpractices have so many loopholes that bankers and fraudsters are 
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always able to manipulate them for their own purposes. He concluded that the 
war against 419 is like the war against corruption: the extent of its success will 
depend invariably on the strength of the institutions of state, and the political will 
to sustain the process. 
 
It should also be underscored that the Nigerian Parliament instituted a law by 
which not only the perpetrators of AFF will be prosecuted but also the managers 
and owners of Internet cafés and offices from where such frauds are committed 
(SAPA-AFP 2005). 
 
In reaction to the Nigerian government’s efforts to investigate and arrest 
suspects, the 419 Coalition (2003) commented that: “… we have heard it so 
many times over the years from successive Nigerian government and whole 
panoply of officials. But we remain hopeful and welcome any sustained, tangible, 
and quantifiable effort by the Nigerian government that arrests 419ers, convicts 
419ers, seizes their assts, and repatriates stolen monies to the victims of 
419ers”. The Coalition hoped that prosecutions, convictions and the recovery and 
repatriations of funds in these cases follow in a timely manner.  
 
5.2.2 South Africa 
 
Like so many other countries, organised crime groups exist in South Africa and a 
recent report drawn up by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for the United States’ President, identified South 
Africa as an important centre for international criminal activity (Irish & 
Qhobosheane 2003:1). Numerous investigations have been conducted about 
organised crime groups’ activities in South Africa, and most of the police 
investigations focused on the actual crimes committed by such groups, and the 
arrests of individuals or the seizure of goods.  
 
 227 
In South Africa this crime is investigated and prosecuted under the Prevention of 
Organized Crime Act no. 121 of 1998 as amended by Prevention of Organised 
Crime Amendment Act, No. 24 of 1999 that describes this form of fraud. This Act 
introduces measures to combat organised crime, inter alia money laundering and 
criminal gang activities to prohibit certain activities relating to racketeering 
activities and to provide for the prohibition of money laundering and the obligation 
to report certain information. 
 
The South African Police Service and the elite service (Scorpions) adopt 
aggressive and spontaneous sting operations to apprehend these fraudsters. 
Their approach led to the successful investigation, arrest and conviction of some 
of AFF perpetrators in South Africa.  
 
Investigation and arrest 
 
The procedure for the investigation of fraud serves two basic functions.  The fist 
of these functions is the preparation of evidence for the subsequent use in the 
sanctioning process. The second goal of investigation is essentially remedial. In 
most cases it might be appropriate to employ fairly intrusive investigative 
techniques against suspected perpetrators of AFF. These might include 
telecommunications interceptions, body wires (microphone concealed on the 
person of an investigator or agent), the use of undercover agents, and 
techniques of covert facilitation or sting operations such as those used by the FBI 
and the South Africa Police Service and the Scorpions.  
 
According to a July 1999 Interpol survey, the highest number of related arrests 
occurred in South Africa, which reported the arrest of 56 individuals. Out of those 
arrested, 22 came from Liberia, 12 from Cameroon, 8 from Nigeria, 6 from South 
Africa, 3 from Rwanda, 3 from DR Congo and 2 from Zimbabwe. 
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In South Africa, the investigation of AFF is led by the South African Police’s 
(SAPS) detective service and the National Prosecuting Authority’s (NPA) 
Investigative Body (Scorpions). Their investigations led to many busts and 
arrests of 419 - perpetrators in South Africa. According to Engelbrecht (2002:1) 
four Nigerians were arrested in 2004, three in South Africa and one in London 
after a joint operation between the South African police and the New Scotland 
Yard police. Engelbrecht (2002:2) reported that the victim was lured to South 
Africa by a Nigerian criminal syndicate operating a 419-scam letter. The arrest of 
the perpetrators followed the kidnapping of the victim, a French national shortly 
after he had arrived in South Africa. The perpetrators contacted the victim’s 
daughter in London and demanded a ransom. She then called in the London 
Metropolitan Police detectives based at New Scotland Yard who alerted the 
South African police through Interpol. 
 
As a result of Interpol’s involvement, a joint operation was launched to rescue the 
victim. Hence two London detectives came to South Africa and supported by the 
South African’s Commercial Crime Unit detectives simultaneously raided 
properties in Roodepoort, Randburg and Orange Grove. New Scotland Yard 
officers raided a London premises at the same time. Equipment and documents 
used by the 419 fraudsters were also confiscated (Engelbrecht 2002:2). 
 
In a related case, Hosken (2002:1) reported a three week intelligence operation 
that netted two criminal operatives who were working for Durban’s biggest West 
Africa crime ring. In this raid, police from the Durban Metro Specialised 
Investigations Unit, Organised Crime Unit and the KwaZulu-Natal Tactical 
Intervention Unit stormed three Point Road Internet cafés and seized computers, 
cell phones and business documents.  The raid followed a similar operation in 
which police closed down a Brickhill Internet café after it was learnt that it was 
used as a front by a Nigerian fraud ring. This unit is said to form part of Project 
West, a campaign aimed at crushing all West African crime syndicates who use 
the city as a base for their criminal activities. 
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A 20 month investigation led the courts to grant an order to the Scorpions to 
seize a 419 suspect’s R1.8m home and two luxury cars. Scorpions believe the 
suspect is one of the South African kingpins of the 419-scam. This investigation 
was sparked by the South African Finance Minister, after two U.S. companies 
alleged that the would-be Member of Parliament had defrauded them using 
documents purporting to be from the South African Presidency and the Reserve 
Bank (Padayachee 2003:2). 
 
In this research, it was found that the South African law enforcement agents used 
a variety of methods to track and arrest AFF perpetrators in South Africa. In his 
statement, the perpetrator in Case 1 said: “… then during that process he 
travelled they apparently they had been making arrangement with somebody 
from abroad over transfers of money of course the money is non - existence and 
then it happened the person they have dealing with contacted the SA authority so 
then now he contacted the scorpion and they started monitoring the telephone 
line of Mr Ribado. So during the process of their monitoring they were able to 
trace the house of Mr. Ribado through the telephone line which the man who was 
abroad gave to them.  Then incidentally I was in the house during August 2002 
when the cops came. They came in early in the morning of August 2002 so when 
they came in we opened the door for him, and they recovered the telephone in 
question from the house, they also recovered the computer”. 
 
The perpetrator in Case 3 was arrested because of a set-up that involved the 
victim. The perpetrator said: “… So I arrived in there I met her by her car so the 
next thing that happened she said I must get into the car, so I get into the car, so 
the police, different guys they come to me, they ask me where is my passport, so 
I show them my passport, so they ask me what am I doing, shut up, find up, and I 
was arrested”.   
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The perpetrator in Case 4 said: “…That the police, before they arrested me, they 
called on my phone.  My partner called me on my cell phone.  When he called 
me he said no, there’s an appointment to my house, can you come and see me.  
I said I’m willing to come.  And I drove to his place.  When I reached there, I find 
the Scorpions they are there.  I didn’t know first they are Scorp ions.  I knocked to 
his door, when I knocked the door, they caught me they say, and no we want 
you, and I was arrested”. 
 
The perpetrator in Case 5 said: “…How did they arrest me?  How they arrested 
me is uh, it was just my girlfriend.  My girlfriend knew.  Yes my girlfriend.  Yeah, 
South African girlfriend.  She knew what I was doing.  Although I was hiding to 
her, but she knew I was always having money, all the time I was having like 50 / 
60 000 in my house.  And also I was driving my cars, and I was going on holidays 
all over the world.  And it came a time when I decided that we should separate.  
She should go her way, and I should also go my way.  Because I had a new 
girlfriend.  So I told her that she should take everything that she wants, and then 
we go separate ways.  And that is the time she complained me to the police.  
Well, you can say, informed the police about my activities.  And then they came 
to arrest me, and I had so many evidence in the house, you know like bank 
statements, and uh…I can just say a lot of illegal things, like bankcards which 
were not mine, which I could not account for, so that’s how I was arrested.  That 
is how I ended up in the hands of the police.  But I didn’t give them any problems.  
Because I pleaded guilty from the word go”. 
 
Prosecution in South Africa 
 
The South African law enforcement agents have adopted an investigative 
technique for AFF perpetrators that assist them to arrive at a successful 
conviction of the accused. In the first place this research found that, despite the 
complicated nature and processes involved in the adjudication of AFF 
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perpetrators, South African authorities succeed to put some of these offenders 
behind bars. 
 
Plea bargain 
 
The main reason, revealed in this research, which led to the successful 
conviction of the offenders was that the offenders were persuaded to enter into a 
plea bargain for a lesser sentence or a fine. Usually, the state would succeed in 
convicting these offenders when they plead guilty, and the court would impose 
the minimum sentence. 
 
In support of this assertion the perpetrator in Case1 stated that: “… Then a friend 
of mine got a lawyer for me. The lawyer came in and I explained the situation to 
him. Then he now advised me that there was no problem in this case, since I 
know the man responsible for the matter, and that I should just say that I was 
guilty, because they were not going to sentence me for a long time.  That is what 
they told me. The lawyer was advising me.  Then I was not conversant with the 
judicial system here and I was not with how the court procedure worked 
especially. So the Monday I went to court. So they asked me if I know anything of 
the things they took from the house.  I said yes.  They asked me who owned 
them.  I said Mr. Ribado. So that was what happened during the first day in court.  
So the Wednesday of the same week they asked me to come back to court. So 
the lawyer briefed me, ‘that there was no problem’ that he has discussed with the 
prosecutor… I should just tell them that I was guilty, and they’ll just give me a 
fine.  So he said if that is the case I must just tell the court that I’m guilty, and 
they will give me a fine. If I am able to pay the fine they won’t arrest me. So then 
in court on the second day they asked me if I’m guilty of this offence.  I told them 
yes I am guilty. So on the Friday of the same week they sentenced”. 
 
He also said: “…. So at the end of the sentence I was speaking to my lawyers 
and he told me that I shouldn’t worry, that he was going to appeal against the 
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sentence. So then it became clear to me that the lawyer and the Scorpions they 
were working together because if they go on trial they will not be able to find 
enough grounds to convict me because I am not the owner of the house and I am 
not the owner of the properties.  So that was actually the easy way out to convict 
me”. 
 
Similarly, the perpetrator in Case 2 said: “… the system of the Scorpion I 
appreciate it (plea bargain). I learnt it come from America that when a fraud boy 
is caught take him into plea-bargain, because this is not a violent crime and it is 
difficult to prove the crime”.  
 
The perpetrator in Case 4 said: “…From the South African police and the 
Scorpion…They just produce a plea bargain and then…” The perpetrator in Case 
5 also said: “…But I didn’t give them any problems.  Because I pleaded guilty 
from the word go, and I started to realise that no, it was a mistake.  What I was 
doing was a mistake to accept to plea guilty”.   
 
5.2.3 United States 
 
In view of the mass losses suffered by the U.S citizens since the 1980s, as a 
result of the 419 scam, the government took a multi-pronged approach to the 
problem of AFF. It is being actively pursued on the law enforcement and foreign 
policy front. Because of the devastating effects of this fraud to its citizens, senior-
level meetings chaired by the Department of State, and attended by members of 
the U.S intelligence community and U.S law enforcement officials, including the 
U.S Attorney General have been ongoing to address the Nigerian/West African 
criminal activity. A United State Government working plan has been drafted to 
combat this issue, and a number of recommendations have been implemented 
(United States Department of State 1997:26). 
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Internationally, in 1996, the Political Eight (G-7 plus Russia) met in Lyon France 
to co-ordinate enforcement efforts against transnational crimes. One outcome of 
the meeting was the formation of a subgroup dedicated to combating AFF. 
 
The United States Secret Service was designated, in 1998 by the Attorney 
General, as the lead investigative agency for Nigerian/West African criminal 
activities in the U.S. Through the Secret Service Internet website, and its 
Financial Crime Division in its Washington headquarters, the Secret Service acts 
as a central repository for complaints about AFF (Buchanan et al. 2001:44). 
 
The Secret Service accumulates all the complaints it receives that relates to AFF 
in an investigative database. In cases where the victims have suffered losses, 
they initiate an investigation. In cases of solicitation, that is where the recipient 
has not fallen for the scam and has not sustained financial losses, the Secret 
Service will save the information for future cases. The database helps to link 
victims of the same perpetrator, since the fraudsters always send out numerous 
solicitations and attempts to hook as many victims as possible with the same 
offer. It must be noted that proof of these multiple victims is powerful evidence in 
demonstrating a defendant’s fraudulent intent (Buchanan et al.2001:44). 
 
In the United States, a case analysis in 2001, revealed a number of Nigerian AFF 
cases that have been prosecuted successfully in the Southern District of Texas 
as a result of aggressive investigation by the Houston Area Fraud Task Force. 
The task force comprises of representatives from a number of Federal and Local 
law enforcement agencies, including the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalistion Service, the Postal Inspection 
Service, the Houston Police Department, the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, the 
Texas Rangers, the State Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration. 
The combination of expertise and assets provided by the representatives of 
these agencies allow for the rapid response to ongoing AFF as well as the ability 
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to work through complicated, long term fraud investigations (Buchanan et al. 
2001:44-47). 
 
In the United States, two African men pleaded guilty, and admitted that they had 
attempted to sell a useless counterfeit scheme to someone they believed was a 
wealthy businessman. The businessman was actually an undercover FBI agent 
investigating the black money scam. Both men who pleaded guilty cooperated 
with investigators. One of the men implicated three of the four African immigrants 
charged with the plot. Each pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge and will face 
up to five years in prison when they are sentenced. A superseding indictment 
accused them of a conspiracy to alter the U.S currency, which carries a sentence 
of up to five years in prison, and three counts of altering currency, each of which 
carries a sentence of up to 20 years in prison (WINS Radio, New York 2003).  
 
From the above it should be clear to the keen reader that there are also problems 
regarding the adjudication of AFF perpetrators. However, the next section 
focuses on the problems associated with the investigation and adjudication of 
AFF offenders.  
 
5.3 ADJUDICATION PROBLEMS 
 
Despite the measures already in place and although law enforcement agencies 
in Nigeria and the United States are inundated with letters and telephone calls 
from victims and targets, AFF have continued to defy traditional investigative and 
law enforcement techniques. As a result, very little progress has been made to 
curb the crime. It was against this backdrop that Hamza (2002:5-7) came up with 
an in exhaustive  list of issues, arbitrarily classified into legal and practical 
obstacles that have stood in the way of the successful arrest, prosecution and 
conviction of AFF perpetrators.  These included the following: 
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Ø Legal impediments: There are several possible explanations for the 
apparent historic failure of the Justice System to successfully apprehend 
the perpetrators. Chief among them are; loopholes that are inherent in 
exiting legislations, jurisdictional question, evidentiary problems, 
differences between legal regimes in different countries, perception of 
interference with sovereignty and socio-political concerns in certain 
jurisdictions. 
 
Ø Practical difficulties: Even where the legal impediments have been 
overcome, practical difficulties remain, for example, victims refusal to co-
operate, inadequately equipped law enforcement agencies, stratification of 
a criminal group into such that arrest, prosecution and conviction of a 
member does not necessarily lead to the demise of the group. Technology 
has now also made it possible to have virtual customers who are able to 
conceal their identity, perpetrators can relocate to other countries to 
escape arrest, law enforcement agencies are unsympathetic towards 
victims especially as it is perceived that greed was their prime motivation 
and the fact that multiple agencies are often require to solve a given case. 
 
In the recent past throughout the world, there have been instances where high 
technology frauds are being investigated by law enforcement agencies. These 
crimes are often investigated by specialist, high tech crime units in the U.K, USA, 
and Australia. Makkai (Smith 2004a:2) stated that, along with the increased 
workload has come the realisation that crimes that involve computers, either as 
the target of offending, or as one of a range of tools, or the principal tool used in 
the commission of offences, are technically difficult to investigate and many legal 
and practical problems arise. Smith, Grabosky and Urbas (2004:4),  and 
Sussman (1999:14) noted that these concerns often arise because of the 
transitional nature of the conduct involved. This necessitates a degree of co-
operation which was rarely required of investigators in the past.  
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The next section of this thesis therefore focuses on the barriers of the successful 
investigation of cross border high-tech fraud, and identifies policy responses that 
may be appropriate to deal effectively with this global crime phenomenon. In this 
regard, Smith (2004a:4) identifies the following barriers: 
 
5.3.1 Identifying suspects 
 
One of the common impediments that investigators face when they deal with AFF 
is to identify the suspects. Occasionally, this can lead to considerable problems 
when the wrong person is arrested. It must be noted that in cyberspace 
identification problems are magnified because digital technologies enable people 
to disguise their identity in a wide range of ways. These disguises make it difficult 
to know for certain who used the terminal when an illegal communication was 
made. Smith (2004a:3) maintains that this problem is more prevalent in business 
environments where multiple users may have access to a workstation (Internet 
cafés) and where passwords are known or shared, than in private homes where 
circumstantial evidence can often be used to determine who was using the 
computer at a given time. 
 
Online technologies make it relatively simple to disguise one’s true identity, to 
misrepresent one’s identity, or make use of someone else’s identity.  A classical 
example in this case is the re -mailing services that can be used to disguise one’s 
identity when an email is sent. The messages are stripped of identifying 
information and an anonymous identifier is allocated, or messages are encrypted 
for services, therefore users can make their communications almost impossible 
to follow. 
 
It must also be pointed out that (Smith 2004a:4) anonymity can also be achieved 
in cyberspace using less technologically complex means which include: 
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Ø Using a false name when purchasing pre-paid Internet access from an 
Internet service provider and when renting a telephone line from a carrier 
Ø Registering for a free e-mail service using a false name and address and 
Ø Using Internet cafés/kiosks to send messages without disclosing one’s 
true identity. 
 
In a recent study of online anonymity, Forde and Armstrong (2002:2) argue that 
those Internet services that provide the highest level of anonymity are most likely 
to be used for criminal purposes. 
 
The problems experienced with the identification of these crime suspects are 
usually resolved by traditional investigative techniques. This might include the 
use of video surveillance, or gathering indirect circumstantial evidence to prove 
the accused was at the terminal at a particular time of day. The use of intrusive 
surveillance is not always successful, and raises issues of human rights and 
legal privileges, problems which exist in both digital and non-digital 
environments. 
 
In an attempt to solve this problem, Smith (2004a:5) indicated that some 
investigators are beginning to use biometric means of identification. He 
maintained, however, that few computers have biometric user authentication 
systems at present (for example, a fingerprint scanner for logging on). Research 
also indicates that DNA samples may also be gathered from keyboards, which 
have been used to link an individual with a particular computer. Smith is of the 
opinion that when such techniques become more widespread, problems of 
identification may be reduced although, of course, once a person has logged on, 
this does not prevent someone else from using that terminal without the person’s 
knowledge if they are absent. A more complicated problem in this regard is the 
need to link the time at which a suspect was using a computer (as disclosed in 
computer forensic evidence) with biometric evidence of the whereabouts of the 
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suspects at a given point in time, because DNA or fingerprints, for example 
cannot be time stamped.  
 
This research study found that the identification of suspects impedes the arrests, 
investigations and prosecutions of the fraudsters. The perpetrators in Case 1 
maintain that: “…. the prosecution is the one difficult thing.  Because the 
offenders are all over the place and they move from place to place and from 
country to country”. It was found in this research that perpetrators have multiple 
identities, and this make it very difficult for law enforcement agents to track down 
suspects. 
 
5.3.2 Criminal law and securing extradition 
 
Where an accused AFF perpetrator is resident in a country other than the one in 
which the criminal proceedings are taking place, it is possible for the person to be 
extradited to stand trial. However, the procedures involved in extradition are 
complex and difficult, making applications costly and slow (Smith 2004a:5). 
Based on this same hindrance, the Commonwealth Directors of Prosecution 
(2003:46) notes: “… there have been cases where an extradition request has 
been withdrawn because the delay has been so long that criminal charges can 
no longer proceed and cases where a person has died of natural causes while 
contesting extradition”. 
 
Extradition requires not only that an appropriate treaty exist between the two 
countries concerned, but also that the conduct in question be criminalised in both 
the referring and receiving country. In the case of computer crimes such as AFF, 
this is not the case.  A survey of cyber laws in 52 countries in 2000 found that 33 
of these countries had not yet updated their laws to address any type of 
computer crime (McConnell International 2000:5). Of the remaining countries, 
nine had enacted legislation to address five or fewer types of computer crimes, 
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and 10 had updated their laws to prosecute six or more of the 10 types of 
computer crimes identified (Smith 2004a:6). 
 
In support of the extradition problem, Bell (2002:45) stated that in 2000 a student 
in the Philippines was alleged to have sent out the so-called ‘Love Bug’ virus. 
This virus infected Microsoft Windows operating systems by sending e-mail 
attachments, which then replicated itself by sending similar messages to all the 
addresses in the infected computer’s address book. The virus was traced to an 
Internet service provider in the Philippines who co-operated with police to locate 
the residence in question. The student was arrested, but the Philippians’ law did 
not proscribe the creation and release of a computer virus at the time. This 
conduct was not illegal in the Philippines, thus the principle of dual criminality 
precluded extradition to the United States where such an activity was a crime.  
 
Criminal law and procedure makes the adjudication of AFF perpetrators very 
difficult. This is because of lack of evidence and the fact the complainant usually 
does not report the real events that took place, if they report it all. The perpetrator 
in Case 2 confirmed this: “... if you follow the procedures of the 419 scam.  
Legally you cannot prosecute the perpetrator.  You cannot call that stealing from 
somebody, because if that person who is the victim in this case, had a little 
common sense, and he wasn’t as greedy as he is, he would have realised that 
it’s something which is not there”.  
 
This perpetrator also said: “… They are not being convicted.  What the 
government is doing is just incarcerating them. It’s the same thing like here in 
South Africa, if I tell somebody I am a businessman, I have a business, I have 
money in Angola for instance, and he comes all the way from Canada for 
instance, and he gives me money, believing that the money he is giving me is 
going to facilitate the money from Angola, how can the government call it fraud?  
How sure is the government that the money is not there?  How sure are they.  It’s 
just not a question of using the motion of following the legal procedure.  Where is 
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the evidence?  What if he came with the money cash?  Obviously if somebody 
comes in, we have more than $10 000, it’s money laundering.  How can you 
arrest somebody?  If somebody come and complain, I came with a $100 000 and 
paid it to Tanfa.  Where is the evidence that he came in with $100 000?  You 
didn’t declare it at the airport.  If you weren’t greedy you wouldn’t transfer $100 
000.  You come with it cash. And you hand it over to somebody. But the thing is 
the criminal justice in South Africa, accepts blindly the words of the victim.  The 
law is blind, I accept that.  I’m not saying the perpetrator is right.  But you must 
also follow, if you want to follow the law without being emotional about it, I mean 
you can’t convict that person, because there is no evidence that the money was 
handed over to him”.   
 
It has also been found that the law enforcement officers do  not actually follow the 
criminal procedures when they investigate AFF cases. This is due to the complex 
nature of the crime. Hence if they have to follow the prescribed legal procedure, 
then they would hardly secure a conviction. In this regard, the perpetrator in 
Case 4 said: “…When they opened the case…you know, they are after 
somebody without going through the real procedure of investigation. But they 
didn’t give me a chance to justify myself; they just put me behind bars”.  
 
The perpetrator said: “… They did take a statement.  It was under pressure.  
Because they were saying, it’s you, it’s you, it’s you, you understand what I am 
saying… In their offices, it was in their offices.  No in court they didn’t give me 
chance to make statement”. This perpetrator also said “...This 419 is 
complicated.  This fraud is complicated.  You can investigate fraud now, but the 
technicalities that are there, it can make the case too complicated”. 
 
5.3.3 Choosing an appropriate jurisdiction 
 
Difficult legal jurisdictional questions also arise when determining where the 
offence has been committed and in which country a prosecution should take 
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place (Smith et al.1999: 4). Smith (2004a:7) states that one of the foremost 
problems of computer related crimes investigations (such as AFF investigations) 
is determining the jurisdiction in which proceedings should occur. Where 
offences are committed in various countries, or where the offender and the victim 
are located in different places, questions arise as to which court should deal with 
the matter. If charges can be laid in the country in which the offender is located, 
then problems of extradition will be avoided. However, if the charges originate 
from the country in which the victim is located, or where the effect of the conduct 
occurred, then the offender may need to be extradited to that country. 
Importantly, it will often be the case that only some of the essential elements of 
the offence occur within one jurisdiction, making prosecution practically 
impossible.  
 
The problem of negative international jurisdiction’ also arises. According to Smith 
(2004:8) this refers to cases that are not investigated because they could not be 
prosecuted in one single country, since many countries are involved but nobody 
wants to take action. There is also the reverse problem if too many countries 
want to prosecute a particular noteworthy case. Smith states that in order to deal 
with this situation the creation of an international instrument along the lines of the 
United Nations protocol regarding the negotiation of jurisdictions, setting out the 
jurisdiction is best determined in these cases. Generally, the rule is that if a 
country refuses to extradite an offender and if it has the power to take action, 
then it should be obliged to do so (Smith 2004a:8). 
 
5.3.4 Search and seizure 
 
In the successful adjudication of AFF cases, the search and seizure of 
documents and equipments are crucial evidence in this regard. This means that 
data has to be recovered from the suspect’s computer. However, two methods of 
obtaining data from a computer system can be distinguished based on technical 
and legal criteria (Smith 2004a:9): 
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Ø The first method involves obtaining data during a physical search of the 
premises where the computer system is located and  
Ø The second method involves the interception or monitoring of data 
transmitted from, to or within the system. 
 
According to Smith (2004a:9), this is an important distinction because remote 
access to computers via the Internet can sometimes result in the search 
amounting to an interception of telecommunications that may require a warrant in 
order for it to be legal. 
 
Whatever the case may be, difficult problems arise when obtaining digital 
evidence regarding crimes committed via the computer although in some ways, 
computers have made the process easier through the ability to conduct remote 
searchers of hard drives via the Internet. Smith (2004a:10) stated that some of 
the main difficulties include: 
 
Ø Obtaining permission to conduct remote searches - this is still illegal in 
Australia 
Ø Securing the relevant access device, such as a password 
Ø Imaging a hard drive without interfering with the evidence and  
Ø Conducting searchers quickly so that data cannot be removed.  
 
Often transnational computer related crime operations have to be closely 
coordinated. Warrants may need to be executed simultaneously in different 
countries in order to ensure that suspects do not collaborate to alter or destroy of 
evidence (U.S. Customs Service 2002). In recent times police managed to 
execute such operations successfully, such as the case mounted successfully by 
the South African Police and their New Scotland Yard counterpart in 2002 who 
acted simultaneously in London and Johannesburg. 
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In has been acknowledged in this research study that the search and seizure of 
equipment used in the commission of AFF hinders the investigations and 
prosecution of these fraudsters. Owing to the transitional nature of the fraud 
search and seizure would at times become difficult for investigators. However, 
this research found that in cases where the investigation takes place where the 
perpetrators are based, the search and seizure of equipment could be easy. 
During the course of this research, some of the perpetrators spoke of some 
equipment that was seized at their premises, which served as important evidence 
and eventually led to their conviction.   
 
In his statement, the perpetrator in Case 1 said: “…and they recovered the 
telephone in question from the house, they also recovered the computer… the 
documents…a copy of those letters that he was sending to the man involved.   
And cellophanes which they were using for transactions... and the computer and 
equipments: two computers and one printer and one fax machine”. 
 
The perpetrator in Case 3 said: “…In the court, they opened the briefcase in the 
court, and they are telling the magistrate actually that there is a paper, paper and 
tissue inside the briefcase… Actually I told her I came into the country with a 
briefcase; actually I’ve been doing fraud for a long time…. he came he gave me 
the briefcase, and go with her to her house… So they took the chemical to the 
house, they tried to wash the money, see I already arranged the briefcase.  I 
arranged it.  I put paper inside, this liquid water, whatever it is.  When I get to the 
place, it’s my arrangement, I take some notes out, which I have washed already, 
so I tried to wash it out, the chemical was finished so actually I wanted to have 
money for buying, to keep buying the chemical”. 
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5.3.5 Mutual assistance 
 
In order to facilitate international criminal investigations in AFF cases and other 
computer related fraud, mutual assistance treaties are often used. This provides 
a legal basis for authorities in one country to obtain evidence for criminal 
investigations at the request of authorities in another country (Smith 2004a:12). 
In this case, Smith said that instruments of this kind cover a range of activities 
including: 
 
Ø Identifying and locating persons 
Ø Serving documents 
Ø Obtaining evidence, articles and documents 
Ø Executing search and seizure request and 
Ø Confiscating the proceeds of crime. 
 
In Australia, victimised citizens of AFF, perpetrated by offenders located 
overseas, may still be able to mount prosecution in Australian courts. Each State 
and Territory has different cross-border legislation that supplements or 
reproduces the Common Law position. In the State of Victoria, for example, 
Section 80A of the Crimes Act of 1958 would enable a 419 fraudster who lives in 
the U.S. to be prosecuted in Victoria where a Victorian person was deceived into 
paying money into an overseas bank account. 
 
However, various evidentiary problems arise, such as the loss of original 
documentation, which are often retrieved from victims by the offenders in order to 
defeat attempts at prosecution. Difficulties have also been experienced when 
extradition, has to be arranged, even if offenders can be located. In Australia a 
package of legislative measures was adopted in the late 1980s to facilitate the 
prosecution of organised crime and serious fraud. The Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Act 1987, which established mechanisms to facilitate 
international cooperation between investigators with respect to obtaining 
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evidence, the location of witnesses and suspects, the execution of search and 
seizure warrants, the service of documents, the forfeiture of property and 
recovery of fines and various other matters. The Proceeds of Crimes Act 1987 
also enable investigators to follow the trail of the illegal proceeds of crimes 
internationally, and allow them to confiscate assets whilst the Extradition Act 
1988 extended Australia’s ability to enter into extradition arrangement 
internationally. The International Branch of the Commonwealth Attorney-
General’s Department administers these sections of the legislation, all of which 
have helped considerably in prosecuting offenders located overseas (Smith et 
al.1997: 4). 
 
 In the same vein the cost of mutual legal assistance are borne by the party 
providing the assistance. This creates hardships for small and poor West African 
nations that would process many requests for assistance from large countries, 
but rarely seek assistance themselves. This means that smaller countries are 
subsidizing the legal process of much larger nations. Smith (2004a: 16) did 
indicate that in bigger nations, problems also emerge. He said that in the U.S. 
requests from around the world for information concerning e-mail accounts of 
companies such as Hotmail and Yahoo are dealt with by the FBI, which sends 
request to corporate head offices located in the United States rather than local 
branches. This has the effects of overburdening the FBI with the administration of 
such requests. 
 
It has also been suggested that obtaining evidence through the use of formal 
assistance arrangements between nations can be exceedingly slow and 
ineffective. This suggestion is buttressed by the fact that searchers need to be 
conducted immediately in order to preserve evidence held on computer servers. 
Hence, the prospect of waiting weeks or even months for official diplomatic 
procedures to be complied with is daunting.  
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5.3.6 Logistical and practical barriers 
 
It must also be underscored that conducting investigations across national 
borders raises many practical problems that delay matters and increase cost. In 
addition to the issues already referred to, Smith (2004a:17) noted that some 
other problems include: 
 
Ø Investigators have to contact people on the other side of the globe at 
inconvenient times 
Ø Documents have to be translated, particularly if required for diplomatic 
purposes and 
Ø Witnesses from English-speaking countries need the assistance of 
interpreters, which can be expensive and can slow down investigations. 
 
One should also bear in mind that, countries have different priorities in terms of 
the importance of computer-related fraud investigations. For instance, economic 
crimes that are committed using a computer may be at the bottom of the 
hierarchy in countries where violent crime is prevalent. The result is that requests 
for assistance in some cases may simply be given a much lower priority, 
especially if they have been requested form a country with no history of co-
operative action. 
 
5.3.7 Lack of evidence to prosecute offenders 
 
A fundamental finding in this research that hinders the adjudication of AFF 
perpetrators is lack of evidence. All the perpetrators who took part in this 
research raised this factor.  In this regard, most of the cases are thrown out of 
court or the perpetrator would receive a small fine and subsequently be deported 
to his native country.  
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Within this frame of reference, Respondent 2 said: “…it’s difficult for the police to 
investigate because that is a network as I told you…..  I don’t know if the police 
can assist in this fraud.  But what I know is that once the police have arrested a 
person who was doing it, with a victim as a witness with evidence, then they can 
succeed to convict. And every time the police suspect you and they have a proof 
that you took this person to this place, they must have a proof”. 
 
5.4 SENTENCES  
 
A sentence is a measure imposed by the courts on an accused that is found 
guilty of an offence. It concludes the trial process in court. Glick (1995:463) 
defines a sentence as a criminal sanction that is imposed by the court on a 
convicted defendant. 
 
Given the diverse manifestations of AFF in the world, authorities should have a 
range of sanctions or punishments available, so as to best achieve the varied 
ends of deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution, and denunciation. 
 
5.4.1 Nigeria 
 
In Nigeria, this fraud is punishable under the Advance Fee Fraud and related 
offence Act of 1995 as amended. The average sentence of AFF offenders in 
Nigeria is 10 years and up and there is a provision for restitution in the law.   In 
Nigeria many of the AFF fraudsters have been arrested, but it has not been easy 
to convict them.  
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5.4.2 South Africa 
 
In South Africa, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act no. 121 of 1998 as 
amended by Prevention of Organised Crime Amendment Act, No. 24 of 1999 
prescribes this form of fraud. This Act introduces measures to combat organised 
crime, inter alia money laundering and criminal gang activities; to prohibit certain 
activities relating to racketeering and to provide for the prohibition of money 
laundering and an obligation to report certain information. 
 
There have been a number of arrests and convictions in South Africa. The first 
person to be found guilty of AFF in South Africa was a Nigerian who was 
sentenced to 12 years imprisonment in the Commercial Crimes Court in Pretoria 
(Otto 2002). 
 
In terms of the sentencing of AFF perpetrators, this research revealed that there 
have been a number of convictions in South Africa. However, the few cases that 
were scrutinised in this research indicated that the perpetrator received severe 
sentence. It should be noted that some of the perpetrators were not happy with 
their sentences, and according to them, they were not treated fairly by the justice 
system in South Africa just because they are Nigerians. 
 
The perpetrator in Case 1 said: “…they sentenced me to 12 years. I was 
shocked. So I asked them what the basis of this sentence was. So at the end of 
the sentence I was speaking to my lawyers and he told me that I shouldn’t worry, 
that he was going to appeal against the sentence…I did not benefit from the 
crime, I did not mastermind the crime, I did not plan the crime, but I’m here 
because of the crime.  I have no regrets of being here, because I have hope that 
one day I will be out, and I’ll be able to teach others that this is what I suffered 
because of this crime.  Even though I did not benefit from the crime.  I did not 
expect that the magistrate will say 12 years imprisonment for not benefiting from 
the crime.  I did not expect that.  That is my only disappointment with the judicial 
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system. I appear in court three times:  Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, its 12 
years, without saying this man, you actually took money from this person, you 
actually benefited from this plan, and you executed this plan.  They played on my 
ignorance on that aspect.  That is my only regret”.   
 
The perpetrator also said: “…I’m not with the sentence.  I can never be satisfied. 
Because it is shocking.  To me it’s shocking.  First of all, first offender.  Second of 
all, I didn’t plan the crime, I didn’t benefit from the crime, and I was only at the 
wrong place at the wrong time.  My only crime is I am at the wrong place at the 
wrong time.  So I listened to my lawyer’s advice in the beginning, he said no don’t 
worry, because they are not going to give you a harsh sentence, they are going 
to give you a fine, because you were just there.  So based on that, I fell into this 
trap of twelve years.  If I had gone on trial, believe you me. Yes!  If I had gone on 
trial, I would have been outside by now.  In fact, I wouldn’t have stayed more 
than two or 3 months in trial.  I would have been outside.  That is my assumption 
…[that the lawyer was working with the Scorpions.  From his attitude and the way 
he behaved.  I paid him so much money.  That is my assumption.  Because how 
can you be somebody’s lawyer and you cannot even cross-examine any of the 
state witnesses in court?” 
 
The perpetrator in Case 2 said: “….  The sentences they gave us were quite bad, 
they were such that they were optional. Like in my own instance, they gave me 3 
years, which means I was supposed to spend 6 months in jail. And after 6 
months I was supposed to be let out under correctional supervision.  On that day 
they gave us that option and told us if we do not take it, they were going to 
postpone the case for 6 months.  I’ll be stupid not to take it.  It would be stupidity 
on my part.  And at the end of the day…and we were reliably informed, that the 
court, the magistrate, the prosecutor, in the court we were, had already formed 
an opinion on us…that they had already made up their minds that we were going 
to be found guilty.  No matter what happens.  No matter how expensive or how 
knowledgeable the advocate would be; that they had already made up their mind 
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and that they were going to be found guilty.  They said the option of the plea 
bargain we got was the best they could offer us so that we should take it”. 
 
This perpetrator also said: “…I’m not satisfy with the sentence.  Because we are 
meant to pay money back to the state.  And the words that the prosecuting officer 
and the investigator used was a You are a Nigerian, you should be made an 
example of, and besides, your case was in the newspaper, so you must sit in jail.  
It wasn’t a fine.  We were asked to refund money that the state was taken in all 
the other cases that they’ve been defrauded.  Apparently, the state said that it 
was the same modus operandi that was being used.  That based on the papers 
they said they had, that this amount of money that they said was lost, pay back, 
and you will be given a fine and a suspended sentence.  But on the day in the 
court that we were supposed to finish our case, our lawyer came to me and said, 
no the prosecutor said we must sit in jail, me and my other fri end, that we had to 
sit, that we are Nigerians and the case was already in the papers.  So if you say 
was the sentence fair, no it wasn’t, because I should’ve…I’m a first offender, I 
don’t have any previous records, I have a legitimate business in South Africa, I’m 
living a legitimate life, but because of my race now, where I come from, and 
there’s already this stigma of you being a Nigerian”.   
 
He continued to say: “…We returned back the money…we paid back about R250 
000 a friend of mine, my friend’s  girlfriend, my own personal friend with whom I 
was arrested, they gave us an option that these three people would walk free, 
would be given a fine.  But they reversed it the day of the judgment … which 
goes to show you the legal system seems to have its own problems”.   
 
The perpetrator in Case 3 said: “… That is why I get my 2 years sentence.  
Actually they gave me 3 years sentence, 2 years inside prison, 5 years once 
outside prison if I ever make any dishonesty, that I will be arrested for one year 
within a period of 5 years”. 
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The perpetrator in Case 4 said “…. they said, I was the mastermind of the 
syndicate.  So he was sentenced for three years, and I was sentenced for seven 
years. I am ok with the sentence because …They searched the office, they didn’t 
find anything. They went through the phone call, my accounts.  Even the witness, 
there was four witness, from the bank manager, the corporate manager, 
everywhere from Cape Town, Durban, they came, they didn’t know me. .. Even 
me I was shocked”. 
 
This perpetra tor further said: “…Yes, I’m satisfied and I’m regretting.  It’s not ok, 
it’s too much, and it’s too much … It’s an offence, it’s an offence, but you know, I 
am a first offender in this country. But I deserve a second chance; give me fine or 
other things.  Yes, even the amount was too big, but there was another person 
who defraud R150 million, they give him fine and he’s out.  The same day they 
arrested him the same day they release him.  He stole R150 million through 
fraud.  He’s a white man in one company, the same day, he’s out.  Yes, he’s a 
white South African.  Even him, they gave him bail, but me they didn’t give me 
bail”. 
 
The perpetrator in Case 5 was sentenced for 12 years in prison. However, this 
perpetrator said he was satisfied with his sentence. He said: “… I’m satisfied with 
the sentence.  Of course, first time, when I was given the 12 years, I was saying 
to myself, because I was sentenced by a white magistrate, he’s a racist.  That is 
how…that is what I was saying.  But anyway, those people who I was going with 
to court, commercial crime court, especially white guys, they could get a 
suspended sentence, right, or maybe a 10 year sentence with supervision.  That 
means he comes to prison, he does 10 months, he goes out and then he’s 
supervised”.   
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5.4.3 United States 
 
In the U.S, there have been some successes in the investigations, arrests, 
prosecutions, convictions and sentences of AFF perpetrators. Below are some of 
the facts and cases, and the sentences that were imposed on the perpetrators: 
  
United States v. Okonkwo 
 
After several attempts to arrest 419 perpetrators, the Houston task force attained 
its first success in June 2000 with the arrest of John Okonkwo, Jerome Okwudi, 
and Kingsley Ireke. This case combined elements of both Advance Fee Fraud 
and black money schemes. All three were charged and convicted of conspiracy 
and inducing another to travel in interstate commerce in furtherance of a scheme 
to defraud . A videotape proved to be compelling evidence and helped to induce 
all three defendants to plead guilty. Okonkwo and his two co-defendants received 
sentences ranging from 8 to 21 months. After they had completed their stay at 
the Bureau of Prisons, they will be release to the INS for deportation proceedings 
to Nigeria (Buchanan et al. 2001:44).  
 
United States v. Okiti 
 
According to Buchanan et al. (2001:45-46) a second successful investigation of 
AFF scheme was in 2001. The task force was contacted by Siler, a 
businessman. He told the task force that he had been contacted by a group of 
Nigerians who requested him to invest a large sum of money on their behalf. 
 
The facts of this case were that in September 2000 Mr. Siler received a letter via 
fax entitled “Abacha Family Estate”. The letter outlined a business proposal in 
which Dr. Maryram Abacha requested that Siler invest $25.6 million of her money 
in the United States. The letter indicated that the funds were the result of some 
deal between her late husband and a Russian firm. After the Nigerian 
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government had revoked Abacha’s license to manage a financial company she 
had removed the funds and packed the money into two trunks. Because of the 
oppression of the Nigerian government, she was supposedly looking for a way to 
quickly sneak the money out of Nigeria. 
 
Mr. Siler responded to the letter via e-mail requesting that the trunks of money be 
sent to him in Portland USA. A series of faxes and e-mails followed with Abacha 
insisting that Siler travel to Europe to receive the money and pay shipping and 
insurance costs. Siler refused. 
 
In December 2000, Abacha advised that the money would be in Houston with a 
family representative named Mohammed and that Siler should contact 
Mohammed to make arrangements to obtain the trunks containing the money. 
From December 2000 through March 2001, several telephones calls were placed 
and recorded between Siler and Mohammed. 
 
On March 11, 2001, Siler arrived in Houston and met with task force members. 
Agents wired a room in a hotel and waited for Mohammed to arrive. A Secret 
Service Agent posed as Siler’s secretary. Mohammed arrived at the hotel with 
two large bags. Once inside the room, he opened the bags and told Siler that 
they contained $6 million each. Inside the bags were numerous individually 
wrapped stacks of money. The money was stamped with the initials “U.N”. 
According to Mohammed, the U.N. stamp meant that the money was from the 
United Nations and could only be used overseas. A special chemical was 
necessary, according to Mohammed, to clean the money. Mohammed then 
removed two hundred dollars bills from one of the stacks and cleaned the initials 
with a small amount of liquid. He stated that he needed $23,000 to purchase 
additional chemicals to clean the rest of the money. After receiving the money, 
the agents arrested Mohammed and identified him as Victor Okiti. The suitcases 
contained numerous stacks of paper, along with the counterfeit hundred dollar 
bills Mohammed had washed during his demonstration. A search warrant 
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executed at Okiti’ home revealed more suitcases and more counterfeit money 
(Buc hanan et al.2001:45) 
 
 Okiti was charged with wire fraud and possessing counterfeit currency. In the 
face of the videotaped evidence of his crimes, he pleaded guilty to the charges. 
Despite the fact that this was a “no loss” case, Okiti received a sentence of 33 
months in prison, after which he was to be deported (Crm. No.H-01-261 
(S.D.Tex.2001).  
 
Despite the challenges in the prosecution of AFF offenders, the successes 
achieved in Houston was attributed to the commitment of the various agencies in 
the task force, the cooperation of the banks and credit card industry, and the 
United States attorney’s office that had dedicated a prosecutor to co-ordinate  the 
prosecution of these cases (Buchanan et al. 2001:46). 
 
Recently, courts in the United States, Europe and Australia have experimented 
with sanctions, which require that the computer of an offender of high-tech 
computer related crimes be forfeited, or seek to prohibit the offender from 
undertaking certain or all computer related activities or use computers or gain 
access to the Internet. Some courts in these countries have also imposed 
requirements that the offender’s computer activities be monitored (Smith 
2004b:1). 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION  
 
With the high and ever-increasing rate of AFF crimes around the world, and  few 
arrests, investigations and convictions, these offenders are encouraged to 
continue their fraud. In this regard, there have been some suggestions on how 
these criminals can be brought to justice. Smith (2004a) suggests that the 
solution of arrests, investigations, prosecution and convictions of AFF offenders 
lie in harmonising laws and procedures globally, improving the technical 
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capabilities of investigators, and sharing of information between public and 
private sector investigators to enhance international co-operation. 
 
Smith (2004) maintains that continuing harmonisation of laws and the adoption of 
international conventions on high tech crime and transnational and organised 
crime will make prosecutions easier and will greatly improve mutual assistance 
and extradition of AFF offenders. The investigation of cross-border fraud 
incidents requires adequate forensic and technical expertise. This implies the 
formulations of training programmes and the development of software tools. 
International training programmes could be developed and expertise could be 
shared between different nations. The United Nations, under its crime 
programme could examine the desirability of reviewing its manual on computer 
crime and further support the work already undertaken by other international 
organisations. 
 
The following are the findings of this chapter: 
 
Table 5.1 Adjudication 
The policing process Barriers to arrest 
Pro-active and re-active Identification of suspects 
Threat to lodge complaints  Securing extradition 
Cost-benefit analysis Criminal law of referring and receiving 
countries 
Complain – report the crime Lack of evidence 
Follow the money transfer trials Lack of reporting  
Pinpoint the beneficiaries Determining the jurisdiction 
Policies and plans to track down Negative international jurisdiction 
Computer networks Too many countries want to prosecute 
Inter-agency task forces Search and seizure from computers 
Compile data-base Intercepting/monitoring transmitted 
data 
 Lack of mutual assistance treaties 
 Loss of original documentation 
 Determine who foots the bill 
 Logistical / practical barriers 
 Lack of evidence to prosecute  
 High cost of equipment 
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From the findings of this chapter and as indicated in the above table, it is clear 
that the pro-active policing strategies, albeit successful up to a point, highlight the 
barriers that prevent the arrests of these offenders. It is exactly because of the 
policing deficits and barriers to arrests that the prosecution usually makes use of 
plea-bargaining and, by doing so, imposes lesser sentences, thus sending a “no 
big problem” message to the victims and the perpetrators. 
 
The next chapter of this theses focus on the prevention of AFF. It will therefore 
explore and analyse the various prevention strategies that are in place in a bid to 
combat this complex type of fraud. The prevention programmes in Nigeria, South 
Africa and the United States will be the focal point. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PREVENTION 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The prevention of crime is one of the most difficult priorities of the state and in 
particular for businesses, individuals and the community. Crime prevention in its 
broadest sense has a long history, stretching as far back as the first use of locks 
and bolts to protect people and their property. However, it was only during the 
last three decades of the 20th century that it emerged as a key institutional 
feature of the criminal justice systems and related sites of social control across 
contemporary societies. It is also during this period that a massive output of 
criminological writing aimed at classifying different types of crime prevention 
approaches emerged.  
 
According to the United Nations (1993:13), criminal justice and the prevention of 
crime are universally considered as fundamental to social progress and better 
standards of living. To keep pace with the changing nature and dimensions of 
crime and to be able to come to grips with practical crime prevention strategies, a 
panel of 27 experts from a number of countries have been nominated to set 
priorities and practical guidelines for criminal justice and the prevention of crime 
in order to assist member countries of the United Nations with the crime problem.  
 
Many countries have also developed national crime prevention policies to deal 
with the crime problem in their countries and these policies normally function at 
national, provincial, state and local or area level (Naude & Maree 2002:148). The 
prevention and control of crime is one of the most important and most difficult 
priorities of the state and the community in particular. According to the literature 
the state has a special duty to prevent crime against its subjects by means of an 
effective judicial system, adequate control of firearms and a comprehensive 
community development policy. 
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However, no single crime prevention package exists as a blueprint for success in 
high crime areas, indeed, many initiatives have met with mixed results. One 
option is to join forces with the victims of crime and harassment in the 
implementation of a crime prevention project. Most countries have adopted this 
victims-based approach to crime prevention. The extent and nature of crime, and 
how residents respond to ‘vicarious’ and direct victimisation, varies in subtle but 
important ways in different high crime localities. In this regard, Simpson and 
Farrell (1990:56) said that crimes and crime related problems should be targeted, 
and how they should be tackled, are the first stages in the development of a 
crime prevention package for a particular locality. 
 
A case in point, fraud prevention involves a complex and sensitive process of 
balancing an organisation’s diverse interests and limited resources. Some 
solutions may be totally effective in terms of reducing fraud but may have the 
consequence of stifling commerce and making everyday business transactions 
so unwieldy and costly to manage that no one would be willing to do business 
with them (Smith 1998:1). Fraud prevention should therefore aim to maximise 
crime reduction without imposing unrealistic burdens on legitimate business 
activities. 
 
Whatever the case, this chapter of the research study discusses how AFF can be 
prevented. Some of the prevention strategies that have been implemented 
internationally, as well as in some countries where this fraud is common, will be 
studied. This chapter will also examine and discus the findings of this research 
pertaining to the prevention of AFF. 
 
But firstly, a discussion of what crime prevention is all about; typologies of crime 
prevention and the theories of crime prevention will be discussed. 
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6.2 THE APPLICATION OF CRIME PREVENTION 
 
Crime prevention is widely misunderstood (Sherman 2003a:2). The debate over 
crime often treats prevention and punishment as mutually exclusive concepts, 
polar opposites of the continuum of the soft versus the tough responses to crime: 
midnight basketball versus chain gangs, for example. The science of 
Criminology, however, contains no such dichotomy. It is like the public debate 
over physics, which had drawn a dichotomy between flames and matches. Flame 
is the result. Matches are only one available tool for achieving that result. Other 
tools besides matches are known to cause fuel to ignite a flame, from magnifying 
glasses to tinderboxes. 
 
Similarly, crime prevention is the result, while punishment is only one possible 
tool for achieving that result. Both midnight baseball and chain gangs may 
logically succeed or fail in achieving the scientific definition of crime prevention: 
any policy which results in a lower number of crimes in the future that would have 
occurred without that specific policy (Sherman 2003a:2). It should, however, be 
noted that some kinds of punishment for some kinds of offenders may be 
preventive, while others may be criminogenic or crime causing, and still consists 
of a legally imposed punishment, which is justified by a goal to prevent crime. 
 
From the above analysis and according to Sherman (2003a:4), crime prevention 
is defined, not by its intention, but by its consequences. These consequences 
can be defined in at least two ways. One is by the number of criminal events, the 
other is by the number of criminal offenders (Hirschi 1987:109). Some would also 
define it by the amount of harm prevented (Reiss & Roth 1993:59-61) or by the 
number of victims harmed or harmed repeatedly (Farrell 1995:89).   
 
Crime prevention involves any action that causes a reduction in the level of 
criminal activity, or in the number of criminal offenders and their victims (Smith 
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2004c:1). It has been described in terms of three stages or levels - primary, 
secondary and tertiary (Cameron & Laycock 2002:315). 
 
However, for a better understanding of this phenomenon Hughes (2001:63) 
defines it as “…any action or technique employed by private individuals or public 
agencies aimed at the reduction of damage caused by acts defined as criminal 
by the state”. 
 
Plumber as quoted by Nelson and Clark (1986:3) describes prevention as 
follows: 
 
Ø Prevention is an active intervention plan comprised of various components 
with the ultimate goal of averting or avoiding negative outcome in an 
offense.  
          Mayer, Currie, Macleod, Gilles and Warden (1992:43) provide the following          
           definition: 
Ø Preventing crime can be seen as a process of altering the potential 
perpetrator, the potential victim or the environment in which both exist. 
They states that prevention should therefore not only be directed at the 
victims, but also be aimed at changing the environment in which they live, 
and, if possible, it should be directed at the potential perpetrator. 
            Daro (1991:3) claims the following: 
Ø Prevention efforts need to target the victim and the potential perpetrator 
simultaneously, as well as those aspects of the social fabric that nurture 
criminal behaviour. 
 
Given that crimes are events prescribed only by legal statute, it is not surprising 
that there is a great plethora of activities and initiatives associated with the term 
crime prevention. 
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Crime prevention is a chameleon concept, which cannot be neatly or effortlessly 
defined. There continue to be many different meanings associated with crime 
prevention and in turn divergent policies and practices associated with the notion 
(Hughes 2001:63). 
 
There is no consensus among criminologists with regards to how best define the 
phenomenon of crime prevention. Instead competing models and typologies 
exist, often of limited theoretical nature, and seemingly driven by rather narrow 
technical concerns about the measurement and evaluation of success or failure 
(Hughes 2001:64).  
 
The next subsection that follows, will discuss the various typologies of crime 
prevention.  
 
6.2.1 Typologies of crime prevention 
 
Hughes (2001:64) maintains that a popular means of defining crime prevention in 
terms of Criminology in the late 20th century has been in terms of the distinction 
between the situational and social strategies of prevention.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, however, the  next paragraph will on focus social 
crime prevention integrated with primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. 
Social crime prevention is focused chiefly on changing the social environment 
and motivations of the offenders. It often tends to focus on the development of 
schemes in order to deter potential or actual offenders from future offending.  
 
Another approach, which, from an academic point of view slots in better with 
social crime prevention, classifies types of crime prevention in three major 
models of crime prevention, borrowed from theorizing in medical epidemiology 
(Weiss 1987:67). He stated that there are three types of crime prevention, 
primary, secondary and tertiary. 
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Primary crime prevention 
 
Smith (2004c:1) said that primary prevention is directed at stopping the crime 
before it happens. This could involve reducing the opportunities for crime, such 
as fraud control policies, or strengthening the community and social structures 
that influence an individual’s likelihood of committing fraud. 
 
According to Weiss (1987:70), this type of crime prevention involves the 
reduction of criminal opportunities, without reference to criminals. In this type of 
prevention, attention is turned to the crime event rather than the motivated 
offender. Schutte (2000:8) described it as those efforts targeted at the 
perpetrators who have been least effected by the problem. The broader 
population is targeted in the hope that they have not yet been introduced to the 
problem, and that they will be able to take a stand against it when confronted 
with it in the future. 
 
In the case of AFF prevention, the research revealed that primary prevention 
would, in some way, prevent people from becoming victims of this fraud. From 
the perpetrators’ perspectives, they suggested people should not reply to 
unsolicited mails, and people should discuss any business proposals with their 
friends and family members or business advisers/ consultants.  
 
In this regard, the perpetrator in Case 1 is of the opinion that stopping corruption 
amongst African leaders would be the first step needed to prevent this type of 
fraud. According to this perpetrator there are huge sums of money owned by 
African leaders, hidden in Foreign Banks and the perpetrator uses these funds as 
a method to entice and convince potential victims. He calls on the African Union 
to step in and address the issues of corruption amongst African leaders.  
 
The perpetrator said: “… I think they can start from the top. First of all government 
officials must stop stealing African money abroad. That’s the first thing. They can 
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stop that. I think they have the African Union who can check that.  I think they 
know what is going on but they don’t want to get involved. But if these different 
countries can check themselves. Remember I told you this business is striving 
because a lot of African money is lying abroad.  Most of these victims see the 
money there.  You won’t believe, but the fraudster will tell them, go to so-so 
bank, check so-so- account and you’ll see this money there.  So if the top can be 
cleared, then this fraud will reduce”. 
 
Secondary crime prevention 
 
It is acknowledged that secondary crime prevention seeks to change people, 
typically those who are high at risk of embarking on criminal activities. The focus 
can be on early intervention programmes that seek to educate people about 
ethics and honesty (Smith 2004c:1). Schutte (2000:8) described it as prevention, 
which is aimed at people who seem to belong to a high-risk group, and who may 
even have been in contact with the problem. 
 
This research study also indicated that secondary crime prevention is also a 
strategy that may be employed in the prevention of AFF. It was found that 
business people are high risk candidates for victimisation, hence intervention 
programmes need to focus on these group of professionals. In this regard 
honesty, patience and consultations in any business-related matters were 
encouraged amongst business people. 
 
 In support of this prevention strategy was the statement made by the perpetrator 
in Case 3 in which he said: “…You see in that aspect, people must be honest 
with themselves.  So in situations like that, you have to be careful with people, 
and try to be close to honest people, real honest people, and people with 
integrity.   You see in this life now, a lot of people believe what is everything, so if 
they come to you and they tell you they have money or whatever, according to 
the idea that I got when I was growing up, in a situation like that you don’t have to 
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listen to people that you don’t know before.  And number two, you must be 
careful when leasing your money out.  You must be very intelligent, and you must 
know the business your doing, and you must know the person you’re doing your 
business with”.   
 
Tertiary prevention 
 
This prevention model focuses on the criminal justice system and deals with 
offending after it has occurred. Smith (2004c:1) indicated that the primary focus 
is on intervening in the lives of known offenders in an attempt to prevent them 
from re-offending, either through periods of incarceration, community-based 
sanctions, or monitoring during periods of probation. The criminal jus tice system 
responses also seek to deter other potential offenders in the community by 
making an example of the convicted offender and educating the community 
concerning the penalties associated with crime. Schutte (2000:8) maintains that 
these types of prevention programmes are offered to those members of the 
population who have been victims. The goal is to avert and avoid future 
victimisation.  
 
This type of prevention strategy was found to be one of the most successful 
when applied to prevent this type of fraud. It was found that the long-term 
imprisonment of the perpetrators would send a message to potential perpetrators 
and hence will serve as a deterrent to others. The perpetrators who took part in 
this research favours incarceration as a prevention strategy of AFF.  
 
The next subsection that follows looks at the criminal justice crime prevention 
model. 
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6.2.2 Criminal justice crime prevention model 
 
The criminal justice crime prevention model involves the role of the police, the 
courts and the correctional facilities. The legislation, policing, punishment by the 
courts and correctional services are important crime prevention methods. The 
criminal justice system must function in an integrated and holistic manner to be 
effective. Laws must be just, the police must be impartial, effective and geared to 
the community’s needs, the courts must also be just and punishment must 
protect the community and rehabilitate offenders (MacKenzie  2003:4). 
 
Criminal justice system prevention seeks to deter other potential offenders in the 
community by making an example of the convicted offenders and educating the 
community concerning the penalties associated with crime. It should, however, 
be noted that the main aim of the criminal justice crime prevention model is to 
punish the offenders. In this regard, Brown et al.(2001:58) maintains that 
deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution and incapacitation have to be taken into 
account during punishment and sentencing by the courts. 
 
In this research, it was found that the complex nature of AFF would warrant the 
application of primary, secondary and tertiary crime prevention strategies to be 
used to prevent this type of crime. The findings in this regard will be discussed 
below. 
 
Since the focus of this thesis is on AFF, the next section will attempt to analyse 
and examine the various strategies that are in place to prevent AFF. 
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6.3 ADVANCE FEE FRAUD PREVENTION 
 
6.3.1 Background to AFF prevention 
 
The prevention and control of fraud and AFF are two great challenges for Africa 
and the international community.  While crimes of deception are well established 
in history, technological, social, demographic and economic developments have 
brought about changes in the form fraud takes and how it is perpetrated. The 
basic motivation of fraud is greed; a fairly robust and enduring human 
characteristic. It is not easy to eliminate greed in humans, so counter measures 
have to be more than psychological or the deployment of feel-good tactics. 
Grayer and Smith (2003:128) pointed out that crime follows opportunity and 
opportunities for fraud flow from economic growth. The more commerce there is, 
the more opportunities are created to commit fraud. Nobody wants to pull the 
plug on electronic commerce, close down the stock market, or the health 
insurance system, just because they may be vulnerable to fraud.  Rather, the 
challenge lies in designing systems, which allow commerce to flourish while 
blocking opportunities for fraud.  Research (Sakurai & Smith 2003:4) indicates 
that fraud prevention is a lengthy process especially when identifying offenders.  
 
What follows are linked to primary, secondary, tertiary and criminal justice crime 
prevention. This is because of the complex nature of AFF, and how it is 
perpetuated by the offenders. 
 
6.3.2 Preventing AFF in highly concentrated places 
 
Most places have no crime and most crime is highly concentrated in and around 
a relatively small number of places. If crime can be prevented in these highly 
concentrated places, then it would be possible to reduce crime in its totality. Eck 
(2003:1) indicated that places have received relatively little attention in crime 
prevention policy and, he defined place as “… a very small area reserved for a 
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narrow range of functions, often controlled by a single owner, and separated from 
the surrounding area”. These may include stores, homes, apartment buildings, 
and street corners. In the case of AFF, places such Internet cafés can be 
targeted as part of the prevention strategies.  
 
The prevention of AFF in places where it is highly concentrated was found during 
the course of this research to be a good method of prevention. The findings of 
this research acknowledged the use of Internet cafés in the execution of AFF, 
especially money transfer. It was also found that some foreigners spend their 
whole day at Internet cafés and some even use it as their office. Hence the 
findings suggest that prevention should focus on Internet cafés. In this case, 
Internet café owners should check their clientele and notify them regarding the 
use of their facilities to commit any criminal activities.  
 
Within this premise, Respondent 1 said: “…I think they should trace the calls they 
do, and since we know that they are forever using the Internet cafes, maybe they 
could put something in the computer to like trace everything they do, especially 
illegal stuff.  I think its better like that. They should like trace the computers and 
call for Internet café owners to monitor and report any suspicious illegal use of 
Internet to the police”.  
 
Therefore it is suggested that the prevention of AFF should focus on Internet 
cafés, the owners and of course, the Internet service providers. 
 
6.3.3 Judicial punishment to prevent AFF 
 
The use of legal prosecution and punishment is one of the principal means of 
deterring criminal conduct in both digital and non-digital environments. Although 
the process may be time-consuming and costly, the publicity, which a criminal 
conviction and sentence of imprisonment attracts, can be beneficial in terms of 
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ensuring that potential offenders take the consequences of their illegal actions 
seriously. 
 
When one applies the tertiary crime prevention to prevent fraud, Smith (2004c:2-
4) suggested that the seven (retribution, proportionality, denunciation, 
incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation and restitution) recognised objectives of 
judicial punishment could be imperative in this regard.  
 
In this research, judicial punishment was indicated to be more effective in the 
prevention of AFF. However, this can only occur if the victims report to the police 
or if the police are able to detect the fraud, and arrest the offenders with sufficient 
evidence to secure a conviction. The perpetrators who took part in this research 
concur that the judicial punishment is a valid strategy to prevent AFF, most 
especially the deterrent effects of punishment. 
 
Retribution 
 
Retribution is the justification for punishment based upon the idea of an eye for 
an eye and a tooth for a tooth. This of course raises the problem of how the 
seriousness of fraud offenders can be matched, or its moral blameworthiness, 
with a range of available sanctions. 
 
Smith (2004c:6) indicated that a survey carried out to determine the community’s 
perception of the seriousness of crime have found that the public do, in fact, 
regard white collar crimes as serious where they entail serious harm. The harm 
that results from fraud offences lies not only in direct financial losses suffered, 
but also in consequential losses associated with the investigation of the incident, 
the recovering of losses, and the prevention of re -victimisation. Retribution seeks 
to match the extent of the harm suffered with the punishment imposed. Applying 
this in the prevention of AFF would imply that the punishments imposed on AFF 
offenders should match the harm suffered by the victim.  
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Proportionality 
 
The modern form of retribution is known as ‘Just Deserts’ or proportionality in 
punishment. This means that the severity of punishment should commensurate 
with the seriousness of the wrong. In the case of fraud this raises difficulties, as 
the consequences of some types of offences can be devastating, and yet the 
conduct itself involved no physical violence which traditionally attracts heavy 
sentences. 
 
Denunciation 
 
Denunciation involves the imposition of sanctions in order to express the public’s 
abhorrence of the crime committed. According to Smith (2004c:2) denunciation 
acts as a symbolic statement that society considers a particular crime as being 
sufficiently serious to warrant punishment, and that society will not tolerate the 
law-breaking conduct of the offender. In the case of AFF perpetrators the aim of 
this punishment would call for harsher and tougher sentences to be imposed on 
offenders.  
 
In order to be effecti ve in this sense, the imposition of a sanctions for AFF 
offenders must be widely publicized, and unlike some other crimes, fraud 
invariably attracts wide media attention. However, the risk arises that notoriety 
such as that obtained by famous individuals, could undermine the seriousness of 
the crime involved and be seen as attractive to some people, keen to make their 
mark in the world. 
 
Incapacitation    
 
Incapacitation simply means that, because the offender is isolated from society, 
generally through imprisonment, he or she will be prevented from committing 
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further crimes of the same or similar nature, while in isolation. In the case of 
fraud offenders, however, prison has sometimes allowed them to continue their 
activities, and we have seen cases of fraudulent scams being carried on from 
prisons, sometimes through the use of prison computers and mobile telephones 
smuggled into the prisons (Smith 2004c:2). The incapacitation of AFF 
perpetrators would help to remove them from the society and may lead to a 
reduction of this fraud. Hence the incapacitation of these offenders through 
imprisonment would prevent this fraud. 
 
Legal Deterrence                   
 
The deterrent effects of criminal prosecution and punishment represent the final 
means of deterring fraud, although quantifying the extent to which they are 
successful is problematic, to say the least (Smith 1998:5). 
 
Deterrence can take two forms which were concisely summarised by Cesare 
Beccaria in 1764: punishment aims to dissuade the criminal from doing fresh 
harm to his compatriots (special deterrence), and to keep other people from 
doing the same (general deterrence) (Young 1986:23).                               
 
In the case of financial crimes, to determine whether punishment is effective, 
evidence is needed of both the extent to which individuals are aware of the 
possible punishments, which may result from their individual criminal conduct, 
and also whether or not individuals will act upon any such knowledge by 
modifying their propensity to commit crime. 
 
Smith (2004c:17) found in his survey that offenders rarely know what penalties 
govern their conduct. It has also been reported that offenders rarely make a 
rational decision to carry out their offence or to desist, based upon the possibility 
of being punished. It should also be noted that the many impediments in the 
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investigations and prosecutions of economic crimes mean that the probability of 
detection and punishment is generally low.   
 
Smith (1998:5) indicated that whilst small-scale property offenders behave more 
or less impulsively, and are unlikely to be deterred by the possibility of criminal 
sanction being imposed, white collar offenders are much more likely to engage in 
rational calculations, and make some assessment as to the prospective benefits 
and costs of a given course of action. In these circumstances, the greater the 
perceived likelihood of conviction and the more severe the expected punishment, 
the less the inclination will exist to offend. This means that individuals who are 
aware that their assets may be confiscated realise that committing the fraud is 
not worth their while. In this regard, Smith (1998) argues that the continued use 
of assets forfeiture legislation is beneficial and deserves increased publicity. 
 
The empirical part of the research indicated that legal deterrence through 
imprisonment would serve as the best prevention for AFF. Apart from the fact 
that imprisonment removes them from society, it also serves as a period of 
education and rehabilitation for these offenders. 
 
In this regard, the perpetrator in Case 1 said: “…because I know I have spent 
here long enough… But having spend so much time in here and I’m still here, I’m 
sure by the time I leave I won’t have any more regrets, because I will be able to 
tell others that I suffered because of this so that they can stop it.  I’m writing a 
book, and when I publish it, it will serve as a source of information… for both the 
victim and the perpetrator… Because you cannot look at somebody and say this 
victim-to-be or this perpetrator”. 
 
Concerning the deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation effects of 
imprisonment in AFF prevention, the perpetrator, in Case 5 said: “…  Because 
you know, one, if I didn’t come to prison, I could not change.  That I tell you, I 
could not change.  And then the second thing is, prison, you know people can 
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say prison is a dark place or it’s not a good place, but it’s also how you conduct 
yourself.  The first thing when you come to prison, you uncondition your mind.  
You accept you did wrong, yes.  Then you accept.  You uncondition your mind.  
Then you move on.  You’ve got time to study, right?  When I came to prison, I 
only did Marketing, somewhere, somehow, but I managed to finish it up to 
Diploma Level in prison.  And I’m now studying towards my degree.  Which is 
something I could not do while I was outside….Because outside I was only 
running with beers, women, things of the world, wild things and doing fraud”.   
 
Similarly, Respondent 2 said: “…I think the court must just put a law that if we 
have a person coming to court for 419, he must be sentenced to 30 years in jail.  
And if at anytime you get a victim, and you get the person who did it, if you have 
him in court, the court should don’t hesitate, give him 30 years.  When you have 
20 people doing 30 years of the 419 guys, I don’t think the other guys will not 
have courage to do it, because if you arrest them, they must also do 30 years.  I 
think the court must put very strong sentences in the number of years that you 
must spend in jail”. 
 
However, it should be recalled that the effect of judicial punishment is relative, it 
depends on the individual, because there will still be some offenders that would 
re-offend after they had served their sentence. Supporting this stance is the 
statement made by the perpetrator in Case 5: “…Listen, you can go to prison, 
even for 30 years, 20 years, but if you don’t want to change, nobody can change 
you…no matter whom, no matter what.  But I think change, comes from the 
person inside.  If you decide to change, it’s yourself.  Me I decided to change, not 
because of prison, no, I decided to change myself.  Because maybe I didn’t get 
this chance, because if you live in the world, you don’t know, you’re just doing 
anything.  The person only change when he decides to change.  It’s just like 
maybe going to church.  You can’t force a person to go to church.  But he goes to 
church when he decides to go… so I say, change is inside”.   
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The conclusions that may be reached from extensive research into the deterrent 
effects of criminal sanctions, are that while incarceration acts as a general 
deterrent to an unsubstantiated extent for some members of the community, 
increasing the use of incarceration will not create a greater deterrent effect nor 
result in an overall reduction in AFF. On the other hand, well-publicised prison 
sentences for AFF offenders will help send an important message to the 
community, and particularly potential AFF offenders that their actions are not 
tolerated. 
 
Monetary penalties 
 
Worldwide fines are frequently used as criminal penalties for a wide variety of 
cases in courts. However, many of these fine sentences are composites of fines 
and other non-custodial sanctions and do not stand alone. Judges may use their 
own discretion when setting fines and therefore these fines are not uniformly 
imposed. Jail sentences are sometimes used as alternatives to fines particularly 
for the poor (MacKenzie 2003:9). In terms of crime prevention, fines may act as a 
deterrent to AFF and other criminal activities. MacKenzie (2003:9) stated, 
however, that most studies of fines have focused on setting just and 
proportionate levels for the amount of the fine, or on compliance, cost saving, or 
prison population impact issues. Overall, there exist limited research that 
examines the effectiveness of fines in the reduction of fraud. A study conducted 
by Gordon and Glaser (1991:651) suggests that fines, as addition to other 
sanctions, may be effective in the recidivism of fraud offenders. When imposing 
monetary penalties, the possibility that the fines would be afforded by 
fraudulently obtained money, should be considered by the courts. 
 
It is obvious from this review of the research regarding crime prevention in the 
criminal justice system that no one strategy is appropriate for all offenders and all 
situations. Careful planning is required to maximise the crime prevention 
potential of these different strategies. 
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Whatever the AFF prevention models discussed above, it would still be 
imperative to discus international strategies that are in place in this regard. 
Therefore the next subsection will examine the international strategies that have 
been developed in order to prevent AFF.   
 
6.3.4 International strategy  
 
The international community has played and must continue to play a key role in 
the fight against AFF. The problem is definitely one of international dimensions 
and efforts must be made to harmonise international criminal laws and 
international cooperation in matters of extradition, the enforcement of assets 
forfeiture laws, as well as the research and training of law enforcement officers 
(Hamza 2002:9).  
 
Hamza (2002:11) is also of the opinion that international pressure on nations 
considered safe havens for corrupt government officials and other criminals to 
revamp their laws in accordance with international standards and to ensure that 
their countries are not used to conceal ill-gotten wealth would go a long way to 
prevent AFF. 
 
Within the same premise, the Nigerian government and the American Information 
Technology (IT) Company, Microsoft (MS) have joined forces to apprehend AFF 
perpetrators. Microsoft and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission 
(EFCC) of Nigeria confirmed that they would stand together in order to bring such 
criminals in West Africa to justice (SAPA-AFP 2005). 
 
It is acknowledged that publicity, awareness and education are some of the best 
instruments available to crime prevention. Therefore it would be important to 
examine what is being done regarding awareness and education to address AFF 
prevention. 
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6.3.5 Awareness and education 
 
Informing the public of the need to protect themselves from AFF is a simple and 
effective strategy which can produce highly beneficial results. In the United 
Kingdom, one particular effective plastic fraud prevention strategy involved a high 
profile publicity and education campaign by the Association for Payment Clearing 
Services to raise public awareness of the problem and to encourage credit card 
holders to take more care of their cards. This approach was highly successful in 
reducing plastic card fraud (Webb 1996:23). 
 
There are also many other practical steps, which individuals can adopt to detect 
the possibility of AFF. Educating users and particularly the vulnerable groups 
about the ways in which AFF may be perpetrated has also been effective, 
although care is needed to ensure that individuals are not alerted to ways in 
which they may act dishonestly when they receive legitimate businesses 
proposals. Conducting close examinations and investigations of any business 
proposal is recommended by both law enforcement agents and business 
organisations (Dyson & McKenzie 1996; Van Leeuwen 1996:49). 
 
Public awareness and education was found to be another important prevention 
method for AFF. It is believed that information about a particular type of crime 
and its manifestation would prevent individuals from becoming victims. Hence 
this research found that awareness and education about AFF would assist in the 
prevention of this fraud. 
 
It should also be underscored in this regard that, all the participants in this 
research agreed that awareness would indeed go a long way in the prevention of 
AFF. Indicating the importance of public awareness in the prevention of AFF, the 
perpetrator in Case 1 said: “…You just have to create awareness.  That should 
be an open statement.  That whoever has ears let him hear it. A lot of awareness 
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is already going on. But some of them are giving it in a bad faith.  The education 
has to be properly done.  Let people be aware in a proper way this fraud is 
done”. 
 
Victimisation focus has also been regarded as a crime prevention strategy. 
Therefore, attempts will be made to see how feasible it can apply to AFF.  
 
6.3.6 Victimisation focused 
 
Pease and Laycock (1999:1) pointed out that preventing crime and preventing 
repeated victimisation could be one of the AFF prevention strategy employed by 
the criminal justice system. According to them, an individual’s past crime 
victimisation is a good predictor of his or her subsequent victimisation, often 
inflicted by the same offender. They also maintained that the greater the number 
of victimisations, the higher the likelihood the victim will endure victimisation in 
the future. 
 
The characteristics of the re-victimisation phenomenon provide a reliable early 
warning indicator of where and when AFF may strike next. Armed with this 
knowledge, the police can maximise the potential of AFF prevention. It should be 
noted that when one focus on the recently victimised, AFF prevention is seen as 
an integral part of victim support. It is acknowledged that, a police officer’s visit to 
an AFF victim is directed at preventing a next possible incident as well as 
addressing the current one. Concentrating on preventing re-victimisation by 
targeting efforts to and around repeat victims emphasises the importance of 
detecting offenders and makes detection an important component of AFF 
prevention (Pease & Laycock 1999:2). 
 
A number of crime prevention efforts in the United Kingdom have been based on 
the prevention of repeat victimisation. However, to oversell the role of repeat 
victimisation would be foolish. At the same time, knowledge that a person would 
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be defrauded does not necessarily enable deployment of resources to prevent 
the crime. Nonetheless, the temptation is to regard the repeat-victimisation 
approach – after a period of unmerited neglect – as exiting and as an integral 
component of crime prevention. 
 
In support of victim focused prevention of AFF, Pease and Laycock (1999:4) 
cited the following advantages: 
 
Ø Crime prevention is thus seen to be integral part of victim support. Victim 
support without crime prevention denies practical help to the people who 
are in most immediate need of it. Pease et al. (1999) said that because 
the tradition has been to reassure victims of the improbability  of crime 
recurrences, dealing with it (and preventing it) is the challenge for the 
integrated role.   
Ø Repeat victimisation defines a natural pace of activity for prevention. 
According to them, the tracking of offences implies constant (hopefully 
declining) efforts. They referred to this as “drip-feeding crime prevention”, 
in contrast to “on-again, off-again efforts”. 
Ø Repeat victimisation is highest in areas with the highest crime statistics. 
Put the other way around, certain areas have substantially high crime 
rates because of the incidents of repeat victimisation. Thus deploying 
efforts to and around repeated victims of crime serve to direct efforts to 
the areas in greatest need. Pease et al. (1999) suggested that one tactic 
is the cocoon watch, whereby residents of very few houses in the closest 
proximity to one that has been burgled are invited to watch for signs that 
indicate attempts at a repetition. 
Ø Concentrating on the prevention of repeated victimisation underscores the 
importance of detecting the offender and makes detection an important 
component of prevention. If the same offender returns, detection at this 
time confers a very particular benefit on the victim and sends a very 
special message to the offender. 
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As per victimisation focus prevention strategy of AFF, this research has found 
that it is absolutely necessary to focus on the victims and potential victims. This 
is because the victims were found to be susceptible to repeat victimisation. In this 
instance, Respondent 2 said: “…  So I think it’s the victim himself who should try 
to be careful and to make sure that before getting involved in any business, he 
must maybe talk to the wife, or a close friend.  In life you must have a wife or a 
girlfriend or a close friend.  But you have to get advice from a close friend”. 
 
This Respondent also made it clear that the prevention of AFF lies with the 
people themselves. He reiterates the fact that the community where this fraud is 
being perpetuated should assist in the prevention of this fraud. He said: “…To 
prevent this crime, I think it’s citizens themselves who can prevent this crime.  By 
staying aware of any people who are coming to talk to them about business that 
is not in his domain so before getting involved into a business he must think…So 
it’s people themselves that must prevent”. 
 
In the same vein, the perpetrator in Case 2 maintains that for victims’ prevention 
to bear some fruits, victims of this type of fraud must be arrested and prosecuted  
for taking part in an illegal action. He said: “…First the person who’s bringing in 
the money has already contravened the laws of the country.  He’s doing money 
laundering…Because if you are arresting the perpetrator you must arrest the 
victim as well. Obviously when you are reading the letters, you, who are the 
supposed victim now, you know what is involved.  It is illegal. .. There’s nowhere 
where they said the money is legitimate.  As a victim, you already knew that you 
were doing something illegal so you are guilty as charged.  It’s simple… You are 
guilty as charged.    Because obviously you know that what you are doing is 
wrong, so why do you go ahead and do it?    The letter says that the money is 
not mine, because very few individuals can afford to have $5 million dollars cash 
stashed somewhere.  I mean, it’s either government money, or the money of the 
corporation or money that was supposed to do something for the greater good of 
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the society. But one way or the other you were made to believe that it was stuck 
somewhere.  I mean if you want to exonerate yourself,  if you want to claim 
yourself as a victim, I mean in the first place you should have said no this money 
should have been used on all these people, I don’t want to get myself involved in 
all these things.  I mean, when they go to court, the court must sometimes see it 
from this perspective that he who comes to be questioned must come with clean 
hands.  If your hands are not clean, so how can you justify yourself?”  
 
According to this perpetrator, the victims of AFF should be prosecuted because 
they are part of a conspiracy to siphoned, or become the beneficiary of ill-gotten 
funds. This would mean that prosecuting the victim would send a message that 
those who engage themselves to these types of activities will face the ugly side 
of justice.  
 
Victims must stop being greedy 
 
It also surfaced in this research study that this type of fraud could best be 
prevented if people or potential victims stop being greedy. It should be recalled 
that, victims of this fraud are found to have been very greedy. Hence, to desist 
from this human trait would prevent this fraud. The perpetrators are fully aware 
that victims of this fraud are greedy and they use this character trait as a 
motivating factor for repeated victimisation.  
 
From the above analysis, it is evident that victims of AFF need some sort of 
assistance from the community and law enforcement authorities to prevent re-
victimisation. However, this can only happen if the victims of AFF come forward 
or speak about their victimisation. 
 
In the prevention of crime, focus has also been on the role of the media in terms 
of communication. Thus, attempts have been made to prevent AFF by 
addressing at the role the media plays.   
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6.3.7 Communication for social change  
 
There is a significant body of research regarding the role the media plays in 
influencing public perception about crime. While the public largely depends on 
the media such as newspapers and television for its information about crime and 
the criminal justice system, the information they receive can be affected by the 
limited sources used by journalist to create news stories, Graber 1980, Ericson, 
Barenek and Chan 1991 and Chermak 1994 (Capobiano 2001:2). Responses in 
this regard have focused on ways to harness the media to support crime 
prevention through public service announcements, public education and 
awareness campaigns or through civic journalism.  
 
In this regard, Capobiano (2001:2) suggests a more inclusive role of 
communication within current policy, practice and research in crime prevention 
and community safety; focused on the emerging field – communication for social 
change. 
 
In the case of AFF prevention, this would serve as a means to empower victims 
and community members to avoid and report any attempt of repeat victimisation. 
It would also inform, initiate and encourage people to engage in collective action 
to fight this form of fraud. It may also help people to make better decisions when 
approached by these fraudsters.    
 
This factor was also found to be important in the prevention of AFF. In this case, 
the role of the media would be imperative because it creates public awareness 
and serves to change people’s minds and the society’s perception regarding an 
involvement in any business of questionable legality. Victim 1 affirmed this 
stance when she said: “…I think the people when they get, uh…I think there must 
be adverts.  And community must be informed, I don’t know how, maybe by TV.  I 
think the SABC must come forth and explain to the community there’s this kind of 
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fraud going on.  Don’t be a victim, its not real money… because TV’s are easy to 
advertise, or newspapers or whatever”. 
 
After discussing the various international strategies that are in place to prevent 
AFF, the next section will look at the various national initiatives that are in place 
to prevent this complex phenomenon. 
 
6.4 NATIONAL INITIATIVES  
 
The creative and innovative methods used by AFF operations require creative 
and innovative measures by all hands to fight and prevent this form of fraud. As 
an international phenomenon, many countries have developed programmes to 
prevent and control this form of fraud. This section focuses on the prevention 
strategies in Nigeria, South Africa and the United States. 
 
6.4.1 Nigeria 
 
From the Nigerian government, to the international committee and Nigerians in 
the Diaspora as well as victims and concerned individuals, everyone has a role to 
play in the renewed war against AFF. It is agreed that increased law enforcement 
focussed on AFF offenders would help to capture more of them. However, the 
possibility of such an approach is questionable.  
 
Sentences for these types of non-violent offences are usually light. Prisons and 
jails are overflowing. Adding more numbers to prisons, jails, probation caseloads, 
and court dockets will not stop this criminal activity (Jones: 1993:70). 
 
Therefore, if imprisonment fails to stop this type of fraud then prevention efforts 
would hold some promise. In this regard, Jones (1993:70) suggested that 
companies, banks and government agencies may be forced to tighten their 
procedures when granting services to some individuals. As noted in the Nigerian 
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Handbook, one reason these offences are committed is that the private and 
public agencies involved simply do not perform a thorough check and verify the 
information o f individuals they deal with. 
 
As a Nigerian phenomenon, Hamza (2002:7-9) indicated that, in order to make 
meaningful progress in the prevention of this type of fraud, the Nigerian 
governments need to: 
 
Ø Develop a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime to take care of all 
aspects of this fraud. She said the best way would be to revamp Nigeria’s 
money laundering laws that they are in line with the recommendations of 
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. 
Ø Enact laws and develop a far-reaching asset forfeiture regime to deal with 
confiscations and seizures to enable law enforcement agencies to 
effectively tackle the problem. This should include: 
§ Expanding the scope of the provisions of Advance Fee Fraud 
relating to asset forfeiture within the framework of the United 
Nations convention against organised crime. 
§ Participating in international cooperation through bilateral and multi 
lateral agreement to facilitate tracing, freezing, confiscating and 
forfeiture of proceeds of crime, as well as the domestic and foreign 
assets of scammers upon indictment and/or arrest.    
Ø Enact enabling legislation to facilitate the speedy prosecution of 
organised crime. This may include: 
§ Dedicating one court to adjudicating matters relating to AFF to 
ensure a speedy disposition of cases 
§ Declaring immunity to all victims of the scams where the fraud 
involves participation in an illegal act, in return for coming forward 
with information and assisting law enforcement agencies with their 
investigations 
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§ Improving existing mechanisms in facilitating international and 
regional cooperation between investigators with respect to 
obtaining evidence, the location of witnesses and suspects, 
services of documents and the execution of search and seizure 
warrants. 
Ø Reorganise and adequately equip the Nigerian police force to face 
challenges posed by the menace of crime in general. An incorruptible law 
enforcement agency is also imperative to any nation’s fight against crime.   
§ In this case, the government should consider setting up a fund to 
boost the police force and other law enforcement agencies. 
Ø Enact law, providing stiff penalties for intercepting calls, especially 
international calls, and make it mandatory for NITEL and other 
telecommunication companies to follow-up on reports of interference with 
telephone lines and trace the sources of interference. 
Ø Enact laws that provide for closer financial sector regulation and 
supervision, including onsite inspections. Such laws should: 
§ Make it mandatory for banks to trail and freeze any account to 
which a scam money trail leads, and arrest the account holders – 
this should be fairly easy to do as all banks typically have a picture 
record of all account holders   
§ Provide for banks to conduct a mandatory dual diligence for all new 
accounts with deposits above a certain thresholds or for unusual 
financial activity with existing accounts 
§ Sanction banks and bureau de change for failure to comply with 
requirements for anti-fraud and anti-money laundering measures, 
including suspending or revoking their licences, and conduct 
routine onsite inspections to ensure compliance with anti-money 
laundering regulations. 
Ø Enact laws that provide for closer regulation of service providers such as 
lawyers, accountants and auditors. Such laws should: 
 284 
§ Provide for stiff sanctions for lawyers and other professionals who  
colluded with criminals, and empower professional regulatory 
bodies to enforce the laws 
§ Include mandatory reporting requirements if a professional is aware 
that his client is seeking advice for fraudulent purposes, of course 
in the case of attorneys, professional secrecy principles such as the 
attorney-client privilege would require delicate attention when 
fashioning a regime. 
 
Ø Publicise and expose criminals. This can be done in several ways: 
§ Develop a system that ensures that competent authorities are kept 
informed regarding the activities of criminals, including publicising 
the names of convicted criminals and maintaining a record with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as other relevant 
agencies to prevent such criminals from holding management 
positions or ownership of large stakes in financial institutions  
§ Maintain a central public directory that contains a periodically 
updated list of directors, share holders and principal officers of all 
companies at the registry of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in Abuja and make such a record readily available 
online for easy access. 
 
Ø Closely monitor and regulate Internet cafés. This can be achieved mainly 
by: 
§ Employing technology to trace emails to a particular computer and 
then notifying the owners of the Internet cafes about the abusive 
use of their facilities 
§ Requiring mandatory installation of hidden cameras in Internet 
cafes to keep a record of all patrons. This way it should be fairly 
easy to identify AFF perpetrators once a scam letter has been 
traced to a particular Internet café 
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§ Empowering law enforcement agencies to shut down or impose 
fines on Internet cafés that tend to be susceptible to be used 
repeatedly for sending the 419 letters, this would serve as an 
incentive for the owners of cafés to pay attention to their patrons. 
Ø Encourage the co-operation in matters relating to technical assistance and 
exchange of information between the Nigerian law enforcement agencies 
and other jurisdictions that have successfully dealt with this form of 
organised crime. 
 
In an effort to prevent 419 scams, the Business Council for the Development of 
Nigeria (BCODEN) held an International Conference on AFF in New York in 
2002. According to BCODEN, speakers at the conference were top-level policy 
makers from within the U.S. and Nigeria, including representatives of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, various Nigerian law enforcement agencies; and various U.S 
and other law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations. The organisers said that the purpose of the conference was “…to 
be a working session where we can develop instruments to cure this 419 
problem which has been associated with our country…” (BCODEN 2002:10). 
 
In this conference, it surfaced that the Central Bank of Nigeria will penalise banks 
over 419 scams. The Bank pointed out that the sledgehammer might soon 
descend on any bank operating in the country that covertly or otherwise aids the 
AFF. The Central bank said that if a bank were found to have been careless in 
allowing a criminal to defraud another person, they would be required to refund 
the money involved. 
 
In his address to this conference, the Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo 
said that the crime has done incalculable damage to Nigeria. The president said: 
“… what is even more worrisome is the widespread perception within the 
international community, especially in the U.S. that our government is not doing 
enough to apprehend the culprits”. He noted that it was apparent  that the 
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advertorials often used by the government to warn potential victims against the 
scam have failed both to achieve the desired result and to convince the 
international community of the government’s genuine efforts to check the crime 
(BCODEN 2002:11). 
 
In a related strategy to prevent this type of fraud in Nigeria, the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) said it has seized property worth $100 
million from over 100 suspected AFF and money launderers across Nigeria 
(Babajide 2003:1). The chairman of this commission said that the properties were 
seized to send out the message that there would be no sacred cows in the 
assault launched by the commission against AFF, money laundering and other 
economic crimes. The chairman indicated that the anti-money laundering 
statutes allows anything to be seized and it was used to facilitate the commission 
of a range of crimes, or if the assets are been acquired through the proceeds of 
crime. According to him, seizing the property of these fraudsters sends a 
message that Nigeria was not a safe haven for AFF and money launderers 
(Babajide 2003:1).   
 
Technical solution for Nigerian AFF 
 
According to Oyesanya (2003:1), from a technical standpoint Nigerian e-mail 
crime is rather challenging. He argues that while the rest of the world tries to 
engineer technical controls to filter incoming unsolicited e-mail, Nigeria is faced 
with the rather unusual task of controlling massive amounts of outgoing 
unsolicited e-mails. He maintains that most technologies are not designed to 
address outgoing e-mails such as those in Nigeria. 
 
Traditionally, spammers reside outside the external network, although some 
might try to harvest internal network resources to convey or relay their 
massages, SPAM traffic is generally seen as incoming traffic of an external 
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nature (Oyesanya 2003:1). Hence most technologies combating unsolicited mail 
tend to address it as undesirable incoming mail. 
 
In his study and analysis of this technology Oyesanya (2003) pointed out that the 
solution for the Nigerian outgoing email 419, is a reverse engineering for 
unsolicited e-mail technologies, that filters these e-mail before leaving its source 
address. In the case of Nigerian, he indicated that the primary source is the 
Nigerian ISP. Nigerian unsolicited e -mail leaves the Nigerian ISP in two forms: 
A. As regular SMTP E-mail and 
B. As HTTP Web Based mail. 
An effective solution needs to address both types of unsolicited mail formats to 
be effective. 
 
From his study, Oyesanya (2003:3) developed the processes to prevent outgoing 
419 e-mails from leaving its source. He emphasised that the 419 e-mail 
solicitation system is an advanced network system that inspects both outgoing e-
mail and HTTP packets, performs Paul Graham’s Spam Filter Bayesian statistical 
analysis, and  then makes a decision on denying or granting a particular outgoing 
e-mail or http request. According to Oyesanya (2003:2) to prevent the Nigerian 
419 email will consist of the following components : 
 
A. Packet Re-assembly 
B. Bayesian Statistical Classification Component 
C. Decision Component 
D. Spam database 
E. Non-Spam Database 
 
He suggested that for an effective result, the system should also be integrated 
with other unsolicited technologies such as: 
 
A. RBL Blocking System (IP Black list database)  
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B. Open relay testing system 
 
Packet re-assembly component 
 
The packet re-assembly module separates outgoing SMTP and HTPP packets 
and combines them into individual whole messages. There will be two types of 
messages; e-mail and http requests. Each type of message will be stored in 
separate databases, and then forwarded to the Bayesian classification 
component. 
 
Bayesian classification component 
 
The Bayesian classification model uses the training data in the 419 and non-419 
database to assign a probability weight to each individual message, and 
classifies the message as 419 or not 419. 
 
Decision component 
 
The decision component evaluates the weighted probability of individual HTTP 
and SMTP messages; discard those that are probable 419 messages and 
forward non-419 messages. Denied messages will be granted appropriate 
feedback, either in the form of a browser message, or in the form of e-mail non-
delivery reports. 
 
Filtering at the centralised Internet exchange model 
 
In a bid of technology to prevent this fraud, Oyesanya (2003:5) said that a 
consortium of African Internet Service Providers, have been actively lobbying for 
Centralised Internet Exchange Points (IXP). The IXP’s are centralised Internet 
service points, where national ISP’s can collectively source Internet connectivity 
and distribute it to their customers. 
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The most efficient level of content filtering can be implemented at these IXP’s 
due to the configuration of the centralised model. However, it should be 
underscored that IXP’s in Nigeria and many other countries in Africa are still 
conceptual. The limitation of this model includes: economic feasibility and the 
general limitations owing to the infrastructure such as consistent electricity and 
the availability of an integrated fibre optic network. In this regard, Oyesanya 
(2003:4) suggests that the implementation of IXP does include 419 filtering 
solutions for HTTP as well as SMTP traffic in regions with high cyber crime 
traffic. 
 
Whatever the case may be, the prime issue of concern regarding this model 
(which aims to prevent AFF) is its feasibility in most African countries, where 
these e-mail letters originate.  Oyesanya (2003:4) maintained that there are three 
companies in Nigeria that are engaged in the production of telecommunication 
cables using imported copper and othe r local resource like poly vinyl chloride 
materials for insulation. There is no company that produces fibre optic cables in 
that country. The copper cable companies produce only low pair capacity cables 
of 50, 100 and 200 pairs. Hence there is a need for a  plant that will produce high 
pair capacity cables that will enhance massive provision of lines to the teeming 
population. 
 
This anti-419 system serves as a prevention strategy because it would prevent 
SMTP and HTTP from leaving its source. Moreover, it can be implemented 
anywhere at the ISPs Internal Network and can also be implemented as a 
hardware solution.  
 
South Africa has been identified as one of the countries where AFF is common. 
Hence, the next subsection will examine the efforts made by the South Africa 
authorities to prevent this fraud. 
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6.4.2 South Africa 
 
The growth of organised crime and AFF in South Africa has its roots in the 
1990s. However, during the 1980s cross-border crime proliferated and crime 
syndicates were ready to take advantage of the favourable conditions promoted 
by the political transition in the early 1990s. In recent past, South Africa was the 
focal point for international crime syndicates. 
 
Berg (1998:22) is of the opinion that in order to prevent organised crime and 
AFF, there should be an increase in policing activity to actually consolidate these 
criminal groups and strengthen linkages between international and local groups.  
She said that South Africa has responded inadequately over the years and has 
demonstrated a lack of co-ordination and information sharing – a factor that has 
been emphasised by most research. 
 
It has also been suggested that a single national investigative agency, to pool 
resources and skills, should be developed due to the low success rate of actually 
bringing offenders to trial, despite successful monitoring of offenders’ activities. 
However, with the increasing concern of international players in the fight against 
this fraud, importing the best prevention practice from abroad may assist in this 
regard. 
 
Criminal justice initiative in AFF prevention 
 
There are policing initiatives and law enforcement strategies that have 
specifically been directed at organised crime and the AFF problem in South 
Africa. The Organised Crime Unit was created as a specialised unit to deal with 
organised crime but due to the transitional factors, crime prevention was not at 
the forefront of policing activities (Berg 1998:22). 
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In 1995, there was the formation of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs 
Coordinating Organisation (SARPCCO). This was not formed in response to 
organised crime but it has proved to be the only concrete regional policing 
organisation employed to address organised crime and AFF with the goal of co-
operation and joint strategies with those regions involved. This would include 
information exchange and the joint management of criminal records (Berg 
1998:23). 
 
The focus on co-operation and communication is seen in the South Africa Police 
Service (SAPS) policing priorities and objectives in the prevention of organised 
crime and AFF. The establishment of reaction forces to assist in combating this 
fraud and by increasing co-ordination between intelligence services, and 
between departments as well as the SAPS and foreign agencies would, to an 
extent, prevent AFF. Presently in South Africa, there is the 419 task team unit of 
the SAPS which is meant to primarily investigate AFF.  
 
Berg (1998:23) indicated that the SAPS identification and infiltration of AFF 
syndicate is a three fold strategy: 
 
Ø Prevention through patrols 
Ø Response through reaction force 
Ø Investigation through specialised units and through teams. 
 
The more police in the streets, the less crime there will be. While citizens and 
public officials often espouse this view, social scientists often claim the opposite 
extreme: that police make only minimal contributions to crime prevention in the 
context of far more powerful social institution (Sherman 2003b:1). However, 
whether additional police will prevent crime may depend on how well they are 
focused on specific objectives, tasks, places, times and people. Most of all it may 
depend upon placing the police where serious crime is concentrated, at the time 
it is most likely to occur. 
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Sherman (2003b:1) pointed out that the most striking finding is the extent to 
which police themselves create a risk factor for crime simply by using bad 
manners. He maintained that scientific evidence supports the hypotheses that 
the less respectful police are towards suspects and citizens in general, the less 
people will comply with the law. This implies that changing police style may thus 
be as important as focusing police substance. Making both the style and 
substance of police practice more legitimate in the eyes of the public, particularly 
AFF offenders and potential offenders may be one of the most effective long-
term police strategies for the prevention of AFF in South Africa. 
 
Given the historical roots of community policing, and perhaps the most 
theoretically compelling version of its crime prevention hypotheses addresses 
police legitimacy, or public confidence in the police as far and equitable (Eck & 
Rosenbaum 1994:39).  Recent theoretical and basic research work in procedural 
justice, Tyler 1990 (Sherman 2003b:4) provides a more scientific elaborate 
version of this hypotheses that it proposes. The claim in the regard is not that the 
police must be viewed as legitimate in order to win public co-operation with law 
enforcement. The claim is that a legitimate police institution fosters more 
widespread obedience of the law itself. Gorer (1955:269) attributes the low levels 
of crime in England to the example of law-abiding masculinity set by 19th Century 
police, a role model that became incorporated in the English character. There is 
even evidence that the police themselves become less likely to obey the law after 
they have become disillusioned with its apparent lack of procedural justice 
(Sherman 1974:134). 
 
Community based intelligence, justifies the many community meetings 
(Sherman, Milton &Kelly 1973:98) and informal contacts police sought through 
storefront offices, foot patrols (Trojanowick 1986: 234) and other methods: 
increasing the flow of intelligence from citizens to police about AFF and 
offenders, which increases the probability of arrest for this fraud and the 
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deterrent incapacitative effects of arrest. The increased flow of citizens’ 
intelligence can also increase police effectiveness at crime prevention through 
problem solving strategies in South Africa. 
 
Legislative frameworks 
 
Three Acts were enacted in 1996 to aid the SAPS, and they relate to the 
problems of organised crime in a transnational sense, in that it provides for co-
operation, information sharing and the enhancement of judicial legislation in thi s 
case. The acts are as follows: 
 
Ø The International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996: This 
Act was meant to facilitate the provision of evidence and the execution of 
sentences in criminal cases and the confiscation and transfer of the 
proceeds of crime between South Africa and other countries, and to 
provide for matters connected therewith 
Ø On the same day Proceeds of Crime Act 77 of 1996: Meant to provide for 
the recovery of the proceeds of crime, for the prohibition of money 
laundering and an obligation to report certain information and to provide 
for matters connected therewith  
Ø The Extradition Amendment Act is an amendment of the Extradition Act of 
1962, and in terms of a section of the Amended Act: Any person accused 
or convicted of an extraditable offence committed within the jurisdiction of 
a designated state shall be liable to be surrendered to such a designated 
state, whether or not a court in South Africa has jurisdiction to trial such a 
person for such offence. 
 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 24 of 1999 as amended, introduces 
measures to combat, amongst others; AFF, organized crime, money laundering 
and criminal syndicates and prohibit certain activities relating to racketeering 
activities. This Act also provides for the prohibition of money laundering and an 
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obligation to report certain information, and criminalises certain activities 
associated with gangs, as well as provide for the recovery of the proceeds of 
unlawful activity, civil forfeiture of criminal assets that have been used to commit 
an offence or assets that are the proceeds of unlawful activity, and to amend the 
International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act.   
 
The Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provision of 
Communication-Related Information Act, number 70 of 2002, and also known as 
RICA, was passed by Parliament and promulgated on 30 December 2002. 
However, the date of coming into effect was suspended until a notice appeared 
in the Government Gazette.  
 
Of particular importance regarding the prevention of AFF, this Act places the 
onus on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and cellular network providers to make 
it possible to intercept emails and cellular phone calls. The Act further stipulates 
that Service Providers will have to install the necessary technology and set up 
data lines to provincial interception centres at their own cost. Furthermore, ISP’s 
and cellular phone operators will have to retain e-mail and call related information 
for specified periods. This would go a long way in preventing AFF, because of 
the vast use these perpetrators make of Internet and cellular phones. 
 
The high incidence of AFF and money laundering in South Africa paves the way 
for the establishment of the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC). The FIC is a 
Government agency meant to receive financial information from accountable 
institutions; a range of financial institutions that have a responsibility to report to 
the FIC in terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001. 
 
The Financial Intelligence Centre was established under the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 which came into effect in February 2002. However, 
it started receiving reports of suspicious and unusual transaction in February 
2003 (Financial Intelligence Centre Act 2001). The Act also set up a regulatory 
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anti-money laundering regime that intends to break the cycle used by organized 
criminals groups and AFF perpetrators who benefit from their illegitimate 
business transactions. 
 
In order to fulfil its objectives, the Centre collects, processes, analyses and 
interprets information reported to it in terms of various statutory reporting 
obligations. The Centre then uses the information to inform and advise law 
enforcement authorities, supervisory bodies, the South African Revenue Service 
and the Intelligence Services and cooperate with these bodies in the 
performance of their functions. 
 
In is also worth noting that the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001 
introduced a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime in South Africa which 
satisfies the major Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations 
(Financial Intelligence Centre  Report 2005). 
 
FATF, which is a de facto international coordinating body responsible for 
combating money laundering, consists of twenty-nine member countries and two 
regional bodies. The report maintains that FATF has developed a set 
Recommendation that spell out the principles of the body and acts as a global 
standard for combating money laundering and other financial crimes such as 
AFF. It is reported that this set of Recommendations is known as the FATF 40+8. 
 
It should be noted that cross border financial crimes could not be dealt with in 
isolation, by one country, because of the ease with which money is able to flow 
across borders. Hence, any attempt to prevent this would require a co-ordinated 
and mutual support between countries. More importantly, South Africa’s 
membership of FATF makes it easier for FIC to access other financial 
intelligence units on a continuous basis, thereby enabling it to share information 
and expertise in the fight and prevention of financial crimes and AFF. 
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The next subsection discusses the initiatives of the United States Government in 
the field of the prevention of AFF. 
 
6.4.3 United States 
 
Due to the high rate of victims of AFF in the United States, the U.S 
Representative Edward J. Markey introduced the Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud 
Prevention Act of 1998 which was meant to bring its perpetrators into the 
forefront of the American public, and focus the government’s attention on the 
implementing a national and international strategy to combat this fraud. 
According to Markey, the Act was aimed to direct the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of the Treasury to jointly report on actions taken by the Nigerian 
government in apprehending the perpetrators of AFF, efforts taken by the United 
States to  inform America about such fraud, and other such actions which are or 
should be undertaken to end it, including the imposition of sanctions on the 
Nigerian government (Markey 1998:1). 
 
In the late 1980s, the U.S. Secret Service took a proactive approach to  
combating Nigerian organized crime by establishing and maintaining task forces 
throughout the United States whose main focus was the investigation of financial 
fraud committed by Nigerian nationals and their accomplices (The 419 Coalition 
2003:1). 
 
In May 1996, pursuant to the PDD-42, a Federal law enforcement interagency 
working group was created to develop a domestic law enforcement strategy 
addressing AFF. The strategy that was developed targeted both domestic and 
international Nigerian criminal activities, and emphasised the increased 
coordination of U.S. law enforcement, the sharing of investigating leads and 
information, and enhanced co-operation with foreign law enforcement 
counterparts to co-ordinate multinational cases and investigation (Nigerian bust 
2003:2) 
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Moreover, by providing co-ordination and dialogue with the government of 
Nigeria, especially Nigerian law enforcement officials, this strategy strengthened 
their ability to combat crime occurring within Nigeria, and assist in combating 
crimes committed elsewhere in the world, by individuals and organisations 
located in Nigeria (Nigerian bust 2003:2). 
 
The proposed enforcement efforts of the strategy became known as the Nigerian 
Crime Initiative (NCI). The working group also proposed to utilise a computer 
database to share Nigerian case data electronically. It was later agreed that the 
Department of Defense/Defense Information System Agency’s Anti -Drug 
Network (ADNET) would be the mechanism used to share this information. 
ADNET uses web based data technologies and a classified communication 
system to enable participation and to securely exchange data. 
 
In 1988, the then Attorney General approved the recommendation of the working 
group to established the Interagency Nigerian Organised Crime Task Force 
(INOCTF). Additionally, it established the installation of the ADNET-NCI system 
to support these task forces and selected foreign sites. As a result, the Secret 
Service hosted the INOCTF that was established from existing Secret Service 
Nigerian Crime Task Force located in New York, Chicago, Houston and Atlanta. 
Overseas ADNET terminals have also been installed at the U.S consulate in 
Lagos - Nigeria and Accra - Ghana. The Secret Service provides the following 
resources as host to a task force: 
A full-time Criminal Research Specialists (CRS), trained in the use of the 
ADNET terminal, is assigned directly to each task force. This individual 
acts as a point -of-contact for all participating task force personnel. 
 
Due to American efforts to prevent AFF, a global Americanisation of foreign 
systems has occurred. Their efforts, in this case, have shaped the evolution of 
the criminal justice systems of many countries. Most countries, in response, have 
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signed extradition and law enforcement treaties, and hosted American agents. 
Gerber and Jensen (Berg 1998:16) contend that although the United States has 
not solely spread the war on AFF and transnational fraud, it has taken the lead 
and its approaches are dominant. The United States has law enforcement 
representatives in most countries; it has also demonstrated the most powerful 
influence on criminal laws, procedures and investigatory tactics; it has created a 
global police presence and thus its role in the containment of AFF and 
transitional organised crime has been invaluable in this regard, Nadelman (Berg 
1998:16).  
 
The strategies employed by the United States agencies and organisations have 
been directed at global co-operation and the sharing of initiatives, with Nigeria 
and other countries, to combat this fraud. The transnational and organised nature 
of AFF makes it inevitable that countries establish some prevention mechanism. 
 
6.5 DIFFICULTIES IN THE PREVENTION OF AFF 
 
6.5.1 Lack of Understanding 
 
Law enforcement agencies or the government usually experience difficulties with 
regards to the prevention of most crimes and the case of AFF is no exception. 
Difficulties in the prevention of crime would arise because of the inconsistencies 
within the law, in terms of detection, investigation, inefficient evidence to secure a 
conviction and more importantly, insufficient knowledge regarding the 
phenomenon to be prevented. 
  
The findings of this research indicated that there are some difficulties that are 
associated with the prevention of this complex form of fraud. This research found 
that preventing this fraud is difficult because law enforcements officials and the 
society outside West Africa do not fully understand the manifestation of this 
fraud. Also, owing to the fact that there are many systems and methods used to 
 299 
execute this fraud further frustrates any prevention efforts. It was also found that 
so long as man remained egoistic and aspire to live beyond their means, this 
fraud would be difficult to prevent. The collusion with government and bank 
officials were also found to be a stumbling block in any prevention efforts.    
 
The perpetrator who took part in this research acknowledged these difficulties. In 
his statement, the perpetrator in Case 2 said: “…men will continue to aspire to be 
rich, men will always aspire to have the best things in life, and they will follow 
whichever way they think will be able to give him that. So it’s basically impossible 
for you to say to stop.  Because even if you offer that kind of person incentive of 
say R100 000 salaries a month and he still believes he can convince somebody 
to pay him half a million dollars cash.   I tell you my brother he wouldn’t stop. He 
wouldn’t stop. A lot of people are entering it these days.  Even people you look at 
as very legitimate people. Obviously you cannot get statistics, but they are there. 
You find kids of the school, you find a lot South Africans, Angolans, 
Mozambicans, Zambians, and everybody is into it.  Because it’s not something 
that stresses you, you send letters, a fax letter, and that’s it.  That’s the work you 
do.  And the turnover of it, if you are successful, it’s more than enough, so why 
would anybody leave it?”   
 
The perpetrator in Case 4 said: “…Yes you cannot. Hey my man, there, it is 
difficult.  You can stop…like now, they stop 419, no, they stop it.  But people are 
using other methods to make money.  People are changing their methods.  Ok, 
this one they discovered.  They will build a new one.  Its something…it’s hard to 
stop it.  If you say you’ll stop it, which is a lie.  If there are more jobs and 
things…from here, what you are doing, I can guarantee you that you will never 
succeed”.   
 
Similarly, the perpetrator in Case 5 said: “...I’ve also made my own research.  I’ve 
been here for three years now.  I’ve made my research, I’ve come down to my 
senses, I’ve only found out that…there’s nothing…you cannot prevent 
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fraud…Because the thing is, those officials inside, those who are working in 
government institutions, those who work in banks, they also involve fraud.  They 
work with outsiders.  So how can you prevent it?  It is so hard to prevent.  That’s 
what I can say”.   
 
6.5.2 Use of fraudsters to overcome these difficulties 
 
Despite the difficulties associated with the prevention of AFF, this research found 
that these difficulties can be overcome if the same fraudsters/West Africans are 
used to investigate themselves. This would therefore mean that the fraudsters 
will make it possible for all evidence to come to the fore and he would shed light 
and assist law enforcements agents in the understanding of the variations and 
modus operandi often use by perpetrators. 
 
In the regard, the perpetrator in Case 4 said “... It’s better for you to use the same 
fraudster.  Without that there’s no way to stop this fraud. I’ve been in Italy for 10 
years, but when I reached there, fraud was still growing”. He also said “…. the 
system here that they are using to investigate fraud, it’s very poor.  From the 
South African police and the Scorpion, it’s very poor.  They just produce a plea 
bargain and then…But if you want to investigate fraud, use a fraudster to catch a 
fraudster, they’ll tell you what happened.  But just to take somebody who doesn’t 
know fraud to investigate fraud, it’s very difficult.  What you are giving to him, 
what you will offer him, and he’s going to help you to get enough evidence.  No 
they know.  They can tell you this, this, how these things happen.  And which part 
of the business, they’ll explain you.  And from that investigation, you’ll get a clue 
of how to start with this one.  Not to say that to get evidence is difficult.  You can 
get evidence, but that evidence is not enough to convince the court, to convict 
someone… even the FBI… I was in Europe; my friends, they used to be arrested 
for the same fraud.  It took two months from America to Italy.  But the FBI from 
Italy, more than 6 months full time, they couldn’t get anything.  And even the 
guys sue the FBI. He took the money from a victim, and when they come to him, 
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he said that you are taking chance, and he sued them”.  This perpetrator further 
said: “…we can prevent fraud, we can prevent it.  You must use the same 
fraudster to prevent it.  If you don’t use a fraudster you can’t prevent it.  Whatever 
I am explaining to you here, if you go and try the same fraud, you can’t do it.  
Somebody can take your money.  Without that information, you won’t be 
successful to prevent it”.   
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The review of crime and fraud prevention indicates that taking criminal action in 
the area of fraud is however, neither simple nor quick. In a study of serious fraud 
cases, the average time that occurred between the commencement of the 
criminal conduct and the imposition of sentence was over four years. In one case 
approximately 16 years progressed between the commencement of the criminal 
conduct and the final termination of court proceedings, which included an appeal. 
 
Financial consideration mean that only the most serious cases involve 
substantial monetary losses and if the victim was killed the cases are likely to be 
investigated and tried, with the added possibility of convicted offenders receiving 
the most severe sanction of a term of imprisonment. The legal response to AFF 
control has, therefore, been severely restricted, although the possibility of 
criminal prosecution and sanction has always remained open. The extent to 
which severe sentences should be used for AFF offences has been subject to 
considerable debate over the years. It has been argued by the 419 Coalition that 
the sentences imposed on AFF offenders in Nigeria have sometime been 
inadequate, although some lengthy terms of imprisonment have been imposed in 
some serious cases. Criminal prosecution and punishment should, and will 
always remain an option for AFF offenders, but there are compelling reasons to 
suggest other remedies to supplement other traditional forms of punishment – 
prevention: public awareness and education, recruiting West Africa to assist 
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investigators and the intervention of the African Union to stop massive corruption 
in African countries.  
 
The findings of this chapter are presented in table 6.1 below: 
 
Table 6.1 Prevention 
CJS 
prevention 
National prevention International 
prevention 
Police, courts, 
prison 
Tighten service granting Harmonize international 
fraud laws 
Deterrence Asset forfeiture laws Educate potential victims 
Rehabilitation Speedy prosecution Identify potential repeat-
victims 
Incapacitation Specialise dedicated 
courts 
Spread AFF information 
Just deserts Increased co-operation Prosecute AFF victims 
also 
Retribution Stop intercepting 
international phone calls 
Desist greediness 
Denunciation Freeze scam accounts Institute preventative civic 
journalism 
Imprisonment De-register professionals 
co-operating with 
fraudsters 
 
Hard sentences Expose offenders  
Monetary fines Monitor Internet Café’s  
 Punish banks with AFF 
accounts 
 
 Prevent 419-e-mails to 
leave their source 
 
 Co-ordinate intelligence  
 International global co-
operation 
 
 Increase policing of AFF  
 
In table 6.1 the typology of prevention nourishes the prevention strategies.  
These in turn funnel down to CJS-prevention techniques.  However, these are 
hampered by some difficulties, including lack of understanding and lack of law 
enforcement.  It is clear that national prevention strategies and international ones 
should be integrated and co-ordinated.  Thus the prevention of AFF can become, 
criminological speaking, an effective AFF-reduction tool. 
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However, by suggesting that the effectiveness of some AFF prevention efforts 
may depend upon their institutional contexts, one does not present a pessimistic 
vision of the future. While some might say that no one strategy can work until the 
root causes of AFF can be cured, there is no scientific base for that conclusion, 
and substantial evidence against it. What this research suggests, is that the 
potential for something much more precise and useful exist, based on a more 
open view of the role of scientific evaluation in the prevention of AFF: a future in 
which strategy evaluation carefully measures, and systematically vary, the 
institutional context of each strategy. That strategy is essential for a body of 
scientific knowledge to be developed. 
 
The next and final chapter of this thesis will focus on the findings, 
recommendations and the scientific contribution of this research in terms of 
understanding this complex phenomenon and its prevention. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This research has attempted to empirically and scientifically explain, examine 
and analyse AFF. In this attempt, the researcher has endeavoured to provide a 
coherent, credible and comprehensive exposition of AFF, facilitating the  
understanding of this complex form of fraud, and most importantly placing it in a 
criminological and victimological perspective. 
 
This research has not only promoted focused intervention with regards to the 
impasse in the investigation and prevention of AFF, but it has also shed some 
light within the wider fraud milieu, thus recognizing and ultimately elevating the 
status of criminological cable from parochial pariah to principle priority in the 
understanding and explaining this form of fraud. This research reveals that AFF 
is no longer an issue limited to West Africans/Nigerians or race, but a criminal 
conduct that requires actions similarly to other forms of fraud and organised 
crime, prevalent in South Africa. 
 
The next sections provide – findings and recommendations – highlights the 
contributions of this research to this field of study. 
 
7.2 FINDINGS 
 
In this research five intrinsic themes have essentially been examined, analysed 
and explained, namely: the nature and extent of AFF, the perpetrators, the 
victims, the adjudication, and prevention of AFF. The focus on these themes 
provided a chronological, lucid and holistic perspective of AFF, exposing the 
fundamentals which underpin this form of fraud as well as those factors that 
serve to endorse and perpetuate it.  AFF is founded on the argument that bad 
governance (corruption) in West Africa needs to be understood and addressed 
within this sphere and that only through structured, good governance and the 
focused integration of theory with practical intervention that this complex 
phenomenon will be eliminated. 
 
It should also be underscored that the empirical research presented in this thesis 
has unequivocally shown that AFF can be ascribed to a combination of factors, 
working together in the execution of this fraud. It was also revealed in this thesis 
that deficiencies regarding compliance/investigation, extradition, lack of 
evidence, compounded with the diverse international legislation, as well as other 
peripheral issues poses a major obstacle in the prevention of this fraud. A 
concerted effort to eliminate these elements is imperative to the success of AFF 
prevention. Hence, it is submitted that the interdependent and indivisible 
management of international resources to fight this fraud is of absolute 
importance. 
 
The findings that adequately encapsulate the central issues of this thesis are 
discussed below in more detail:   
 
7.2.1 The nature and extend of the crimes 
 
The initial phase of this research was directed at exposing the nature and extent 
of AFF, as it occurs and is perpetuated worldwide. This part of the research 
exclusively and effectively unravelled the findings of this form of fraud.  This 
research study found that AFF, although it originated in Nigeria, it is now a 
worldwide phenomenon. The research found that there are many forms of AFF 
and the most common form prevalent in South Africa is money transfer or wash-
wash. 
 
It was also found that AFF usually begins with one form and end up as another 
form of AFF. A new form of AFF, which is referred to as: “spiritism” and “fimash”, 
of which no information is available in the literature, was uncovered during the 
empirical research. This research found that this fraud may begin as money 
transfer and when the victim visits the resident country of the perpetrator, the 
perpetrator would use another form which is black currency or wash-wash/ 
fimash and end it with spiritism. Interestingly, the whole processes of black 
currency or wash-wash fraud were uncovered. This research illuminates how the 
perpetrators introduce this fraudulent ‘business’ to their victims, how they contact 
the victims, how they convince victims to pay them and finally how they depart 
with the victim’s money. In this regard, the various complications used by 
perpetrators were also uncovered. The findings also support the fact that the high 
rate of unemployment and business opportunities for investment, comparable to 
other African countries, was associated with this form of fraud in South Africa. 
The findings also support the premise that AFF is very organised, specialised 
and well networked with associates all over the world. 
 
From the nature of these findings it can be deduced that AFF is indeed a 
complex criminal activity, and this explains why the perpetrators usually succeed 
to defraud victims as many times as they can, without the victim coming to their 
senses. The complexity of this fraud was also found to be the reason why it is 
difficult to detect, investigate, arrest and prosecute offenders. 
 
7.2.2 The perpetrators 
 
In order to sensitise and orientate readers to the perpetrators of AFF and to 
furthermore foster an understanding of the complexities and interactions of 
perpetrators with their victims, this section of the thesis has endeavoured to 
provide a succinct but systematic and comprehensive overview of these 
particular groups of perpetrators inter alia emphasising the nature and 
organisation of these perpetrators, their characteristics, whilst simultaneously 
illustrating their modus operandi.  
 
Nature of perpetrators 
 
As per the nature of these perpetrators, it was found in this research that the lack 
of face-to-face contact in this crime, at the initial phase, allows the perpetrators to 
impersonate government and corporate officials to increase their credibility, and 
in some cases, to coerce reluctant victims. This was found to be a common 
factor in all letters that they sent to prospective victims. It is acknowledged that 
they do not use their real names because they want to create the impression that 
their letters are from the General Manager, Presidents, Chiefs, Mayors, 
Sons/Wives of former presidents, and Directors of companies. 
 
The findings of this thesis reveal that the lifestyle of perpetrators is all about 
ostentation, ostentation and more ostentation. Ostentation and more ostentatious 
goods/materials were found to be part and parcel of the mind and lifestyle of AFF 
perpetrators. These groups of individuals are well known travellers, both 
nationally and internationally. These fraudsters travel to complete a job/business, 
to enjoy their loot, to evade law enforcements agents and to stay away from their 
victims in cases of local victimisation. This research also indicated that these 
fraudsters travel to invest their stolen money especially in their native country. 
 
Organisation of the perpetrators 
 
In terms of organisation, it was found that AFF perpetrators are well organised 
and they operate as a network, both nationally and internationally. Nationally, it 
was found that they networked and operated with government officials, law 
enforcement agents and businessmen. As a matter of fact, research submitted 
the role the bankers play in the facilitation of the commission of AFF. The 
research found that bank officials assist these fraudsters by giving them 
information regarding the processes involved when conducting international 
banking transactions. This, of course, makes it easier for the perpetrators to 
deceive their victims. It also became evident that perpetrators of AFF 
commission or outsource their business/crime. It was found that amateur 
perpetrators would hand over or transfer a victim that he has hooked to an 
experienced perpetrator for a 50-50 sharing of their loot when the fraud matures. 
 
The Internet was revealed to be one of the instruments that AFF perpetrators 
used to contact victims. They use this facility to send emails that propose 
business investments, or the transfers of funds from Africa or any trouble area 
around the world to Europe and America. This research found that these 
fraudsters spend most of their time at Internet cafés, sending emails to victims. 
The findings indicated that AFF use Internet cafés as their offices and they have 
special rooms and computers that they use. 
 
Another significant finding is that a typical AFF perpetrator was found to be male 
with an average age of 35 years, and business as his profession. Contrary to 
other fraudsters, this   research found that AFF perpetrators are very patient. It 
was revealed that the perpetrator would wait for a long time (from 3 months to 1 
year) for their deal to mature. So patience is one of the outstanding 
characteristics of these fraudsters. 
 
Modus operandi of perpetrators 
 
In terms of the modus operandi used by these fraudsters in order to commit AFF 
it was found that they did not act alone, that criminal specialists or low-level 
expendable individuals are used on a once-off basis or sporadically, but many 
are said to be professional criminals who provide their services on a continuing 
basis. The use of violence and intimidation also emerged as a means to manage 
and maintain their fraud amongst themselves and their victims. Corruption was 
found to be a modus operandi used by these perpetrators to penetrate the 
systems in the country where they operate. In this study it was found that AFF 
perpetrators, in order to facilitate and get away with their fraud, corrupted law 
enforcement officials, government officials and banks official.  Identity fraud and 
misrepresentation by perpetrator were found to be reasons why perpetrators 
were able to insulate themselves from law enforcements agents, as this 
facilitates their movement in and out of a country. 
 
As with most organised crime, operating legitimate businesses was found to be 
one of the modus operandi used by AFF perpetrators in order to disguise their ill-
gotten funds. In this research, it was found that AFF perpetrators in South Africa 
were/have been owners of Internet cafés, groceries shops, importer and 
exporters businesses, liquor businesses, night clubs and some were hawkers. It 
should be noted that these legitimate businesses act as fronts to justify what 
perpetrators do for a living and as means to launder money. 
 
This research found that AFF is all about manipulation and deceit of victims. 
Perpetrators have special manipulating skills to cajole and entice their victims to 
get involved into their business proposals. The fact that most of the proposals 
emphasised urgency, anonymity and at times excitement, are geared towards 
preparing the victims for manipulation when the business starts. 
 
This research stated that AFF perpetrators even make use of law enforcement 
agents in the execution of their crime. In this regard, police officers were found to 
have been used by perpetrators to discharge/scare victims. In some instances, 
police officers act as accomplices and are said to even employ perpetrators. 
Hence police involvement in this type of fraud would suggest why these 
fraudsters are so successful and at times are able to avoid detection and the 
justice system. 
 
Throughout this thesis, it was found that the perpetrators are usually very 
successful at executing this type of fraud and their success partly explains why 
most people with legitimate jobs perpetrate this fraud. 
 
 
7.2.3 The victims 
 
In this research, the researcher explored AFF victimisation as it occurs, from the 
time an individual is introduced or coerced to take part in a business that he/ she 
is informed is illegal, up to the time the perpetrators depart with their money. 
Interestingly, this research has actually shed some light into the lives and minds 
of these victims, from the perpetrator’s perspective. 
 
In terms of categorisation, it was found that individuals easily fall victim to money 
transfer and black currency (money cleaning /wash-wash).  The victims of the 
money cleaning type of AFF were found to be local South Africans and victims of 
the money transfer type of AFF were mostly foreigners. However, it was also 
found that those foreigners who were victims of money transfer, once they come 
to South Africa to finalise the deal, they may also become victims of the black 
currency type of AFF. This happens because the perpetrators usually change 
their approach from one type of problem to another. In certain cases, the initial 
proposal was to transfer money from Africa to Europe or America and when the 
victim has paid the first and second instalment of the transfer fee, the perpetrator 
would then change the story and ask the victim to come to their base country. 
From there he will be introduced to black dollar and then they would start talking 
about money to buy a chemical to clean the money. 
 
The research found that the change of the business motive would lead to multiple 
or repeated victimisation of AFF victims. Most victims of this fraud lost money 
more than once to the same perpetrators or to different perpetrators within the 
same network.  It was found that the moment a victim got involved in the 
‘business’ he/she would be victimised repeatedly. According to the findings of 
this research, these victims were repeatedly victimised because of their hopes to 
recover part of the money they have invested into the business. Hence they 
continue to pay, despite all the complications, hoping that the business will bear 
fruit.  
 The findings in this research indicate that AFF victims vary, but in most cases the 
perpetrators target those whom they believe have money. In this regard business 
people are their prime targets. In terms of gender, studies indicate that AFF 
victims are of both sexes. However, it is acknowledged that males are more often 
defrauded than females. In some cases, husbands and wives were found to be 
victims of this form of fraud. 
 
The findings of the empirical part of this research indicated that both Africans and 
Caucasians are victims of AFF. However, the findings suggest that race would 
come into play depending on where the victim is based. Most victims of the 
money transfer type of AFF were found to be foreigners from Europe and 
America. This automatically means that they will be Caucasian. The victims of 
the black currency type of AFF in South Africa are both African and Caucasian 
whereas the victims in other African countries are only African. 
 
A fundamental finding in this research is that greed was found to be a core 
characteristic of all the victims of AFF. Most people fall victim to AFF because of 
their greed and love for money. Hence, those who love money and want 
something for nothing are more likely to be victims.  
 
It was found that, only those who are greedy would accept to take part in a deal 
of questionable legality. This eventually linked them to any criminal charges that 
might arise. Hence, they are victimised repeatedly and hardly ever report this 
fraud to the police. 
 
7.2.4 Adjudication 
 
Despite the problems associated with the adjudication of AFF perpetrators, this 
research was able to find that the South African law enforcement agents have 
made breakthroughs. The research study found, however, that the role of the 
police is very paramount in the arrest and investigation of AFF perpetrators. In 
this regard, the South African Police Service and the elite service (Scorpions) 
adopt an aggressive and spontaneous sting operation to apprehend these 
fraudsters. Their approach led to successful investigations, arrests and 
convictions of some of the AFF perpetrators in South Africa.  
 
The South Africa law enforcement agents adopted an investigative technique that 
assists them to arrive at a successful conviction of the accused. In the first place 
this research revealed that, despite the complicated nature and processes in the 
adjudication of AFF perpetrators, South African authorities had succeeded to put 
some of these offenders behind bars. In this case it was found that, the 
introduction of a plea bargain by prosecutors made it possible to put these 
fraudsters behind bars. 
 
Plea bargain 
 
The main reason identified in this research study which led to the successful 
conviction of the offenders was that the offenders were persuaded to enter into a 
plea bargain for a lesser sentence or a fine. Usually, the state would succeed in 
convicting these offenders when they pled guilty, and the court would impose the 
minimum sentence. 
 
Problems in adjudication 
 
In this research it was found that the identification of suspects was one of the 
impediments when it came to the arrests, investigations and prosecutions of the 
fraudsters.  The offenders are everywhere and they move from place to place 
and from country to country. It was also found that perpetrators had multiple 
identities, and this makes it very difficult for law enforcement agents to track them 
down and apprehend them. 
 
In this case, the research revealed that the criminal laws and procedures made 
the adjudication of AFF perpetrators very difficult. This is because of lack of 
evidence and the fact tha t the complainant usually does not report what really 
took place, if they report it at all, they change the scenario and this complicates 
the already complicated situation.   
 
It has also been established in this research study that the law enforcement 
officers do not actually follow the criminal procedures when they investigate AFF 
cases. This is due to the complex nature of the crime. Hence, if they have to 
follow the prescribed legal procedure, they would hardly ever secure a 
conviction. In has been acknowledged in this research that the transnational 
nature of AFF leads to difficulties regarding the search and seizure of the 
equipment that would serve as evidence used in the commission of AFF, and this 
hinders the investigations and prosecutions of these fraudsters.  
 
It was established that in cases where the investigation takes place where the 
perpetrators are based, the search and seizure of equipment could be an easy 
task. Some of the perpetrators referred to some equipment that was seized at 
their premises which served as an important piece of evidence that eventually led 
to their conviction.   
 
A fundamental finding in this research is that the adjudication of AFF perpetrators 
is hindered owing to lack of evidence. All the perpetrators who took part in this 
research raised this factor. In this regard, most of the cases are thrown out of 
court or the perpetrator would receive a small fine and subsequently be deported 
to his native country because of lack of evidence. 
 
7.2.5 Prevention 
 
Throughout this thesis, the techniques or strategies that had been used to 
prevent this type of fraud were found to be inadequate. The way with which these 
fraudsters execute this crime and the complex nature of their operations, 
hampered any attempts to prevent this fraud. However, this research made some 
significant findings that could be applied in order to prevent this type of fraud.  
 
As is the case with most crime prevention strategies, this research found that 
primary prevention would, in some way, prevent people from becoming victims of 
this fraud. The perpetrators perspectives revealed that people should not reply to 
unsolicited mail and people should discus any business proposals with their 
friends and families or business advisers/ consultants before getting invo lved.  
 
In the case of secondary crime prevention, it was found to be a strategy that may 
be employed to prevent AFF. Business people are highly at risk to become 
victims of AFF, since AFF perpetrators target them, hence intervention 
programmes need to focus on this group of professionals. In this regard honesty, 
patience and consultations in any business related matters should be 
encouraged amongst business people. 
 
This research study highlights that prevention that occurs at places where this 
fraud is most common is a good method of prevention. The findings of this 
research acknowledge that Internet cafés are used in the execution of AFF 
especially, especially where the money transfer type of AFF is involved. It was 
also noted in the research that most foreigners spend whole days at Internet 
cafés and some even use it as their office. Hence, the suggestion that prevention 
should focus on Internet cafés. Internet café owners should be mandated, by law, 
to check on their clients and notify them that they are not allowed to use the 
Internet cafés’ facilities to commit any criminal activities. 
 
In this research, judicial punishment was found to be more effective strategy in 
the prevention of AFF. However, this can only occur if the victims report the 
crime to the police or if the police are able to detect the fraud, and arrest the 
offenders with sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. The perpetrators who 
took part in this research concur that the judicial punishment was a good strategy 
to prevent AFF, especially the deterrent effects of the punishment - 
imprisonment. It was found that legal deterrence through imprisonment would 
serve as the best preventative method for AFF. Apart from the fact that 
imprisonment would remove them from the society, it also serves as a period of 
education and rehabilitation for these offenders, as acknowledged by some 
incarcerated offenders. 
 
It has also been strongly argued and found in this research that public awareness 
and education will assist to prevent AFF. It is believed that information about a 
particular type of crime and its manifestation would safe-guard individuals against 
victimisation. Hence, this research indicated that awareness and education about 
AFF would assist in the prevention of this type of fraud. The role of the media, 
radio and television, would assist with the education of the public and and create 
awareness amongst victims and potential victims.    
 
As per the victimisation focus prevention strategy of AFF, this research has found 
that it is absolutely necessary to focus on the victims and potential victims. Some 
perpetrators submitted that victims of AFF should be prosecuted because they 
are part of a conspiracy to siphoned or become the beneficiary of ill-gotten funds. 
According to them prosecuting the victim would send a message to those who 
engage in these types of activities that they will face the hostile side of justice.  
 
This research also revealed that this fraud could also be prevented if people or 
potential victims stop being greedy. It should be recalled that, victims of this fraud 
were found to be very greedy. Hence, desisting from this human trait would 
prevent this fraud. The perpetrators of AFF are fully aware that victims of this 
fraud are greedy and they use this character trait as a motivating factor to repeat 
the victimisation.  
 
It should however be noted that law enforcement agencies or the government 
usually find it difficult to prevent crimes, and AFF is no exception. Difficulties in 
the prevention of crime would arise because of the inconsistencies within the law, 
as well as difficulties in terms of detection, investigation, and inefficient evidence 
to secure a conviction. More importantly insufficient knowledge regarding the 
phenomenon to be prevented creates one of the biggest barriers with regards to 
the prevention of AFF.  These research findings therefore indicated that 
preventing this fraud is difficult because law enforcements officials and the 
society outside West Africa do not fully understand the manifestation of this 
fraud. Owing to the fact that there are many systems and methods in place that 
allows this fraud to be executed further frustrates any prevention efforts. It is also 
revealed that as long as man remains egoistic and aspire to live beyond his 
means, this fraud will be difficult to prevent. The organised nature of the 
perpetrators and the fact that governments and bank officials assist/ work with 
these fraudsters poses a stumbling block for any prevention efforts. These 
difficulties were acknowledged in this research, and suggestions to overcome 
these impediments were made that would lead to prevent this type of fraud. 
 
Despite the difficulties associated with the prevention of AFF, this research found 
that these difficulties could be overcome if the same fraudsters/West Africans are 
recruited to assist with the investigations. This would therefore mean that these 
recruited fraudsters, who are either reformed or retired fraudsters, would shed 
some light onto the investigations (of evidence) and an understanding of the 
variations and modus operandi often used by perpetrators would come to the 
fore. 
 
7.2.6 Theoretical explanations  
 
Based on the salient features of AFF identified in this thesis, this research was 
undertaken with the intention to develop an integrated, authentic and plausible 
justification for the existence and persistence of this complex phenomenon. 
Ideologies such as the classical, positivist, and conflict schools of thought, 
through which criminology evolved, were concisely examined as a precursor to  
the creation and formulation of an integrated theoretical explanation of AFF, the 
perpetrators and the victims. 
 
The theoretical explanation produced for AFF was constructed from existing 
theories by assimilating their relevant elements into an integrated model, capable 
of adequately and logically explaining this phenomenon, and not only one 
particular theory was forced or manipulate into explaining something it cannot. 
 
In an attempt to explain AFF, it was found in this research that these individuals 
tend to strive for short-term gratification without taking account of the possible 
long -term consequences of their actions, in this case crime. Such persons are 
characte rised by impulsiveness, aggression and indifference to the opinion of 
others. Accordingly, this explanation of AFF is based on the assumption that 
human behaviour is motivated by self-interest, in that pleasure is sought and pain 
avoided.  This research also found that a typical AFF offender does not display 
deviancy problems such as alcohol or drug use, poor performance or social 
maladjustment. 
 
It was also found that cognitive behaviour plays a role in the explanation of AFF. 
Hence a person of low intelligence will not be capable of committing computer 
fraud, convince or manipulate people, and  write complex letters. This explanation 
indicates that AFF perpetrators are intelligent, since the crime requires special 
skills and knowledge which is supported by this research. 
 
Supporting this assertion is the fact that the degree of intelligence influences a 
person’s social position in society and this, in turn, offers the opportunities for 
overseas travel and possible contacts or opportunities to commit fraud. An 
intelligent person may have access to computer systems, a database of 
companies and governments, bookkeeping skills and international business 
language which is used to commit fraud. 
 
Cognitive theorists assume that offenders are rational actors. The way in which 
people make decision is very important in understanding criminal behaviour. As 
with the biological and the psychodynamic perspectives, the cognitive 
perspective relates to the internal processes of a person. Rather than 
emphasising urges, needs and motives, the emphasis falls on how people 
interpret and use information to resolve problems, and of course, commit crimes. 
Thus the cognitive perspective places greater emphasis on current thinking and 
problem-solving strategies than on a person’s history. The individual is regarded 
as an information processor and they gather, store, modify, interpret and 
comprehend internal and general information as well as environmental stimuli. 
Through their influence on cognitive processes, schemes enable people to 
rapidly identify stimuli, group them into manageable units, and supplement 
missing information to develop a strategy for obtaining further information in 
order to resolve a problem or realise an objective. 
 
The labelling theory focuses on the process that leads to crime and the 
advocates of this theory are concerned with the effect of labels on the person 
who is labelled. In the case in point most West Africans/ Nigerians have been 
labelled in South Africa/Western countries as drug dealers and fraudsters. This 
concept of label treats the label as an independent variable, a causal agent that 
then creates criminal behaviour in some of these individuals. 
 
This process causes crime because the label creates a reaction and individuals 
who have been labelled become more visible in the sense that people are more 
aware of them. This awareness often causes them to be watched more closely. 
Especially important are those at the law enforcement agencies who closely 
watch individuals once they have come to the attention of their agency. In this 
regard, those who  are labelled become the client of the criminal justice system, 
and, like any other good business, the system keeps close tabs on its customers. 
Accordingly it becomes difficult for those labelled (West Africans/Nigerians) to 
escape the attention of this audience, and subsequent AFF behaviour is likely to 
be identified and relabelled. The point to note here is that West 
Africans/Nigerians who are identified as ‘criminals’ have fewer chances to make 
good in the conventional world in South Africa. This means that conventional 
avenues to success are often cut off, and illegal (AFF) means may become the 
only way left open to them. 
 
The findings of this research suggest that one reason why immigrants, Nigerians  
and West Africans are involved  in Advance Fee Fraud is because they have very 
few legitimate opportunities for employment and make money. This is 
exacerbated by their arrest and subsequent criminal record which makes it 
difficult for them to find legitimate employment. Employers, who would not hire 
the individual before are even less likely to do so once the immigrant has a 
criminal record. Hence there may be little for the individual to turn to except to 
AFF. This explanation indicates that continued AFF behaviour is therefore not a 
matter of choice, but takes place because the person’s choices have been limited 
by society.  
 
In order to appreciate and use learning theory as an explanation of AFF, this 
research found that AFF is a learned behaviour. It is a criminal behaviour that 
requires the young recruits to actually receive some training from those already 
in the profession. This theory is supported by the use of the Nigerian Handbook, 
which outlines the processes involved in the execution of AFF.  
 
The rational choice perspective was found best able to explain AFF. This 
perspective stresses calculated decision-making, arguing that offenders choose 
how to act after determining the likely payoff from a particular kind of behaviour. 
The rational choice perspective focuses on the processes by which individuals 
initially decide to violate the law, choose to continue in a life of crime, and 
eventually opt to desist from crime. However, it was found in this research that 
not all AFF offenders calculate rewards and risks in the same way. Some of the 
many factors that affect the choices people make are age, marital status, group 
ties, social class background, opportunities for legitimate careers, and attitudes 
towards work, willingness to use violence, preferred lifestyle, identity, and values. 
 
 It was found that their decisions to commit this type of fraud are affected by 
lower-class and working-class values such as autonomy, toughness, and 
excitement; by their lack of opportunities for legitimate careers; by their low 
aspirations; and their desire to gain the respect of others. This was found in this 
research to be applicable to AFF offenders whose decision to commit fraud are 
made in the context of a lifestyle characterised by a “life as party” attitude, 
meaning that they seek the enjoyment of ‘good times’ with minimal concern for 
obligations and commitments that are external to their immediate social settings. 
 
This research also found that many AFF offenders find that the rewards of crime 
justify their violation of the law. Some of the AFF offenders argue that the income 
they derive from AFF is more certain and more substantial than the income they 
could earn from the legitimate jobs that are available to them. Some of these 
offenders also argue that, even if they were paid the amount they realise from 
criminal activities, many of them would continue to violate the law because of the 
non-economic rewards of AFF. In this case, one would suggest that non-
economic reward of criminal behaviour is the challenge of violating the law and 
getting away it, which is important in many computer related crimes and fraud. 
 
The primary risk associated with crime is the threat of arrest, conviction, and 
punishment. Offenders often plan their crimes to minimise this risk, but most 
people who continue with their criminal activities for any significant amount of 
time are eventually arrested. This explanation was found to be one of the 
reasons behind the increase incidence of AFF in South Africa and even 
internationally. It was also found that continued AFF activity increases some 
offenders’ expertise, thereby minimising their chances of being arrested, but with 
continued success many offenders become over-confident and careless. Chance 
plays an important role in determining whether an offender will be arrested for a 
given crime, an offender’s luck will eventually run out if he or she continues to 
break the law. Hence some of them end up being arrested. 
  
For AFF perpetrators, the risks are relatively small because few of them are 
convicted of a crime, and the courts usually treat those who are arrested 
leniently. Perhaps the major risk they face is the loss of reputation. The 
instrumental nature of fraud lends itself to a careful calculation of the cost and 
benefits of violating the law. 
 
Criminologists have attempted to develop integrated theories that explain white-
collar crimes and fraud by incorporating insights from different theoretical 
traditions that account for fraud at different levels. Coleman (1987) developed an 
integrated theory that centres on the coincidence of appropriate motivation and 
opportunity. He stated that culture  generates motives for lawbreaking when it 
emphasises possessive individualism, competition, and materialism; justifies 
rationalisation; and removes unified restraining influences.  This means that a 
built-in structure of opportunity renders white -collar crime and fraud both less 
vulnerable to legal controls and sanctions (due to the disproportionate power of 
the elite in the formulation and administration of the law) and opens to a variety 
of attractive possibilities for disregarding or violating the laws that do exist. 
 
In this research, it was found that various factors, including the structure of 
opportunity, the nature of financial reimbursement, and the occupational 
subculture, could render some occupations more conducive to illegality than 
others. Accordingly, AFF is most pervasive in societies that nurture a culture of 
competition, in organizations that are financially pressured, and in occupations 
with special opportunities and sub cultural values that promote illegality. 
 
The findings in this research support Braithwaite’s (1989) integrative theory 
which is based on two traditions: structural Marxist theory which links fraud with 
the promotion of egoism in capitalist societies, and differential association which 
holds that fraud is learned relative to differential opportunity. Accordingly, nations 
with high levels of inequality of wealth (West Africa/Nigeria) and power will have 
high rates of both fraud and conventional crime because they produce a broad 
range of illegitimate opportunities that are more rewarding than legal 
opportunities. As a result, AFF specifically is a response to relatively more 
attractive illegitimate opportunities and the sub cultural value system that 
rationalises the taking advantage of these opportunities. For Braithwaite, the 
theoretical challenge is to construct a tipping point explanation that predicts when 
a stake in non-compliance outbalances a stake in conformity with the law.  
 
In conclusion therefore, one would argue that AFF is clearly a complex, 
multifaceted phenomenon of which no single theory or explanation can 
comprehensively explain the perpetrators. One must be clear about what exactly 
is being explained: criminality, crime, or criminalisation. The overarching view of 
this finding is that the complexity and diversity of AFF precludes any single 
comprehensive theory or explanatory scheme. It is evidently clear how it is 
difficult to overcome the methodological barriers to demonstrating conclusively 
the validity of competing theories of AFF. 
 
7.3 DISCUSSIONS 
 
Advance Fee Fraud has been a lucrative method of stealing money from gullible 
punters for more than 30 years, but the Internet boom has made it much more 
effective. The Internet was also accompanied by a subtle change in tactics. While 
criminals were once happy to steal cash, they are now increasingly prepared to 
steal their identities as well. 
 
It should be noted that AFF have accounted for losses estimated to be billions of 
dollars worldwide. This fraud is diverse and target not only individuals and 
businesses but government offices as well. Document fraud, used to develop 
false identities, contributes to the difficulties law enforcement experience in all 
the countries to stem the flow of these fraudsters’ activities. 
 
The findings of this research would suggest that AFF is on the increase in South 
Africa. According to the findings of this research, this increase was because of 
the success of the fraudsters and luxurious lifestyles of mature perpetrators and 
hence serves as a motivating/pull factor for amateur perpetrators. The lifestyle of 
perpetrators also convinces their victims of the legitimacy of the proposed 
business.  
 
Throughout the entire thesis, it became evident that AFF is a very complex 
phenomenon to understand, explain, adjudicate and prevent. The manner with 
which the fraud is executed is so complicated that at times even the perpetrators 
may become victims of this fraud. Accordingly, no one would say he/she couldn’t 
become a victim of AFF, because there are so many variations of AFF and 
perpetrators would at times study their target very well to determine what they 
like and where their interests are. In this regard perpetrators would approach a 
potential victim based on the interests of that victim. 
 
The styles with which these fraudsters draft their letters are able to convince 
individuals to get involved.  In one case, a church minister received an AFF letter 
that stated the perpetrators had funds, which were meant for the advancement of 
the gospel of God, but these funds needed to be transferred into the church’s 
account for that purpose. The minister was very exited and went ahead and paid 
the transfer fee, and he was definitely defrauded. Charity organizations have also 
been victimised by promises that they are the beneficiaries of millions of dollars 
of late so-and-so, but they have to pay a certain amount as a transfer fee. One 
would argue that, to escape AFF victimisation is just a matter of luck. Some of 
these frauds definitely start and function as legitimate businesses for quite some 
time and, then the complications start, so that the investor lose his/her 
investment to the business. 
 
Although the fraud is complicated, it is somehow simple to understand the trick 
used by these fraudsters to defraud people. In the case of black currency, the 
issue of buying chemicals is just one method of parting victims with their money. 
These fraudsters blackened the notes themselves. What these fraudsters do is 
that, after they had convinced the victim and collected the money to go and 
collect the consignment from overseas or a supposed security company, they 
would buy a silver box. They would cut papers into dollar size notes, buy black 
paint, at times they mix it with paraffin, or they with petrol, and would dip the cut 
papers inside the paint mixture and allow it to dry. The “money” consequently 
becomes black.  It is then packed into the silver box along with some real dollars. 
At this stage, they use some other chemicals to change the colour of the real 
dollar notes into black notes and they put the real blackened dollar bills on top.  
They then deliver the consignment of blackened notes. The chemical used to 
clean the real notes is vitamin C. Vitamin C. is always the solution they use to 
clean the notes that they put on top in the box. In essence, AFF is complicated 
and a simple trick to the fraudsters. 
 
It should also be pointed out that what makes this fraud even more complicated 
is the greed of the victim.  Most of the victims do not discuss the business 
proposals with their friends, family members and other associates. They just 
want to get all the money for themselves; hence, at the end of the day, they do 
not disclose it to anybody even after they have lost a substantial amount of 
money.  This fraud would not be a problem to law enforcement agents if victims 
report the first contact with perpetrators to the police, for early detection and 
arrest with substantial evidence would enable the successful conviction of 
offenders. 
 
The international network associated with AFF and the assistance received by 
the fraudsters from law enforcements officials, governments and bank officials 
make this fraud a lucrative business for the fraudsters. This has in many ways 
encouraged law-abiding citizens to become involved and has even prompted 
some victims to become perpetrators.  
 
As an African phenomenon, the entire African continent and West African 
countries in particular suffer due to the high incident rate of this fraud.  The 
negative impact of this fraud cannot be underestimated. Apart from driving 
business away from Africa, it also destroys Africa’s social and human capital and 
undermines the State. 
 
The interpretation of this research appears to suggest that there is a moral crisis 
in Africa. Politicians, religious leaders and social commentators have all spoken 
about the breakdown of morality. The most commonly cited evidence of this crisis 
is fraud, specifically corruption that involves those citizens who avoid their basic 
duties and obligations to the state or to each other. The moral regeneration 
initiative in South Africa was the response to this crisis, emerging to the 
countless initiatives aimed at reducing crime. The link between South Africa’s 
moral regeneration and the African Union’s Peer Review Mechanism should be 
created in an attempt to prevent the spread of this fraud into the bloodstream of 
new generation of Africans.  
 
Based on these findings and the brief discussion, attention will now be given to 
some recommendations. The recommendations are also presented as an 
integrated Criminological model for the prevention of AFF. 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Now that some fundamental challenges regarding AFF prevention have been 
identified, it is imperative to provide some remedial proposals which by no means 
should be considered to be exhaustive, to address these existentialistic issues. 
With the application of these initiatives, either singularly or in 
combination/integration, it is envisaged that it would have some bearing on the 
prevention of AFF. The recommendations provided herein are to provide a focus 
for the intervention strategies and initiatives directed at those prominent AFF 
variables identified in this research, detailing the motivational and contributing 
factors pertaining to AFF, as well as those causative elements around which the 
integrated explanatory theory was developed. 
 
7.4.1 The administration of the judicial system 
 
It is common knowledge, as well implicit throughout this thesis, that minimal 
knowledge regarding AFF is available within the investigative agencies. 
Consequently generic prosecutions regarding this fraud, if and when initiated, are 
not afforded a high priority. The seriousness of these cases are subsequently 
undermined, resulting in poor investigation and insufficiently prepared 
prosecutors and of course, inconsistent, and more often than not, extremely 
insignificant sentences. To alleviate these problems, it is therefore recommended 
that the South African law enforcement agency should set up its own West 
African fraud unit to deal with the burgeoning number of these criminal acti vities 
operative in South Africa. In this regard, West Africans with an in-depth 
understanding of the manifestation of this fraud should be recruited by the South 
Africa Police - the South African Police 419 Task Team to shed light on the 
variations of AFF, their modus operandi and assist with the interpretation and 
analysis of false documents. There are indications that, if these 
recommendations were adhered to, there would be a positive impact on the 
prevention of AFF in South Africa. 
 It is a well-known fact that AFF perpetrators are renowned travellers; they are 
always in and out of the country. They usually, after ‘hitting a jackpot’ leave the 
country and wait for the dust to settle before they return. In this regard, any 
efforts to prevent AFF in South Africa would warrant routine indictments in 
absentia of all perpetrators by the names they are using at the time. 
 
The South Africa law enforcement should set up a joint Task Team composed of 
representatives from Justice, the Chamber of Commerce, Banks, and Revenue 
Services to collect all the data regarding this fraud. In this case, the Banks should 
also have their West African fraud unit to monitor the accounts of foreigners and 
report any suspicious activities for further investigations.   
 
Within the justice system, and more importantly where the prevention of this 
fraud is concerned, immunity of prosecution and confidentiality should be 
announced for all victims of AFF in South Africa in return for their testimonies, 
particularly regarding the money trail.  This would help to provide investigators 
with more insight into the fraud, how it is perpetrated and the syndicates 
involved. To achieve this goal, an aggressive media advertisement campaign is 
needed, on television, involving all the channels, and in newspaper in all the 
languages of South Africa.   
 
The legal reforms that have been taken in most countries may not have sent a 
sound message to AFF perpetrators. However, these reforms have been 
celebrated because they bring to an end the capacity of AFF bosses to insulate 
themselves from prosecution by financing operation or using associates as 
subcontractors. It is therefore recommended that the law be amended to address 
the money defrauded by AFF and the opportunities available to AFF 
perpetrators. 
 
 
After the money 
 
The Proceeds of Crime Act 77 of 1999, which provides for the assets recovery 
from offenders in South Africa, should be introduced to address and adjudicate 
even the least cases of AFF. To support the enforcement of this, the Act should 
place responsibility upon banks, bureau the change  and other financial 
institutions to report any suspicious transactions over R50 000, by mostly African 
immigrants and especially West African immigrants to the National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA). The NIA would then collate and coordinate the intelligence upon 
which the police/ Scorpions will base their investigations for a proper prosecution. 
This responsibility should be extended to lawyers, accountants, casino, 
managers, estate agents, car dealers who can all be prosecuted for withholding 
information that could secure the successful prosecution of AFF perpetrators. 
 
It is thus argued that by recovering assets from amateur AFF perpetrators 
operating in South Africa, the overall volume of activity can be reduced more 
effectively and finances for the investment in future deals better curtailed, than if 
one were to focus exclusively on the ‘bosses’ who are actually easily replaced 
and whose direct involvement in AFF is limited. 
 
After the opportunity 
 
Whether this implementation reflects a gross overestimation of the asset 
recovery strategy or poor performance from law enforcement agencies remains a 
moot question to which there is no research-led answer. More certain are, 
however, the theoretical claims about the causes of AFF that are presupposed in 
the asset recovery strategy. This classical conception of crime is a consequence 
of the rational calculations made by actors about the relative risk, the efforts and 
rewards involved in the offending behaviour. If the proceeds of crime can be 
seized, so the logic goes, criminals will be deterred from further offences, and 
increase the efforts needed for AFF and accentuate the risk of apprehension. 
 This logic is also present in opportunity reducing strategies for controlling crime. 
Ascertaining criminal opportunities through research into the routine activities 
that generate crime, the confluence of motivated offenders, suitable targets and 
absent guardians, has been an increasingly influential feature of ‘ordinary’ crime 
control but is now being applied to the specific field of organized crime. It is, for 
example, the causal accounts that underpin the work of the National High-Tech 
Crime Unit, established in England and Wales in 2001, which, amongst other 
things, aims to secure software programmes and computer operating systems 
against hackers employed by AFF perpetrators. 
 
7.4.2 Diplomatic meetings 
 
In view of the fact that most of these fraudsters are immigrants form other African 
countries, it is recommended here that the South Africa government should 
constantly hold meetings with these countries to discuss the havoc caused by 
their citizens in South Africa. In this case, issues such as the extradition of 
offenders who flee to their native country and mutual assistance in the cross 
border investigations should be discussed. If this happens, joint investigations 
with law enforcements officials from mostly West Africa countries are 
recommended.  
 
The recommendation is therefore that an effective preventive approach to AFF 
and its associated harm should involve the establishment of partnerships among 
the relevant key actors at all levels, in order to tackle in the short, medium and 
long  term the causes and opportunities for AFF, and the risk for potential victims. 
 
It is therefore submitted that partnership amongst countries would help to prevent 
this fraud. In this regard, it is recommended that governments: 
 
§ Recognise that the responsibility for AFF prevention should be shared in 
society and that partnership approaches are practical means to share this 
responsibility and pool diverse resources. 
§ Ensure that the legal context is appropriate and enables but does not 
constrain partnerships, and review proposed new legislation and 
regulation for the impact on AFF prevention 
§  Establish a wider understanding among politicians, administrators, 
practitioners, private business, the public and the media regarding the 
diversity of the causes and variations of AFF. 
§ Identify the areas for possible partnerships to address AFF and the 
agencies and institutions responsible for them (law enforcement and 
criminal justice system, education and the media). 
§ Gather and make available reliable and valid knowledge and data as well 
as facilitate the exchange of practical expertise and experience among 
actors across fraud prevention partnerships, while respecting professional 
confidence and data protection. 
§ Promote scientific research and evolution of the partnership approach 
regarding AFF prevention in terms of its operations, results and 
legitimacy. 
§ Encourage the development of a system and a rigorous knowledgebase 
on partnerships to share, disseminate, and apply that knowledge 
nationally and internationally and support evidence based, innovative, 
evolutionary and improvement oriented approach which is capable to 
adapt to changing AFF patterns, social conditions and legislations.  
 
The fact that some offenders and victims justify their involvement in AFF because 
of the massive corruption prevalent in Africa and especially amongst African 
leaders and poli ticians, send a strong signal that corruption within this sphere 
need to be addressed as a matter of urgency. Transparency International (1998) 
places most African countries very high on their corruption index. This then, 
would justify the intervention of African Union via the Peer Review Mechanism in 
an attempt to prevent this fraud.  
 
7.4.3 Massive education and awareness 
 
Although the above recommendations are chiefly directed at preventing AFF 
through the criminal justice system by increasing the investigative techniques to 
secure convictions (reactive), this particular recommendation is aimed more at a 
reducing the opportunities for AFF victimization (proactive). One should bear in 
mind that increased education and awareness of the activities that result in AFF 
victimisation should not be implemented in isolation but rather in parallel with 
extensive and ongoing media coverage of how this type of fraud perpetuates. In 
the case of black currency, the process of blackening the notes and washing 
them should be demonstrated in the public media. Although it would be naïve to 
except that public sentiment regarding AFF will change overnight, such initiative 
would definitely make the public more aware of the precarious effects when they 
accept such business proposals.  
  
Apart from raising awareness, AFF data should be used to support interventions. 
Research may also indicate that unrecognised problems exist, or that they are 
connected in unrecognisable ways. It is submitted here that information regarding 
AFF gathering, however modest its scope, be continual to keep the public 
informed about the new developments in the execution of AFF. Africa is a 
continent in flux, and new issues/nature of AFF emerges all the time. Early 
intervention through education, awareness and the sharing of AFF data with the 
public can prevent this complex practice from spreading, curb the cycles of fraud, 
and arrest the development of AFF criminal networks in South Africa and 
beyond.   
 
It should also be noted that AFF had developed quickly since the 1980’s due to 
the globalisation of the world’s economies and the great advances in the 
communications technology. The ease of international travel, expanded world 
trade, had enabled AFF offenders to expand their roles from more traditional 
local and regional criminal groups to that of targeting international victims and 
developing criminal networks within countries and regions of the world with 
greater prosperity. The political, social, and economic conditions in African 
countries, especially West Africa have contributed significantly to the 
development of some of the AFF groups worldwide. It is therefore recommended 
that the African Union (AU) and specialised bodies such as the New Economic 
Plan for African Development (NEPAD) play a leading role in addressing this so-
called Nigerian/West African fraud in order to enhance business confidence and 
trust between Africa and the outside world. 
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that none of the countermeasures noted above can 
be expected to render South Africa and the international community invulnerable 
to the risk of AFF. Given the diversity, which characterises South Africa and the 
world at large, some approaches will be more appropriate in some settings than 
others. It is therefore incumbent upon governments to identify and implement the 
most effective and efficient mix of countermeasures.  
 
A summary of the findings and recommendations of this research are presented 
in table 7.1 below for more clarity and understanding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1 Findings and Recommendations 
   Findings Recommendations 
Crimes: 
Various forms and begins with one form 
and end up as another form, process of 
black currency, complicated phenomenon, 
spiritism, fimash. 
Crimes: 
Education and awareness of how this fraud 
is committed, how the criminal approach 
victims, display of black currency on T.V.  
Perpetrators: 
Impersonate ostentatious lifestyle, operate 
as a network, use of Internet, and work 
with corrupt officials, mostly males, 
average age 25 years. 
Freeze accounts, seize properties, and 
close their front businesses, monitor 
foreigners who live a flamboyant lifestyle.  
Victims: 
Individuals are mostly victimised, anyone 
can be victimized, greedy, re-victimisation,  
both African and Caucasian, of all 
nationality. 
Stop being greedy, immunity from 
prosecution, encourages victims to report 
fraud to police, verify background of any 
business proposals. 
Adjudication: 
Plea bargain, court impose minimum 
sentence, problems in adjudication, lack of 
substantial evidence to prosecute. 
International cooperation of law 
enforcements agents during investigations, 
use fraudsters to assist in investigations. 
Prevention: 
Strategies inadequate, complicated nature 
of this fraud hampers any prevention 
attempts. 
 People should not reply to unsolicited 
emails, verify any business proposals, 
prevention be directed mostly at business 
people, focus on Internet cafés and owner 
should be compelled to check on their 
clients, public awareness and tougher 
sentences. 
 
 
This table can be explained as follows: 
 
The crimes take various forms and the perpetrators utilize even spiritism to 
achieve the goal of attaining an ostentatious life style.  These 25-years and older 
offenders target any greedy and/or gullible potential victim and even re -victimize 
them.  These crimes are very difficult to adjudicate and prevent because some 
victims do not report their victimisation to the police.  Adjudication is especially 
hindered by lack of evidence and extradition treaties between countries.  
Prevention is difficult because the victims are also participating in an illegal scam 
and they also do not want to get caught . 
 The Criminological model to prevent it proposed in this thesis (the 
recommendations) include that massive awareness campaigns be launched, 
accounts of suspects  be frozen, international co-operation regarding these 
crimes be extended, and that people should be made aware of the effects of 
being greedy, and not to react to 419-suspicious e-mails or snail mail. 
 
7.6 SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
However, further research is required in order to determine the extent to which 
patterns of these findings that were obtained in this research apply to South 
Africa. Such research has to be longitudinal in nature in order to identify and 
document temporal changes in the nature and scope of the organization of AFF 
and the modus operandi of offenders. It is also suggested here that intensive 
research needs to be carried out on the victims of AFF to determine how this 
fraud can be prevented. Any research of this nature should involve the 
participation of all the investigation agencies involved in the investigation of AFF. 
One would then be able to determine the problems these investigators are face 
with from which holistic prevention programmes can be drawn.   
 
7.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The actual dynamics of AFF are only beginning to be explored and very little of 
what is known to the society and the world of social sciences of the phenomenon 
has penetrated public consciousness. The current research provides a 
foundation for understanding the problematic and complex situation of AFF. 
 
This research is important for the processes of the repressive policing of AFF 
perpetrators, and its value lies in the possibility of revealing the identity of the 
perpetrators. The study increases the chances of the individualisation of this 
fraud through the continuous process of identification by law enforcement agents, 
involving the act of a specific persons or group of persons. The research 
enhances the knowledge and classification of the modus operandi of AFF 
perpetrators in a Criminological way, which can be applied in practice by means 
of scientific comparison in the future.  
 
It is hoped that this research would increase an understanding and stimulate 
further research on the nature of this form of fraud and the modus operandi of 
AFF perpetrators, as this information is imperative in the investigations of this 
fraud, and would spur the development of prevention programmes. In this regard, 
Du Plessis (Prinsloo 1996:34) argued that, with a bette r understanding of the 
modus operandi of offenders, particular patterns of crime can be predicted and 
resources can be used meaningfully to maintain, and or restore the social order. 
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